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Criminal - Property Forfeiture (2). R. v. Nguyen
In R. v. Nguyen (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada considered issues of "the forfeiture of criminally tainted property to the Crown".
Here the court considers the operation of CCC 490(9) ['Detention of things seized - Disposal of things seized'] - a provision not relying on criminal convictions for it's operation - and whether it can operate to effect property forfeiture:D. Forfeiture Independent of Trial and Sentencing Proceedings (Section 490 Cr. C.)
[118] Having concluded that there was no jurisdiction under the provisions tied to trial or sentencing proceedings, the Court of Appeal ended its analysis and decided that there was no forfeiture jurisdiction whatsoever in the Court of Québec (para. 20). It stated that “[n]o statutory provision allows an application for forfeiture to proceed in the absence of proven criminality” (para. 19). With great respect, I am of the view that the court failed to recognize that the relevant property is subject to legislative provisions governing its detention and residual disposition, which provide for forfeiture in an appropriate case by the Court of Québec, notably under s. 490(9) Cr. C.
[119] In fairness to the courts below, the Crown did not press the issue of s. 490 before the Superior Court or the Court of Appeal, but it is nonetheless appropriate and important that this Court consider this provision. As I will explain, failing to address this possibility would risk an injustice, namely leaving the seized and restrained property in an indefinite limbo. Section 490(9) was argued by both parties before the Court of Québec (see A.R., vol. II, at p. 168; C.Q. reasons, at paras. 29-30, 33 and 43-93). The respondents have always relied on s. 490(9) as a basis for the return of their property (see A.R., vol. II, at p. 70), and the Crown discusses s. 490 at some length in its factum (see A.F., at paras. 1, fn. 1, and paras. 34, 38, 40-43, 66, 96 and 102). Therefore, at the hearing, the parties’ views on the possibility of forfeiture under s. 490(9) were solicited and are considered here (see transcript, at pp. 2-7, 25-28, 47-48, 52-64 and 67-75).
[120] It is true that the intervener the Director of Public Prosecutions also invoked s. 490(9) before our Court, but it did not do so at the expense of the parties’ representations, nor did it unduly widen or add to the points in issue (see generally R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 579, at para. 53). In addition to their oral arguments at the hearing, the respondents’ factum treats the provision extensively, and the Crown’s condensed book speaks to this alternative argument. Importantly, our Court could not confirm the Court of Appeal’s decision to declare “that the Court of Québec did not have jurisdiction to hear the [Crown’s] application for an order of forfeiture against the [respondents]” (para. 6) without addressing s. 490(9), which, as I will explain, provides a residual basis for forfeiture in the Criminal Code.
(1) Forfeiture Is Engaged by the Residual Disposition of Seized or Restrained Property
[121] Section 490 sets out default rules for the detention and disposition of seized property, which apply unless Parliament has provided more specific, conflicting rules (“[s]ubject to this or any other Act of Parliament” / “[s]ous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi ou de toute autre loi fédérale” (s. 490(1) and (9))). Where s. 490 has not been displaced by legislation, police who seize any property in the execution of their duties under federal legislation, and who do not return it, must submit that property to judicial supervision under s. 490 (ss. 489.1(1)(b) and 490(1) Cr. C.; see N. Hasan et al., Search and Seizure (2021), at pp. 538-39). The purpose of s. 490 is to ensure that courts supervising seized property can carefully balance the private interests in that property against the public need for that property to be detained in pursuit of investigating and prosecuting crime (see Hollaman, at paras. 97-98; Breton, at para. 62; see also Uniform Law Conference of Canada, at paras. 12-13; Further Detention of Things Seized (Re), 2024 BCSC 354, at para. 15; Ayotte, at para. 51). It purports to provide a “complete scheme” for this purpose (Raponi, at para. 28; see also paras. 8‑15 and 30; R. v. Backhouse (2005), 2005 CanLII 4937 (ON CA), 195 O.A.C. 80, at para. 111). Section 490 also applies with necessary modifications to property that has not actually been seized but is nonetheless subject to judicial supervision, such as property subject to a restraint order, where this is contemplated by statute (see, e.g., s. 490.9(1) Cr. C.; s. 15(1) CDSA).
