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Civil Litigation - Orders - Interpretation. Copyright Collective of Canada v. Bell Canada
In Copyright Collective of Canada v. Bell Canada (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed a JR, here from "a redetermination decision [SS: ordered from a prior JR] made by the Copyright Board of Canada ... that set royalty rates for the Tariff for the Retransmission of Distant Television Signals, 2014-2018 (the Tariff) pursuant to section 70 of the Copyright Act".
Here the court considers a second JR challenging the interpretation of terms of a prior JR order which remitted specific issues back down for redetermination:[21] While the parties disagree about whether the principles of functus officio or stare decisis apply in the present circumstances, it is not necessary to address these issues in detail. The parties agree that the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction is constrained by the JR Decision, and that this Court should focus on the Judgment therein (reproduced at paragraph 8 above) to determine which aspects of the Original Decision the Board was entitled to revisit in its Redetermination Decision. The jurisprudence supports this approach, holding that only instructions explicitly stated in a judgment are binding on the subsequent decision-maker: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Yansane, 2017 FCA 48, [2017] F.C.J. No. 264 at para. 19; Jagadeesh v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2024 FCA 172 at para. 46. While not binding on their own, the reasons in the JR decision can be used to interpret the Judgment. Aside from the JR Decision, the Board’s power to change the Original Decision was essentially limited to (i) slips in drawing up the formal judgment and errors in expressing the Board’s manifest intention (see Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, 1989 CanLII 41 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848, 62 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at 860), and (ii) material changes in circumstances since the Original Decision (see section 66.52 of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42). Neither of these sets of circumstances is present in this case.
[22] I note that the Board explicitly acknowledged the limits on its power on redetermination, stating as follows at paragraph 46 of the Redetermination Decision:The Board cannot unilaterally perform a review of its own decision, whether an error is obvious or not, or whether it is significant or not. The Board requires direction from a reviewing court. [23] At paragraph 48 of the Redetermination Decision, the Board cited this Court’s decision in Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc., 2003 FCA 53, [2003] 3 F.C. 529 at para. 10, for the framework for determining whether a tribunal has acted within its authority on a redetermination:In order to determine whether the Tribunal, in its redetermination decision, failed to follow the directions of the Federal Court of Appeal, it is necessary to consider:
l. the relevant legislative scheme;
2. the relevant findings of the Tribunal in its original decision;
3. what the Court found to be in error in the Tribunal’s original decision;
4. what the Court concluded and directed the Tribunal to do; and
5. whether the Tribunal, in its redetermination decision, did what it was directed to do by the Court. [24] In my view, a strict application of these criteria is not needed here. A simpler analysis suffices: (1) what did this Court direct on redetermination, and (2) did the Board follow those directions: ABB Inc. v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., 2015 FCA 157 at para. 29.
[25] The dispute between the parties does not appear to relate to the legal limitations on the Board in redetermination, but rather on how those legal limitations should have been applied in the circumstances of this case.
....
[31] The BDUs note that the JR Decision could have included an explicit direction to the Board of the kind contemplated in paragraph 18.1(3)(b) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, to the effect that the redetermination should be limited to the two errors identified therein. The BDUs argue that this Court’s failure to do so indicates that it did not intend the JR Decision to be interpreted in such a limited way. While this Court could indeed have chosen to include such a direction, I see no reason to infer a broader meaning to the JR Decision from its absence. . Business Development Bank of Canada v. 170 Willowdale Investments Corp.
In Business Development Bank of Canada v. 170 Willowdale Investments Corp. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an insolvency-related appeal. Here the court considers the interpretation of court orders, to which it generally applies principles of statutory interpretation:[24] The interpretation of a court order is “much like the interpretation of a statute”: Fontaine v. Ontario, 2020 ONCA 688, at para. 29. A statute is interpreted “by reading the language chosen by the legislature in light of the purpose of the provision and the entire relevant context”: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at para. 118. Similarly, an order is to be understood by examining the text, context, and purpose of the provision in issue. . Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation v. South Bruce Peninsula (Town)
In Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation v. South Bruce Peninsula (Town) (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered an indigenous claim seeking damages and a declaration that "excluded coastline (the “Disputed Beach”) forms part of the Reserve, that no third parties have any interest in the Disputed Beach, and that the honour of the Crown and its fiduciary duties were breached by the wrongful demarcation of the Reserve boundaries".
