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Labour (Fed) - Canada Labour Code (4). British Columbia Maritime Employers Association v. International Longshore & Warehouse Union‐Canada
In British Columbia Maritime Employers Association v. International Longshore & Warehouse Union‐Canada (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a labour JR, this brought against a CIRB decision "that no collective agreement was in force between the BCMEA and the International Longshore & Warehouse Union-Canada (the ILWU) when members of the ILWU engaged in an illegal strike on July 18 and 19, 2023".
Here the court canvasses and interprets CLC provisions regarding the termination of a collective agreement, strikes and lock-outs, bargaining and arbitration, and related changes in employment terms, this in a JR context:[5] By virtue of paragraph 50(b) and subsections 67(4) to 67(6) of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 (the Code), the parties’ collective agreement continued in force during the statutory freeze period provided by those provisions. This application for judicial review turns on the meaning the Board gave to paragraph 50(b) and subsections 67(4) to 67(6) of the Code. They provide as follows:Duty to bargain and not to change terms and conditions
Obligation de négocier et de ne pas modifier les modalités
50 Where notice to bargain collectively has been given under this Part,
50 Une fois l’avis de négociation collective donné aux termes de la présente partie, les règles suivantes s’appliquent :
....
(b) the employer shall not alter the rates of pay or any other term or condition of employment or any right or privilege of the employees in the bargaining unit, or any right or privilege of the bargaining agent, until the requirements of paragraphs 89(1)(a) to (d) have been met, unless the bargaining agent consents to the alteration of such a term or condition, or such a right or privilege.
b) tant que les conditions des alinéas 89(1)a) à d) n’ont pas été remplies, l’employeur ne peut modifier ni les taux des salaires ni les autres conditions d’emploi, ni les droits ou avantages des employés de l’unité de négociation ou de l’agent négociateur, sans le consentement de ce dernier.
....
Provision for settlement of differences to remain in force
Règlement des désaccords
67(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in a collective agreement, the provision required to be contained therein by subsection 57(1) shall remain in force after the termination of the collective agreement and until the requirements of paragraphs 89(1)(a) to (d) have been met.
67(4) Malgré toute disposition contraire de la convention collective, la clause obligatoire visée au paragraphe 57(1) demeure en vigueur après l’expiration de la convention tant que n’ont pas été remplies les conditions énoncées aux alinéas 89(1)a) à d).
Power of arbitrator where agreement terminates
Pouvoirs de l’arbitre à l’expiration de la convention
67(5) Where a difference between the parties to a collective agreement relating to a provision contained in the collective agreement arises during the period from the date of its termination to the date the requirements of paragraphs 89(1)(a) to (d) have been met,
67(5) Les cas de désaccords portant sur une disposition de la convention collective et survenant dans l’intervalle qui sépare l’expiration de celle-ci et l’accomplissement des conditions énoncées aux alinéas 89(1)a) à d) :
(a) an arbitrator or arbitration board may hear and determine the difference; and
a) peuvent être soumis à un arbitre ou un conseil d’arbitrage;
(b) sections 57 to 66 apply to the hearing and determination.
b) sont assujettis, pour leur règlement, aux articles 57 à 66.
Powers of arbitrator when conditions of paragraphs 89(1)(a) to (d) have been met
Pouvoirs de l’arbitre lorsque les conditions énoncées aux alinéas 89(1)a) à d) ont été remplies
67(6) Where a disagreement concerning the dismissal or discipline of an employee in the bargaining unit arises during the period that begins on the date on which the requirements of paragraphs 89(1)(a) to (d) are met and ends on the date on which a new or revised collective agreement is entered into, the bargaining agent may submit the disagreement for final settlement in accordance with the provisions for the settlement of differences contained in the previous collective agreement. The relevant provisions in the collective agreement and sections 57 to 66 apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to the settlement of the disagreement.
67(6) Lorsque survient un litige concernant le congédiement d’un employé de l’unité de négociation — ou la prise de mesures disciplinaires à son égard — au cours de la période qui commence à la date à laquelle les conditions énoncées aux alinéas 89(1)a) à d) sont remplies et se termine le jour de la conclusion d’une nouvelle convention collective ou d’une convention collective révisée, l’agent négociateur peut soumettre le litige pour règlement définitif en conformité avec les dispositions de la convention collective antérieure qui porte sur le règlement des désaccords. Les dispositions pertinentes de la convention collective et les articles 57 à 66 s’appliquent au règlement du litige, avec les modifications nécessaires. [6] Subsection 57(1) of the Code requires that every collective agreement contain a provision providing for mandatory arbitration of all differences concerning the interpretation, application, administration or alleged contravention of a collective agreement.