[122] Under s. 490(1), the property must be returned unless the court is satisfied that detention is required for the purposes of criminal investigation or proceedings. Where so satisfied, detention can be ordered for a period of up to three months from the date of seizure (ss. 490(1)(b) and 490(2)). This period of detention can be extended, provided the court is satisfied that further detention is warranted (ss. 490(2)(a), 490(3)(a) and 490(9.1)). Regardless of initial detention orders and their extension, s. 490 authorizes the continued detention of property if proceedings are instituted in which the property may be required, such as where charges are laid and criminal liability proceedings are ongoing (ss. 490(2)(b), 490(3)(b) and 490(4); see Hasan et al., at p. 555).
[123] Applications for disposition of the property can be made both before and after the detention periods provided for under s. 490(1) to (3) have expired (s. 490(5) to (8); see Hasan et al., at p. 558). Under s. 490(9), the court is empowered to dispose of the property if it meets different criteria depending on whether the relevant detention periods have expired (see generally Hasan et al., at p. 559). If they have not expired, the court must be satisfied that the property will not be required for the purposes of criminal investigation or proceedings. If the detention periods have expired, the court must still be satisfied, in deciding whether to dispose of the property, that proceedings have not been instituted in which the property may be required.
[124] When it is validly engaged, s. 490(9) empowers the court to order the return of property to a lawful owner or possessor or, if there is no known lawful owner or possessor, order it forfeited to the Crown (see Breton, at paras. 68-69; Gagnon, at para. 105; see also Hollaman, at para. 97; Ayotte v. R., 2025 QCCS 546, 2 C.R. (8th) 289, at paras. 49-50). This is the forfeiture provision we are asked to consider here:(9) Subject to this or any other Act of Parliament, if
(9) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi ou de toute autre loi fédérale :
(a) a judge referred to in subsection (7), where a judge ordered the detention of anything seized under subsection (3), or
a) le juge visé au paragraphe (7), lorsqu’un juge a ordonné la détention d’une chose saisie en application du paragraphe (3);
(b) a justice, in any other case,
b) le juge de paix, dans tout autre cas,
is satisfied that the periods of detention provided for or ordered under subsections (1) to (3) in respect of anything seized have expired and proceedings have not been instituted in which the thing detained may be required or, where those periods have not expired, that the continued detention of the thing seized will not be required for any purpose mentioned in subsection (1) or (4), he shall
qui est convaincu que les périodes de détention prévues aux paragraphes (1) à (3) ou ordonnées en application de ceux-ci sont terminées et que des procédures à l’occasion desquelles la chose détenue peut être requise n’ont pas été engagées ou, si ces périodes ne sont pas terminées, que la détention de la chose saisie ne sera pas requise pour quelque fin mentionnée au paragraphe (1) ou (4), doit :
(c) if possession of it by the person from whom it was seized is lawful, order it to be returned to that person, or
c) en cas de légalité de la possession de cette chose par la personne entre les mains de qui elle a été saisie, ordonner qu’elle soit retournée à cette personne;
(d) if possession of it by the person from whom it was seized is unlawful and the lawful owner or person who is lawfully entitled to its possession is known, order it to be returned to the lawful owner or to the person who is lawfully entitled to its possession,
d) en cas d’illégalité de la possession de cette chose par la personne entre les mains de qui elle a été saisie, ordonner qu’elle soit retournée au propriétaire légitime ou à la personne ayant droit à la possession de cette chose, lorsqu’ils sont connus;
and may, if possession of it by the person from whom it was seized is unlawful, or if it was seized when it was not in the possession of any person, and the lawful owner or person who is lawfully entitled to its possession is not known, order it to be forfeited to Her Majesty, to be disposed of as the Attorney General directs, or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the law.
