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Torts - Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) (3). Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia
In Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada establishes of a new tort of 'Intimate Partner Violence'.
At paras 96-180 the court justifies the need for and appropriateness of the new tort of 'intimate partner violence' - summarizing it at paras 181-209:(c) The New Tort of Intimate Partner Violence
[181] In view of the distinct wrong that may arise in this setting, it is appropriate to recognize a new tort of intimate partner violence. While such violence encompasses conduct that may fall within existing torts such as battery, assault, or IIED, the new tort captures a wider spectrum of abusive conduct. Crucially, the new tort centres on a distinct dimension of intimate partner violence — coercive control — that undermines the victim’s dignity, autonomy, and equality, unlike violence directed at a stranger. Whether manifested through a single violent act, discrete acts of violence, or a pattern of abuse, the new tort fixes on coercive or controlling conduct by which one partner overpowers the will of the other.
[182] This is not a new label for a collection of existing torts. The new tort of intimate partner violence fills a gap in the common law by properly recognizing that conduct objectively resulting in domination and control of an intimate partner is a qualitatively distinct wrong from those wrongs redressable through existing torts. It is the intimate partnership context that enables the abuser to exert control over their victim. Liability arises because coercive control constitutes an interference with an intimate partner’s autonomy; it is inherently incompatible with an intimate partnership as it renders the partnership unequal and results in dignitary harm, alongside, but distinct from, the physical or psychological harm that can be caused by abuse.
[183] The tort is most appropriately named “intimate partner violence”, a term widely used and understood by courts, academics, and, most importantly, the public. The term “violence”, however, should not be interpreted as limiting the tort to physical or psychological violence; rather, as I have explained, it broadly captures conduct that, because of its coercive effects, is incompatible with the fundamental tenets of dignity, autonomy, and equality inherent in an intimate partnership. The design of this new tort seeks to address the gap in the current law by remedying coercive control of one partner by the other, which has been described as “the most emotionally damaging and often the most physically dangerous type” of intimate partner violence (Bala, Maur and Houston, at p. 69). The focus on coercive control further underscores that this form of abuse is tortious not merely because it arises in intimacy, but because it is a distinct wrong giving rise to a distinct harm.
[184] Under the new tort of intimate partner violence recognized in these reasons, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath; (2) the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct; and (3) the conduct, on an objective measure, constitutes coercive control. The harm associated with coercion flows from proof of the wrongful conduct. The interference with an intimate partner’s dignity, autonomy, and equality itself constitutes the harm experienced by the victim of coercive control. Accordingly, much like certain intentional torts, this new tort does not require the plaintiff to prove any consequential harm separately (Linden et al., at §2.01). Once the three elements of the tort are established, the harm is necessarily present and liability follows. The quantum of compensatory damages that may then be awarded “must represent a meaningful response to the seriousness of the breach” (Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28, at para. 54; see also Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, at paras. 40-49). The quantum of damages depends on the extent of the harm and the factual circumstances. Generally, coercive control constitutes a serious breach of a victim’s intangible interests, as dignity, autonomy, and equality are fundamental tenets of intimate partnerships. Each element of the new tort bears comment.
[185] First, the impugned conduct must arise in the context of an intimate partnership or its aftermath. The personal connection, the intimacy that comes with such partnership, and the partners’ interdependence and attending vulnerabilities shape the intimate partnership during its lifetime and can persist after separation or the formal end of the relationship. Co‑parenting, for example, often continues connections and interdependence between former partners. Some former partners continue cohabitating for some time post-separation until other accommodations can be arranged. But an abusive partner may seek to exploit past intimacy in other ways, such that the aftermath of the partnership is the site of controlling misconduct. As the interveners WCLEAF and RWLC jointly submit, one common method by which abusers seek to exercise coercive control over victims is through litigation abuse — that is, through the misuse of litigation for coercive ends post-separation (I.F., at para. 12). The mere fact that the parties have formally separated does not necessarily put an end to the intimate partner violence.
