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Reasons - Charter. Noel v. The Corporation of the City of Dryden
In Noel v. The Corporation of the City of Dryden (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a municipal councillour's JR, this brought against council imposing "a number of corrective measures, including a requirement that the Applicant complete workplace civility training and attend Council meetings and City functions virtually until that training was completed" and this after an "investigator concluded that the Applicant had engaged in workplace harassment and bullying directed toward the City's Chief Administrative Officer and By-Law Enforcement Officer".
Here the court finds a reduced duty of provide reasons for decision in this municipal council political context, despite Charter issues being raised:[71] Nor am I persuaded that Council was required to provide formal written reasons explaining every departure from Ms. Durant's original recommendations. The rationale underlying the corrective measures can be readily understood from the record as a whole, including the Durant report, the revised recommendations, and Council's subsequent amendments following the June 9 submissions (see Vavilov, at para. 138). The Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that certain kinds of decision-making, including when a municipality passes a by-law, do not lend themselves to formal reasons: Vavilov, at para. 137.
[72] The Supreme Court has also held that there is no general duty to provide formal reasons in a context where the decision is made by elected representatives through a democratic process: Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, at paras. 53-55, and Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, at paras. 29, 33.
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[80] Certainly, it would have been preferable for Council to provide express reasons demonstrating how it balanced the Applicant's Charter interests against its workplace-harassment obligations. However, the absence of formal reasons is not determinative. The Supreme Court has recognized that, particularly in democratic and legislative contexts, detailed reasons for decision are not necessarily required. Reviewing courts may examine the broader record, including deliberations and surrounding materials, to understand the rationale for a decision: Trinity Western University, at paras. 53-55; Catalyst Paper, at paras. 29, 33.
[81] Nor is this a case like CHP v. City of Hamilton, 2018 ONSC 3690, at paras. 61-63, or Guelph and Area Right to Life v. City of Guelph, 2022 ONSC 43, at paras. 78-85, 94, where the record contained no indication that Charter interests had been considered at all. Here, the Applicant's counsel expressly raised Charter concerns before Council. Counsel specifically argued that an attendance restriction would violate the Applicant's freedom of expression, was not minimally impairing, and was not rationally connected to the objectives identified by the City. Council thereafter reconsidered the matter and amended the proposed recommendations. Most significantly, Council modified the attendance restriction so that the Applicant would be permitted to continue participating in Council meetings and City functions by video conference pending completion of training.
[82] The significance of that amendment should not be understated. It demonstrates that Council considered the impact of the proposed measures on the Applicant's ability to continue discharging the functions of elected office. The final decision reflects an effort to preserve those functions while advancing the City's workplace-harassment objectives.
[83] This is therefore not a case in which the court is being asked to invent a balancing exercise after the fact or substitute its own justification for a decision unsupported by the record. Rather, the record itself demonstrates that Charter concerns were raised, considered, and influenced the ultimate form of the decision.
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