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Federal Court - Vexatious (2). Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Abi-Mansour
In Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Abi-Mansour (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal usefully considered factors involved in a motion under FCA s.40(3) ['Vexatious proceedings - Application for rescission or leave to proceed']:[1] This Court has declared Mr. Abi-Mansour a vexatious litigant under subsection 40(1) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7: Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Abi-Mansour, 2025 FCA 81. He now moves to the Court under subsection 40(3) of the Act, which permits "“rescission of [this Court’s] order”" declaring him a vexatious litigant.
[2] What must a vexatious litigant show to get this relief? The answer is found by interpreting subsection 40(3). We do that by looking at the text of subsection 40(3), its context alongside other provisions in section 40 and the Act, and the purpose of subsection 40(3), section 40, and the rest of the Act.
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[7] The text of subsection 40(3) is unqualified. It supplies no criteria for rescission. Literally read in isolation, it suggests that the Court may rescind a vexatious litigant order under subsection 40(1) at any time, period.
[8] But here, an examination of context adds more. Subsection 40(3) allows the Court to revoke the vexatious litigant order entirely. But subsection 40(4) is narrower. It allows a vexatious litigant to apply for "“leave to institute or continue a [single] proceeding”", while leaving the vexatious litigant order in place: see Bernard v. Canada (Professional Institute of the Public Service), 2020 FCA 211 and Bernard v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 144 at para. 26. Thus, perhaps lesser, narrower measures might tip the balance under subsection 40(4). For example, perhaps reputable counsel—an officer of the court who is bound by ethical rules—is representing the vexatious litigant in an individual case and will manage the conduct of the litigation responsibly. Subsection 40(3), a complete revocation of the vexatious litigant order, must require more than a transitory, one-off solution.
[9] Another important element of context is section 27 of the Act: the availability of an appeal to this Court from a Federal Court decision that a litigant is vexatious. Subsection 40(3) and the power of a court to revoke a vexatious litigant order cannot be taken as a further or alternate appeal provision. Once an appeal is decided, the matter is res judicata and at an end: Canada v. MacDonald, 2021 FCA 6.
[10] This takes us to purpose. One of the purposes of section 40 is to restrain litigants who continually abuse and waste the resources of the Registry and the Court and to prevent the damage they cause to other parties, the Registry and the Court itself: Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42. Subsection 40(3) cannot be interpreted in a way that undercuts that purpose. Rescission under subsection 40(3)—the complete revocation of the vexatious litigant order—can only happen when the vexatious litigant order is no longer needed.
[11] Thus, to get relief under subsection 40(3), the litigant must demonstrate that the misbehaviour that triggered the vexatious litigant order will no longer happen. The litigant must show, through compelling evidence, some fundamental, meaningful and lasting change in circumstances, personal condition or attitude about the use of the courts. Practically speaking, that’s a tough burden, especially given the track record of most vexatious litigants that led to the making of the vexatious litigant order.
[12] Here, Mr. Abi-Mansour falls way short of the mark. He seeks revocation of the vexatious litigant order because the Court making the order misinterpreted section 40 and used an improper procedural vehicle. This is blatant relitigation. It is a request that the Court reconsider a final order over a year after it was made.
[13] Far from supporting revocation of the vexatious litigant order, this sort of thing cements the order even more firmly in place. As well, Mr. Abi-Mansour’s chronic failure to pay any outstanding cost awards shows that he has not changed his attitude about the use of the Courts.
[14] The Registry shall not file any more motions, proceedings or other documents of any sort from Mr. Abi-Mansour absent leave of the Court under Rule 72 of the Federal Courts Rules, S.O.R./98-106. . Sandhu v. College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants
In Sandhu v. College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an FCA s.40 ['Vexatious proceedings'] appeal:[7] The Federal Court’s decisions to declare a person a vexatious litigant under section 40 of the Federal Courts Act and to dismiss an action for lack of merit are discretionary: Hutton v. Sayat, 2025 FCA 66 at para. 4, citing Feeney v. Canada, 2022 FCA 190 at para. 4 and other decisions. As such, this Court may overturn the Federal Court only if it erred in law or committed a palpable and overriding error on a question of fact or on a question of mixed fact and law: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33; Hospira Healthcare Corporation v. Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology, 2016 FCA 215 at paras. 28, 72, 79.