en cas d’illégalité de la possession de cette chose par la personne entre les mains de qui elle a été saisie, ou si nul n’en avait la possession au moment de la saisie, et lorsque ne sont pas connus le propriétaire légitime ni la personne ayant droit à la possession de cette chose, le juge peut en outre ordonner qu’elle soit confisquée au profit de Sa Majesté; il en est alors disposé selon les instructions du procureur général ou autrement en conformité avec le droit applicable. [125] Since Canada’s Criminal Code was first enacted in the late 19th century, setting out rules governing the seizure of property for purposes of criminal investigation and prosecution, there have been ancillary provisions managing the detention and eventual disposition of that property, including its possible forfeiture to the Crown (see The Criminal Code, 1892, s. 569; Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 432). Initially, the circumstances in which forfeiture was expressly foreseen were relatively narrow. The property was generally to be returned to the hands from which it was seized, unless the justice was “authorized or required by law to dispose of it otherwise” (see The Criminal Code, 1892, s. 569(4); see also Rex v. Rocco (1931), 1931 CanLII 502 (MB CA), 39 Man. R. 453 (C.A.), at p. 454). Specifically noted exceptions in The Criminal Code, 1892 included per se unlawful property like improved firearms, forged banknotes and counterfeit coins, which were generally to be forfeited to the Crown or otherwise disposed of or destroyed (s. 569(4) to (6)).
[126] The circumstances in which forfeiture was expressly provided for were significantly broadened in the 1953-54 Criminal Code, which introduced a provision that looks much like the current s. 490(9). The law was now clear that if there was no known lawful owner, the justice supervising the detention of seized property could order that property forfeited to the Crown (see Criminal Code (1953-54), s. 432(3); House of Commons Debates, vol. III, 1st Sess., 22nd Parl., March 9, 1954, at pp. 2830-34; House of Commons Debates, vol. III, 1st Sess., 22nd Parl., March 15, 1954, at p. 3009 (Hon. S. S. Garson, Minister of Justice)). Despite various amendments to the provision in the intervening decades, notably the introduction of timelines for detention and other measures to facilitate the return of items to lawful owners (see, e.g., Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, S.C. 1968-69, c. 38, s. 29; Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, s. 73; see also Backhouse, at para. 107; House of Commons Debates, vol. I, 1st Sess., 33rd Parl., December 20, 1984, at p. 1390 (Hon. J. C. Crosbie, Minister of Justice)), the language foreseeing forfeiture as an option for the disposal of seized property has remained constant.
[127] Commentators have noted that, despite subsequent legislative development creating more specific forfeiture provisions, such as s. 462.37 dealing with proceeds of crime, forfeiture under s. 490(9) continues to provide an important route to seek forfeiture of criminally tainted property (see German at § 33:1; J. A. Fontana and D. Keeshan, The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada (13th ed. 2024), at § 7.03[1][a]). There are, of course, circumstances in which property would be susceptible to forfeiture under those more specific provisions, but not under s. 490(9). For example, I recall that s. 490(9) forfeiture applies only to property that is seized, or deemed to have been seized for the purposes of s. 490, and only where there is no known lawful owner of the property. Further, as I note below, it imposes a higher evidentiary threshold than provisions that make forfeiture available on a balance of probabilities standard. Still, s. 490(9) continues to play an important role as a residual basis for forfeiture in circumstances where it does apply. Forfeiture under s. 490(9) serves the same purposes as forfeiture elsewhere in the Criminal Code, namely deterring further criminal activity and ensuring the court is not facilitating unlawful possession (see German, at § 33:13, citing Lavigne, at para. 16, and R. v. James, 2016 ONCJ 424, at para. 7).
(2) Forfeiture Remains Available Despite Proceedings Having Been Instituted
[128] The Court of Québec concluded that s. 490(9) could not apply to this case because of the language “proceedings have not been instituted” and the fact that proceedings were instituted in this case but have now concluded (paras. 56-91, citing inter alia R. v. Taylor, 2011 NLCA 72, 285 C.C.C. (3d) 293; R. v. Spindloe, 2001 SKCA 58, 42 C.R. (5th) 58; 9141-2023 Québec; Echostar Corporation v. Service de poursuites pénales du Canada, 2009 QCCQ 4827). With respect for this view, I disagree.
[129] Interpreting s. 490(9) to be inapplicable if proceedings were instituted at any point in the past would risk the indefinite detention of property in many cases like this one where charges were laid but proceedings were stayed before trial. I agree with the Uniform Law Conference of Canada’s report on this provision that this narrow interpretation of s. 490(9) would “create difficulties and legal voids for those things that cannot otherwise be dealt with via some other legal substratum” (para. 211).