[7] Subsection 89(1) of the Code sets out the pre-conditions for acquiring the right to engage in a legal strike or lockout. It reads as follows:No strike or lockout until certain requirements met
Conditions relatives aux grèves et lock-out
89(1) No employer shall declare or cause a lockout and no trade union shall declare or authorize a strike unless
89(1) Il est interdit à l’employeur de déclarer ou de provoquer un lock-out et au syndicat de déclarer ou d’autoriser une grève si les conditions suivantes ne sont pas remplies :
(a) the employer or trade union has given notice to bargain collectively under this Part;
a) l’un ou l’autre a adressé un avis de négociation collective en application de la présente partie;
(b) the employer and the trade union
b) les deux :
(i) have failed to bargain collectively within the period specified in paragraph 50(a), or
(i) soit n’ont pas négocié collectivement dans le délai spécifié à l’alinéa 50a),
(ii) have bargained collectively in accordance with section 50 but have failed to enter into or revise a collective agreement;
(ii) soit ont négocié collectivement conformément à l’article 50, sans parvenir à conclure ou réviser la convention collective;
(c) the Minister has
c) le ministre a :
(i) received a notice, given under section 71 by either party to the dispute, informing the Minister of the failure of the parties to enter into or revise a collective agreement, or
(i) soit reçu l’avis mentionné à l’article 71 et l’informant que les parties n’ont pas réussi à conclure ou à réviser la convention collective,
(ii) taken action under subsection 72(2);
(ii) soit pris l’une des mesures prévues par le paragraphe 72(2);
(d) twenty-one days have elapsed after the date on which the Minister
d) vingt et un jours se sont écoulés depuis la date à laquelle le ministre, selon le cas :
(i) notified the parties of the intention not to appoint a conciliation officer or conciliation commissioner, or to establish a conciliation board under subsection 72(1),
(i) a notifié aux termes du paragraphe 72(1) son intention de ne pas nommer de conciliateur ou de commissaire-conciliateur, ni de constituer de commission de conciliation,
(ii) notified the parties that a conciliation officer appointed under subsection 72(1) has reported,
(ii) a notifié aux parties le fait que le conciliateur nommé aux termes du paragraphe 72(1) lui a fait rapport des résultats de son intervention,
(iii) released a copy of the report to the parties to the dispute pursuant to paragraph 77(a), or
(iii) a mis à la disposition des parties, conformément à l’alinéa 77a), une copie du rapport qui lui a été remis,
(iv) is deemed to have been reported to pursuant to subsection 75(2) or to have received the report pursuant to subsection 75(3);
(iv) est réputé avoir été informé par le conciliateur des résultats de son intervention, en application du paragraphe 75(2), ou avoir reçu le rapport, en application du paragraphe 75(3);
(e) the Board has determined any referral made pursuant to subsection 87.4(5); and
e) le Conseil a statué sur un renvoi fait en vertu du paragraphe 87.4(5);
(f) sections 87.2 and 87.3 have been complied with.
f) les conditions prévues aux articles 87.2 et 87.3 ont été remplies. ....
[14] It is well-settled that the applicable standard of review this Court is to apply to the review of CIRB decisions is reasonableness: ILWU and BCMEA FCA at para. 77; Watson v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, 2023 FCA 48 at para. 16. Therefore, this Court may set aside the CIRB’s decision in the present case only if it is unreasonable: Heatley v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 14, 2025 FCA 188 at para. 3.
[15] I see nothing unreasonable in the CIRB’s decision. The Board provided thorough and intelligible reasons for its decision. Moreover, the conclusion it reached is supported by a reasonable interpretation of the applicable provisions in the Code and by the relevant case law.
[16] More specifically, it is reasonable to conclude that the combined effect of paragraph 50(b) and subsections 67(4) to (6) of the Code is to maintain the provisions of an expired collective agreement in force (other than those that allow for arbitration of dismissal or discharge grievances), once the collective agreement expires, only until the requirements of paragraphs 89(1)(a) to (d) of the Code are met. Thereafter, subsection 67(6) of the Code provides for the arbitration only of dismissal and discharge grievances but not for grievances like the one filed by the BCMEA in this case. The requirements for a strike notice, strike vote, or to settle maintenance of activities issues before a legal strike may occur are set out in paragraphs 89(1)(e) and (f) of the Code and not in paragraphs 89(1)(a) to (d).
[17] In the present case, the requirements of paragraphs 89(1)(a) to (d) had been met when the illegal strike occurred and the collective agreement had expired. The strike was found to have been illegal only because the ILWU did not provide a second strike notice the CIRB found it was required to provide. In the circumstances, it was reasonable for the CIRB to find that the combined effect of the relevant provisions in the Code meant that there was no collective agreement in force when the illegal strike occurred.
