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Final v Interlocutory Orders (7). Gandhi v. Mayfield Arcadeium Holdings Ltd.
In Gandhi v. Mayfield Arcadeium Holdings Ltd. (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers (and allows) a time extension to commence an appeal, here under Construction Act s.71 ['Appeal to Divisional Court'] - with a 15-day limit and extension authority [under 71(2)].
In this quote, the court equates a 'judgment' with a 'final order', here in a Construction Act appeal context:[16] The term “judgment” as set out in ss. 71(1) applies to any decision by which a party’s rights are finally disposed of: Villa Verde L.M. Masonry Ltd. v. Pier One Masonry Inc., 2001 CanLII 7060 (ONCA) at para 8; Heinrichs v. 374427 Ontario Ltd., 2018 ONSC 78 (Div Ct) at para 19. . Yurkovich v. Citibank Canada [amending pleadings]
In Yurkovich v. Citibank Canada (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered (and granted) a motion to quash an appeal as it was brought in the wrong court. The issue was whether the underlying order was 'interlocutory' (appeal to the Divisional Court) or 'final' (appeal to the Court of Appeal):[2] The motion judge’s order granting the respondents leave to amend their statement of claim is an interlocutory order: Natario v. Rodriguez, 2015 ONCA 227, at para. 7; Fram Elgin Mills 90 Inc. v. Romandale Farms Limited, 2016 ONCA 404, 131 O.R. (3d) 455, at para. 28.
[3] In assessing whether there would be non-compensable prejudice to the appellants if leave to amend were granted, the motion judge considered whether the proposed amendments constituted a new cause of action or were elaborations of the original claims already pleaded: Boyer v. Callidus Capital Corporation, 2023 ONCA 233, at paras. 66-68. The fact that the motion judge considered whether the amendments constituted a new cause of action in her analysis does not transform her order granting leave to amend the statement of claim into a final ruling on the appellants’ limitation period defences: Natario, at paras. 3-6; Fram Elgin Mills, at paras. 18, 20, 25 and 36-39. The reasons and order of the motion judge are clear that the parties retain the right to assert arguments at trial in relation to the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24.
[4] As the order is interlocutory, the appeal lies to the Divisional Court, with leave, pursuant to s. 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. . LeGrand v. LeGrand [contempt orders]
In LeGrand v. LeGrand (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court notes that contempt orders are 'final' orders (as opposed to 'interlocutory' orders):[29] The finding of contempt and sanctions imposed are final Orders, see Mantella v Mantella, 2009 ONCA 194, para 17. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to ss. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. . Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 550 v. Del Ridge (Appleby) Inc. [denying stay]
In Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 550 v. Del Ridge (Appleby) Inc. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered (and dismissed) a motion to quash an appeal of interlocutory orders, here some that "denied a motion for a stay of the underlying action based on the nondisclosure of a litigation agreement entered into by Halton, the City of Burlington, and two third parties, but excluding the Del Ridge defendants (the “Pierringer Agreement”)" (advanced under the Handley Estate abuse of process line of cases). One issue was whether such orders were final or interlocutory:
[4] The motion judge next assessed the impact of the Pierringer Agreement and found that it did not entirely change the litigation environment. While the agreement released Burlington from liability for some claims, it did not address all the claims between the two parties, and so the Pierringer Agreement did not bring the litigation between Halton and Burlington to an end. Similarly, the agreement did not end crossclaims between Burlington and the remaining defendants, it did not contemplate cooperation between the parties, nor did it require the provision of evidence from the settling parties to Halton. On these bases, the motion judge found that the subject agreement was “not an agreement which requires immediate disclosure.”
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(2) The denial of the stay aspect of the order is final
[11] The Del Ridge defendants argue that an order denying a stay of an action on the basis that a settlement agreement was not disclosed as soon as it was completed is a final order, and so its appeal is properly before this court.
