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Criminal - Peace Bonds [CCC 810]. Senos v. Senos
In Senos v. Senos (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal partially allowed a family law appeal, this brought against orders "which finally resolved the issues of spousal support, child support, and special/extraordinary expenses".
The court sets aside a 'restraining order' (aka 'peace bond'), here originally sought under FLA s.46, but granted under the court's common law jurisdiction [the Criminal Code s.810 jurisdiction was considered as well]:4. The trial judge erred in imposing the peace bond
[38] The respondent sought a restraining order against the appellant pursuant to s. 46 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. However, rather than granting the relief sought, the trial judge proceeded on her own initiative to invoke the court’s common law jurisdiction to prevent a breach of the peace by requiring the appellant to enter into a peace bond that would remain in effect for a period of ten years.
[39] The peace bond stated that His Majesty the King (or the “Crown”) had requested the imposition of the order. It required the appellant to keep the peace be of good behaviour generally, and especially in relation to the respondent. The appellant was prohibited from having any direct or indirect contact with the respondent and his current or past romantic partners, landlords, employers, and business associates. The peace bond then listed 18 individuals and entities with whom the appellant could not communicate directly or indirectly, including by text, email, phone, mail, or social media. The peace bond further stated that any breach without lawful excuse of the order would constitute an offence under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, which carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment if prosecuted by indictment.
[40] The imposition of a peace bond, whether on the basis of s. 810 of the Criminal Code or pursuant to the court’s common law jurisdiction, can have serious implications for an individual. The entering of the bond places restrictions on the Charter-protected liberty of the individual and subjects them to criminal sanctions for breach of its terms. It is therefore imperative that procedural safeguards be observed in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter, including providing sufficient notice that the court is considering making such an order, advising the individual of its possible terms, and providing the individual with a meaningful opportunity to retain counsel, adduce evidence, and make submissions: see R. v. Petre, 2013 ONSC 3048, 299 C.C.C. (3d) 246, at paras. 12-15; see generally R. v. Musoni (2009), 2009 CanLII 12118 (ON SC), 243 C.C.C. (3d) 17 (Ont. S.C.), aff’d 2009 ONCA 829, 248 C.C.C. (3d) 487, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 534.
[41] The procedure followed in this case fell significantly short of what was required.
[42] First, the appellant was not provided with proper notice prior to the issuance of the peace bond. The respondent did not seek this relief in his pleadings or in his submissions to the court. Although the peace bond states that it was issued on application by the Crown, in fact this was not the case because the Crown was not a party to the proceeding. The matter was not discussed during the course of the eight-day trial and was raised by the trial judge only after the parties had made their closing submissions. Then, instead of adjourning the proceedings, even briefly, in order to provide the appellant with a meaningful opportunity to consult counsel and consider whether she wished to adduce evidence and prepare submissions, the trial judge issued the order orally immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing.
[43] Even if the appellant had been afforded appropriate procedural protections, the terms of the order are extremely broad and unduly vague. For example, the categories of persons with whom the appellant is prohibited from communicating over the next ten years, such as “current or past girlfriends” or “business associates”, are not clearly defined. Nor is the scope of the prohibition on posting on social media “to or about” any of these persons. Thus the peace bond subjects the appellant to possible penal consequences for a period of ten years without her being able to know exactly what conduct could give rise to a breach of the order.
[44] I conclude that these were serious breaches of the principles of fundamental justice, requiring that the peace bond be set aside.
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