[186] Second, to attract liability, the defendant must have intentionally engaged in the abusive conduct. The plaintiff must simply establish the defendant’s intention to engage in the impugned conduct. The plaintiff need not prove that the defendant intended subjectively to exercise coercive control over them through the abuse, nor that the defendant intended to cause a specific type of harm. The burden of proof of this novel tort is consistent with intentional torts such as battery and assault that require plaintiffs to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally engaged in the wrongful conduct (see Letang, at pp. 238‑40).
[187] The new tort recognizes that coercive conduct can take many forms, including those captured by existing torts such as battery, assault, and IIED. Acts of physical violence on an intimate partner is a plain example. As scholar Camille Carey notes, “abusive physical contact is particularly offensive in domestic violence situations because it violates the trust that should be present in an intimate partner relationship and is generally part of a pattern of abuse that is aimed at subordinating and controlling the victim” (“Domestic Violence Torts: Righting a Civil Wrong” (2014), 62 Kan. L. Rev. 695, at pp. 698-99). But coercive and controlling conduct faced by an intimate partner can also include: psychological, sexual or emotional violence; controlling behaviour such as stalking, monitoring activities and financial control; intimidation, threats to family members, or making false allegations to the police or to employers; litigation abuse; and preventing the victim from seeing family and friends, working, or participating in other educational or recreative activities (see, e.g., Divorce Act, s. 2(1); Stark (2023), at pp. 15-16).
[188] These examples, which are not meant to be exhaustive, illustrate that the tort captures controlling conduct that may not otherwise rise to the level of tortious conduct under existing torts which have a different focus. The new tort dispels the mythology that intimate partner violence must be punctuated by egregious incidents of physical or psychological abuse. I recall that, in Ms. Ahluwalia’s marriage, she endured “silent treatment” and denigration that undermined her autonomy in the relationship. Intimate partner violence can comprise psychological interference or harassment that would not rise to the threshold of “flagrant or outrageous” required by IIED but, because it can be understood as part of a low-grade pressure that objectively brings about domination in the relationship, stands as wrongful under the new tort. What matters is not the number or frequency of incidents, but the effect on the protected interests of the victim. Considered in its context, even a single act of violence may objectively constitute coercive control and bring the conduct within the scope of this tort. The abusive character of the alleged conduct becomes evident once the plaintiff establishes that it objectively constitutes coercive control under the third element.
[189] Third, the abusive conduct must, on an objective measure, constitute coercive control. When abuse arises in an intimate partnership, the burden that the plaintiff bears will generally be readily met. This is because a reasonable person would be likely to regard abusive conduct — even where it consists of a single act of violence — as incompatible with the dignity, autonomy, and equality inherent in an intimate partnership, unlike misconduct between persons at arm’s length. Such conduct exploits and violates the trust between intimate partners (Carey, at pp. 698-99). It is the intimate partnership context that allows an individual “to shape discrete acts into patterns of dominance that entrap partners and make them subordinate” (Stark (2023), at p. 249). Two points merit further explanation: first, what constitutes coercive control, and second, how judges may deploy an objective standard to assess whether the abusive conduct constitutes coercive control.
[190] Coercive control has been broadly described as conduct that non-exhaustively includes tactics of isolation; manipulation; humiliation; surveillance; physical, psychological, sexual, and economic abuse; and intimidation that can control, isolate, and entrap intimate partners; it is “a way to encompass and understand the use of a range of behaviours to control and restrict victims”, rather than being a specific form of conduct (K. L. Scott et al., “Coercive Control and Family Court in an Intersectional Context”, in Bala et al., Understanding Family Violence in Family Court Proceedings, 35, at p. 37, citing K. A. Crossman and J. L. Hardesty, “Placing Coercive Control at the Center: What Are the Processes of Coercive Control and What Makes Control Coercive?” (2018), 8 Psychology of Violence 196). Central to coercive control is the idea that “[i]t operates through a power dynamic where one partner exerts dominance over the other” (P. G. Jaffe et al., “Recognizing the Impact of Family Violence on Parents and Children: Translating Legal Reforms into Practice”, in Bala et al., Understanding Family Violence in Family Court Proceedings, 1, at p. 8; Bala, Maur and Houston, at p. 69). The intervener Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic similarly emphasizes that the relevant conduct is “designed to assert dominance, coercion, and control over intimate relationships” (I.F., at para. 18; see also I.F., Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, at para. 4; I.F., Luke’s Place, at para. 9). As Professor Stark explains, coercive control involves “a ‘course of conduct’ . . . embedded in control structures, that has cumulative effects” ((2023), at p. 129). Accordingly, the individual is subject to a “‘condition of unfreedom’ . . . that is experienced as entrapment” (E. Stark and M. Hester, “Coercive Control: Update and Review” (2019), 25 Violence Against Women 81, at p. 89 (emphasis deleted), citing E. Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (2007), at p. 205).