[12] The broad principle stated by this court “is that an order granting a stay is final, but an order refusing one is interlocutory”: McClintock v. Karam, 2017 ONCA 277, at para. 1; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Nanji, 2020 ONCA 591, at para. 8. However, in the narrow context of motions alleging an abuse of process as a result of the failure to disclose a litigation agreement, an order granting or dismissing a stay has been treated as final: Aecon Buildings v. Brampton (City), 2010 ONCA 773, at para. 2; CHU de Québec-Université Laval v. Tree of Knowledge International Corp., 2022 ONCA 467, at paras. 38-45; Handley Estate v. DTE Industries Limited, 2018 ONCA 324, 421 D.L.R. (4th) 636, at paras. 46-48.
[13] By contrast, the respondent raises Drywall Acoustic Lathing Insulation Local 675 Pension Fund v. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., 2020 ONCA 375, where this court concluded that a denial of a motion to stay one of two similar class actions proceeding in different jurisdictions was interlocutory. As Zarnett J.A. explained, at para. 20, “… it is clear that the refusal to stay the Ontario Action at the request of the Quebec Plaintiff is an interlocutory order. The dismissal of his stay request does not determine the subject matter of the Ontario Action or of any action. It does not determine any substantive right to relief that the Quebec Plaintiff, the Ontario Plaintiff, or any potential class member has against the Defendants, nor does it determine any substantive defence. It does not terminate the Quebec Plaintiff’s right to proceed with the Quebec Action. It does not determine the Quebec Plaintiff’s right or any potential class member’s right to opt out of the Ontario Action if the latter is certified as a class proceeding. Nor does it determine anyone’s right to pursue an individual claim.”
[14] However, Drywall Acoustic is distinguishable from Aecon, Handley, Chu and the present case. While Drywall Acoustic did involve a stay of proceedings, it did not implicate a settlement agreement, nor did it concern the specific issue of abuse of process.
[15] Consequently, the appeal of the motion judge’s denial of the stay requested due to the alleged abuse of process from the non-disclosure of the Pierringer Agreement in this case lies to this court.
[16] While the motion judge’s decision relating to the expert evidence is interlocutory for the reasons stated above, the appeal of the otherwise interlocutory question of the motion judge’s decision concerning expert evidence may also be heard by this court as part of the appeal from the stay denial. This court can take jurisdiction over the appeal of the interlocutory aspects of an order if the issues in the final and interlocutory aspects of the order “are so interrelated that” that “there is a good reason to hear them together”: Cooper v. The Laundry Lounge, Inc., 2020 ONCA 166, at para. 2; Azzeh v. Legendre, 2017 ONCA 385, 135 O.R. (3d) 721, at paras. 25-26, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 289. This is the case here. The final and interlocutory aspects of the order are bound together in that the disposition of the stay appeal may also dispose of the need of the interlocutory order. To avoid potentially unnecessary duplication of efforts, the appeals from the two aspects of the order will be heard together. . Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 550 v. Del Ridge (Appleby) Inc. [where alternate remedy exists]
In Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 550 v. Del Ridge (Appleby) Inc. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered a 'final versus interlocutory' appeal route issue, here regarding an appeal of an issue over documentary discovery of expert report material:[5] Halton’s motion to quash raises the question of whether the motion judge’s order concerning the expert evidence and the stay were final or interlocutory. Sections 6(1)(b) and 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, provide that only final orders are appealable to this court, while interlocutory orders are appealable to the Divisional Court, with leave.
ANALYSIS
[6] This court provided a clear explanation of the distinction between interlocutory and final orders in 1476335 Ontario Inc. v. Frezza, 2021 ONCA 822. Specifically, Feldman J.A. stated that a final order “disposes of the litigation or finally disposes of part of the litigation” while an interlocutory order “disposes of the issue raised, most often a procedural issue, but the litigation proceeds”: Frezza, at para. 7.
(1) The expert evidence aspect of the order is interlocutory
[7] With respect to the relief sought by the Del Ridge defendants concerning expert reports, the motion judge observed that this issue should be reserved for the trial judge. The motion judge ordered Halton to write to its retained experts to obtain all their supporting documentation, and specifically referred to the Del Ridge defendants’ ability to bring a motion under r. 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, if this was not done.
