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CTA - Consumer (2). Air Canada v. Landry
In Air Canada v. Landry (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a Small Claims Court appeal (by Air Canada), this brought against an order "awarding damages to each of the Respondents as a result of delayed flights and denial of boarding".
Here the court considers the Montreal Convention [under the Carriage by Air Act] and the Air Passenger Protection Regulations [under the Canada Transportation Act]:The Alleged Montreal Convention Error
[14] Air Canada raises a preliminary issue that the Deputy Judge demonstrated his lack of understanding of the applicable regime when he wrote that each respondent was entitled to $1,000 compensation, “whether the APPR or the Montreal Convention is relied upon.” It is true that this is an incorrect statement of law. The standardized compensation of $1,000 is available only through the APPR. However, the Appellant does not point to how this misstatement effected the Deputy Judge’s analysis with respect to damages that were ordered pursuant to the Montreal Convention. I conclude that it had no effect, as is clear from his reasoning.
[15] The Appellant’s real complaint is two-fold. First, that the Deputy Judge erred in holding that damages for “breach of contract” were available under the Montreal Convention. Second, it is alleged that the Deputy Judge erred in failing to find that the term “delay” in Article 19 of the Montreal Convention means “reasonable delay.”
[16] I do not accept that the Deputy Judge made either of these errors.
[17] Article 19 of the Montreal Convention reads as follows:The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures [emphasis added]. [18] Article 22 of the Montreal Convention limits the amount of damages that can be claimed in relation to any delays that have occurred.
[19] The Deputy Judge found that Air Canada did not prove that it had taken all measures reasonably required to avoid the delay. That finding is entitled to deference on appeal. Indeed, the Appellant does not challenge that finding. As a result, the Respondent was entitled, pursuant to the Montreal Convention, to damages occasioned by the delay. Although the Deputy Judge used the phrase “breach of contract,” he ordered damages that flowed directly from the delay. Not only was he entitled to do so, Article 19 of the Montreal Convention required him to. The amount ordered was below the threshold set out in Article 22. The use of the phrase “breach of contract” does not detract from the Deputy Judge’s analysis of what damages flowed from the delay caused by Air Canada.
[20] The Appellant further argues that because the Respondent pre-emptively booked a new flight, there is no evidence as to what the actual delay would have been if Air Canada had rebooked them. As a result, the Respondent is not entitled to damages. It is submitted that there is a sound policy reason for ensuring that passengers do not “skip the queue” by rebooking before the airline has had an opportunity to do so.
[21] In light of the evidence led at trial and the factual findings made by the Deputy Judge, this argument has no merit.
[22] There was evidence at trial that Air Canada has a re-booking tool that will attempt to automatically re-book the passenger on a later flight(s) to their ultimate destination if there are delays and, if the tool is successful, the passenger will receive a notification of their revised itinerary upon the first flight. When the automated tool does not re-book the passenger, for whatever reason, the passenger must seek assistance from Air Canada and request re-booking from the appropriate agent at the airport or call Air Canada’s call centre, which is open 24 hours a day. However, there was no evidence that the re-booking tool had been activated or that Air Canada made any other attempt to rebook the Respondent. There was no evidence that the Respondent had been informed that he must wait to be rebooked. In fact, there is nothing in the tariff or in the Montreal Convention that states that a passenger must wait to accept a new flight from the airline. On the contrary, there was uncontradicted evidence that an Air Canada employee had told the Respondent that he had made the right decision to rebook.
[23] As noted by the Deputy Judge, this entire claim could have been avoided if Air Canada, in its multitude of emails to its waiting passengers in Montreal, had clearly stated words to the effect that he should not make any attempts to rebook and that Air Canada would do it automatically.
[24] It is not the role of this Court to ignore the evidence led at trial and the findings of fact made by the Deputy Judge in order to fashion a policy that one of the parties believes would be “sound.”
The Alleged Delay vs. Refund Error
[25] The Deputy Judge found that the Respondent arrived in Lisbon on July 4th - 24 hours and 20 minutes after the originally scheduled time.