[191] Coercive control is key to understanding intimate partner violence for two reasons. First, it “exposes dimensions of partner abuse that have gone largely unnoticed”, including particularly subtle acts undertaken over a period of time that may not appear abusive outside their relational context (Stark (2023), at p. 254). Multiple interveners emphasize “pattern” or “strategy” as a key attribute (see I.F., Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, at para. 4; I.F., Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic, at para. 18). Luke’s Place, for example, describes “a pattern of cumulative, often-repetitive abuse, in conjunction with coercive behaviour” (I.F., at para. 9, citing House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, The Shadow Pandemic: Stopping Coercive and Controlling Behaviour in Intimate Relationships — Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 2nd Sess., 43rd Parl., April 2021). Similarly, the intervener Attorney General of British Columbia asserts that the coercive control lens captures conduct “not adequately addressed by existing common law torts . . . used by perpetrators as part of a constellation of physical, verbal, sexual, psychological, emotional, and/or financial abuse” (I.F., at para. 21).
[192] The emphasis on pattern, however, does not mean that only multiple acts of abuse qualify as coercive control. Rather, it calls on judges to be attuned to the context in which a wrongful act or acts occurred, including the power dynamics of the intimate partnership and any subtle acts that may appear innocuous in isolation. As Hayden J. observes in an English case, “the significance of isolated incidents can only truly be understood in the context of a much wider picture” (F. v. M., at para. 60). Indeed, viewing intimate partner violence through the lens of coercive control dispels the myth that isolated acts — or even a single act of violence — occur in a vacuum. Karakatsanis J. explained in Barendregt that “proof of even one incident may raise safety concerns for the victim” (para. 144; see also S. Zaccour and M. Lessard, “Le droit de la famille: Avancées et défis depuis la reconnaissance de la violence familiale et du contrôle coercitif”, in Lapierre, Côté and Frenette, Contrôle coercitif, 223, at p. 232). A single act of violence, when considered in context, may objectively constitute coercive control if its impact on the victim undermines their dignity, autonomy, and equality within the relationship. As scholar Linda C. Neilson explained in her report presented to the Department of Justice, “[a] single act of violence or emotional intimidation should be classified as a pattern of domestic violence if it causes lingering fear” and may thus be characterized as “coercive intimate partner violence” ((2013), at p. 32 and fn. 44). Courts must therefore examine the totality of the alleged abusive conduct — regardless of whether each act is independently tortious — to determine the cumulative effects over the victim, keeping in mind the “interconnected nature of the different physical and non-physical behaviour patterns that constitute coercive control” (Wiener, at p. 17). Coercive control focuses on “a cumulative effect that is far greater than the mere sum of its parts” (Stark (2023), at p. 120). It is crucial for judges to be attuned to coercive behaviour in all of its manifestations and the context in which it occurs.
