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The Criminal "Crown"

. R v Anderson

In R v Anderson (SCC, 2014) the Supreme Court of Canada took the oppourtunity to expound on judicial review available against the Crown with respect to prosecutorial discretion (and abuse of process, below). It held that while all Crown decisions are reviewable for abuse of process, prosecutorial decisions are only reviewable for abuse of process:
[36] All Crown decision making is reviewable for abuse of process. However, as I will explain, exercises of prosecutorial discretion are only reviewable for abuse of process. In contrast, tactics and conduct before the court are subject to a wider range of review. The court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes even in the absence of abuse of process.

(a) Prosecutorial Discretion

[37] This Court has repeatedly affirmed that prosecutorial discretion is a necessary part of a properly functioning criminal justice system: Beare, at p. 410; R. v. T. (V.), 1992 CanLII 88 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 749, at pp. 758-62; R. v. Cook, 1997 CanLII 392 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1113, at para. 19. In Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51 (CanLII), [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339, at para. 47, the fundamental importance of prosecutorial discretion was said to lie, “not in protecting the interests of individual Crown attorneys, but in advancing the public interest by enabling prosecutors to make discretionary decisions in fulfilment of their professional obligations without fear of judicial or political interference, thus fulfilling their quasi-judicial role as ‘ministers of justice’”. More recently, in Sriskandarajah v. United States of America, 2012 SCC 70 (CanLII), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609, at para. 27, this Court observed that “[n]ot only does prosecutorial discretion accord with the principles of fundamental justice — it constitutes an indispensable device for the effective enforcement of the criminal law”.

[38] Unfortunately, subsequent to this Court’s decision in Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, confusion has arisen as to what is meant by “prosecutorial discretion” and the law has become cloudy. The present appeal provides an opportunity for clarification.

[39] In Krieger, this Court provided the following description of prosecutorial discretion:
“Prosecutorial discretion” is a term of art. It does not simply refer to any discretionary decision made by a Crown prosecutor. Prosecutorial discretion refers to the use of those powers that constitute the core of the Attorney General’s office and which are protected from the influence of improper political and other vitiating factors by the principle of independence. [para. 43]
[40] The Court went on to provide the following examples of prosecutorial discretion: whether to bring the prosecution of a charge laid by police; whether to enter a stay of proceedings in either a private or public prosecution; whether to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge; whether to withdraw from criminal proceedings altogether; and whether to take control of a private prosecution (para. 46). The Court continued:
Significantly, what is common to the various elements of prosecutorial discretion is that they involve the ultimate decisions as to whether a prosecution should be brought, continued or ceased, and what the prosecution ought to be for. Put differently, prosecutorial discretion refers to decisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s participation in it. Decisions that do not go to the nature and extent of the prosecution, i.e., the decisions that govern a Crown prosecutor’s tactics or conduct before the court, do not fall within the scope of prosecutorial discretion. Rather, such decisions are governed by the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own processes once the Attorney General has elected to enter into that forum. [Emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted; para. 47.]
[41] Since Krieger, courts have struggled with the distinction between prosecutorial discretion, and tactics and conduct. The use of the word “core” in Krieger has led to a narrow definition of prosecutorial discretion, notwithstanding the expansive language used in Krieger to define the term, namely: “. . . decisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s participation in it” (para. 47). Difficulty in defining the term has also led to confusion regarding the standard of review by which particular Crown decisions are to be assessed.

[42] The current appeal presents a good illustration of both problems. As noted earlier, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal split on the issue of how to characterize the Crown’s decision to tender the Notice. Welsh J.A. held that it was a matter of “core” prosecutorial discretion, whereas Green C.J.N.L. and Rowe J.A. (following R. v. Gill, 2012 ONCA 607 (CanLII), 112 O.R. (3d) 423, at paras. 54-56), considered it to be a tactical decision and thus “outside [the] core” (para. 49).

[43] The court also diverged on the applicable standard of review. Welsh J.A. held that the distinction between core decisions and decisions falling outside the core was of no consequence as both types of decisions were reviewable on the same standard — the standard articulated in Gill, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the decision to tender the Notice was reviewable if it (1) undermined the integrity of the administration of justice; (2) operated in a manner that rendered the sentencing proceedings fundamentally unfair; (3) was arbitrary; or (4) resulted in a limit on the accused’s liberty that was grossly disproportionate to the state interest in pursuing a particular course of action (Gill, at para. 59). Green C.J.N.L. and Rowe J.A. disagreed. In their view, tactical decisions (decisions “outside the core”) were reviewable according to the Gill standard, whereas “core” prosecutorial discretion was reviewable solely for abuse of process. The diverging views present in this case, and in many others, demonstrate the unsatisfactory state of the law.

