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Charter - s.7 Security of the Person. Patterson v. Eastern Residential Services Inc. [Charter s.7 application to parenting]
In Patterson v. Eastern Residential Services Inc. (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal partially dismisses an appeal, here brought against the "order made on a r.21 motion under the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, which struck his statement of claim against Eastern Residential Services Inc. (“ERS”) and Simcoe Muskoka Family Connexions (“SMFC”), except for the breach of contract claim against ERS, which was struck with leave to amend".
The court considers whether Charter s.7 'security of the person' "may be engaged in child protection proceedings and asks this court to extend that principle to foster parents":[24] The appellant relies on authorities that hold a parent’s security of the person may be engaged in child protection proceedings and asks this court to extend that principle to foster parents: see, e.g., New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), 1999 CanLII 653 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46.
[25] In my view, the appellant’s position as a foster parent is not equivalent to that of a parent. Parental status is central to personal identity, and the state-imposed loss of that status may carry serious stigma and emotional consequences. The appellant was not in that position. B.M. had only been in the appellant’s care for about six months before J.P. and E.P. applied to adopt him, and B.M. had already been removed from the appellant’s care when the investigation began. That removal did not engage the appellant’s identity, companionship interests, or social standing in the same way as the loss of parental status. In other words, the Societies neither usurped, nor attempted to usurp, a parental role, nor did they “relieve [the appellant] of custody”: see e.g., G.(J.), at para. 69. Simply put, a foster home does not involve the same degree of intimacy and privacy as a parental home. . Dorceus v. Ontario
In Dorceus v. Ontario (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here brought against findings of a motion judge that "concluded that the claim constituted both an abuse of process and a pleading that disclosed no reasonable cause of action", and consequently struck the pleadings. The claim was by "a group of more than 400 current and former healthcare workers" who "allege that a provincial public health directive led to the suspension or termination of their employment because they declined vaccination".
The court addresses a Charter s.7 issue, here regarding consent to medical treatment:[53] Beginning with s. 7, those claims are not viable. Section 7 protects the right to refuse to consent to medical treatment: Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para. 67. The Directive, however, did not deprive the appellants of this right. As the motion judge observed, it did not compel them to undergo any form of medical procedure. Instead, the heart of their complaint is that they faced employment consequences for choosing not to vaccinate or test. Those consequences do not engage s. 7 because it does not protect the right to pursue a particular occupation: Tanase v. College of Dental Hygienists of Ontario, 2021 ONCA 482, 156 O.R. (3d) 675, at para. 40, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 350. . Tan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
In Tan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, this brought against a JR dismissal determining whether: "section 10 of the Citizenship Act, by which citizenship that was obtained by “false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances” may be revoked, violate paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights".
Here the court considers the 'security of the person' element of Charter s.7:[119] The right to security of the person under section 7 protects against physical punishment and the threat thereof, imprisonment and detention, and serious and profound psychological distress, a requirement far beyond the normal stress and anxiety that may arise because of state action: Canadian Council for Refugees at para. 90; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), 1999 CanLII 653 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 46 at para. 60.
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