[193] Second, coercive control excludes violence — which may be tortious on another basis — that does not interfere with the victim’s dignity, autonomy, and equality, particularly violence associated with resistance against an intimate partner’s attempts at domination or control. When an intimate partner strikes out as an act of resistance against their aggressor, the victim has not acted in a controlling or coercive manner, and the new tort should not cover this conduct (M. P. Johnson, A Typology of Domestic Violence: Intimate Terrorism, Violent Resistance, and Situational Couple Violence (2008), at p. 5; Bala, Maur and Houston, at pp. 69-70; Department of Justice). Studies confirm that many women respond to abuse with violent acts of resistance (see Johnson, at pp. 51-53; Kelly and Johnson, at pp. 484-85). These instances of intimate partner violence often “result in false identification of the victim as a perpetrator or as an equal participant” when the context in which the acts occurred is overlooked (L. C. Neilson, “Assessing Mutual Partner-Abuse Claims in Child Custody and Access Cases” (2004), 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 411, at p. 426). Furthermore, victims responding to abuse with acts of resistance may have difficulty claiming self-defence (see Neilson (2013), at pp. 31-32, fn. 43; V. Bettinson and N. Wake, “A New Self-Defence Framework for Domestic Abuse Survivors Who Use Violent Resistance in Response” (2024), 87 Mod. L. Rev. 141, at p. 152). An overinclusive new tort that captures acts of resistance risks exposing victims of intimate partner violence to retaliatory claims by perpetrators and may inhibit victims of coercive control from coming forward, thereby raising barriers of access to justice (Sowter and Koshan, at p. 343).
[194] The risk is further heightened by the fact that abusers frequently utilize litigation as a tool “to continue to dominate and maintain contact and control following separation” and to deflect attention from their own role as the aggressor (Neilson (2004), at p. 419). Litigation abuse — where intimate partners utilize the legal system as a tool “to coerce, control, harass, undermine and dominate” their intimate partners — is a well-documented tactic frequently employed by abusers to control survivors (L. C. Neilson, Responding to Domestic Family Violence in Family Law, Civil Protection & Child Protection Cases (3rd ed. 2025), 2017 CanLIIDocs 2 (online), at para. 7.4.1; see C. Caro, Violence judiciaire: le contrôle post-séparation, November 13, 2025 (online); see, e.g., Droit de la famille — 231579, 2023 QCCS 3557, at para. 40, aff’d 2023 QCCA 1547; F.S. v. M.B.T., 2023 ONCJ 102, 89 R.F.L. (8th) 442, at para. 142). As the intervener NAWL submits, and I agree, this Court must “minimiz[e] the risk that [the new tort] will be weaponized against victims of family violence” (I.F., at para. 5). In addressing litigation abuse, Chappel J. emphasized in Levely v. Levely, 2013 ONSC 1026, at para. 12, that judges must ensure legal proceedings “are not hijacked by a party and transformed into a process for further victimizing the other party”. Centring the inquiry on the deprivation of autonomy caused by coercive control allows courts to “identify false claims brought by the abuser” (I.F., NAWL, at para. 16).
[195] An additional point bears emphasis. One purpose of tort law is to enable litigants to vindicate their rights (Hill, at para. 166; see also J. N. E. Varuhas, “The Concept of ‘Vindication’ in the Law of Torts: Rights, Interests and Damages” (2014), 34 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 253; Klar and Jefferies, at p. 11). Anchoring the new tort in coercive control distinguishes abuse perpetrated by an intimate partner from other forms of violence, including acts of resistance by victims. Failing to draw that distinction would “do families, men, women and children a disservice” by allowing abusers to subvert the justice system to blame and manipulate victims (Neilson (2013), at p. 35; E. Sheehy and S. B. Boyd, “Penalizing women’s fear: intimate partner violence and parental alienation in Canadian child custody cases” (2020), 42 J. Soc. Welfare & Fam. L. 80, at pp. 87-88). Labelling acts of resistance as “intimate partner violence” without recognizing the distinct wrong suffered by the victim of abuse could therefore perpetuate the kind of manipulation and victim-blaming that so often characterizes relationships involving coercive control (Sheehy and Boyd, at pp. 87-88). An overinclusive tort that risks casting victims as tortfeasors of intimate partner violence is an outcome that would undermine the very reason for recognizing the new tort.
