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JR - SOR - 'Reasonableness Review' - General. The Professional Conduct Committee of the CPAO v. Siddiqi [a non-JR 'reasonableness review']
In The Professional Conduct Committee of the CPAO v. Siddiqi (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a CPAO-initiated JR, this brought against a CPAO Appeal Decision that the Registrar readmit a former accountant who "was convicted of three counts of knowingly making a false statement in an application to obtain a small business loan, ...", and consequently had his license revoked.
Here the court considered a statutory administrative appellate 'reasonableness' standard [ie. not a JR/Vavilov 'reasonableness', but one under CPAOA, 2017 s.37(5)]:The Appeal Panel did not conduct a reasonableness review
[62] The Appeal Panel’s reasons for finding the Reconsideration Decision to be unreasonable are summarized in the following paragraph of the Appeal Decision, which for ease of reference is reproduced again:[80] The Appeal Panel finds that the Reconsideration Panel’s decision was unreasonable in that it placed disproportionate emphasis on the Appellant’s failure to express remorse in the manner expected and insufficient emphasis on his substantial rehabilitative efforts in the last 20 years. The Reconsideration Panel’s misapprehension of some of the evidence, set out above, contributed to their failure to fully appreciate the evidence of the Appellant’s rehabilitation. [63] As Vavilov makes clear, the reasonableness of a decision may be undermined if the decision maker fundamentally misapprehended the evidence before it. Absent such a misapprehension or a failure to consider relevant evidence or a reliance on evidence that was not before it, an adjudicative body that is conducting a reasonableness review is not to reweigh or reassess the evidence considered by the original decision maker.
[64] On the issue of remorse, the Reconsideration Panel concluded, after hearing Mr. Siddiqi testify, that his focus was on the suffering caused to him and his family and that he did not sufficiently appreciate the impact his misconduct had had on the banks, Industry Canada, or on the reputation of the accounting profession. As noted in the Reconsideration Decision, maintaining the reputation of the accounting profession is one of the fundamental goals of the good character requirement.
[65] The Reconsideration Panel was concerned about the issue of remorse since “when [Mr. Siddiqi] appeared before the Tribunal in 2018, [Mr. Siddiqi] did not appear to accept responsibility for any of his misconduct. He blamed his lawyers for the outcome before the Courts. The Tribunal was concerned that the Applicant took no responsibility for any of his poor choices”: Reconsideration Decision, para. 110.
[66] One of the requirements for readmission is to demonstrate a material change in the circumstances that existed when the revocation order was made. One of the circumstances that the Reconsideration Panel found existed at the time of revocation was Mr. Siddiqi’s non-acceptance of responsibility for his misconduct. Thus, the question for them was whether this circumstance had materially changed. On their assessment of the evidence, it had not.
[67] According to the Reconsideration Panel there was an “absence of any evidence from the Applicant” about the impact of his behaviour on the banks, Industry Canada or the reputation of the profession as a whole: Reconsideration Decision, para. 112.
[68] The Appeal Decision found that this statement ignored evidence from the Applicant as to his remorse that was before them. First, there was his statement in the declaration that accompanied his readmission application and second, there was his testimony that he accepted responsibility for disbursing funds to Iran and had betrayed the public trust and lived with that every day.
[69] The question then becomes whether these failures display the kind of fundamental misapprehension of the evidence that jeopardized the rationality of the Reconsideration Panel’s decision. In my view they do not. It is clear from the Reconsideration Decision that the entire panel (even the member who dissented on the result) came to the same conclusion regarding Mr. Siddiqi’s remorse – that his primary focus was on the effect of his conduct on him, his family and his professional designation. They did so after hearing and seeing Mr. Siddiqi testify, something the Appeal Panel did not do.
[70] Thus, rather than fundamentally misapprehending or ignoring the evidence before them, the Reconsideration Panel weighed all of the evidence they heard and came to the conclusion that that evidence did not demonstrate the insight they were looking for to be satisfied that there had been a material change in Mr. Siddiqi’s acceptance of responsibility for his actions since the revocation decision in 2018.
[71] The same analysis applies to the Reconsideration Panel’s view of the character letters. Their concern was whether those letters demonstrated the kind of acceptance of responsibility that they had not heard from Mr. Siddiqi in his testimony – an insight and appreciation into the effect of his conduct on the banks, Industry Canada and the reputation of the profession. The letters did not contain sufficient detail to satisfy them of this. Further, to the extent that they heard from three witnesses who wrote character letters, their evidence did not satisfy them on this point.
[72] Instead of deferring to the Reconsideration Panel’s assessment of the weight to be attributed to the character letters on the question of remorse, the Appeal Panel did its own weighing of that evidence and decided to accept it, something that is impermissible on a reasonableness review. Again, they did not see or hear the character witnesses who testified.
