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Civil Litigation - SLAPP - General
MORE CASES
Part 2
. Park Lawn Corporation v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd.
In Park Lawn Corporation v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered an appeal of a dismissal of a SLAPP motion brought by the plaintiff/appellant against a counterclaim for breach of contract and defamation. In these quotes the court reviews the basics of the SLAPP provisions:[25] Before addressing these arguments, it is helpful to first review the applicable test, remind ourselves of the original objectives of the anti-SLAPP provision found in s. 137.1 and the Supreme Court’s directions in Pointes Protection and Bent, and examine the evolution of the practice relating to these motions. This in turn will inform the analysis of the arguments advanced by the appellants.
a) The test
[26] Subsections 137.1(3) and (4) of the CJA set forth the test on an anti-SLAPP motion. Those subsections state:(3) On motion by a person against whom a proceeding is brought, a judge shall, subject to subsection (4), dismiss the proceeding against the person if the person satisfies the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression made by the person that relates to a matter of public interest.
(4) A judge shall not dismiss a proceeding under subsection (3) if the responding party satisfies the judge that,
(a) there are grounds to believe that,
(i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and
(ii) the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and
(b) the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression. [27] In Pointes Protection, Côté J. explained the shifting burden described in s. 137.1 of the CJA: (i) the onus is on the moving party (in this case, the appellants who were the defendants by counterclaim) to satisfy the motion judge that the proceeding arises from an expression relating to a matter of public interest; and (ii) if that burden is met, the responding party (in this case, the respondent Kahu who was the plaintiff by counterclaim) must then satisfy the motion judge that (a) there are grounds to believe that the proceeding has substantial merit and the moving party has no valid defence, and (b) the harm likely to be or that has been suffered is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression.
[28] Justice Côté emphasized that the weighing exercise under ss. 137.1(4)(b) is the “crux” or “core” of the s. 137.1 analysis: Pointes Protection, at para. 18; Bent, at para. 139. She explained that the “open-ended nature of s. 137.1(4)(b) provides courts with the ability to scrutinize what is really going on in the particular case before them: s. 137.1(4)(b) effectively allows motion judges to assess how allowing individuals or organizations to vindicate their rights through a lawsuit — a fundamental value in its own right in a democracy — affects, in turn, freedom of expression and its corresponding influence on public discourse and participation in a pluralistic democracy”: Pointes Protection, at para. 81.
[29] In considering “what is really going on”, the cost consequences encompassed by ss. 137.1(7) and (8) may be relevant. They differ from the usual costs regime where typically costs follow the event, meaning that generally the winner receives a partial indemnity award. Pursuant to ss. 137.1(7) and (8), there is a presumption that a successful moving party will be entitled to full indemnity costs but if the responding party is successful, it is presumptively not entitled to costs of the motion. As the motion judge on this appeal was aware, this cost regime carries the potential for litigation tactics that are tethered to costs and expense rather than the merits of the case. Put differently, if the appellants were fully successful with their request, the defamation counterclaim would be dismissed and they would presumptively obtain a full indemnity costs order of $376,567.78. On completion of the anti-SLAPP proceedings, the parties would then re-engage with the litigation involving the appellants’ claim and the breach of contract component of Kahu’s counterclaim.
b) Purposes of s. 137.1
[30] Section 137.1 expressly sets forth the purpose of the provision. The statement of purpose serves to inform both the interpretation and the application of the test. Specifically, s 137.1(1) states:The purposes of this section and sections 137.2 to 137.5 are,
(a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest;
(b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest;
(c) to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and
(d) to reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action. [31] In Pointes Protection, Côté J. outlined the legislative background of the provision including the Anti-SLAPP Advisory Panel’s report to the Attorney General of Ontario published in October 2010 that was the genesis of the anti-SLAPP legislation. She noted that fundamental to the Panel’s proposal was a theme of balancing and proportionality: Pointes Protection, at para. 9.
[32] Justice Côté also referenced the legislative debates, particularly the statement of the Attorney General of Ontario, the Honourable Madeleine Meilleur, on the occasion of the second reading of the bill:If passed, this legislation will allow courts to quickly identify and deal with strategic lawsuits, minimizing the emotional and financial strain on defendants, as well as the waste of court resources.
