|
Civil Litigation - Dismissal (or Stay) of Action (by Defendant) - Another Proceeding Pending [R21.01(3)(c)] (2). Dorceus v. Ontario
In Dorceus v. Ontario (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here brought against conclusions of a motion judge that "the claim constituted both an abuse of process and a pleading that disclosed no reasonable cause of action", and resulted in their consequent striking of the pleadings. The claim was by "a group of more than 400 current and former healthcare workers" who "allege that a provincial public health directive led to the suspension or termination of their employment because they declined vaccination".
Here the court makes what is essentially a 'non-justiciable' holding where it finds that the COVID conspiracy-themed case "was a forum for a broad political and scientific inquiry into the entirety of Ontario’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic rather than a vehicle for resolving legally cognizable disputes between the parties". The court relies on this finding to uphold the motion judge's dismissal of the action on both an R21.01(3)(d) 'abuse of process', and an R21.01(1)(b) 'disclosing no reasonable cause of action' grounds.
Further, the court also seems to be advancing as justification for it's holding a 'prematurity' (aka 'exhaustion', or 'adequate alternative remedy') doctrine regarding the competing administrative proceedings [see para 5].
Both of these holdings apply (in a civil action context) what are normally JR doctrines - ie. political non-justiciability, and the exhaustion doctrine to bar the action:[1] This appeal concerns the proper role of courts in the administration of justice and the limits of civil litigation. The appellants, a group of more than 400 current and former healthcare workers, allege that a provincial public health directive led to the suspension or termination of their employment because they declined vaccination. They challenge an order of the Superior Court of Justice striking their Amended Statement of Claim against 59 defendants – the provincial Crown, four government officials, and 54 healthcare organizations – under rr. 21.01(1)(b) and 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.[2]
[2] The motion judge concluded that the claim constituted both an abuse of process and a pleading that disclosed no reasonable cause of action. In particular, he ruled that the claim was a forum for a broad political and scientific inquiry into the entirety of Ontario’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic rather than a vehicle for resolving legally cognizable disputes between the parties. He further concluded that the claims of the unionized appellants and those holding hospital privileges should be pursued in other statutory decision-making forums rather than in court.
[3] The appellants argue that the motion judge erred in finding an abuse of process, wrongly dismissed their Charter and tort claims at an early stage, improperly took judicial notice of scientific facts, erred in declining jurisdiction, denied them procedural fairness, and awarded excessive costs against them.
[4] I disagree and, for the reasons that follow, would dismiss the appeal. The motion judge properly determined that the proceeding was an abuse of process which disclosed no reasonable cause of action and, for many of the appellants, was subject to the decision-making authority of labour arbitrators and hospital committees. His decision was procedurally fair, and his costs award was reasonable.
[5] Like the motion judge, I emphasize that this decision does not foreclose the appellants from pursuing any legally viable claims for the suspension or loss of their employment which may be available to them. Because work is an important interest that merits careful protection, the law provides multiple avenues to seek remedies for the loss of employment. As the motion judge ruled, unionized appellants can pursue labour arbitration, those with hospital privileges can seek relief under a statutory process, and non-unionized appellants without those privileges have leave to amend to bring focused claims disclosing a reasonable cause of action against their employers in court.
....
b. Staying the Claims of the Privileged Hospital Staff Appellants
[69] Second, I agree with the motion judge that the eight privileged [SS: those with hospital 'privileges'] hospital staff appellants are subject to the Public Hospitals Act dispute resolution regime. Thus, their claims against the healthcare respondents should be stayed unless and until they exhaust that process.
[70] As the motion judge recognized, the Public Hospitals Act establishes a comprehensive code for determining hospital privileges. That code vests decision-making authority in each hospital’s Medical Advisory Committee. Parties may appeal that committee’s decisions to the HPARB, whose decisions are in turn judicially reviewable in the Divisional Court. Parties must exhaust this process before commencing an action in court if the dispute’s essential character concerns the determination of hospital privileges: Kadiri v. Southlake Regional Health Centre, 2015 ONCA 847, 343 O.A.C. 186, at paras. 11-14, 26-29, 55, citing Beiko v. Hotel Dieu Hospital St. Catharines, 2007 ONCA 860, at para. 4.
[71] The motion judge properly applied this test. He concluded that the dispute’s essential character concerned the determination of hospital privileges because the privileged hospital staff appellants sought the reinstatement of privileges along with declarations that those privileges were unlawfully revoked. Thus, they were required to exhaust the statutory process before seeking relief in court.
[72] I do not accept the appellants’ submission that the motion judge overlooked the principles in Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, as restated in Solgi v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, 2022 SKCA 96, 473 D.L.R. (4th) 421. TeleZone permits the court to stay damages claims whose essential character concerns public law rights subject to judicial review: at para. 78; see also Manuge v. Canada, 2010 SCC 67, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 672, at paras. 18-19. The motion judge was entitled to exercise that authority because, as he determined, this dispute’s essential character concerned public law rights subject to judicial review. Solgi is distinguishable because there, unlike here, the dispute’s essential character concerned private law damages – the plaintiff in that case did not seek to invalidate a public body’s decision and the request for reinstatement was merely incidental: at paras. 82-86.
....
[74] Courts exist to resolve legal disputes grounded in concrete facts. They are not political forums, scientific tribunals, or commissions of inquiry into public policy. The motion judge correctly recognized that the appellants’ claim sought to transform the court into a platform for a sweeping political and scientific debate about the pandemic rather than a forum for adjudicating legal rights. The abuse of process doctrine and the motion-to-strike procedure exist precisely to prevent such misuse of the judicial process. The motion judge applied those principles carefully and correctly.
|
