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Class Proceedings (Ont) - Representative Plaintiff. G.G. v. Ontario [Ragoonanan principle]
In G.G. v. Ontario (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered cross-appeals, here brought against both "the decision refusing to certify the action as against the CASs" and where "Ontario has appealed the decision certifying the action as against it".
The court considered the 'Ragoonanan principle' of class proceedings, this in a context of intervention motions:[4] One of the reasons the motion judge declined to certify the action as against the CASs was the “Ragoonanan principle”, which requires that there be a representative plaintiff (and not merely any member of the proposed class) with a cause of action against each defendant: Ragoonanan Estate v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. (2000), 2000 CanLII 22719 (ON SC), 51 O.R. (3d) 603 (S.C.J.). The Ragoonanan principle has been adopted by this court: Hughes v. Sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Ltd. (2002), 2002 CanLII 45051 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 446.
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The Nature of the Appeals
[15] The representative plaintiffs’ appeal involves the question of whether this court should revisit its decision in Hughes and hold that the Ragoonanan principle should not be applied. They argue that this question has important consequences for access to justice and judicial efficiency. In support of their position, they advance three principal submissions.
[16] First, the representative plaintiffs argue that neither Ragoonanan nor Hughes engaged in a thorough interpretation of s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 (“CPA”), nor did they consider rr. 5 and 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In their submission, nothing in the Rules or the CPA mandates the Ragoonanan principle.
[17] Second, the representative plaintiffs argue that the Ragoonanan principle is undermined by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, 2014 SCC 55, [2014] 2 SCR 725, which states that “[n]othing in the nature of class actions […] requires representatives to have a direct cause of action against, or a legal relationship with, each defendant in the class action”.
[18] Third, and in the alternative, the representative plaintiffs submit that there should be an exception to the Ragoonanan principle in cases where (i) the class is advancing the same causes of action and common issues against multiple defendants; (ii) the fact-finding process necessary to adjudicate at least one common issue incorporates all the defendants; and (iii) refusing to certify the action would cause a substantial injustice.
[19] In response, the CASs submit that Ragoonanan and Hughes were correctly decided; that the appellants’ reference to Marcotte is misplaced, as Marcotte dealt with Quebec’s legislation; and that the Ragoonanan principle is “baked into” the CPA, particularly s. 2(1), which requires a representative plaintiff to be a member of the class.
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[29] The continued application of the Ragoonanan principle in Ontario class proceedings is an issue that transcends the interests of the immediate parties and has policy implications. This issue is quintessentially one in which it is important for the Court to “have all of the relevant possibilities brought to its attention, including submissions on the impact on its judgment, not only on the parties, but on those not before the court whose positions may be similar to but not the same as the parties”: Louie v. Lastman (2001), 2001 CanLII 2843 (ON CA), 208 D.L.R. (4th) 380 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 12.
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