[26] S. 19 of the APPR reads as follows:(1) If paragraph 12(2)(d) or (3)(d) applies to a carrier, it must provide the following minimum compensation:
(a) in the case of a large carrier,
(i) $400, if the arrival of the passenger’s flight at the destination that is indicated on the original ticket is delayed by three hours or more, but less than six hours,
(ii) $700, if the arrival of the passenger’s flight at the destination that is indicated on the original ticket is delayed by six hours or more, but less than nine hours, or
(iii) $1,000, if the arrival of the passenger’s flight at the destination that is indicated on the original ticket is delayed by nine hours or more; [27] Section 19(2) of the APPR section limits the delay compensation to $400 in the event the passenger’s ticket is refunded under section 17(2), which states:If the alternate travel arrangements offered in accordance with subsection (1) do not accommodate the passenger’s travel needs, the carrier must
(a) if the passenger is no longer at the point of origin that is indicated on the original ticket and the travel no longer serves a purpose because of the delay, cancellation or denial of boarding, refund the ticket and provide to the passenger, free of charge, a confirmed reservation for a flight to that point of origin that accommodates the passenger’s travel needs; and
(b) in any other case, refund the unused portion of the ticket [emphasis added]. [28] The Appellant submits that, in the context of Sections 12(2) and 17 of the APPR, section 19 should be interpreted as providing standardized compensation in the case of delay only when the passenger accepts an alternative travel arrangement offered by the carrier under the original contract of carriage pursuant to Section 17 of the APPR. If the passenger is not provided with or rejects an alternative travel arrangement by a carrier, then the carrier is obligated to provide a refund of the unused portion of the ticket pursuant to Section 17 and provide standardized compensation of $400.00 in the case of a large carrier pursuant to Section 19(2) of the APPR.
[29] I do not accept the Appellant’s submission. On a plain reading of the legislation, section 17(2) is only invoked if the airline has offered the passenger alternative travel arrangements. In other words, an offer of alternative travel arrangements is a prerequisite to the application of both sections 17(2) and 19(2). The Deputy Judge found as a fact that no such alternative travel arrangements were offered in this case. While Air Canada eventually provided a refund, it did not do so in accordance with subsection 17(2) because it had not offered alternative travel arrangements. As a result, section 17(2) has no application here. Absent the applicability of section 17(2), the proper compensation provision is that found in section 19(1)(a)(iii). The Deputy Judge was correct to award standard compensation in the amount of $1,000 to the Respondent. . Westjet v. Lareau
In Westjet v. Lareau (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a Federal Court appeal, this where the "legal question before this Court is the scope of the safety category: when is a flight disruption "“within the carrier’s control but ... required for safety purposes”" under section 11 of the Regulations?"
Here the court summarizes this aviation consumer protection case:[1] A decade ago, a review of Canada’s transportation system and of the legal and regulatory frameworks which govern it reported that while Canada’s airlines were frequently ranked among the best in the world, Canadians were very concerned with the unsatisfactory treatment of airline passengers affected by delays, cancellations, and denials of boarding (each a disruption or flight disruption). The review concluded that legislative and regulatory reform was needed to ensure the fair and reasonable treatment of air travellers.
[2] In 2019, legislative amendments led to the promulgation of the Air Passenger Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2019-150 [the Regulations]. The amendments directed the Canadian Transportation Agency, after consulting with the Minister of Transport (the Minister), to make regulations in relation to flights to, from, and within Canada, that prescribed air carriers’ obligations towards passengers in the event of a flight disruption. Depending on which of three categories of flight disruptions applies in a particular case, carriers are required to (i) ensure that passengers complete their itinerary, (ii) meet minimum standards of treatment, and/or (iii) in some circumstances, pay passengers minimum compensation for inconvenience. Under the Regulations, a carrier owes its passengers compensation only for inconvenience caused by a disruption within its control (the "“within control”" category). It owes them no compensation in the case of a disruption within its control but required for safety purposes (the safety category) or where a disruption is due to situations outside its control (the "“outside control”" category).
[3] In the decision on appeal to this Court (the Decision), the Agency, also charged with investigating and adjudicating passenger complaints under the Regulations, stated that disruptions within the safety category should be limited to events that "“cannot be foreseen nor prevented or, in other words, that cannot be prevented by a prudent and diligent carrier.”" It held that a disruption resulting from a crew shortage should not be considered to fall within the safety category unless the carrier demonstrates that the disruption could not have been reasonably prevented, or was unavoidable, despite proper planning and did not result from the carrier’s own actions or inactions.