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Our proposed legislation strikes a balance that will help ensure abusive litigation is stopped, but legitimate action can continue. [Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 41A, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., December 10, 2014, at p. 1975 (Hon. Madeleine Meilleur).] [33] The new framework was not a “carte blanche” to defame. Rather, the overall theme in the legislative debates was that the anti-SLAPP legislation was designed to stop a plaintiff from silencing a defendant by pursuing meritless litigation that served to intimidate and undermine public expression. The process was intended to be efficient and economical. Presumably this would pre-empt the need for a motion judge to conduct a granular analysis. As stated in Pointes Protection, at para. 52, a “deep dive” into the record is not required. . Thatcher-Craig v. Clearview (Township)
In Thatcher-Craig v. Clearview (Township) (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by a municipality against a defamation and tort lawsuit. Here the court sets out the basics of a SLAPP CJA 137.1 defence:Framework for a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act
[41] Section 137.1 of the CJA was enacted to allow the court, at an early stage, to dismiss a claim that will limit freedom of expression on matters of public interest. The four purposes of the section are set out in s. 137.1(1):The purposes of this section and sections 137.2 to 137.5 are,
(a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest;
(b) To promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest;
(c) To discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and
(d) To reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action. [42] Subsections (3) and (4) describe the test the court applies to determine whether to dismiss the proceeding. Under s. 137.1(3), the proceeding shall be dismissed if the defendant satisfies the court that it arises from expression by a person that relates to a matter of public interest.
[43] However, under s. 137.1(4), the proceeding shall not be dismissed if the responding party then satisfies the court that, nevertheless, three criteria of the proceeding have been met: 1) there are grounds to believe that the proceeding has substantial merit; 2) there are grounds to believe that the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and 3) the harm likely caused to the plaintiff by the impugned expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. It is important to note that all three criteria must be met for the motion to fail.
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[44] The motion judge had no trouble finding that the impugned comments from members of the public that the Township posted on its website related to a matter of public interest. ....
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[46] The proceeding would therefore be dismissed unless the respondents satisfied the court, to the requisite standard, of the three matters in s. 137.1(4): that their case has substantial merit, that the defences raised by the appellant are not valid, and that the public interest in allowing the case to proceed outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. . Safavi-Naini v. Rubin Thomlinson LLP
In Safavi-Naini v. Rubin Thomlinson LLP (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal cited a leading case on the Ontario SLAPP provisions:[15] In 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the framework for applying the s. 137.1 CJA test. Justice Côté, writing for the Court, said, at para. 18:In brief, s. 137.1 places an initial burden on the moving party — the defendant in a lawsuit — to satisfy the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression relating to a matter of public interest. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the responding party — the plaintiff — to satisfy the motion judge that there are grounds to believe the proceeding has substantial merit and the moving party has no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. If the responding party cannot satisfy the motion judge that it has met its burden, then the s. 137.1 motion will be granted and the underlying proceeding will be consequently dismissed. It is important to recognize that the final weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b) is the fundamental crux of the analysis: as noted repeatedly above, the [Anti-Slaap Advisory Panel: Report to the Attorney General] and the legislative debates emphasized balancing and proportionality between the public interest in allowing meritorious lawsuits to proceed and the public interest in protecting expression on matters of public interest. Section 137.1(4)(b) is intended to optimize that balance. . Blair v. Ford
In Blair v. Ford (Ont CA, 2021) the Court of Appeal considered the issue of the RCP s.137.1 rules applying to defamation litigation that was not in the classic SLAPP model (ie. not by corporate plaintiffs to stifle expression):THE NATURE OF THE S.137.1 MOTION
[17] Section 137.1 was meant to address SLAPP lawsuits. These lawsuits are described as follows in 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, 449 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 2:SLAPPs are generally initiated by plaintiffs who engage the court process and use litigation not as a direct tool to vindicate a bona fide claim, but as an indirect tool to limit the expression of others. In a SLAPP, the claim is merely a façade for the plaintiff, who is in fact manipulating the judicial system in order to limit the effectiveness of the opposing party’s speech and deter that party, or other potential interested parties, from participating in public affairs. [18] Section 137.1 allows a defendant to move at an early stage to dismiss such a lawsuit. A motion under s. 137.1 to dismiss such a lawsuit involves a shifting burden and a framework that was set out in Pointes Protection, at para. 18:In brief, s. 137.1 places an initial burden on the moving party – the defendant in a lawsuit – to satisfy the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression relating to a matter of public interest. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the responding party – the plaintiff – to satisfy the motion judge that there are grounds to believe the proceeding has substantial merit and the moving party has no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. If the responding party cannot satisfy the motion judge that it has met its burden, then the s. 137.1 motion will be granted, and the underlying proceeding will be consequently dismissed. It is important to recognize that the final weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b) is the fundamental crux of the analysis … legislative debates emphasized balancing and proportionality between the public interest in allowing meritorious lawsuits to proceed and the public interest in protecting expression on matters of public interest. Section 137.1(4)(b) is intended to optimize that balance. [Emphasis added.] [19] Often a SLAPP is used to protect speech and combat a power imbalance sometimes present in defamation cases, where the plaintiff has significant resources and the defendant is vulnerable.