[130] Some decisions have suggested that s. 491.1 would fill any gap by permitting forfeiture after proceedings have ended (see, e.g., 9141-2023 Québec, at para. 68; C.Q. reasons, at para. 92). But in my humble view, this does not account for the fact that, as discussed above, s. 491.1 applies (1) only to property obtained by the commission of an offence; (2) only if there has been a trial; and (3) only if there is still a trial court seized of the matter. Other decisions have pointed to s. 490(4) Cr. C., which provides that when an accused “has been ordered to stand trial” seized property is forwarded to the clerk of the court in which the trial will occur to be detained and “disposed of as the court directs”, as another means to close the resulting gap in forfeiture jurisdiction (see, e.g., Spindloe, at para. 119). But even if this is read to confer a forfeiture power on the trial court, from which there would be no appeal, an apparent gap would remain where charges are laid, commencing criminal proceedings, but the accused is not ordered to stand trial. While there may be other mechanisms through which property could be returned or forfeited, such as a Charter application, a civil forfeiture application, or a common law property claim by a lawful owner, there will be property that is not susceptible to disposition under any of these regimes. Not every case will involve a Charter breach, an applicable civil forfeiture regime or a lawful owner who can make out a common law action for the recovery of the property. Despite the various routes to disposition of the property before criminal courts, gaps would remain.
[131] Respectfully stated, it is best to be wary of a proposed interpretation of s. 490(9) creating these kinds of gaps in a scheme that, as discussed above, is intended to provide a residual regime for the orderly detention and disposition of seized property (see generally Backhouse, at para. 111).
[132] Indeed, it is significant that both parties to this litigation took the position that the Court of Québec retains s. 490(9) jurisdiction to dispose of the subject property even though proceedings were instituted against the respondents and have since been stayed (A.F., at paras. 40-41; R.F., at para. 54). While the respondents argue that there is no jurisdiction to forfeit the property at issue, for the reasons I have considered and rejected above, they seek an order returning the property to them under the same provision, s. 490(9) (R.F., at para. 154). This position is incompatible with the conclusion of the Court of Québec that, proceedings having been instituted against the respondents, s. 490(9) is not available to either party (para. 91).
[133] To the extent that the case law suggests a narrow interpretation of s. 490(9), that reading is largely hinged on the words “proceedings have not been instituted” (“des procédures . . . n’ont pas été engagées”) (see, e.g., Taylor, at para. 49; Spindloe, at para. 111; Echostar, at paras. 26-27). I acknowledge that the plain meaning of these words, if read in isolation from the remainder of s. 490(9), could suggest that the requirement is that proceedings have never been instituted. But recall that the modern approach to statutory interpretation requires that even superficially plain text always be read in context and in light of its purpose (see Wilson, at para. 34). Applying that approach, with an eye to both linguistic texts and the context and purpose of the provision, shapes a proper reading of s. 490(9).
[134] As we shall see, even a purely textual analysis coincides with the meaning revealed by the provision’s context and purpose and supports the broader reading. The text immediately surrounding the words “proceedings have not been instituted” (“des procédures . . . n’ont pas été engagées”) suggests strongly that Parliament is concerned with ensuring that the disposition of seized property does not occur until the continued detention of the property is no longer required. The text of the requirement in its entirety is: “proceedings have not been instituted in which the thing detained may be required” (“des procédures à l’occasion desquelles la chose détenue peut être requise n’ont pas été engagées”) (s. 490(9)). The underlined words make plain that the prerequisite is not that proceedings must never have been instituted, but rather the absence of proceedings in which the detained thing “may be required” (“peut être requise”), a modal phrase referring to the present and future, for proceedings that have been instituted at some time in the past. When proceedings were commenced in the past but have since definitively ceased, it cannot be said that “proceedings have not been instituted”, but it is true that “proceedings have not been instituted in which the thing detained may be required”. No thing will “be required” in the present or future for proceedings that have come to an end.
[135] Thus, the language ensures that property that may be required for a proceeding is not prematurely released from the court’s supervision. Even where the periods for detention provided for or ordered under s. 490(1) to (3) have expired, Parliament has ensured, through this language in s. 490(9), that seized property will remain in detention where it is still required for judicial proceedings that have been instituted. Once the property is no longer required for those proceedings, such as when a stay is entered, there is no purpose to the continued detention of the property, and the prerequisite to disposition is satisfied.