[44] In an effort to clarify, I think we should start by recognizing that the term “prosecutorial discretion” is an expansive term that covers all “decisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s participation in it” (Krieger, at para. 47). As this Court has repeatedly noted, “[p]rosecutorial discretion refers to the discretion exercised by the Attorney-General in matters within his authority in relation to the prosecution of criminal offences” (Krieger, at para. 44, citing Power, at p. 622, quoting D. Vanek, “Prosecutorial Discretion” (1988), 30 Crim. L.Q. 219, at p. 219 (emphasis added)). While it is likely impossible to create an exhaustive list of the decisions that fall within the nature and extent of a prosecution, further examples to those in Krieger include: the decision to repudiate a plea agreement (as in R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34 (CanLII), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566); the decision to pursue a dangerous offender application; the decision to prefer a direct indictment; the decision to charge multiple offences; the decision to negotiate a plea; the decision to proceed summarily or by indictment; and the decision to initiate an appeal. All pertain to the nature and extent of the prosecution. As can be seen, many stem from the provisions of the Code itself, including the decision in this case to tender the Notice.

[45] In sum, prosecutorial discretion applies to a wide range of prosecutorial decision making. That said, care must be taken to distinguish matters of prosecutorial discretion from constitutional obligations. The distinction between prosecutorial discretion and the constitutional obligations of the Crown was made in Krieger, where the prosecutor’s duty to disclose relevant evidence to the accused was at issue:
In Stinchcombe, supra, the Court held that the Crown has an obligation to disclose all relevant information to the defence. While the Crown Attorney retains the discretion not to disclose irrelevant information, disclosure of relevant evidence is not, therefore, a matter of prosecutorial discretion but, rather, is a prosecutorial duty. [Emphasis added; para. 54.]
Manifestly, the Crown possesses no discretion to breach the Charter rights of an accused. In other words, prosecutorial discretion provides no shield to a Crown prosecutor who has failed to fulfill his or her constitutional obligations such as the duty to provide proper disclosure to the defence.

(i) The Standard of Review for Prosecutorial Discretion

[46] The many decisions that Crown prosecutors are called upon to make in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion must not be subjected to routine second-guessing by the courts. The courts have long recognized that decisions involving prosecutorial discretion are unlike other decisions made by the executive: see M. Code, “Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Decisions: A Short History of Costs and Benefits, in Response to Justice Rosenberg” (2009), 34 Queen’s L.J. 863, at p. 867. Judicial non-interference with prosecutorial discretion has been referred to as a “matter of principle based on the doctrine of separation of powers as well as a matter of policy founded on the efficiency of the system of criminal justice” which also recognizes that prosecutorial discretion is “especially ill-suited to judicial review”: Power, at p. 623. In Krieger, the Court discussed the separation of powers doctrine as a basis for judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion:
In our theory of government, it is the sovereign who holds the power to prosecute his or her subjects. A decision of the Attorney General, or of his or her agents, within the authority delegated to him or her by the sovereign is not subject to interference by other arms of government. An exercise of prosecutorial discretion will, therefore, be treated with deference by the courts and by other members of the executive . . . . [para. 45]
[47] The Court also noted the more practical problems associated with regular review of prosecutorial discretion:
The quasi-judicial function of the Attorney General cannot be subjected to interference from parties who are not as competent to consider the various factors involved in making a decision to prosecute. To subject such decisions to political interference, or to judicial supervision, could erode the integrity of our system of prosecution. [para. 32]
[48] Manifestly, prosecutorial discretion is entitled to considerable deference. It is not, however, immune from all judicial oversight. This Court has repeatedly affirmed that prosecutorial discretion is reviewable for abuse of process: Krieger, at para. 32; Nixon, at para. 31; Miazga, at para. 46.

[49] The jurisprudence pertaining to the review of prosecutorial discretion has employed a range of terminology to describe the type of prosecutorial conduct that constitutes abuse of process. In Krieger, this Court used the term “flagrant impropriety” (para. 49). In Nixon, the Court held that the abuse of process doctrine is available where there is evidence that the Crown’s decision “undermines the integrity of the judicial process” or “results in trial unfairness” (para. 64). The Court also referred to “improper motive[s]” and “bad faith” in its discussion (para. 68).