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[37] The fact that the usual indicia of a SLAPP were not present does not mean that s. 137.1 does not apply. In this regard the appellant is importing a requirement that does not exist in the statute or in the jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has clarified that s. 137.1 should be broadly construed to apply to proceedings that arise from expression. As the motion judge articulated, the legislature specifically avoided reference to the term “SLAPP” in the provision. In Pointes Protection, at para. 24 the Supreme Court specified the following:What is crucial is that many different types of proceedings can arise from an expression, and the legislative background of s. 137.1 indicates that a broad and liberal interpretation is warranted at the s. 137.1(3) stage of the framework. This means that proceedings arising from an expression are not limited to those directly concerned with expression, such as defamation suits. A good example of a type of proceeding that is not a defamation suit, but that nonetheless arises from an expression and falls within the ambit of s. 137.1(3), is the underlying proceeding here, which is a breach of contract claim premised on an expression made by the defendant … Indeed, the [Anti-SLAPP Advisory Panel: Report to the Attorney General] explicitly discouraged the use of the term “SLAPP” in the final legislation in order to avoid narrowly confining the s. 137.1 procedure … and the legislature obliged. [Emphasis added.] [38] Nor do I accept the appellant’s submission that the indicia of a SLAPP should have been specifically addressed at each step in the judge’s analysis. This too has been clarified in Pointes Protection, at paras. 78-79:I note that in Platnick v. Bent, 2018 ONCA 687, 426 D.L.R. (4th) 60, at para. 99, Doherty J.A. made reference to recognized “indicia of a SLAPP suit” (emphasis omitted). He recognized four indicia in particular: (1) “a history of the plaintiff using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics”; (2) “a financial or power imbalance that strongly favours the plaintiff”; (3) “a punitive or retributory purpose animating the plaintiff’s bringing of the claim”; and (4) “minimal or nominal damages suffered by the plaintiff” (para.99). Doherty J.A. found that where these indicia are present, the weighing exercise favours granting the s. 137.1 motion and dismissing the underlying proceeding…
I am of the view that these four indicia may bear on the analysis only to the extent that they are tethered to the text of the statute and the considerations explicitly contemplated by the legislature. This is because the s. 137.1(4)(b) stage is fundamentally a public interest weighing exercise and not simply an inquiry into the hallmarks of a SLAPP. Therefore, for this reason, the only factors that might be relevant in guiding that weighing exercise are those tethered to the text of s. 137.1(4)(b), which calls for a consideration of: the harm suffered or potentially suffered by the plaintiff, the corresponding public interest in allowing the underlying proceeding to continue, and the public interest in protecting the underlying expression. [Emphasis in original.] [39] Pointes Protection requires the motion judge to “scrutinize” what is really going on in the case before them. The reasons of the motion judge read as a whole indicate that he did just that. The motion judge’s comment that the “defamation action is not, strictly speaking a SLAPP” because “the plaintiff is not a large and powerful entity that is using litigation to intimidate a smaller and more vulnerable opponent” confirm that he was alive to any perceived power imbalance that the appellant references. . Kelava v. Spadacini
In Kelava v. Spadacini (Ont CA, 2021) the Court of Appeal cited a case where the Small Claims Court did not have jurisdiction to adopt the RCP Rule 137.1 SLAPP provisions under Small Claims Court Rule 1.03(2):[35] An example of a marker limiting jurisdiction is shown in Bruyea v. Canada (Veteran Affairs), 2019 ONCA 599, 147 O.R. (3d) 84. There, the issue was whether the Small Claims Court had the authority to dismiss an action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act. This is the so-called anti-SLAPP[2] law. It is meant to address concerns arising from the use of litigation to interfere with freedom of expression and quickly dismiss unmeritorious claims that unduly encroach on an individual’s right to freedom of expression on matters of public interest: Bruyea, at para. 11. The process permits the summary dismissal of an action. In Bruyea, this court determined that, by drafting the Act to refer exclusively to “judge”, not “deputy judge” or “court”, the legislature put down a “marker” of an intent to omit the jurisdiction from the Small Claims Court. Interestingly, the court commented on access to justice, at para. 27, by noting that:…ironically, s. 137.1 is not a provision providing access. To the contrary, at least viewed from the perspective of the plaintiff, it is the very opposite. It is a provision that is intended, in proper circumstances, to prohibit access to the courts. . Laurentide Kitchens Inc. v. Homestars Inc.