[136] Tracing the legislative evolution of this provision makes this even clearer. The equivalent provision in the earliest iteration of the Criminal Code simply contemplated the justice detaining the property until the “conclusion of the investigation” or where required for “the purpose of evidence on the trial” (The Criminal Code, 1892, s. 569(4)). The provision was significantly recast in the 1950s, but disposal of seized property was still made conditional on the justice being satisfied that the property “will not be required” for the purpose of further investigation or trial (Criminal Code (1953‑54), s. 432(3)). The language “proceedings have not been instituted in which the thing detained may be required” in s. 490(9) simply reflects a homologous prerequisite, focused on the necessity of continued detention. It does not somehow require that proceedings have never been instituted.
[137] This reading is further supported by the legislative context of s. 490(9), including the other subsections of s. 490 itself. The initial detention order is made to ensure that the property is preserved until the conclusion of the investigation or until it is required to be produced for criminal proceedings, not simply until proceedings are commenced (s. 490(1)(b)). Indeed, ss. 490(2)(b) and 490(3)(b) specify explicitly that detention of property under the authority of s. 490(1)(b) is permitted to continue if “proceedings are instituted in which the thing detained may be required”. This would be meaningless if s. 490 ceased to apply as soon as proceedings were commenced. Further, s. 490(10) says a lawful owner can apply for return of the property “at any time”, suggesting that s. 490 continues to apply after proceedings have been instituted.
[138] This interpretation also achieves harmony with the wider scheme of the Criminal Code. For example, s. 491.1 specifies that when its prerequisites are met “section 490 does not apply” in respect of the property, which would be a tautology if s. 490 could not apply after proceedings had been commenced against an accused person. As discussed above, s. 491.1 can only apply where there has been a trial and, by extension, only after proceedings have been commenced. Interpretations that render any words in a statute “mere surplusage” should generally be avoided (British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 795, at paras. 45‑46, citing R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 28; see also Côté and Devinat, at paras. 1009-15).
[139] Understanding s. 490 in this way also avoids complicating the interpretation of related provisions in the CDSA. In a case like the present where the accused were neither convicted nor discharged, because the proceedings were stayed, and did not die or abscond, the only mechanism contemplated to put an end to restraint orders under the CDSA is an order made under s. 490 (see s. 14(9) CDSA). To avoid property being locked in a state of restraint forever, it seems clear that Parliament intended that s. 490 remain available even when proceedings had been instituted in the past. The interpretation that results in a harmonious fit between these related provisions is to be preferred over discordant or disjointed readings (see Pointe-Claire (City) v. Quebec (Labour Court), 1997 CanLII 390 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015, at para. 61; R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867, at para. 52).
[140] As I suggested above, this reading of s. 490(9) aligns with the purpose of s. 490, which is to provide a residual regime for the orderly detention and disposition of seized property. The narrower reading would undermine this purpose by creating gaps in the regime, thereby risking that some property would become trapped in a state of limbo. Reading the text of this provision in context and in light of this purpose, there is no ambiguity as to its meaning. This is not, therefore, a case for the application of the principle of strict construction of penal statutes (see La Presse, at para. 24).
[141] Many trial and appellate courts across the country have similarly concluded that s. 490(9) remains available even after charges have been laid and proceedings have begun (see, e.g., Breton, at para. 63; Guimont, at para. 31; Desjardins, at paras. 27-28; R. v. Savard, 2021 QCCS 5717, at paras. 28-31; Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales v. Hébert, 2019 QCCQ 8754, at para. 7; Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales du Québec v. Lacelle, 2013 QCCQ 10269, at paras. 42-45; see also R. v. MacLeod, 2005 MBQB 15, 194 C.C.C. (3d) 257, at para. 32; R. v. Elansooriyanathan, 2025 ONSC 5823, at paras. 36 and 91). This was the view of Poulin J.C.Q. (as he then was) in Procureur général du Québec v. Bagui, 2021 QCCQ 12225, at paras. 10 and 90. With respect, the Court of Québec in our case did not meaningfully grapple with these sources in coming to the opposite conclusion on s. 490(9).
[142] Instead, the Court of Québec placed greater weight on the appellate authorities Spindloe and Taylor in support of the narrower reading of s. 490. But, importantly, both decisions involve complications not present in the respondents’ case and reach outcomes that are, in any event, reconcilable with the broader interpretation proposed here. As their narrower interpretation of s. 490 is not consistent with the text, context and purpose of the provision, for the reasons I have set out above, they should not be followed on this point.