[8] The Del Ridge defendants argue that this aspect of the order was a final decision, at least in relation to the non-parties involved, relying on case law from this court which has recognized decisions under r. 30.10 as final.
[9] We reject this submission.
[10] There is nothing in the motion judge’s decision that would preclude the Del Ridge defendants from bringing an r. 30.10 motion for relief. Having not yet brought such a motion, the order of the motion judge remains procedural and interlocutory. It determines no rights, forecloses no remedies, and the litigation proceeds despite the order. . Tyner v. Certas Insurance
In Tyner v. Certas Insurance (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court confirms the 'final order' appeal jurisdiction of the LAT [s.11(1) and (6)] in dismissing a Divisional Court appeal for lack of jurisdiction:[5] The issue of this court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order of the LAT was comprehensively addressed by this court in Penney v. The Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2022 ONSC 3874, in which the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.
[6] The Court’s conclusion is explained at para. 26:[26] Given the language of s. 11(1) and (6) of the LAT Act, read in the context of the entire statute and the objective of preventing fragmentation of and delay in administrative proceedings, I conclude that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory decision of the LAT. In my view, this conclusion is consistent with the instruction from the Supreme Court of Canada in Vavilov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 SCC 65 that the courts should respect the Legislature’s decisions with respect to institutional design (at paras. 24, 26). Here, the Legislature chose not to confer a right to appeal interlocutory decisions of the LAT to the Divisional Court. . Bank of Montreal v. Iskenderov [discharge a certificate pending litigation]
In Bank of Montreal v. Iskenderov (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered a specific final versus interlocutory issue:[71] ... an order dismissing an application to discharge a certificate pending litigation is an interlocutory order that is within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court: see e.g., 313473 Ontario Ltd. et al. v. Lornal Construction Ltd. et al. (1976), 1976 CanLII 601 (ON SC), 18 O.R. (2d) 374 (Div. Ct.). . Sebastiano v. Brunello Imports Inc. [paying funds out of court]
In Sebastiano v. Brunello Imports Inc. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the final versus interlocutory orders distinction, here in quashing an appeal of an interlocutory order (it should have been advanced in the Divisional Court with leave):[15] There is a preliminary issue of whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. This court does not have jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders – orders that do not finally determine any substantive matter in issue between the parties: see Drywall Acoustic Lathing Insulation Local 675 Pension Fund v. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., 2020 ONCA 375, at para. 16.
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[18] We do not agree that the order appealed from is final. Although the motion judge engaged with the substantive arguments raised by the appellants – arguments that are the subject of the appellant’s outstanding application – he did so for the limited purpose of assessing whether those arguments could provide a reason not to pay the funds out of court.
[19] An order to pay funds out of court is not, in these circumstances, a final order. The ultimate question of whether the respondent foreclosed on the condominium in satisfaction of the mortgage debt, or whether he is liable in damages to the appellants for improvident realization of the mortgage, has not been adjudicated. It is true that the motion judge – at the invitation of the appellants – considered and rejected the appellants’ arguments qua reasons not to order the payment of funds out of court, but this was not an adjudication of the appellants’ claims against the respondent. Those claims live to be adjudicated another day. . 10720143 Canada Corp. v. 2698874 Ontario Inc. [default judgment / setting aside noting in default]
In 10720143 Canada Corp. v. 2698874 Ontario Inc. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the 'final versus interlocutory' order issue in deciding whether an appeal was properly before the Court of Appeal. Here, the appeal issues were both regarding default judgment and setting aside noting in default:[13] In my view, this court’s jurisdiction to hear this appeal is a matter of legitimate debate. Consequently, it is helpful for the court to address that issue. I am satisfied that this court does have jurisdiction.
[14] The appellants purport to challenge both the order refusing to set aside the noting in default of the defendants[1] and the order granting default judgment. An order refusing to set aside a noting in default is not, standing on its own, a final order.