In Laurentide Kitchens Inc. v. Homestars Inc. (Ont CA, 2021) the Court of Appeal held that an administrative judge in the Small Claims Court [appointed under CJA 87.2] did not have jurisdiction to make s.137.1 SLAPP orders.
. Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v. Castellano
In Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v. Castellano (Ont CA, 2020) the Court of Appeal considered the then-recent Ontario Court of Appeal case of Points Protection in an appeal from a successful respondent on the motion. But now see the SCC case treatment of Points Protection at SLAPP 2020 SCC Cases]:[10] We do not, however, see any error in the motion judge’s dismissal of the appellant’s s. 137.1 motion. She correctly articulated and applied the appropriate test, as set out in para. 7 of this court’s decision in 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 685, 142 O.R. (3d) 161, leave to appeal granted and appeal heard and reserved November 12, 2019, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 467:Stripped to its essentials, s. 137.1 allows a defendant to move any time after a claim is commenced for an order dismissing that claim. The defendant must demonstrate that the litigation arises out of the defendant’s expression on a matter relating to the public interest. If the defendant meets that onus, the onus shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that its lawsuit clears the merits-based hurdle in s. 137.1(4)(a) and the public interest hurdle in s. 137.1(4)(b). ....
[13] The motion judge properly considered the issue of the reputational damage to the respondents. In particular, she found that the appellant’s expression had cast “serious aspersions upon their individual characters”. The motion judge found the respondents’ general damages, as exacerbated by the appellant’s malice, to have been more than nominal, partly in the light of the positions held by the individual plaintiffs. It was not necessary for her to find monetary damages because “a serious libel does not always manifest itself in financial losses”: Montour v. Beacon Publishing Inc., 2019 ONCA 246, at para. 31, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 154.
[14] Similarly, the motion judge carefully considered the public interest in the expressive content of the appellant’s posts, including the videos. She did not, as the appellant submits, limit her analysis to the added commentary to the videos. She found that the posts involved gratuitous personal attacks, as well as vulgar and offensive language, and did not address any governance or leadership issues in any constructive or cogent way. She therefore found that the public interest in the appellant’s expression was low. Her conclusion that the harm suffered by the respondents outweighed the public interest in protecting the appellant’s expression was well-grounded in the evidence and free from error. . Nanda v. McEwan
In Nanda v. McEwan (Ont CA, 2020) the Court of Appeal, hearing an appeal of a motion judge's denial of their anti-SLAPP motion, reviewed the legal basics of SLAPP law:(1) Section 137.1 of the CJA – The “Anti-SLAPP” Provision
(a) Purpose
[25] Section 137.1 of the CJA is designed to prevent the legal process from being used as a weapon to limit debate on matters of public interest. Section 137.1(1) explains that its purpose is:(a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest;
(b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest;
(c) to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and
(d) to reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action. [26] In Pointes, the seminal case on the interpretation of s. 137.1, Doherty J.A. provided the following summary of the operation of the legislation, at para. 7:s. 137.1 allows a defendant to move any time after a claim is commenced for an order dismissing the claim. The defendant must demonstrate that the litigation arises out of the defendant’s expression on a matter relating to the public interest. If the defendant meets that onus, the onus shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that its lawsuit clears the merits-based hurdle in s 137.1(4)(a) and the public interest hurdle in s. 137.1(4)(b). (b) Section 137.1(3): The Threshold Requirement
[27] Section 137.1(3) sets out what was described in Pointes as a “threshold requirement”:On motion by a person against whom a proceeding is brought, a judge shall, subject to subsection (4), dismiss the proceeding against the person if the person satisfies the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression made by the person that relates to a matter of public interest. [28] This provision requires the moving party to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the expression “relates to a matter of public interest.” This term is to be given a broad reading and does not require that the expression actually further the public interest. It covers language that is intemperate, false, or even contrary to the public interest: Pointes, at para. 55.