[73] On the issue of rehabilitation, the Appeal Panel found that the majority decision of the Reconsideration Panel was unreasonable for a number of reasons. First, they found at para. 76 of the Appeal Decision that the Reconsideration Panel “discounted” the 17 letters submitted in support of Mr. Siddiqi. While it is true that the Reconsideration Panel did express its view of the weight to be attributed to those letters on the question of remorse, there is no suggestion in the Reconsideration Decision of a questioning of the evidence in those letters as to the fact that Mr. Siddiqi was a “beloved pillar and leader in his community”. Nor does the Reconsideration Decision question the evidence as to the role that Mr. Siddiqi had played in that community and in his family since the events giving rise to the convictions that led to the revocation of his license.
[74] Second, the Appeal Panel expressed a concern about the fact that the majority of the Reconsideration Panel failed to consider Mr. Siddiqi’s exemplary conduct in the years prior to 2013. Again, there is no evidence of this. The Reconsideration Panel never questioned the fact that Mr. Siddiqi’s conduct since the events giving rise to the misconduct had been exemplary. Rather, they took the view that in light of their concerns about Mr. Siddiqi’s lack of insight into the effects of his behaviour, both at the time of his revocation and before then. The Reconsideration Panel concluded not enough time had passed since the revocation to be assured that Mr. Siddiqi had gained sufficient insight into the seriousness of his behaviour.
[75] Third, the Appeal Panel found that the Reconsideration Panel unreasonably discounted Mr. Siddiqi’s rehabilitative efforts because he did not self-report behaviour prior to the criminal charges being laid. I agree with the Appeal Decision that, given that Mr. Siddiqi did not appreciate that he had done anything wrong before he was charged criminally, he could not have been expected to self-report his behaviour before then. However, I do not agree that this error on the part of the Reconsideration Panel is sufficiently material to call into question the reasonableness of the Reconsideration Decision when that decision is read as a whole.
[76] Fourth, the Appeal Panel found that the Reconsideration Decision unreasonably discounted Mr. Siddiqi’s rehabilitative efforts because the crime he committed was not a victimless crime and the victims of the crime, namely the banks and Industry Canada, had not been fully compensated. In the view of the Appeal Panel, Mr. Siddiqi had done what the Crown had requested and had paid the fine imposed by the court at great personal sacrifice by selling his daughter’s condominium. I disagree that there was no rational basis for the Reconsideration Decision to consider the fact that the victims of the misconduct had not been fully compensated. As noted in the Reconsideration Decision, one of the goals of the good character requirement is to maintain the reputation of the profession. In other words, the public must have confidence in the good character of the profession’s members. It is not irrational to find that the public would have more confidence in a member whose misconduct had caused losses if that member had fully compensated the victims of that misconduct for their losses. In this case the fine imposed was considerably less than the losses suffered.
[77] Finally, the Appeal Decision found that the Reconsideration Decision unreasonably failed to give sufficient weight to the hours of continuing professional development that Mr. Siddiqi had engaged in over a three-year period. In the view of the Reconsideration Panel, since continuing education is a prerequisite for registration that every member must establish, it did not say much about Mr. Siddiqi’s rehabilitation. While it is true that Mr. Siddiqi performed 41 more hours of continuing education than was required over a three-year period, it is not irrational to find that this does not necessarily say anything about rehabilitation. If there had been evidence that the courses were specifically directed at gaining an understanding of the behaviour that led to the misconduct at issue (for example, courses about the fiduciary obligations of chartered accountants), there might have been a stronger argument to be made on this issue.
[78] In the end, the Appeal Panel simply had a different view than the majority of the Reconsideration Panel of the weight that should have been attributed to the evidence on rehabilitation, just as they had a different view of the weight that should have been attributed to the evidence on remorse. However, their task was not to reweigh the evidence to come their own conclusion. It was to examine the Reconsideration Decision to determine if, taken as a whole, its outcome fell within a range of reasonable outcomes and its reasoning disclosed a rational chain of analysis.
[79] It is important to emphasize again that the reasonableness analysis recognizes that reasonable people can disagree and that disagreeing with the outcome below does not entitle the reviewing body to intervene.
[80] Determining good character is a nuanced exercise. As pointed out in the Reconsideration Decision at paras. 90-91, “[g]ood character connotes moral or ethical strength, distinguishable as an amalgam of virtuous attributes or traits which would include, among others, integrity, candour, empathy and honesty…[a]n appreciation of the difference between right and wrong; [t]he moral fibre to do that which is right, no matter how uncomfortable the doing may be and not to do that which is wrong no matter what the consequences may be to oneself”.
