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Administrative - Abuse of Process [SPPA s.23(1)]. Ottawa-Carleton Association for Persons with Developmental Disabilities/Open Hands v. Séguin
In Ottawa-Carleton Association for Persons with Developmental Disabilities/Open Hands v. Séguin (Div Ct, 2020) the Divisional Court considered the SPPA s.23(1) abuse of process authority to justify re-instatement of a tenant after an illegal eviction. The landlord had attempted to rely on evidence that justified the illegality, but was denied that effort as to allow it would have been to condone the illegality, and thus tolerate an abuse of process:[21] The appellant then sought to introduce evidence from two witnesses with respect to funding and events at the care home prior to the eviction, as well as evidence from the investigator. The Board refused to hear evidence about the staff grievances, their threats to resign and the investigation, as to do so would bypass the procedures for termination of a tenancy under the Act (Transcript, p. 24). The Board member also concluded that the proposed evidence would not show that the return of the respondent would cause unsafe conditions, as all the staff complaints were against his parents’ demands and harassment, and there were no allegations of violence against anyone (Transcript, pp. 34, 35). However, the Board member did tell the appellant’s counsel that she would hear arguments and “any evidence you want to present on this remedy being requested” (Transcript, p. 17).
[22] The Board member was informed by the appellant’s counsel and Don Ferguson, the Executive Director of the appellant, that the respondent’s former room remained empty, but that the Ministry had assigned the room to another individual JJ. JJ was in transitional temporary housing paid for by the appellant because of the Board’s order to keep the room vacant. Mr. Ferguson also told the Board that he feared the staff would quit if the respondent were reinstated, and he might have to close the home.
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[26] The member explained why she refused to hear the appellant’s evidence with respect to the reasons that the tenant was evicted, relying on s. 23(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 22 (the “SPPA”). At para. 9, she stated,In my view, allowing the Landlord to introduce evidence regarding what led to the Tenant’s unlawful eviction would have amounted to an abuse of process as it would have allowed the Landlord to circumvent the Act’s requirements respecting how landlord’s [sic] can lawfully terminate a tenancy. ....
[45] The appellant relies on s. 10.1 of the SPPA, which provides that a party in a hearing may call and examine witnesses, present evidence and submissions, and conduct cross-examinations of the witnesses “reasonably required for a full and fair disclosure of all matters relevant to the issues in the proceeding.” The appellant submits that the Board denied it a fair hearing by refusing to hear its witnesses and allowing it to cross-examine witnesses, and the Board improperly relied on s. 23(1) of the SPPA in finding that allowing the admission of the evidence would result in an abuse of process.
[46] Subsection 23(1) of the SPPA provides that a “tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.” This is a broadly worded power.
[47] The August 2019 hearing was to deal with the remedy for an unlawful eviction. The appellant had removed the respondent from his room and the residence without following the process in the Act. As the Board found, that was a substantial interference with the tenant’s right to reasonable enjoyment. That only left the issue of remedy pursuant to s. 31.
[48] The appellant sought to adduce evidence respecting the situation that led it to evict the respondent and the funding structure for the care home. The Board correctly held that this evidence was not relevant to the issue of remedy, although it might properly be considered if the appellant commenced a proceeding under the Act seeking to terminate the tenancy lawfully. Therefore, the Board did not err in excluding the proposed evidence.
[49] Moreover, the Board did not err in relying on s. 23(1) of the SPPA. The member concluded that it would be an abuse of process for the appellant, who had not complied with the termination process under the Act, to then lead evidence at a hearing to determine the tenant’s remedy so as to justify keeping him out of the residential unit. Allowing a landlord to, in effect, justify an unlawful eviction in these circumstances would deprive the tenant of the notice and protections to which he is entitled under the Act. The Board made no error in law when it concluded that the leading of evidence of events that occurred prior to the eviction would be an abuse of process.
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[74] The respondent also argues that the Board had the authority to order reinstatement pursuant to s. 23(1) of the SPPA to prevent an abuse of its process, relying on Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority v. Ahmed, [2001] O.J. No. 1477 (Div. Ct.) and Kwak v. Marinecorp Mgt. Inc., [2007] O.J. No. 2692 (Div. Ct.)). However, the Board member did not rely on this section to justify her order of reinstatement. In my view, she had the authority to make the order pursuant to s. 31(1)(f) and made no error in law in doing so.
[75] The appellant makes much of the fact that the Ministry has now assigned JJ to the respondent’s room. However, JJ is not in physical possession of the room. Indeed, the respondent is still the lawful tenant of that room, given that his tenancy has not been terminated in accordance with the Act. In making the order, the Board member considered the interests of JJ, but reasonably concluded that the respondent should be reinstated, given that there has been no lawful termination of his tenancy, there is no danger of violence nor safety issues because of his conduct if he returns, and JJ is not in possession of the room. . Martinez v. Toronto Police Services Board
The Divisional Court case of Martinez v. Toronto Police Services Board (Div Ct, 2012), emanated from police discipline hearings in relation to their conduct during the G20 demonstrations in June 2010. The officers moved to judicially review the decision of the Toronto Police Services Board to exercise it's statutory discretion under s.83(17) of the Police Services Act to serve notices of hearing more than six months after the day on which the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (“OIPRD”) decided to retain a public complaint for investigation.