[50] Regardless of the precise language used, the key point is this: abuse of process refers to Crown conduct that is egregious and seriously compromises trial fairness and/or the integrity of the justice system. Crown decisions motivated by prejudice against Aboriginal persons would certainly meet this standard.

[51] In sum, prosecutorial discretion is reviewable solely for abuse of process. The Gill test applied by the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal was developed at a time when courts were struggling with the post-Krieger “core” versus “outside the core” dichotomy. To the extent the Gill test suggests that conduct falling short of abuse of process may form a basis for reviewing prosecutorial discretion, respectfully, it should not be followed.

(ii) The Threshold Evidentiary Burden

[52] The burden of proof for establishing abuse of process lies on the claimant, who must prove it on a balance of probabilities: Cook, at para. 62; R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 69, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; R. v. Jolivet, 2000 SCC 29 (CanLII), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 751, at para. 19. However, given the unique nature of prosecutorial discretion — specifically, the fact that the Crown will typically (if not always) be the only party who will know why a particular decision was made ― this Court in Nixon recognized that where prosecutorial discretion is challenged, the Crown may be required to provide reasons justifying its decision where the claimant establishes a proper evidentiary foundation: para. 60.

[53] In Nixon, this Court noted the following reasons as to why there must be a “proper evidentiary foundation” before the abuse of process claim should proceed:
. . . mandating a preliminary determination on the utility of a Charter-based inquiry is not new: R. v. Pires, 2005 SCC 66 (CanLII), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 343. Similar thresholds are also imposed in other areas of the criminal law, they are not an anomaly. Threshold requirements may be imposed for pragmatic reasons alone. As this Court observed in Pires (at para. 35):
For our justice system to operate, trial judges must have some ability to control the course of proceedings before them. One such mechanism is the power to decline to embark upon an evidentiary hearing at the request of one of the parties when that party is unable to show a reasonable likelihood that the hearing can assist in determining the issues before the court.
Quite apart from any such pragmatic considerations, there is good reason to impose a threshold burden on the applicant who alleges that an act of prosecutorial discretion constitutes an abuse of process. Given that such decisions are generally beyond the reach of the court, it is not sufficient to launch an inquiry for an applicant to make a bare allegation of abuse of process. [Emphasis added; paras. 61-62.]
[54] Nixon involved the Crown’s repudiation of a plea agreement. The Court held that the repudiation of a plea agreement was “a rare and exceptional event” that met the evidentiary threshold and justified an inquiry into the propriety of the Crown’s decision: Nixon, at para. 63. Indeed, the evidence in Nixon was that only two other plea agreements had been repudiated in Alberta’s history. As a result, the Court held that
to the extent that the Crown is the only party who is privy to the information, the evidentiary burden shifts to the Crown to enlighten the court on the circumstances and reasons behind its decision to resile from the agreement. That is, the Crown must explain why and how it made the decision not to honour the plea agreement. The ultimate burden of proving abuse of process remains on the applicant and, as discussed earlier, the test is a stringent one. However, if the Crown provides little or no explanation to the court, this factor should weigh heavily in favour of the applicant in successfully making out an abuse of process claim. [para. 63]
[55] Requiring the claimant to establish a proper evidentiary foundation before embarking on an inquiry into the reasons behind the exercise of prosecutorial discretion respects the presumption that prosecutorial discretion is exercised in good faith: Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, at para. 95. It also accords with this Court’s statement in Sriskandarajah, at para. 27, that “prosecutorial authorities are not bound to provide reasons for their decisions, absent evidence of bad faith or improper motives” (emphasis added).

[56] Finally, I note that the content of a Crown policy or guideline may be relevant when a court is considering a challenge to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Policy statements or guidelines are capable of informing the debate as to whether a Crown prosecutor’s conduct was appropriate in the particular circumstances. See R. J. Frater, Prosecutorial Misconduct (2009), at p. 259. For example, a decision by a Crown prosecutor that appears to contravene a Crown policy or guideline may provide some evidence that assists the claimant in establishing the threshold evidentiary foundation. However, as the intervener the Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada submits, Crown policies and guidelines do not have the force of law, and cannot themselves be subjected to Charter scrutiny in the abstract: see R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5 (CanLII), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 45 (discussing police practices manuals).



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