|
Constitution (Non-Charter) - Government. Dorceus v. Ontario
In Dorceus v. Ontario (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here brought against findings of a motion judge that "concluded that the claim constituted both an abuse of process and a pleading that disclosed no reasonable cause of action", and consequently struck the pleadings. The claim was by "a group of more than 400 current and former healthcare workers" who "allege that a provincial public health directive led to the suspension or termination of their employment because they declined vaccination".
Here the court sets out the fundamental structure of government in Canada, in particular the non-political role of the courts:a. The Courts’ Institutional Role and the Abuse of Process Doctrine
[18] Before turning to the specific legal tests applicable to the abuse of process issue, it is necessary to recall a fundamental constitutional principle: courts are not political institutions.
[19] Canada’s constitutional structure divides authority among three branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial. Under this separation of powers, the legislature and executive are the political branches of government, while the courts serve a different institutional role: Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, 1997 CanLII 317 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 108.
[20] The twin political branches exercise political responsibilities. The legislative branch makes laws, and the executive branch administers them. Both make policy choices that balance competing economic, social, and political considerations: Nelson (City) v. Marchi, 2021 SCC 41, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 55, at paras. 42-44.
[21] The judicial branch performs a distinct apolitical function – upholding the rule of law by resolving legal disputes. Courts discharge this mission by independently and impartially interpreting and applying the laws enacted by the legislature and administered by the executive: Marchi, at para. 42; Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 28.
[22] The three branches are interdependent. They rise or fall together. For all to flourish, each must play its proper role. When any branch oversteps its bounds, public trust in all is endangered: Criminal Lawyers’ Association, at paras. 29, 79.
[23] Thus, the cornerstone of the separation of powers is mutual respect. By respecting each others’ proper role, each branch preserves public confidence in our system of government. By respecting judicial independence, for example, the political branches not only show proper regard for the courts – they also strengthen public trust in the rule of law, the justice system, and our constitutional democracy: Vriend v. Alberta, 1998 CanLII 816 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at paras. 136-137; British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Provincial Court Judges’ Association of British Columbia, 2020 SCC 20, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 506, at para. 29.
[24] Because respect is reciprocal, the judiciary must remain mindful not to intrude into the domains of the political branches. The courts of law exist to resolve legal disputes. The courtroom is not a political forum. Nor is it a proxy for the public inquiry process in which the policy judgments of the legislative and executive branches can be second-guessed and re-weighed. These differences between the judicial function and the political arena must be preserved: see, e.g., Vriend, at para. 136; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38, at para. 39; Ontario Teachers’ Federation v. Ontario (Attorney General), (1998), 1998 CanLII 14680 (ON SC), 39 O.R. (3d) 140 (Gen. Div.), at pp. 146, 148; Everywoman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. Bridges (1991), 1991 CanLII 5715 (BC CA), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 294 (C.A.), at paras. 19-20.
....
E. Conclusion
[74] Courts exist to resolve legal disputes grounded in concrete facts. They are not political forums, scientific tribunals, or commissions of inquiry into public policy. The motion judge correctly recognized that the appellants’ claim sought to transform the court into a platform for a sweeping political and scientific debate about the pandemic rather than a forum for adjudicating legal rights. The abuse of process doctrine and the motion-to-strike procedure exist precisely to prevent such misuse of the judicial process. The motion judge applied those principles carefully and correctly.
|