[81] It is not surprising that reasonable people could disagree on this issue, particularly in the case of someone like Mr. Siddiqi whose misconduct involved financial fraud (a profound betrayal of the values and ethics of the accounting profession), but who, at the same time, has done much good in the world since the misconduct occurred. At play is the tension between recognizing that rehabilitation is an important value of the readmission process and the need to maintain the reputation of the profession by assuring the public that its members will not betray the fundamental values of that profession by engaging in fraudulent conduct. In the end the legislature made a choice about who should make that decision and what powers a panel on appeal should have to set aside the first decision. The decision is to be made by the panel who hears the witnesses and considers the matter at first instance. That decision can only be set aside on appeal if it is unreasonable, not if the Appeal Panel merely thinks that it is wrong. . Goovaerts (Litigation Guardian of) v. Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund
In Goovaerts (Litigation Guardian of) v. Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a SABS dual appeal-JR, this brought against a LAT "determination of attendant care benefits ('ACBs')".
Here the court sets out in salutory fashion JR function and process:Application for Judicial Review
[21] The applicable standard of review is reasonableness: Vavilov, at para. 23. The onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that the decision is unreasonable. Any shortcoming must be more than merely superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision: Vavilov, at para. 100. Deference is to be afforded to the decision maker: Vavilov, at para. 85. A reasonable decision is one that is transparent, intelligible and justified in light of the evidentiary record: Vavilov, at paras. 15, 126. It is not the role of the reviewing court to re-weigh or reassess the evidence considered by the decision maker: Vavilov, at para. 125.
[22] A reasonableness review is not a “rubber-stamping” process or a means of sheltering administrative decision makers from accountability. It remains a robust form of review: Vavilov, at para. 13. When engaging in a reasonableness review, the reviewing court is to consider whether the decision made, including the rationale for the decision and outcome, are reasonable: Vavilov, at paras. 83-84. Two fundamental flaws can render a decision unreasonable. The first is where the decision is not based on internally coherent reasoning. The second is where the decision is not justified or is untenable in light of the legal and factual constraints that bear on the decision: Vavilov, at para. 101.
[23] The general constraints will differ depending on the context. Generally, a reviewing court will consider the governing statutory scheme, other relevant statutory or common law, the principles of statutory interpretation, the evidence before the decision maker and facts of which it may take reasonable notice, the submissions of the parties, the past practices and decisions of the administrative body, and the potential impact of the decision on the individual to whom it applies: Vavilov, at para. 106.
[24] The decision maker’s reasons must account for the central issues and concerns raised by the parties. The failure to meaningfully grapple with key issues or central arguments raised by the parties may call into question whether the decision maker was alive or sensitive to the matters at issue: Vavilov, at paras. 127-128.
[25] While administrative decision makers are not bound by stare decisis, those affected by administrative decisions are entitled to expect that like cases will generally be treated alike. Where a decision maker departs from longstanding practices or established internal authority, it bears the justificatory burden of explaining such departure in its reasons. If such a departure is not justified, the decision is unreasonable: Vavilov, at paras. 129, 131. . Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a federal AG JR, this brought against "the Federal Court’s finding that the declaration of a public order emergency was unreasonable and that some provisions of the Regulations and of the Economic Order violated the Charter", here where the emergency order was made under the federal Emergencies Act.
Here the court offers another characterization of Vavilov's 'reasonableness review':[158] When applying the reasonableness standard, a reviewing court must start with a posture of judicial restraint and deference for the legislature’s choice to delegate decision making authority. A reviewing court must take a "“reasons first”" approach that evaluates the administrative decision-maker’s justification for its decision: Vavilov at para. 84; Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 [Mason] at para. 8. In other words, a reviewing court must show respectful attention to the decision-maker’s reasons, seeking to understand the reasoning process followed to arrive at the conclusion (Vavilov at para. 84). Stated differently, a reviewing court "“must focus on the decision the administrative decision maker actually made, including the justification offered for it, and not on the conclusion the court itself would have reached in the administrative decision maker’s place”" (Vavilov at para. 15).
[159] As to what it means for a decision to be reasonable, the Supreme Court in Vavilov made it clear that it requires consideration of both the outcome of the decision and the reasoning process that led to the outcome. In a nutshell, a reasonable decision is one "“that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”" (Vavilov at para. 85). Among the legal and factual considerations that can constrain an administrative decision-maker, the governing statutory scheme will usually be the most salient aspect of the legal context relevant to a particular decision (Vavilov at para. 108).
[160] Context is also relevant. As the Supreme Court has stated in a number of cases, "“reasonableness is a single standard that takes its colour from the context”": see, for example, Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para. 59, and the cases cited at para. 89 in Vavilov. The Supreme Court has clarified, however, that reasonableness remains a single standard. Despite the diversity of decisions in terms of complexity and importance, "“elements of a decision’s context do not modulate the standard or the degree of scrutiny by the reviewing court”". Context will only constrain what is reasonable for an administrative decision-maker to decide in their specific case.
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