[196] Furthermore, coercive control is best understood as abusive conduct and not simply antisocial conduct that often characterizes high conflict relationship breakdown (see Johnson, at p. 11; Bala, Maur and Houston, at p. 70). Courts should refrain from imposing liability based on the inevitable ups and downs of a relationship or for mere dysfunction. Again, an intimate partnership may suffer from dishonesty, infidelity, emotional neglect, lack of maturity, or even cold and dismissive conduct; it may be altogether antagonistic and disagreeable. In some cases, however, violence between intimate partners will not occur in isolation, but within a broader relational context — often over time — that reveals, on an objective measure, the coercive conduct to be wrongful (Sheehy, at p. 144). Partners who respect one another’s dignity, autonomy, and equality are unlikely to be physically violent with one another.
[197] Turning to the objective standard that judges must deploy to assess the abusive conduct, the question is whether a reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant context of the relationship, would have perceived the conduct as coercive control. For example, the victim’s known vulnerability to the defendant will influence how a reasonable person perceives the impugned conduct (see American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2010), at § 46). In such a context, a single act of violence, on its own, may serve to exploit the power dynamics within the intimate partnership, thereby rendering the victim subordinate to their abuser (I.F., PATHS, at para. 26). As I mentioned, the burden will ordinarily be readily met by the plaintiff, since a reasonable person would perceive abusive conduct to be fundamentally incompatible with an intimate partnership. Often, as was the case for Ms. Ahluwalia, violent conduct forms part of a broader pattern of distinct abusive conduct that together constitute coercive control. However, in certain circumstances, a single act of violence, may, where it meets this standard, constitute coercive control.
[198] The coercive control lens calls for an inquiry that asks whether the defendant’s conduct has objectively undermined the plaintiff’s ability to make fundamental decisions pertaining to their own life or to meaningfully participate in decision making that concerns the intimate partnership. Coercive control constitutes “breaking down a victim’s will” such that “the victim’s individual decision-making ability” is removed (Maur (2023), at p. 110). As the Court recognized in Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, at para. 212, “a legacy of abuse” can “colour the parties’ interactions”, even after the relationship ends. Competent adults are entitled to decide their own fate (A.C., at para. 40, citing Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment), [1992] 4 All E.R. 649 (C.A.), at p. 661). Conduct that objectively undermines an intimate partner’s ability to meaningfully exercise this right, therefore, amounts to coercive control. Evidence adduced by a defendant showing that the victim could make some decisions for themselves — such as leaving the relationship, as in this case, or returning after the abuse — does not preclude a finding of coercive control. The victim need not prove that they experienced a complete loss of autonomy, nor can the defendant be absolved of a past wrong by pointing to some notional reconciliation.
[199] Once it is established that the defendant’s intentional conduct objectively constitutes coercive control, the resulting loss of autonomy suffered by the plaintiff in the intimate partnership follows as a matter of course, requiring no separate proof of harm. Any intimate partnership entails a certain degree of sacrifice of personal freedom; partners make choices in service of a common life that do not always accord with their personal desires. This mutual compromise reflects the reciprocity inherent in intimate partnerships. Distinct from the shared compromises that are part of intimate partnerships, coercive control by an aggressor meaningfully constrains the victim’s freedom to live their own life within the intimate partnership beyond the ordinary expectations of the relationship. Intimate partners have a right to be treated by one another as equals, and abusive conduct that serves to coerce or control one partner and places the other in a position of dominance constitutes a civil wrong under this new tort.
[200] Put differently, under conditions of coercive control, the victim is no longer their partner’s equal; they are deprived, through abuse, of the freedom to make choices in relation to those things that matter the most to them, which can include whether to pursue a career, maintain a relationship with their family and friends, and generally to pursue their own happiness. Within an intimate partnership, autonomy and equality are legal interests that are both animated by dignity. When a victim of intimate partner violence has, by reason of abusive conduct that objectively constitutes coercive control, been deprived of their personal autonomy and equal place in the partnership, it undermines their dignity. The design of the tort elements accords with Professor Stark’s observation that, in coercive control, “[t]he victim’s agency is its principal target”, resulting in a loss of autonomy ((2023), at p. 257). It is this dignitary harm that the new tort seeks to remedy.