[15] However, a purposive and practical approach should be taken to the characterization of the order. In this proceeding, the motions to set aside the noting in default and the default judgment were heard together. The challenge to the noting in default is, in reality, one of the arguments put up against the granting of default judgment. The motion judge’s decision to grant default judgment was premised, in part, on the validity of the order noting the appellants in default. In this circumstance, it would place form over substance when determining the appropriate appellate jurisdiction to treat the noting in default as a separate and distinct order from the order granting default judgment. In determining this court’s jurisdiction, the focus should be on the order granting default judgment.
[16] This court has held that an order granting default judgment is not a final order appealable to this court: National Bank of Canada v. Royal Bank of Canada (1999), 1999 CanLII 3733 (ON CA), 44 O.R. (3d) 533 (C.A.). In National Bank, this court held that r. 19.08 provides a specific remedy to those who are subject to a default judgment. Those persons may move in the Superior Court of Justice to set aside the default judgment. As the court observed, default judgments are not uncommon. A motion to set aside a default judgment under r. 19.08 provides an efficient and relatively inexpensive means by which a party can challenge a default judgment. In most cases, the default judgment will be set aside and the proceeding will be back on track toward a determination on the merits.
[17] Treating a default judgment as a final order requiring an appeal to the Court of Appeal would cause considerable delay and added expense. In the vast majority of challenges to default judgments, the defendant will seek to put before the court information that was not before the court on the default judgment motion. Default judgment motions are almost always heard ex parte. An appeal on the record to this court from an order made ex parte granting default judgment would not, in the vast majority of cases, provide a suitable means for the defendant to put before the court material relied on in support of the motion to set aside the default judgment.
[18] I see no reason to depart from the holding in National Bank.
[19] This motion for a default judgment was not, however, a typical default judgment motion. The defendants participated in the motion and had a full opportunity to put before the motion judge whatever they deemed relevant to their position on the motion. As the motion judge noted, at paras. 93 and 101, the motion before him took on the characteristics of a motion to set aside a default judgment. An order refusing to set aside a default judgment is a final order: Laurentian Bank of Canada v. Goldshmidt, 2013 ONCA 122, at paras. 3-4; National Bank, at pp. 534-35; Laurentian Plaza Corp. v. Martin (1992), 1992 CanLII 7561 (ON CA), 7 O.R. (3d) 111 (C.A.), at p. 113; and Roblin v. Drake, 1938 CanLII 54 (ON CA), [1938] O.R. 711 (C.A.), at p. 712.
[20] Although the cases agree that an order refusing to set aside a default judgment is a final order, there is some disagreement as to the proper forum on appeal. Some authorities take the position that a refusal to set aside a judgment awarding damages is itself not a money judgment and is, therefore, appealable in all cases as a final order to the Court of Appeal: Marcus Direct Marketing Inc. v. M & K Plastic Products Ltd., [1989] O.J. No. 467 (C.A.); Paul M. Perell and John W. Morden, The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario, 4th ed. (Canada: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2020), at para. 12.103. Other authorities take the view that an order refusing to set aside a judgment awarding damages is, like the judgment awarding damages, an order for the payment of money, meaning the appropriate appellate forum depends on the quantum of the award: see e.g. Laredo Construction Inc. v. Sinnadurai (2005), 2005 CanLII 46934 (ON CA), 78 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), at para. 19.
[21] While I am inclined to the view that an order dismissing a motion to set aside a judgment awarding damages is itself a money judgment, I need not decide that issue here. On the facts of this case, this appeal is properly brought to the Court of Appeal on either interpretation. If the order is not a money order, the appeal lies to this court. If the order setting aside the default judgment is a money order, it is an amount in excess of $50,000, the Divisional Court limit, and is therefore properly appealable to this court: see Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 6(1)(b), 19(1)(a) and (1.2).
