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Charter - Section 11(b) Trial Delay - Court Delay. R. v. Jacques-Taylor [joint duty to ensure timelines met]
In R. v. Jacques-Taylor (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a Crown appeal, this brought against an Ontario Court of Appeal ruling that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice Charter s.11(b) ['trial delay'] stay of proceedings.
Here the court considered the joint duty of the parties and the court to ensure that their Charter s.11(b) timelines are met:B. The Duty to Ensure That Cases Proceed to Trial Quickly
[40] As I noted at the outset of these reasons, in Jordan the Court took aim at the culture of complacency that had become deeply engrained in our criminal justice system. Faced with this dire problem, and recognizing the unworkability of the Morin framework, the Court devised a new s. 11(b) framework characterized by two presumptive ceilings (Jordan, at paras. 37‑38 and 46; R. v. Morin, 1992 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771). These ceilings were not merely intended to be aspirational targets, but rather were the points at which delays become presumptively unreasonable (para. 56). Indeed, the Court noted, Canadians rightly expect the criminal justice system to bring accused persons to trial expeditiously (para. 27). Justice delayed is justice denied. This is true not only for the presumptively innocent accused — who is forced to live with the sword of Damocles hanging precariously over his or her head — but also for victims and society as a whole, who are denied the certainty of closure that a judgment on the merits brings (paras. 2 and 19).
[41] In order to tackle this rampant culture of complacency, the Court charted a new course: Jordan. Under the new framework, the Court emphasized the duty of every actor in the criminal justice system to take personal responsibility for expediting criminal proceedings and complying with the new ceilings. This was not merely an invitation. Rather, it is a duty that is incumbent upon all: Crown counsel, defence counsel, and courts.
[42] Of course, given the unique quasi‑judicial status of Crown counsel as “ministers of justice”, they play a central role in bringing the accused to trial within a reasonable time and, in doing so, seeing that justice is done (Boucher v. The Queen, 1954 CanLII 3 (SCC), [1955] S.C.R. 16, at pp. 23‑24; R. v. Anderson, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, at para. 37). However, Crown counsel’s unique position in the criminal justice system should not be misunderstood as somehow requiring them to shoulder this burden alone.
[43] The defence, too, must ensure that proceedings move forward quickly and efficiently. The Court’s holdings in Jordan could not have made this any clearer: “This framework is intended to focus the s. 11(b) analysis on the issues that matter and encourage all participants in the criminal justice system to cooperate in achieving reasonably prompt justice, with a view to fulfilling s. 11(b)’s important objectives” (para. 5 (emphasis added); see also paras. 45 and 116‑17).
[44] In practice, this requires proactive good faith cooperation on the part of the defence when dealing with the Crown and the court. In order to ensure compliance with this duty, illegitimate or unjustifiable defence conduct that results in delays must give rise to deductions for those delays (J.F., at para. 32; R. v. Ste‑Marie, 2022 SCC 3, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 14, at para. 11; Cody, at para. 28). It cannot be stressed enough that the accused must be proactive in resolving issues promptly when they arise. Where the accused cannot adequately explain inaction, tardiness, or a lack of cooperation, courts should not hesitate to make deductions for defence delay or, in certain cases, find that defence conduct amounts to a discrete exceptional circumstance (J.F., at para. 33; Cody, at para. 33). Lest it be forgotten, s. 11(b) was always intended to be a shield, and not a sword with which to frustrate the ends of justice (Jordan, at para. 21; Morin, at pp. 801‑2; Askov, at p. 1222).
[45] The duty to proactively collaborate becomes particularly heightened where the procedural or legal complexities of the prosecution require increased coordination to avoid needlessly delaying proceedings. For instance, in cases where many pre‑trial motions are envisaged, the parties must — together and with the help of the case management judge — build a concrete plan that will allow them to expedite the proceedings. The parties should not hesitate to make admissions and resolve issues before they arise wherever this is reasonably possible. Moreover, procedural mechanisms that enhance trial efficiency should also be favoured. For example, the use of a blended voir dire may, depending on the particularities of the case, be a powerful mechanism for reducing the amount of time needed at trial (Jean v. R., 2020 QCCA 1455, at paras. 30 and 35; R. v. Cochrane, 2018 ABCA 80, 359 C.C.C. (3d) 210, at para. 5; R. v. Furlong, 2012 NLCA 29, 323 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 77, at para. 28). The parties and the court should ask themselves whether issues can be decided in advance, or the proceedings shortened, by reliance on written rather than oral submissions (R. v. Felderhof (2003), 2003 CanLII 37346 (ON CA), 68 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), at para. 57; R. v. Haevischer, 2023 SCC 11, [2023] 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 102). Crown counsel should also consider whether the indictment contains essentially duplicative or superfluous counts that will serve only to complicate and prolong the proceedings (R. v. Di Paola, 2025 SCC 31, at para. 52; R. v. R.V., 2021 SCC 10, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 131, at para. 78; R. v. Sciascia, 2017 SCC 57, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 539, at para. 32).
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