[201] Properly construed, the trial judge’s three “modes of liability” fall under a single framework encompassing all forms of conduct where they exert coercive control over an intimate partner, including acts that are “violent or threatening” or “caus[e] the plaintiff to fear for their own safety or that of another person” (para. 52). Under the new tort, such conduct is tortious not because it causes physical or psychological harm, but because it results in a loss of autonomy and inequality of an intimate partner. A threat of violence between strangers may amount to tortious assault, but the same threat, uttered in the context of an intimate partnership, may also function as a tool of coercive control, thereby altering the victim’s behaviour to avert future harm. Likewise, a flagrant or outrageous remark may support a claim for emotional distress, but the same remark, when made in the context of an abusive relationship, may have the effect of subordinating an intimate partner. By the same token, a subtle insinuation that may not rise to the level of assault between strangers, or low-level emotional abuse that may not be “flagrant” when viewed in isolation, could still undermine the dignity, autonomy, and equality of an intimate partner when viewed in light of a broader pattern of conduct. Such conduct may constitute a tortious wrong within the intimate partnership because it contributes to the violation of the victim’s right to be treated with respect as an equal and autonomous partner.
[202] Finally, the tort of intimate partner violence reflects an appropriately incremental development that is “necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society” (Salituro, at p. 670, cited in Hill, at para. 85). The new tort does not raise the same difficulties as the tort of family violence as defined by the trial judge. Unlike the tort of family violence, the elements of the new tort are closely tailored to the wrongful conduct at issue (see, e.g., A.A., at para. 300) and specifically addresses the gap left by existing torts (Wainwright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 A.C. 406, at para. 18). Recognizing a broader tort that encompasses wrongs already adequately redressed by existing torts is inconsistent with the incremental development of tort law. In Jones, Sharpe J.A. recognized intrusion upon seclusion as a new tort — carefully responding to the facts before the court — rather than embracing a more expansive approach adopting the four privacy torts developed in the U.S. (para. 18). He explained that “[a] cause of action of any wider breadth would not only over-reach what is necessary to resolve this case, but could also amount to an unmanageable legal proposition that would . . . breed confusion and uncertainty” (para. 21).
[203] Here, the trial judge’s second mode of liability (conduct that “constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour”) properly and precisely identified the gap that existing torts failed to address for intimate partner violence, drawing on Ms. Ahluwalia’s submissions describing a “pattern of violent and controlling conduct” (paras. 34 and 52; see also para. 35) and the relevant evidence adduced. The trial judge noted that these facts disclose “unique elements that justify recognition of a unique cause of action” and that coercive control involves “uniquely harmful aspects of family violence” that are unaddressed by existing torts (para. 54; see also para. 59). Her first and third modes of liability, however, overlap fully with existing torts, as she acknowledged. In this exercise, courts are guided by the principle ubi jus ibi remedium (“where there is law (a right) there is a remedy” (J. Gray, Lawyers’ Latin: A Vade-Mecum (2006), at p. 133)), a maxim relied upon by the Court when considering the recognition of new grounds for tort liability (Nevsun, at para. 118, citing Sidaway v. Gov. of Bethlem Royal Hospital, [1985] 1 A.C. 871 (H.L.), at p. 884). Only where there is a right for which the existing torts cannot provide relief should the courts fashion a new remedy to fill the gap.
[204] The new tort recognized in these reasons is responsive to the intimate character of such relationships in a way that existing torts are not, by confronting the harm to dignity, autonomy, and equality in intimate partnerships (Réaume, at p. 93). The evolution of the common law proposed here is constrained to fill the void left by established torts that have proved insensitive to coercive control as a distinct wrong on intimate partnerships (Maur (2023), at p. 117). The consequences of such recognition are neither complex nor indeterminate but are instead properly tailored to the wrongful conduct at issue, seeking to “defin[e] the precise contours of a legal right” (Sharpe, at p. 199). It builds upon precedents and existing social and legal understanding of intimate partner violence. In aligning the common law with the legal and societal consensus against such a wrong, the courts are well within their proper domain and function (ibid.; Goudkamp, at pp. 65-66). To constrain its development when the “social facts, values, concerns, and expectations” that judges legitimately consider in adjudication of private law disputes so clearly cry out for such a change would undermine the vital social functions that the law serves in our society (J. Stapleton, Three Essays on Torts (2021), at p. 26; see also p. 1).
