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Human Rights (Ont) - Summary Dismissal (3). McLeod v. Direct Coil Inc.
In McLeod v. Direct Coil Inc. (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court grants a claimant's HRTO JR, this brought against "the decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) .... dismissing her application to the HTRO (sic)(the Dismissal Decision) on a preliminary basis", that grounded in a finding that the claim's "substance had already been dealt with in [a] proceeding before the WSIB".
Here the court examines the tribunal ruling under the HRC's summary dismissal provisions [HRC s.45.1]:[7] The issue at the preliminary hearing was whether the application should be dismissed because its substance had already been dealt with in the above proceeding before the WSIB. The Tribunal applied s. 45.1 of the Code, which permits the Tribunal to dismiss an application where another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.
[8] As set out in the Dismissal Decision, the Tribunal found that the WSIB had concurrent jurisdiction, the issues were essentially the same, and the applicant had the opportunity to know the case and respond to it. The HRTO application was dismissed. The applicant’s request for reconsideration was dismissed.
[9] The applicant submits that the Dismissal Decision is unreasonable because the Tribunal wrongly conflated two distinct statutory regimes when reaching its decision under s. 45.1 of the Code.
[10] Section 45.1 provides that the Tribunal may dismiss an application where it is of the opinion that “another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.” The HRTO accepts that a common factual basis is not sufficient.
[11] In the Dismissal Decision, the Tribunal reviewed case law that identified factors relevant to a decision under s. 45.1. Several concerns raised in those cases are not at issue here. This is not a case where the applicant is attempting to circumvent an earlier determinative ruling or failing to respect the WSIB Decision. Nor is this a case where the WSIB addressed the human rights issue raised before the HRTO. The WSIB expressly acknowledged a potential problem – accommodation – and found that it was outside its mandate. Despite the above express statement by the WSIB, the Tribunal found that the same issues were raised and dealt with by the WSIB. This was plainly unreasonable. In the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the WISB dealt with the substance of the HRTO application except to exclude it from consideration. Nor does proceeding with the HRTO application compromise the finality of the WSIB Decision. . Paquette v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
In Paquette v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed an applicant's HRTO JR, this where the application was "dismissed as abandoned based on his failure to follow a direction to resubmit documents which an adjudicator concluded were “faint and blurry and cannot be read.”".
The court finds that no SOR deference is warranted for fact-findings, here the court is in the 'same position' as the tribunal to assess them:[11] In our view, the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the application as abandoned because of the applicant’s failure to file legible documents was entirely unreasonable for the simple reason that the documents he filed were legible. Although the letters on them are faint, we had no difficulty reading the documents. Counsel for the WNGH and the Tribunal both acknowledged during the hearing that they could also read the documents.
[12] Counsel for WNGH nonetheless submits that we should defer to the Tribunal’s conclusion that the documents were illegible. We see no basis for deference. We are in as good a position as the Tribunal to assess the legibility of the documents, and the Tribunal’s conclusions were not based on any type of specialized expertise. Insofar as the Tribunal’s conclusion that the documents were illegible is a finding of fact, it is clearly unreasonable, unsupported by the evidence, and reflects palpable and overriding error: H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, at para. 55.
[13] Counsel for WNGH also submits that the Tribunal’s decision can be upheld on the basis that the applicant initially filed his documents six days late and was two days late in responding to the Tribunal’s April 29, 2024 e-mail requiring him to submit legible copies of the documents by May 13, 2024. We do not accept this submission for three reasons. First, the lateness was not the basis on which the Tribunal dismissed the application. Second, the applicant had already complied with the request, since the initial documents were legible. Finally, even if the applicant was a few days late in responding, he cannot be said to have been deliberately refusing to cooperate, which was the case in Eisenberg v. Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology, 2012 ONSC 4802 (Div. Ct.), on which the Tribunal relied.
[14] We recognize that the proceedings before the Tribunal have been ongoing for some time, as counsel for WNGH points out. However, it was WNGH which requested the Tribunal to dismiss the application as abandoned based on the applicant’s failure to provide new readable copies of documents which its counsel now acknowledges were legible to begin with.
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