Here the court considers the textual interpretation of formal court orders:[168] A court considering the interpretation of a court order must consider “the language of the order in the context of the pleadings, the proceedings in the action that led to the order, the circumstances surrounding the making of the order, and the reasons given for making the order, if any”: Giesbrecht v. Stettner, 2023 SKCA 52, at para. 6; see also Greenwood v. Greenwood, 2023 SKCA 87, 487 D.L.R. (4th) 668, at paras. 26-27; Sutherland v. Reeves, 2014 BCCA 222, 61 B.C.L.R. (5th) 308, at para. 31; and Kuang v. Young, 2023 ONSC 2429, at paras. 7-12. . Jones v. Quinn
In Jones v. Quinn (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the required clarity of formal orders:[98] Finally, the appellant argues that the order is impermissibly vague, since it does not define “items”, “vehicles”, or “rightful owner”: see Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79.
[99] I agree with the appellant that courts have a duty to ensure that their orders “state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done”: Prescott-Russell Services for Children and Adults v. N.G. (2006), 2006 CanLII 81792 (ON CA), 82 O.R. (3d) 686 (C.A.), at para. 27. To be enforceable, a court order must include all essential details as to the who, what, and when of its application, and must avoid overly broad language: Carey, at para. 33.
[100] In the abstract, an order to return “vehicles” to their “rightful owner” could be considered too vague to meet the Carey standard. However, in the context of this case, and in particular in light of the lengthy factual narrative in the application judge’s reasons, it is clear what is required of the appellant.
[101] As noted above, the application judge’s factual narrative includes a discussion of certain prior court orders emerging from Property-related litigation between the parties. These include the orders of Lavine J., which have long since expired, but which originally authorized the appellant to remove a green flatbed truck and an Airstream trailer from the Property. Since the expiry of Lavine J.’s order, the appellant has no obvious lawful basis to continue possessing these vehicles. He did not point to any such basis in the court below, nor has he done so on appeal. It is therefore sufficiently clear that these are the “vehicles” referred to in the application judge’s judgment.
[102] As to the “rightful owner” of these vehicles, the respondents argue that this simply means the vehicles must be returned to the Property, where whoever their rightful owner is can find them again. I do not agree with this interpretation, as it is not realistic. I do not believe that the application judge would have expected the rightful owner of the vehicles to return to the Property in search of the vehicles, more than a year after they were taken. Instead, I believe that the application judge’s judgment was for the appellant to take all reasonable steps to identify the rightful owner of the vehicles. My view is fortified by the absence of a direction in the application judge’s judgment requiring the appellant to return the vehicles to the Property.
[103] While an order for the appellant to take all reasonable steps to identify the rightful owner of the vehicles may be onerous, a court order is not impermissibly vague simply for being onerous. Mr. Franklin chose to remove the vehicles from the Property of his own free choice. He was not required to do so. And so he now must bear the consequences of his actions.
[104] I come to a different conclusion with regards to the order to return “items”. The word “items” is exceedingly broad. And unlike with vehicles, a careful review of the application judge’s reasons does not aid in narrowing down exactly what is being asked of the appellant. There is simply no guidance for the appellant to follow to determine what “items” he has control over and is expected to return. Nor is it clear how the appellant is to determine the “rightful owner” of these “items.” I note that the respondents did not defend this aspect of the application judge’s order before this court.
[105] Accordingly, I would quash the application judge’s order that the appellant return “items” to their “rightful owner”. I would further clarify that the remaining order with regard to “vehicles” relates to the green flatbed truck and Airstream trailer discussed in the application judge’s reasons, over which the appellant must take all reasonable steps to ascertain their rightful owner. . Wellman v. Telus Communication Company
In Wellman v. Telus Communication Company (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court issued an unusual order. The parties disagreed about the interpretation of a Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) order with respect to costs, so - after they moved at trial level to resolve it (leading to the present appeal) - the Divisional court ordered (it wasn't simply a suggestion) that they make an application to the SCC to resolve the issue. It's unusual that parties could be ordered to make what is normally highly-deferred-to tactical decision:[6] As a result, this court orders that the parties jointly apply to the Supreme Court of Canada pursuant to Rule 81 and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156. The parties are to apply for clarification of the terms of the costs order issued by the Supreme Court, and an extension of time if necessary. The decision of Morgan J. is to be included in the application. Although directed as a joint application, the relief sought by each party may differ. This application must be made within 45 days. . Rak v. Ontario College of Pharmacists
In Rak v. Ontario College of Pharmacists (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court considered the interpretation of the wording of a tribunal order:[17] The appellant submits that the order of the Discipline Committee is akin to a court order and therefore should be interpreted much like the interpretation of a statute: Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 ONCA 688, at para. 29. The College relies on Sweda Farms Ltd. v. Ontario Egg Producers, 2011 ONSC 3650, at para. 34, aff’d, 2012 ONCA 337, which similarly found that the principles that apply to contract and legislative interpretation also apply to court orders, with necessary modifications.
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