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Torts - Defamation - Injunction. Miranda v. Balita Media Inc. [defamation injunction]
In Miranda v. Balita Media Inc. (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal (mostly) dismissed a newspaper defendent's defamation appeal, here where the trial judge "allowed the action and awarded general damages of $150,000 and punitive damages of $100,000, together with costs", and a permanent expressive injunction.
Here the court considered appellate amendments to a defamation injunction:[29] Fourth, the appellants submit that the trial judge made an error of law in imposing an overly broad and vague permanent injunction. Notwithstanding that they consented to the form of judgment, including the injunctive terms, the appellants submit that they did so as directed by the trial judge, and in any event the injunction lacks any temporal limitation and imposes a prior restraint on a community newspaper that is so broad it constitutes an error of law.
[30] In his supplementary reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated that his decision “justifies the granting of a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to refrain from further defamatory publications concerning the plaintiff and to remove all publications and social media posts that are not subject to the limitations defence. This latter part of the injunction would be best achieved by wording setting out the start date for the publications captured by the injunction”.
[31] The judgment provides as follows:3. THIS COURT ORDERS that the defendants shall be permanently enjoined from, directly or indirectly, publishing and/or broadcasting, or encouraging or assisting others to publish or broadcast any statements about the plaintiff, in any manner whatsoever, which in their plain or ordinary meaning or by innuendo be similar to the defamatory statements made in the December 18, 2022 Balita article titled “BEWARE… Toronto scammers abound around us!” or the statements of the defendant, Teresita “Tess” Cusipag, on social media concerning the plaintiff. [32] An ongoing injunction for defamation is an exceptional remedy.
[33] Injunctive relief must be broad enough to be effective, but no broader than reasonably necessary to effect compliance: Labourers' International Union of North America, Local 183 v. Castellano, 2020 ONCA 71, 444 D.L.R. (4th) 183, at paras. 18-19.
[34] The injunction imposed here has no temporal restrictions and is permanent in duration. In the circumstances of this case, and given the conduct of the appellants, it was open to the trial judge to award an injunction that was permanent in nature.
[35] However, the scope of the injunction is overly broad, not proportionate and not properly defined. The order enjoins the appellants from publishing any statements about the respondent “which in their plain or ordinary meaning or by innuendo be similar” to the defamatory statements made in the December 18, 2022 article or by Ms. Cusipag on social media. It does not define, and the trial judge does not provide an exhaustive list of, the specific defamatory statements in either the articles or on social media the publication of which is enjoined, either by reference to the libel notices issued or at all.
[36] In imposing the injunction with such a scope, the trial judge made an order that was both broader than reasonably necessary to effect compliance and also incapable in practical terms of enforcement. The language of the injunction lacks precision as well as scope and invites questions about whether statements are defamatory or not.
[37] Accordingly, paragraph three of the judgment is set aside to be replaced with a new paragraph that accords with these reasons. The record, including but not limited to the illustrative and imprecise definition of the specific defamatory statements complained of in the libel notice, is such that this Court is unable to determine the terms of a properly scaled and defined injunction order.
[38] We encourage the parties to agree on revised language of an order to be submitted to the trial judge or another judge of the Superior Court of Justice as may be directed by the Regional Senior Justice for the Toronto Region, for consideration. If they cannot agree, the scope of injunctive relief will be determined by the Superior Court.
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