[18] This finding also accords with the CIRB’s previous decisions in City of Yellowknife, Intek, and Canada Post, upon which the CIRB relied. Contrary to what the BCMEA submits, I do not see that the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Paccar mandates a different result because the issues in that case were different and it arose under different legislation, as the CIRB noted.
[19] In Paccar, the Supreme Court was concerned with whether an employer could unilaterally alter terms and conditions of employment following the termination of a collective agreement under a legislative scheme that did not contain a statutory freeze. The Court was not required to determine whether a collective agreement remained in force following the expiry of a statutory freeze period. Nor do Justice La Forest’s comments, that the terms and conditions formerly contained in a collective agreement may be presumed to continue governing the employment relationship, imply that the collective agreement itself continues in force indefinitely. As the CIRB reasonably observed, those comments addressed the continuing employment relationship after the collective agreement had ceased to operate and were expressly made subject to the requirements of the governing statutory scheme. Here, the Code provides a specific answer to the question before the CIRB by limiting the continuation of the terms of an expired collective agreement to the period prescribed by paragraph 50(b) and the circumstances detailed in subsection 67(6). The CIRB was therefore entitled to conclude that Paccar did not undermine its interpretation of the Code or its conclusion that no collective agreement was in force when the illegal strike occurred.
[20] Similarly, contrary to what the BCMEA asserts, I see nothing in the return-to-work Order the Board issued in ILWU and BCMEA CIRB 2023 that could be interpreted as a finding that the collective agreement remained in force during the illegal strike. Rather, the Board merely directed that employees would be required to work under the terms and conditions in the collective agreement, a conclusion similar to that reached in Paccar. This is different from a finding that the collective agreement remained in force for purposes other than accessing arbitration to settle dismissal or discipline grievances after the requirements of paragraphs 89(1)(a) to (d) of the Code had been met.
[21] Indeed, the reasons of this Court in ILWU and BCMEA FCA at paragraph 64 contemplate that the BCMEA’s grievance, seeking damages for the illegal strike, might well be inarbitrable as no collective agreement was in force when the illegal strike occurred.
[22] Perhaps more importantly, the standard of reasonableness leaves no room for this Court to intervene merely because the BCMEA advances a different interpretation of the Code, even if it might also be tenable. As the Supreme Court explained in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov], reasonableness review is concerned with whether the decision-maker’s interpretation falls within a range of acceptable outcomes and is justified in light of the relevant legal and factual constraints, not with whether a reviewing court would have reached the same conclusion: Vavilov at paras. 83–85, 99,125. More recently, the Supreme Court reiterated in Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 [Mason] that a reviewing court is not to undertake a de novo analysis of the statutory scheme or determine for itself the "“correct”" interpretation of the legislation. Rather, the task is to assess the reasonableness of the interpretation actually adopted by the decision-maker: Mason at paras. 68–70. Thus, even if the BCMEA’s proposed interpretation of the interaction between sections 50, 67 and 89 of the Code were a possible one, that would not justify setting aside the CIRB’s decision so long as the interpretation adopted by the Board is itself reasonable.
[23] Indeed, in the earlier proceedings between these same parties, the BCMEA successfully relied on these very principles to defend the CIRB’s interpretation of section 87.2 of the Code. In ILWU and BCMEA FCA, this Court emphasized that the question was not whether the Court would have interpreted the strike notice provisions in the same manner as the Board, but rather whether the Board’s interpretation was reasonable. The Court accordingly upheld the CIRB’s determination that a new 72-hour notice was required before strike activity could recommence. The same deferential approach governs here. The issue before us is not whether we would have reached the same conclusion as the Board regarding the continued force of the expired collective agreement, but rather whether the conclusion the Board reached is one that can reasonably be drawn from the text, context, and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Code.
[24] Given the statutory scheme, the Board’s expertise in the administration of the Code, and the authorities upon which it relied, the CIRB’s interpretation easily meets that standard. This is not a case where the Board ignored a binding authority, failed to grapple with a central argument, or adopted an interpretation that is incompatible with the governing legislation. Rather, the Board carefully considered the competing submissions, explained why it preferred one interpretation over the other, and reached a conclusion that is rational and internally coherent and that is available under the statutory scheme. In such circumstances, Vavilov teaches that a reviewing court must refrain from substituting its own view of the preferable outcome for that of the decision-maker: Vavilov at paras. 12–13, 83, 125. The shoe is therefore on the other foot in this proceeding than in ILWU and BCMEA FCA. Just as the BCMEA successfully argued in ILWU and BCMEA FCA that deference was owed to the CIRB’s reasonable interpretation of the Code, deference must also be afforded to the Board’s reasonable interpretation in the present case.
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