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A. No misapplication of the legal principles on vexatious litigants
[9] Regarding the vexatious litigant test, the Federal Court properly identified the overarching question before it — whether Mr. Sandhu’s ungovernability or harmfulness to the court system and its participants justify regulating his court access—and the "“hallmarks”" of vexatiousness that have been repeatedly affirmed by this Court: FC Decision at paras. 42–43 citing Simon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 28 at para. 18 and Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 at paras. 32–34.
[10] Mr. Sandhu is right that vexatiousness "“comes in all shapes and sizes”": Appellant’s Corrected Memorandum at para. 15, citing Olumide at para. 32. And so, the Federal Court considered Mr. Sandhu’s particular circumstances to determine whether they bore the hallmarks of vexatiousness.
[11] These circumstances included Mr. Sandhu’s pattern of continuously relitigating and seeking investigation into his claim that the College and its affiliates have forged signatures: FC Decision at para. 48. They also included Mr. Sandhu’s "“continued and repeated allegations against the College regarding forgery, fraud, tampering with evidence, unethical practices, and ‘serious criminal violations’”": FC Decision at paras. 49–50. The Federal Court found these allegations, raised in proceedings and motions where they were irrelevant to the issues at play, to be scandalous, frivolous, unsupported and damaging to the College, the Discipline Committee, individual staff, adjudicators and counsel: Ibid. A third circumstance was Mr. Sandhu’s disregard of both the Federal Court’s orders and the Federal Courts Rules, S.O.R./98-106: FC Decision at para. 51.
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[18] Subsection 40(2) of the Federal Courts Act says that an application for an order declaring a person a vexatious litigant "“may be made only with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada”". ....
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[26] Second, section 40 requires the Attorney General to consent. While subsection 40(2) states that the Attorney General "“is entitled to be heard on the application”", he is not required to participate in the hearing or explain why he consented to the application. . Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Abi-Mansour
In Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Abi-Mansour (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal grants a vexatious litigant application [under FCA s.40], here where one issue was whether the applicant could file a 'stand-alone' application (ie. one not within another pre-existing proceeding):[1] The Public Service Alliance of Canada applies for an order declaring the respondent, Paul Abi-Mansour, a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 40 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 (the Act). As required by subsection 40(2) of the Act, this application has been made with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada.
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[4] The applicant seeks an order barring Mr. Abi-Mansour from commencing or continuing any proceedings in this Court except with leave of the Court. It further seeks that any such leave only be granted if Mr. Abi-Mansour demonstrate that all outstanding costs awarded against him in this Court have been paid in full.
[5] According to subsection 40(1) of the Act, the applicant, to succeed, must satisfy the Court that Mr. Abi-Mansour "“has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner”".
[6] In Feeney v. Canada, 2022 FCA 190 (Feeney), a panel of this Court reminded that vexatiousness "“comes in all shapes and sizes”" and is best to not be precisely defined (Feeney at para. 24, quoting from Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 at para. 32 (Olumide)). As stated in Olumide, vexatiousness draws its meaning "“mainly from the purposes of section 40”", which "“reflects the fact that the Federal Courts are community property that exists to serve everyone, not a private resource that can commandeered in damaging ways to advance the interests of one”" (Olumide at paras. 17 and 31-32).
[7] As community property, courts and judges must ensure that their finite resources and limited capacity to deal with all sorts of litigants, who come before them, are not squandered. As stated in Olumide at paragraph 19 (see also for e.g., Coady v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 154 at para. 22 (Coady)):[19] […]. Every moment devoted to a vexatious litigant is a moment unavailable to a deserving litigant. The unrestricted access to courts by those whose access should be restricted affects the access of others who need and deserve it. Inaction on the former damages the latter. [8] A non-exhaustive list of vexatiousness indicia can be gleaned from this Court’s case law: (a) being admonished by various courts for engaging in vexatious and abusive behaviour; (b) instituting frivolous proceedings; (c) making scandalous and unsupported allegations against opposing parties or the Court; (d) re-litigating issues which have already been decided against the vexatious litigant; (e) bringing unsuccessful appeals of interlocutory and final decisions; (f) ignoring court orders and court rules; and (g) refusing to pay outstanding costs awards (Feeney at para. 20; Turmel v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FCA 197 at para. 2).
[9] The express wording of section 40 makes it clear that vexatious behaviour in a single matter may provide sufficient basis to issue a vexatious litigant order (Olumide at para. 25). Further, evidence of vexatious conduct in other judicial or quasi-judicial fora is relevant in determining whether such an order is warranted (Lessard-Gauvin v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 94 at para. 12; Coady at paras. 27-29).
