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Municipal - Planning (5). City of Toronto v. Korkmaz
In City of Toronto v. Korkmaz (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court allowed an appeal (here where both JR and appeal were commenced), these brought against an earlier TLAB appeal decision which "allowed the severance of a property under the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, and gave related variances":[5] The respondent appealed to the Toronto Land Appeal Body (TLAB), a delegated body under the Planning Act, s. 8.1, and the City of Toronto Act, S.O. 2006, C. 11, Sch A.
[6] The TLAB may make any decision that the Committee could have made: Planning Act, ss. 53(34) and 54(4). The applicable criteria for the relevant decision-making, as set out below, apply to both the Committee and the TLAB, but the focus of these reasons is on the TLAB.
[7] The TLAB allowed the appeal and approved the applications for consent to sever and for variances. The City requested an internal review, which was refused. The TLAB Decision was confirmed.
[8] There is a right of appeal to the Divisional Court on a question of law, with leave: City of Toronto Act, s. 115(9); Planning Act, s. 81.(10). The appeal was heard together with the City’s application for judicial review.
Applicable Regime
[9] The regime that applies to the applications for severance and variances begins with statutory requirements. The regime then incorporates aspects of the Provincial Planning Statement, 2024 (PPS), the City of Toronto Official Plan, and, in this case, Official Plan Amendment 649 (OPA 649). [3] As discussed below, the Official Plan designates the Property as Neighbourhoods. Neighbourhoods are physically stable areas made up mainly of residential uses such as houses, duplexes and townhouses. OPA 649 provides criteria for multiplex developments.
[10] Beginning with the statutory requirements, s. 2 of the Planning Act lists many matters of provincial interest that the Tribunal should have regard for, including the adequate provision of a full range of housing and the appropriate location for growth and development.
[11] The Planning Act then sets out specific criteria for various steps. When deciding an application to sever real property, the TLAB must have regard for the criteria set out in s. 51(24) of the Planning Act, including the following:(c) whether the plan conforms to the official plan and adjacent plans of subdivision, if any;
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(f) the dimensions and shapes of the proposed lots; .... [12] Minor variances must meet the criteria set out in s. 45(1) of the Planning Act. In the opinion of the TLAB, the variances must be desirable for the appropriate development or use of the land, building or structure and the general intent and purpose of the By-Law and of the Official Plan must be maintained.
[13] In addition to these statutory requirements, all land use decisions must be consistent with the PPS, which provides that municipal official plans are the most important vehicle for implementing the PPS and achieving comprehensive, integrated and long-term planning. At paras 15-23 the court considers provisions of the Toronto Official Plan, and then continues:Interpretation of an Official Plan
[24] The Court of Appeal has underscored that “the proper interpretation of an official plan is not a factual matter to be decided based on opinion evidence from planners, but rather a question of law”: Niagara River Coalition v. Niagara-on-the-Lake (Town), 2010 ONCA 173, 68 M.P.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 43. . Regional Municipality of York v. 2090396 Ontario Ltd. [land dedication]
In Regional Municipality of York v. 2090396 Ontario Ltd. (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, here brought against an Ontario Land Tribunal compensation valuation of an expropriated lot.
Here the court considered the planning principle of 'land dedication', as it bears upon expropriation market value:B. Land Dedication
(i) The Issue
[45] Sections 41(8) and (9) of the Planning Act provide that in certain circumstances, a municipality from whom certain development approvals are sought may require as a condition of such approval that the owner of the land convey to the municipality at no expense portions of the land in accordance with the municipality’s official plan, a process known as “land dedication.”
[46] Before the Tribunal, the appellant argued that the approvals necessary for Development Concept 1 would have been conditional on land dedications of up to 30% of the property’s area and the remaining area would have been too small for the proposed development. The risk of such a land dedication would have been taken into account by a reasonably informer buyer, and as such had to be considered when determining the land’s market value in accordance with s. 14(1) of the Act.