(c) Section 137.1(4): The Merits-Based and Public Interest Hurdles
[29] If the defendant establishes that the expression relates to a matter of public interest, s. 137.1(4) comes into play and the onus shifts to the plaintiff. It provides:A judge shall not dismiss a proceeding under subsection (3) if the responding party satisfies the judge that,
(a) there are grounds to believe that,
(i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and
(ii) the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and
(b) the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression. [30] First, to satisfy s. 137.1(4)(a), the “merits-based hurdle”, the plaintiff must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the proceeding has substantial merit and that the defendant has no valid defence.
[31] Second, to surmount s. 137.1(4)(b), the “public interest hurdle”, the plaintiff must show that the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s expression “is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression.” . Ontario College of Teachers v. Bouragba
In Ontario College of Teachers v. Bouragba (Ont CA, 2020) the Court of Appeal set out basic SLAPP principles, though at that time the leading case of 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association was only at the Ontario Court of Appeal stage (it later went to the Supreme Court of Canada):III. The Governing Principles Concerning SLAPP Litigation
[13] This court addressed s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act in a group of linked decisions, the heart of which is 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association. The associated decisions were Fortress Real Developments Inc. v. Rabidoux, 2018 ONCA 686, 426 D.L.R. (4th) 1; Platnick v. Bent, 2018 ONCA 687, 426 D.L.R. (4th) 60, leave to appeal granted and appeal heard and reserved November 12, 2019, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 466; Veneruzzo v. Storey, 2018 ONCA 688, 23 C.P.C. (8th) 352; Armstrong v. Corus Entertainment Inc., 2018 ONCA 689, 143 O.R. (3d) 54; and Able Translations Ltd. v. Express International Translations Inc., 2018 ONCA 690, 428 D.L.R. (4th) 568.
[14] In Pointes, Doherty J.A. noted that the scheme in s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act has three features or steps. The first is that for the section to be engaged, the expression must relate to a matter of public interest under s. 137.1(3), which provides:(3) [A] judge shall, subject to subsection 4, dismiss the proceeding against the person if the person satisfies the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression made by the person that relates to a matter of public interest. [15] The second feature is the “merits-based hurdle.” It is set out in s. 137.1(4)(a), which provides:(4) A judge shall not dismiss a proceeding under subsection (3) if the responding party satisfies the judge that,
(a) there are grounds to believe that,
(i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and
(ii) the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and [16] The third feature is the “public interest hurdle.” It is found in s. 137.1(4)(b), which provides:(4) A judge shall not dismiss a proceeding under subsection (3) if the responding party satisfies the judge that,
(b) the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression. [17] The first step in the required analysis is to identify the relevant “public interest,” if any. This requirement is intended to be based on a “broad reading” of the meaning of “public interest” so that public discourse on matters of public interest is not unduly discouraged: Pointes, at para. 57. Doherty J.A. did not identity an exhaustive list of topics that fall under the rubric of public interest but noted that Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 provided considerable assistance.
[18] Of significance to this case, Doherty J.A. noted, at para. 47, that s. 137.1 “does not fix on the plaintiff’s purpose or motive in bringing the claim as the determining factor”. Regarding the concept of public interest, he noted, at para. 65:In summary, the concept of “public interest” as it is used in s. 137.1(3) is a broad one that does not take into account the merits or manner of the expression, nor the motive of the author. The determination of whether an expression relates to a matter of public interest must be made objectively, having regard to the context in which the expression was made and the entirety of the relevant communication. An expression may relate to more than one matter. If one of those matters is a “matter of public interest”, the defendant will have met its onus under s. 137.1(3). [Emphasis added.] [19] Doherty J.A. returned to the issue of motive at para. 94, when he contrasted the assessment of the public interest in s. 137.1(3) with the “public interest hurdle” in s. 137.1(4)(b), which is the third step in the analysis. He said, at para. 94: “Unlike the ‘public interest’ inquiry in s. 137.1(3), in which the quality of the expression or the motivation of the speaker are irrelevant …, both play an important role in measuring the extent to which there is a public interest in protecting that expression.” He added, at para. 95:In addition to the quality of the expression and the defendant’s motivation for making the expression, the consequences of the plaintiff’s claim will figure into the weight to be given to the public interest in protecting that expression. Evidence of actual “libel chill” generated by the plaintiff’s claim can be an important factor in the public interest evaluation required under s. 137.1(4)(b): Able Translations Ltd., at para. 102. [Emphasis added.] [20] Doherty J.A. noted, at para. 96, in relation to the third or balancing step: “Because the balancing of the competing public interests will often be determinative of the outcome of the s. 137.1 motion, and because the analysis contains an element of subjectivity, it is crucial that motion judges provide full reasons for their s. 137.1(4)(b) evaluations.”
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