No evidence was adduced as to prejudice caused by the delay, but in any event the application was dismissed as premature in light of the parties' as-yet unused abuse of process s.23(1) SPPA remedy, which could be applied at the administrative proceedings level to relieve against prejudice caused by the delay.
. Nyonzima v Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
In Nyonzima v Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario 2012 ONSC 5120 (CanLII) the Divisional Court considered a judicial review application from an HRTO applicant whose case was not only dismissed, but held to be an abuse of process. The HRTO finding of abuse of process (rather than a simple dismissal) appears to have been motivated by a finding that the applicant had attempted to introduce forged letters into evidence. The court, citing the high level of review deference to be accorded to the HRTO both by reason of it's institutional expertise and that it was engaging largely in fact-findings in reaching it's conclusions, dismissed the judicial review.
. Papouchine v. Touram LP d.b.a. Air Canada Vacations
In Papouchine v. Touram LP d.b.a. Air Canada Vacations (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court endorses an HRTO tribunal 'frivolous proceedings' order grounded in the abuse of process provisions of SPPA s.23(1). The order mimicked RCP 2.1 and CJA 140 frivolous and vexatious provisions for the civil courts:[4] Tribunals, like courts, are custodians of a scarce public resource: time before the tribunal. Meritorious complaints cannot proceed promptly if frivolous complaints clog the system and waste resources. Some tribunals, including the Tribunal, do not charge fees to initiate and pursue a complaint, and some do not order legal costs in favour of unsuccessful parties. These practices facilitate access to justice, but they may also create a false impression that justice is “free” and that there are no constraints on matters that may be brought forward for adjudication.
[5] Justice is not free. Quite the contrary. Justice is expensive. To the extent that the cost of justice is not borne by the parties, it is borne by the public purse. Tribunals, like courts, are responsible for overseeing their own processes so that public resources are applied effectively to matters worthy of adjudication. To achieve this, tribunals, like courts, must control their own processes, including restraining vexatious conduct and abuse of process.
[6] Two sets of issues arise on this application. The first concerns the Tribunal’s dismissal of the Applicant’s eight complaints before the Tribunal at the time of the summary hearing. Although the Applicant has not raised the reasonableness of the Tribunal’s substantive dismissal decision, he is implicitly doing so on the basis of his arguments that his complaints ought to have proceeded further through the Tribunal’s process. Second, the Applicant argues that the process followed by the Tribunal was procedurally unfair to him.
[7] The Tribunal’s second disposition is its finding that the Applicant is a vexatious litigant. This raises two sets of issues before this court:(a) whether the Tribunal’s finding that the Applicant is a vexatious litigant is reasonable; and
(b) whether the Tribunal’s finding was arrived at following a fair process. [8] In respect to the substantive disposition, the Tribunal’s findings are reasonable and are firmly grounded in the record. The proximate complaints are “customer service complaints” and there is no objective basis on which to conclude that the respondents’ handling of the complaints was tainted by discrimination on a protected ground. The customer service complaints, themselves, are, or verge on being, trivial and, in one instance, absurd.
[9] The summary process followed by the Tribunal was consistent with the Tribunal’s Rules and past practice, was reasonable in all the circumstances, and afforded the applicant a fair opportunity to address the Tribunal’s concerns about his complaints.
[10] The Tribunal applied an appropriate test to decide that the Applicant is a vexatious litigant. Its findings of fact related to this issue are reasonable. The process followed afforded the Applicant an opportunity to be heard in argument; it was a fair and a reasonable process to follow in respect to this issue. The orders made consequent to the finding of vexatiousness were tailored reasonably to the circumstances.
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Documentary Disclosure
[54] An inquiry into whether a litigant is vexatious does not open the door for that litigant to litigate fully all his allegedly vexatious proceedings.[23] In the context of the proceedings below, the Applicant was permitted to adduce any evidence, argument or allegations he wished to present to try to establish a connection between his complaints and his allegation that respondents discriminated against him on a ground protected by the Human Rights Code. In respect to the vexatious litigant issue, the Applicant was told that the Tribunal would consider his record as a litigant before the Tribunal. The only documents relied upon by the Tribunal that were not provided to the Tribunal by the Applicant himself were prior Tribunal decisions involving the Applicant. These were provided to the Tribunal by respondents at the time of the hearing. The Applicant objected to these decisions being used against him, without prior disclosure, but the Tribunal ruled that this was not unfair, since the Applicant had prior notice of the decisions and had to be taken to know their contents. (Decision, para. 3). I see no unfairness in this ruling, and the Applicant was unable to point to any additional information or arguments he would have provided to the Tribunal if he had received prior notice of respondents’ reliance on his past litigation history before the Tribunal. Finally, on this point, the Tribunal received and considered written submissions from the Applicant after the oral hearing, and so the Applicant had an opportunity to respond to his past litigation history after the hearing, if he felt “caught by surprise” at the hearing itself.
[55] The Applicant was given prior notice that the Tribunal was considering making a vexatious litigant order against him and was given an opportunity to respond to this issue. I see no unfairness in the process followed.
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