[22] The policy considerations identified in National Bank, which favour treating a motion to set aside a default judgment as the appropriate remedy, do not apply in the circumstances of this case. An appeal to this court on the record does give the appellants a full opportunity to challenge the merits of the motion judge’s decision. Unlike a r. 19.08 motion to set aside a default judgment, the appellants here do not offer evidence that was not before the motion judge on the motion for default judgment. Instead, the appellants maintain that the motion judge erred on the record before him in granting default judgment and seek appellate review of that alleged error.
[23] A purposive interpretation of this court’s jurisdiction dictates that the decision of the motion judge in the present circumstances should be treated as the equivalent of a refusal to set aside a default judgment properly appealable as a final order to this court. That was the position taken by both the appellants and the respondents on this appeal. Their positions suggest to me that an appeal to this court is consistent with the efficient and fair determination of the appellants’ challenge to the motion judge’s decision. . Novosel v. Campisi [solicitor's contingency fee 're-opening']
In Novosel v. Campisi (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered whether a order 're-opening' a solicitor's contingency fee agreement under Solicitors Act s.25 was final or interlocutory:[3] Ms. Novosel challenged the jurisdiction of this court to hear the lawyers’ appeal, arguing that the application judge’s order is interlocutory since the substantive right to payment remains to be determined at the assessment hearing. Ordinarily, this submission would have merit, but the application judge’s finding that the fee charged under the CFRA for the Accident Benefit Claim was excessive and unreasonable is a final determination, as it would be binding during the assessment and foreclose an order for the entire fee claimed. Since we have jurisdiction relating to this final determination, and it is in the interests of justice to hear all of the issues in the appeal together, we decided to hear the appeal, pursuant to s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. . Gefen v. Gefen [appointment of a guardian of property]
In Gefen v. Gefen (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered whether the appointment of a guardian of property is final or interlocutory:[5] A preliminary procedural question is whether this court has jurisdiction over the appeal or whether the orders were interlocutory, such that the appeal is to the Divisional Court under s. 19 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”). This is a perennially vexing question. Although an order appointing a litigation guardian is interlocutory, the weight of the authority suggests that this court has jurisdiction over appeals from the appointment of a guardian of property: see e.g., Roelandt v. Roelandt, 2016 ONCA 858; Public Guardian and Trustee v. Gaumont, 2018 ONCA 731. On the basis of Lax v. Lax (2004), 2004 CanLII 15466 (ON CA), 70 O.R. (3d) 520 (C.A.), at para. 9, we conclude that this court has jurisdiction over the final order, such that, to the extent that the other orders under appeal are interlocutory, it can address them as well under s. 6(2) of the CJA. No party argued to the contrary. . Huggins v Hayhurst [summary judgment]
In Huggins v Hayhurst (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers when summary judgment appeals are interlocutory or final:[3] In our view, contrary to the submissions of the appellant, the order is clearly interlocutory. While an order granting summary judgment is a final order, an order dismissing a motion for summary judgment such as this one is not because it does not dispose of a substantive right of any of the parties: Skunk v. Ketash, 2016 ONCA 841, at para. 58. . Gueye v. DiNino [contempt orders, granted and dismissed]
In Gueye v. DiNino (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal held that an order granting a contempt order is a final order, but that one dismissing a contempt order is interlocutory:[6] With respect to the order dismissing the contempt motion, the appellant argues that because this court has held that orders making a finding of contempt are final orders for purposes of an appeal, orders dismissing a motion for contempt are also final orders. We do not agree.
[7] This Court has held that orders making findings of contempt are final orders: Bush v. Mereshensky, 2007 ONCA 679, 229 O.A.C. 200, at paras. 9-10; Mantella v. Mantella, 2009 ONCA 194, 246 O.A.C. 386, at para. 17; see also Leeming v. Leeming, 2016 ONSC 1835, 78 R.F.L. (7th) 120 (Div. Ct.), at para. 16.