[4] The appellant, WestJet, submits that the Agency’s interpretation ignores the plain and ordinary meaning of the Regulations, which essentially define a flight disruption required for safety purposes as one that is "“required by law in order to reduce risk to passenger safety.”" It argues that passengers should receive no compensation for any flight disruption that arises in response to a safety issue, regardless of the circumstances that have led to the safety issue, including a carrier’s failure to take reasonable measures to develop and implement a reasonable contingency plan to mitigate the disruption. Moreover, in the appellant’s view, the Agency’s interpretation of the safety category cannot stand because it puts pressure on carriers and their personnel to choose to operate flights unsafely in order to avoid paying their passengers compensation.
[5] I disagree. The Agency did not err in interpreting and applying the Regulations. The appellant’s proposed interpretation of the safety category would effectively defeat the consumer protection scheme established by the Regulations to redress the acute imbalance in market power to which passengers have historically been subjected in relation to air carriers. It must be rejected.
[6] Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation, a disruption is "“within a carrier’s control but required for safety purposes”" when the carrier incurs that disruption to reduce a risk to passenger safety despite having taken reasonable measures 1) to plan and conduct its day-to-day operations in such a manner as to avoid the occurrence of situations causing that risk and 2) to follow a reasonable contingency plan developed to effectively and expeditiously reduce the risk. . Westjet v. Lareau
In Westjet v. Lareau (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a Federal Court appeal, this where the "legal question before this Court is the scope of the safety category: when is a flight disruption "“within the carrier’s control but ... required for safety purposes”" under section 11 of the Regulations?"
Here the court summarizes the CTA Air Passenger Protection Regulations:C. The promulgation of the Air Passenger Protection Regulations
[24] Promulgated on May 21, 2019, the Regulations were implemented in two stages to give carriers the time to make the necessary systems and operational changes. Accordingly, while some of the provisions came into force on July 15, 2019, those relating to seating, delays, and cancellations only came into effect on December 15, 2019.
[25] The provisions of the Regulations relevant to this appeal are reproduced in an appendix to these reasons.
[26] Under the Regulations, minimum compensation for inconvenience is owed only in the case of disruptions that are within a carrier’s control (Regulations, s 12(1)) and, in the case of a delay or cancellation, where a passenger is informed of the disruption 14 days or less before the departure time indicated on the original ticket (Regulations, ss 12(2)(d) and 12(3)(d)). It is not owed for:. a disruption due to situations outside a carrier’s control described by subsection 10(1);
. a disruption that is within a carrier’s control but that is required for safety purposes under subsection 11(1);
a disruption that, under subsection 10(2), is a knock-on effect of a delay or cancellation due to situations that are outside the carrier’s control; or
. a disruption that, under subsection 11(2), is a knock-on effect of a delay or cancellation within a carrier’s control but required for safety purposes. [27] Subsection 19(1) of the Regulations sets out the minimum compensation amounts payable to passengers to whom compensation is owed under paragraphs 12(2)(d) (for delay) and 12(3)(d) (for cancellation). These amounts increase the more the arrival of the passenger’s flight at the destination is delayed, and are larger for "“large carriers,”" defined as carriers that have transported a worldwide total of two million passengers or more during each of the two preceding calendar years (Regulations, s 1(2)). To receive compensation for a flight delay or cancellation, passengers must file a request with the carrier within a year of the day the flight disruption occurred (Regulations, s 19(3)). Subsequently, upon receipt of the request, the carrier has 30 days to provide the compensation or an explanation as to why it is not payable (Regulations, s 19(4)). Similarly, subsection 20(1) of the Regulations sets out the minimum compensation amounts for a denial of boarding (Regulations, s 12(4)(d)).
[28] The compensation owed by carriers to passengers under subsections 19(1) and 20(1) of the Regulations is summarized in the following tables:**** SS: Charts here, see original. **** [29] Under subsection 86.11(4) of the CTA, the carriers’ obligations established under the Regulations are deemed to form part of the terms and conditions set out in the carriers’ tariffs, insofar as these do not provide more advantageous terms and conditions of carriage than those obligations.
[30] At the time of the events underlying this appeal, section 67.1 of the CTA provided that when a carrier failed to comply with these obligations, passengers could file a complaint with the Agency. If the Agency determined that the carrier had failed to apply its tariffs, contrary to subsection 67(3) of the CTA, it could order the carrier to take corrective measures, including payment of the required compensation. Detailed provisions governing the filing, mediation, and adjudication of complaints under the Regulations are now set out in sections 85.01 to 85.16 of the CTA. At paras 31-42 the court addresses CTA guidance on the interpretation of these regulations.
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