[143] At issue in Spindloe was jurisdiction over property that had been made an exhibit at trial. The provincial court judge had returned the property to an offender who had been convicted at trial on the understanding that her forfeiture power was limited to s. 490(9) and that the criteria to order forfeiture found there were not met (paras. 95-96). The Court of Appeal found this conclusion to be in error because it overlooked an implied power of a judge overseeing a trial to return only those exhibits that were not tainted by criminality (paras. 125-26 and 161). In exercise of that power, the Court of Appeal declined to return exhibits tainted by illegality to the offender, as doing so would “defeat Parliament’s intention” and offend ex turpi causa principles (para. 127; see also paras. 162 and 173-74).
[144] The analysis in Spindloe turned on the application and exercise of the implied power of trial courts over exhibits. The grant of jurisdiction to conduct a proceeding includes implied powers to manage that proceeding (see generally R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331, at paras. 18-19), including powers to manage exhibits (see E. G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings & Practice in Canada (3rd ed. (loose-leaf)), at § 16:175). There is no necessary inconsistency between the power of the trial court to manage exhibits during the trial and the continued application of s. 490 after the trial has ended or where it never takes places. Indeed, the power of the trial court to manage seized property relevant to the trial is expressly contemplated in s. 490(4), which provides for property detained under s. 490 to be made available to the trial court after an accused is ordered to stand trial.
[145] In the respondents’ case, though, the relevant property was not entered as an exhibit, since they never went to trial, and the forfeiture application was made after their criminal liability proceedings had permanently ceased. The concern in Spindloe was that the lower courts had too narrowly construed their powers to dispose of the subject property. The result that the Court of Appeal in that case intervened to correct was one that would have allowed tainted property to be returned to unclean hands. It would be perverse to rely on it here to deny forfeiture jurisdiction in a case in which there are no exhibits and no trial court.
[146] In Taylor, an accused was ordered to stand trial in superior court following a preliminary inquiry (para. 6). After her arraignment in that court, proceedings were stayed for unreasonable delay. She applied to the superior court for the return of property seized from her (para. 7). The Crown objected on jurisdictional grounds, relying on s. 490 to say that the superior court’s jurisdiction to deal with the property was ousted (paras. 18-22). The Court of Appeal concluded, on the contrary, that the superior court retained jurisdiction to dispose of the property (paras. 54-55).
[147] The majority’s reasoning turned on its conclusion that s. 490 did not implicitly oust the inherent jurisdiction of the superior court with the “irresistible clearness” that would be required to that end (para. 54, citing Gendron v. Supply and Services Union of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 50057, 1990 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1298). The conclusion was that s. 490 did not confer on the provincial court “exclusive” jurisdiction to deal with the property (para. 54). The majority’s explicit intention was to decide the case narrowly, confining its comments to “matters necessary to resolve the questions as to jurisdiction that are specifically raised on this appeal . . . in factual circumstances such as exist in this case” (para. 29).
[148] The degree to which provincial and superior courts may have concurrent jurisdiction to order forfeiture when proceedings were pursued in the superior court but have since ceased need not be resolved in our case, where the respondents were never arraigned or tried in the superior court. Without the benefit of full submissions on the issue, I would leave it to another day.
[149] In sum, it was not necessary for the courts of appeal in these cases to adopt a narrow reading of s. 490(9). To the extent their analyses conflict with the proper statutory interpretation set out above, their decisions should not be followed. The fact that proceedings have been instituted in the past does not on its own vacate forfeiture jurisdiction under s. 490(9). At paras 150-157 the court applies the operation of these examined laws to the facts of the case, concluding that the matter should be remitted back to the Court of Québec "for continuation of forfeiture proceedings, together with consideration of the respondents’ application for return of the property".
. R. v. Nguyen
In R. v. Nguyen (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada considered issues of "the forfeiture of criminally tainted property to the Crown".
At paras 73-113 the court considers whether the Court of Québec (a Quebec statutory court) has jurisdiction to apply the property forfeiture provisions of "ss.462.37(2) and 491.1 of the Criminal Code (“Cr. C.”) and s. 16(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”)", here as a matter of statutory interpretation.
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