[8] However, an order dismissing a contempt motion is not necessarily a final order. This is because not all orders which dismiss contempt motions finally determine the rights of the parties. Whether an order dismissing a contempt motion is a final or an interlocutory order must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Orders dismissing a contempt motion are final only where there are no ongoing proceedings and the party seeking the order has no other means of obtaining relief arising out of the failure to abide by the terms of the order: Wang v. Li, 2023 ONCA 119, at paras. 15-16; Chirico v. Szalas, 2016 ONCA 586, 132 O.R. (3d) 738, at paras. 36-49; Overtveld v. Overtveld, 2022 ONCA 269, at para. 7.
[9] In the circumstances of this case, the order dismissing the contempt motion is an interlocutory order. The order of the trial judge expressly provides for any further motions in relation to parenting time or contempt to be brought to the Superior Court (with a leave requirement if brought prior to July 4, 2022, and no leave requirement after that date). Thus, this is not a case where the appellant has no other means of obtaining relief in relation to access rights. As such, the dismissal of the contempt motion in this case is not a final order. Because the order dismissing the contempt motion is interlocutory, this court does not have jurisdiction over the appeal. . Pavletic v. Pavletic [fully striking family law pleadings]
In Pavletic v. Pavletic (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers whether an order that strikes family law pleadings for failure to make support payments is final or interlocutory, and thus whether it should be advanced in the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal:[3] In January of 2023, the applicant raised the jurisdictional issue with the respondent, who took the position that the order did not become final until he failed to meet his obligations by the deadline: February 23, 2023. He failed to meet his obligations by the due date, having made part payments only and leaving substantial arrears outstanding. There is authority from this court that an order striking a pleading is a final order: see Four Seasons Travel Ltd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., 1974 CanLII 881 (Div. Crt) Laczko v. Alexander, 2012 ONCA 803 at para 6. There are multiple examples of appeals from the striking of pleadings directly to the Court of Appeal: Manchanda v. Thethi, 2016 ONCA 909; Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONCA 1063; Holly v. Greco, 2019 ONCA 464. . Shanghai Lianyin Investment Co. Ltd. v. Lu [validity of service]
In Shanghai Lianyin Investment Co. Ltd. v. Lu (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal held that orders regarding the validity of service are interlocutory:[1] Having regard to the nature of the proceedings and the reasons of the motion judge giving rise to the order under appeal, we are satisfied that the only “real matter in dispute between the parties” was the validity of the service on the appellant, Mr. Lu: see Paulpillai Estate v. Yousef, at 2020 ONCA 655, at para. 16. Orders relating to the validity of service are interlocutory: see Xela Enterprises Ltd. v. Castillo, 2014 ONCA 275. . Molani Estate v. Iran [appointment of litigation guardian/administrator]
In Molani Estate v. Iran (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal held that orders appointing litigation guardians (and litigation administrators) were interlocutory:[2] In several cases, this court has held that the appointment or removal of a litigation guardian is an interlocutory order: see e.g. Divitaris v. Gerstel, 2022 ONCA 605, at paras. 2, 6; Huang v. Braga, 2017 ONCA 268, 30 E.T.R. (4th) 19, at paras. 3, 5; Must v. Shkuryna, 2015 ONCA 665, at paras. 1, 3, leave to appeal refused, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 482; and Willmot v. Benton, 2011 ONCA 104, at paras. 3, 6. We are satisfied that those cases have application to an order appointing a litigation administrator, at least in the context of an order that appoints a litigation administrator and goes no further.
[3] Counsel for the appellants/responding parties, however, submits that this order does go further. He submits that, even if the appointment of a litigation administrator is an interlocutory order when considered as a standalone order, it becomes final in circumstances like this, when it is joined with a final order, such as the opt-out order made in this case.
[4] We cannot agree with counsel for the appellants’/responding parties’ submission. The two parts of the order do different things. The appointment of the litigation administrator gives control of the litigation to XXX. It does not determine any issue in the litigation. The other part of the order validating the provisional opt-out form addresses a particular decision made by XXX in her capacity as litigation administrator. The appointment of XXX and the decisions made under the authority of that appointment are distinct. The former is an interlocutory order, some, at least of the latter, will generate final orders.
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