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Charter - Section 11(b) Trial Delay - Jacques-Taylor (SCC, 2026). R. v. Jacques-Taylor [JACQUES-TAYLOR]
In R. v. Jacques-Taylor (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a Crown appeal, this brought against an Ontario Court of Appeal ruling that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice Charter s.11(b) ['trial delay'] stay of proceedings.
Here the court summarizes this Supreme Court of Canada Charter s.11(b) case:[1] In R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, the Court emphasized that all actors in the criminal justice system have a duty to participate in reforming the culture of complacency. While individual and systemic efforts have been laudable, considerable work yet remains. This case offers an opportunity for the Court to address three distinct, but intertwined, issues: (1) the duty of all actors in the criminal justice system to proactively collaborate; (2) the role of joint trials as a powerful tool for ensuring systemic efficiency; and (3) the discrete exceptional circumstances that may result from the Crown’s decision to proceed jointly.
[2] In regard to the first issue, it must be repeated that the duty outlined in Jordan applies to each and every actor in the criminal justice system, be it the defence, the Crown, or the judge. While the Crown does have a unique role to play in bringing the accused to trial promptly, this duty cannot be borne by it alone. All must be proactive in ensuring that proceedings move forward efficiently and quickly. This is not lofty idealism; it is a constitutional imperative, for the accused, for the victims, and for society at large.
[3] The Court has reiterated, time and again, that the criminal justice system must employ all means at its disposal to bring accused persons to trial within a reasonable time. For the courts, this means harnessing their broad case management powers so that the parties collaborate and conduct the case as efficiently as possible. For the defence and the Crown, this means cooperating in good faith at every stage of the proceedings. Prompt disclosure must be made without hesitation. Reasonable admissions on uncontested or largely peripheral issues should be the norm. Evidence ought to be streamlined to the extent that is reasonable to do so. The parties should also identify and anticipate potential hurdles. Pre‑trial motions should be resolved swiftly and the issues at trial closely circumscribed. In short, everyone has their part to play, and judges must not fail to properly consider the duty of all parties to ensure that the case proceeds quickly to trial.
[4] In regard to the second issue, joint trials should be held wherever it is in the interests of justice to do so. This will be the norm rather than the exception, as joint trials are an essential component of any well‑oiled criminal justice system. Notably, they reduce the overall number of trials, mitigate the risk of contradictory verdicts, and obviate the need for witnesses to testify in multiple proceedings relating to the same set of facts. These advantages increase systemic efficiency, which, in turn, leads to shorter trial delays across the entire criminal justice system. In short, joint trials are indispensable and play a key role in guaranteeing the right of all accused persons to a trial within a reasonable time.
[5] Of course, joint trials are not without their own set of unique challenges. In particular, coordinating schedules between the Crown and multiple defence counsel is, even at the best of times, easier said than done. Even so, faced with an overburdened criminal justice system, Crown and defence counsel alike cannot remain passive. Instead, they must proactively collaborate to find solutions that move the case through the system quickly and efficiently, thereby ensuring that the accused’s right under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is respected. This requires give and take from both sides in any criminal prosecution. However, proactive collaboration becomes particularly crucial in joint proceedings, where coordination is more difficult and scheduling conflicts are likely to abound. Everyone involved — be it the Crown, the defence, or the court — has an imperative duty to work together so that the accused’s right to a trial within a reasonable time is respected.
[6] Finally, in regard to the third issue, the Court is being asked to decide whether a delay occasioned by proceeding jointly can amount to a discrete exceptional circumstance. More precisely, can a delay caused by a co‑accused be considered a discrete exceptional circumstance in relation to an accused, irrespective of whether the accused is in any way responsible for that delay? In the case at bar, scheduling conflicts led to a delay that exceeded the presumptive 18‑month Jordan ceiling by just two weeks. The Crown chose not to sever the indictment.
[7] I am of the view that delays flowing from the Crown’s decision to conduct a joint prosecution may, sometimes, amount to discrete exceptional circumstances. In the instant case, I am of the view that the delay caused by the unavailability of the co‑accused’s counsel amounts to a discrete exceptional circumstance. It should therefore be deducted from the net delay. This brings the total delay to under 18 months, rendering it presumptively reasonable.
[8] Accordingly, I would allow the Crown’s appeal, set aside the stay of proceedings, and order that the matter be remitted back for trial.
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