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Administrative - Dismissal for Delay. Deokaran v. Law Society of Ontario
In Deokaran v. Law Society of Ontario (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, here brought against two orders, the first by the Hearing Division of the Law Society Tribunal revoking their license to practice law, and the second by the Appeal Division of the Law Society Tribunal dismissing their appeal to it for delay.
Here the court considers the Appeal Division's control of process, this in relation to an administrative dismissal for delay issue:[11] ... On July 13, 2025, following receipt of submissions, a further proceeding management conference endorsement was released requiring Ms. Deokaran to perfect her appeal within 30 days failing which her appeal would be dismissed without requiring the Law Society to bring a Rule 17.4(1) motion.
[12] On August 8, 2025, Ms. Deokaran wrote to the Appeal Division advising that she had undertaken filings in the Court of Appeal for Ontario that effectively stayed the order requiring her to perfect her appeal by August 13, 2025. On August 11, 2025, the Appeal Division issued a further proceeding management conference endorsement indicating once again that if she failed to perfect her appal by August 13, 2025, her appeal would be dismissed for delay without the requirement of a Rule 17.4(1) motion.
[13] Ms. Deokaran filed a further motion with the Appeal Division asking for an extension of time to perfect her appeal. In a proceeding management conference endorsement dated August 14, 2025 her motion was denied and the appeal was dismissed for delay.
[14] Rule 17.3 (1) requires an appellant to perfect an appeal within 60 days of filing the notice or appeal or 60 days from the panel giving its reasons for the final order, whichever comes last. Rule 17.3(3) provides that if it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice, a member of the Appeal Division may give special directions and vary Rule 17.3(1).
[15] Rule 17.4(1) provides that if an appeal is not perfected by the deadline the respondent may bring a motion to dismiss the appeal for delay.
[16] The appellant argues that it is only by such a motion that dismissal of the appeal can take place.
[17] We disagree.
[18] Rule 1.1 of the Law Society Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure sets out the purposes of the rules, which include establishing fair processes, promoting timely determination of proceedings, and ensuring efficient processes and proceedings.
[19] Rule 1.2 requires that the rules be interpreted and applied in accordance with their purposes. Rule 1.4 says that the Tribunal may exercise any of its powers at the request of a party or on its own initiative. Rule 1.5 states that the Tribunal may decide not to apply the rules strictly unless to do so would be inconsistent with legislation, regulations or a mandatory rule.
[20] The appellant argues that Rule 17.4(1) is a mandatory rule. We disagree. To the contrary, it is a permissive rule. It allows a motion by the respondent. It does not require it. Accordingly, the Tribunal acted appropriately and within its power when it first ordered the perfection of the appeal within a set timeframe, disposing with the need to bring a motion if the timeframe was missed, and subsequently dismissing the appeal for failing to perfect the appeal within the time frame set out in its order.
[21] Furthermore, Rule 7.5 provides for proceeding management conferences to be held at the request of a party or on is own initiative. At such a conference the panel may, among other things, set timelines and deadlines for steps in a proceeding and hear and decide procedural motions.
[22] In our view, these rules clearly allow the Tribunal to proceed as it did. The rules provide it with authority to largely control its own procedure and to initiate procedural steps when a party fails to do so.
[23] We therefore find that the appeal cannot succeed on this ground.
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