[10] Vexatious behaviour can be proven by an affidavit providing "“only the most relevant information, court decisions that describe the litigant’s intentions and conduct, and selected pleadings and documents that demonstrate vexatiousness”" (Olumide at para. 36).
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[12] Mr. Abi-Mansour opposes the present application on several grounds. First, he claims that this Court has no jurisdiction to deal with a stand-alone application under section 40 of the Act. He says that a vexatious litigant order can only be obtained by way of motion within an existing proceeding. This issue has been settled in Bernard v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 144 (Bernard), a decision issued by a three-judge panel of this Court. In that case, the alleged vexatious litigant was arguing that a vexatious litigant order could only be obtained by way of an application. Our Court concluded that in the context of section 40 of the Act, proceeding by way of motion within an existing proceeding or by way of a stand-alone application "“ha[d] been seen as identical and interchangeable”", both offering the same level of protection in all meaningful procedural respects (Bernard at paras. 8-10, citing Olumide at paras. 34 and 42). In addition, contrary to Mr. Abi-Mansour’s argument, this Court’s authority to consider an application for a vexatious litigant does not have to be set out in sections 27 and 28 of the Act as that authority is spelled out in no equivocal terms in section 40.
[13] Mr. Abi-Mansour’s submissions based on the doctrines of functus officio, issue estoppel and abuse of process, the so-called "“doctrine of election”" and Rule 74, must fail as well because they are all premised on the argument that the applicant could only seek a vexatious litigant order by way of a motion within an existing proceeding, namely, here, the Federal Court of Appeal segment of the Complaint Proceedings (file no. A-173-22).
[14] Mr. Abi-Mansour further contends that a vexatious litigant order would annihilate his access to justice. This is not so. This Court has stated on numerous occasions that an order under subsection 40(1) of the Act only regulates the litigant’s access to the courts; it does not deny that access. In that sense, section 40 is "“a gate-keeping mechanism whereby the litigant is required to get leave before starting or continuing a proceeding”" (Coady at para. 23; Feeney at para. 26). Whether leave will be granted in any given case will depend on each case’s particular circumstances.
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[17] Mr. Abi-Mansour submits as well that any vexatious litigant order issued pursuant to section 40 of the Act can only benefit one specific party. This submission is without merit. As indicated previously, section 40 is aimed at regulating access to this Court or the Federal Court in instances where the alleged vexatious litigant’s behaviour puts at risk the Court’s finite resources and limited capacity to deal with all sorts of litigants who come before them. As stated at paragraph 20 of Olumide:[20] This isn’t just a zero-sum game where a single vexatious litigant injures a single innocent litigant. A single vexatious litigant gobbles up scarce judicial and registry resources, injuring tens or more innocent litigants. The injury shows itself in many ways: to name a few, a reduced ability on the part of the registry to assist well-intentioned but needy self-represented litigants, a reduced ability of the court to manage proceedings needing management, and delays for all litigants in getting hearings, directions, orders, judgments and reasons. [18] On the issue of the costs orders issued against him, Mr. Abi-Mansour essentially contends that these orders trigger a creditor-debtor relationship governed by the provincial laws on garnishment and that, as a result, he is "“well within his rights to require the [a]pplicant bring the proper enforcing procedure to collect its costs award according to law, as opposed to giving all his salary to the [a]pplicant and renouncing all the protections he enjoys as a judgment debtor”" (Respondent’s Memorandum of Fact and Law at para. 145). In other words, Mr. Abi-Mansour has chosen to deliberately disregard these orders to let the rules on garnishment play out.
[19] I agree with the applicant that that position further underscores the need for a vexatious litigant order, because it confirms that traditional costs orders are insufficient to regulate Mr. Abi-Mansour’s behaviour.
[20] Mr. Abi-Mansour submits that the present application should be dismissed because he never had the intention of bringing vexatious or abusive proceedings. However, this argument misses the mark and is of no assistance to him. As stated in Feeney, at paragraph 25, citing Olumide:[25] [...] section 40 of the Act is not only aimed at litigants who pursue unacceptable purposes and litigate to cause harm. It is also aimed at those who have good intentions but “litigate in a way that implicates section 40’s purposes” (Olumide at para. 33).
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