(d) Summary of the Elements for Establishing Liability Under the Tort of Intimate Partner Violence
[205] To summarize, in making a finding of liability under the tort of intimate partner violence, a trial judge must assess whether the evidence establishes all three elements and evaluate the quantum of damages required to remedy the resulting harm. The burden of proof rests with the plaintiff on the civil standard of balance of probabilities.
[206] First, the defendant’s wrongful conduct must have occurred during the course of an intimate partnership or in its aftermath.
[207] Second, the defendant must have intentionally engaged in the abusive conduct. The plaintiff need only show that the defendant intended to engage in the impugned conduct, not that they subjectively intended to control their intimate partner. With respect to the abusive conduct itself, the plaintiff must adduce specific evidence to make out the tort claim. However, evidence may show a range of abusive conduct that appears less harmful in isolation but which may, considered cumulatively, form a pattern of coercive control. For guidance, the following are some types of conduct that are capable of constituting coercive control: physical and sexual violence; emotional and psychological abuse, including verbal abuse; harassment, humiliation, and denigration; financial control, stalking, and surveillance; behaviour that isolates a partner from others, or that denies a partner access to educational, employment, and recreational opportunities; litigation abuse; and threatening conduct, including threatening to harm the children or take them away, and threatening to commit suicide (see United Kingdom, Home Office, Controlling or Coercive Behaviour: Statutory Guidance Framework, April 5, 2023 (online), at pp. 15-16; Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, National Framework for Police Intervention in Intimate Partner Coercive Control, July 2025 (online), at pp. 5-7). The foregoing list is merely illustrative and should not be treated as exhaustive.
[208] Third, the plaintiff must show the conduct to be, on an objective measure, coercive control. The trial judge must determine whether a reasonable person, fully apprised of the relevant context of the relationship, would have perceived the defendant’s acts, considered cumulatively, as amounting to an assertion of control over the plaintiff that has the effect of depriving them of their dignity, autonomy, and equality in the relationship. The key feature of coercive control is, on an objective measure, the breakdown of the plaintiff’s will, manifested through a diminished power to decide important matters in their own life or to meaningfully take part in decisions that affect the intimate partnership. Neither the timing of the commencement of the claim nor when the plaintiff left the relationship has any necessary bearing on whether the plaintiff can successfully establish this element. The threshold serves an essential limiting function by anchoring the tort in the deprivation of autonomy, but where circumstances show that the reasonable person would conclude that the abusive conduct is incompatible with the intimate partnership, the burden will be readily met. In particular, courts must of course take care not to mischaracterize a victim’s resistance to a partner’s attempt at domination, or all misconduct in a high conflict breakdown, as coercive control under the new tort. Mere dysfunction of an intimate partnership, or a relationship marked by an imbalance between the parties in the absence of coercive control, is not intimate partner violence in this sense. But at the same time, trial judges must be cautious not to “subject evidence of non-physical [intimate partner violence] to heightened suspicion or skepticism, minimize it, or misattribute its harms to a high conflict relationship or post-separation emotionality” (I.F., WCLEAF and RWLC, at para. 29; Sowter and Koshan, at p. 340).
[209] Proof by the plaintiff of these three elements establishes liability under the tort of intimate partner violence. The plaintiff’s dignitary harm flows from proof of the intentional wrong and does not require proof of other consequential harms. On this basis, the trial judge may then award general compensatory damages to provide redress for the harm to dignity, autonomy, and equality suffered through coercive control, as well as any other harm that flows therefrom.
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