|
Civil Litigation - Orders - Interpretation. Jones v. Quinn
In Jones v. Quinn (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the required clarity of formal orders:[98] Finally, the appellant argues that the order is impermissibly vague, since it does not define “items”, “vehicles”, or “rightful owner”: see Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79.
[99] I agree with the appellant that courts have a duty to ensure that their orders “state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done”: Prescott-Russell Services for Children and Adults v. N.G. (2006), 2006 CanLII 81792 (ON CA), 82 O.R. (3d) 686 (C.A.), at para. 27. To be enforceable, a court order must include all essential details as to the who, what, and when of its application, and must avoid overly broad language: Carey, at para. 33.
[100] In the abstract, an order to return “vehicles” to their “rightful owner” could be considered too vague to meet the Carey standard. However, in the context of this case, and in particular in light of the lengthy factual narrative in the application judge’s reasons, it is clear what is required of the appellant.
[101] As noted above, the application judge’s factual narrative includes a discussion of certain prior court orders emerging from Property-related litigation between the parties. These include the orders of Lavine J., which have long since expired, but which originally authorized the appellant to remove a green flatbed truck and an Airstream trailer from the Property. Since the expiry of Lavine J.’s order, the appellant has no obvious lawful basis to continue possessing these vehicles. He did not point to any such basis in the court below, nor has he done so on appeal. It is therefore sufficiently clear that these are the “vehicles” referred to in the application judge’s judgment.
[102] As to the “rightful owner” of these vehicles, the respondents argue that this simply means the vehicles must be returned to the Property, where whoever their rightful owner is can find them again. I do not agree with this interpretation, as it is not realistic. I do not believe that the application judge would have expected the rightful owner of the vehicles to return to the Property in search of the vehicles, more than a year after they were taken. Instead, I believe that the application judge’s judgment was for the appellant to take all reasonable steps to identify the rightful owner of the vehicles. My view is fortified by the absence of a direction in the application judge’s judgment requiring the appellant to return the vehicles to the Property.
[103] While an order for the appellant to take all reasonable steps to identify the rightful owner of the vehicles may be onerous, a court order is not impermissibly vague simply for being onerous. Mr. Franklin chose to remove the vehicles from the Property of his own free choice. He was not required to do so. And so he now must bear the consequences of his actions.
[104] I come to a different conclusion with regards to the order to return “items”. The word “items” is exceedingly broad. And unlike with vehicles, a careful review of the application judge’s reasons does not aid in narrowing down exactly what is being asked of the appellant. There is simply no guidance for the appellant to follow to determine what “items” he has control over and is expected to return. Nor is it clear how the appellant is to determine the “rightful owner” of these “items.” I note that the respondents did not defend this aspect of the application judge’s order before this court.
[105] Accordingly, I would quash the application judge’s order that the appellant return “items” to their “rightful owner”. I would further clarify that the remaining order with regard to “vehicles” relates to the green flatbed truck and Airstream trailer discussed in the application judge’s reasons, over which the appellant must take all reasonable steps to ascertain their rightful owner. . Wellman v. Telus Communication Company
In Wellman v. Telus Communication Company (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court issued an unusual order. The parties disagreed about the interpretation of a Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) order with respect to costs, so - after they moved at trial level to resolve it (leading to the present appeal) - the Divisional court ordered (it wasn't simply a suggestion) that they make an application to the SCC to resolve the issue. It's unusual that parties could be ordered to make what is normally highly-deferred-to tactical decision:[6] As a result, this court orders that the parties jointly apply to the Supreme Court of Canada pursuant to Rule 81 and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156. The parties are to apply for clarification of the terms of the costs order issued by the Supreme Court, and an extension of time if necessary. The decision of Morgan J. is to be included in the application. Although directed as a joint application, the relief sought by each party may differ. This application must be made within 45 days. . Rak v. Ontario College of Pharmacists
In Rak v. Ontario College of Pharmacists (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court considered the interpretation of the wording of a tribunal order:[17] The appellant submits that the order of the Discipline Committee is akin to a court order and therefore should be interpreted much like the interpretation of a statute: Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 ONCA 688, at para. 29. The College relies on Sweda Farms Ltd. v. Ontario Egg Producers, 2011 ONSC 3650, at para. 34, aff’d, 2012 ONCA 337, which similarly found that the principles that apply to contract and legislative interpretation also apply to court orders, with necessary modifications.
|