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(iv) Analysis
(a) Considering the Likelihood of Dedication Rather Than Risk
[49] The Tribunal’s reasons focussed on whether the Region would have obtained a land dedication. I agree with the appellant that the issue for the purposes of determining market value pursuant to s. 14(1) of the Act was not whether the Region would have done so, but rather what effect the risk of a land dedication would have on what a reasonable buyer would be willing to pay. Nonetheless, there are two reasons why I am not persuaded that the Tribunal committed any reversible error.
[50] First, while a reasonable buyer would take the risk of a land dedication into account, the effect of that risk on the amount the buyer would be willing to pay would depend on the extent of the risk. The more remote the prospect of a land dedication, the less effect the risk of it would have on what the buyer would be willing to pay. The Tribunal’s analysis of the likelihood that the Region would obtain a land dedication was therefore relevant, as a reasonable buyer would engage in the same type of analysis.
[51] Second, it is obvious that a reasonable buyer would have considered the risks associated with purchasing the property, including the risk of land dedications, and the Tribunal appreciated this. This is evident in the Tribunal’s list of the issues that had to be determined, set out in para. 16 of the reasons, which includes: “What impact, if any, does potential land dedication have on the claim?” . 2701836 Ontario Inc. v. Haldimand County
In 2701836 Ontario Inc. v. Haldimand County (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a JR, this brought to quash "the respondent Committee of Adjustment of Haldimand’s decision that granted a minor variance .... because it unreasonably failed to consider the proper test and because the applicant was denied procedural fairness at the Committee hearing".
The court considers JR 'standing', here in a municipal planning context:Jurisdiction and standing
[11] The respondents submit that the applicants have no standing, and the court should not assume jurisdiction over this application for two principal reasons.
[12] Their first argument is based on recent statutory amendments. The Planning Act R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13 was recently amended by the More Homes Built Faster Act, 2022, S.O. 2022, c. 21 to severely limit third party appeal rights. The applicant’s prior right to appeal to the Ontario Land Tribunal has been extinguished by these amendments. The respondents still have a right of appeal to the Ontario Land Tribunal, followed by a right to appeal to this court on a question of law only, with leave of the court. The respondents argue that given the clear legislative intention to limit third parties’ rights to review planning decisions, and given the respondents’ narrow ability to appeal to this court, it would be nonsensical if the applicants have a right to seek judicial review directly from this court.
[13] I do not accept this argument. The absence of a statutory right to appeal, or the existence of a circumscribed right to appeal, does not mean a party does not have the right to seek judicial review: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8, 489 D.L.R. (4th) 191, at paras. 43-50. An applicant may still seek judicial review based on private interest standing if a decision affects the applicant’s direct, personal interest or tangibly interferes with an applicant’s private right: Kilian v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2022 ONSC 5931 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 41-43; West Nipissing Police Services Board v. Municipality of West Nipissing, 2018 ONSC 6454 (Div. Ct.), 83 M.P.L.R. (5th) 243, at para. 32.
[14] The respondents’ second submission is that the applicant has no such private interest, as the applicant’s intention to build on its property is speculative and remote. There is no current residential building on the property that would be affected by the variances. The applicant’s description of the land as a “potential” building lot demonstrates that its interest is speculative. There is therefore no interference with the applicant’s private right or interest.
[15] I disagree. The applicant owns land next to the land in respect of which the variance is sought. The use the applicant may make of its land, in terms of where it will be permitted to construct a dwelling, is directly and significantly affected by the Committee’s decision. The respondents do not dispute that the prevailing use of the lands in the area is residential. The applicant has owned the land for several years. The fact that it has not yet committed to a particular residential dwelling in a particular spot on its land does not render its interest speculative. The applicant’s ability to build freely on its land is directly affected by the Committee’s decision.
[16] I find the applicant’s private rights and interests are affected and am satisfied that the court should entertain its application for judicial review on the merits.
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