Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Criminal - Sentencing - Dangerous Driving

. R. v. Robertson

In R. v. Robertson (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here where the defendant argued that "the THC limit [SS: under CCC s.320.14(3) 'Operation while impaired - Operation causing death'] violated s. 7 of the Charter because it could capture drivers who were not actually impaired.".

Here the court considered sentencing and dangerous driving:

1. The Governing Principles

[47] Dangerous driving offences attract criminal sanction because they involve the creation of serious and unacceptable risks to public safety, coupled with a significant degree of fault. Such conduct places others in harm’s way and, when those risks materialize, can lead to what has been described as “carnage on the highways” and “all too many tragic deaths and disabling injuries”: R. v. Hundal, 1993 CanLII 120 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867, at pp. 886-887. The requisite fault is established where the accused’s driving amounts to a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver, a fault requirement which the blameworthy choice to create danger easily meets: R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60, at paras. 33-38.

[48] Similarly, the offence of driving with a blood drug concentration level above the legal limit targets a culpable choice: the decision to operate a vehicle after voluntarily consuming intoxicants. This conduct is inherently risky, and the law responds to that risk even in the absence of proven impairment: Kelly, at paras. 20, 47.

[49] Where these offences result in death, sentencing must also reflect the gravity of the harm caused. In cases of dangerous driving causing death, the prohibited conduct is, by definition, a significant contributing cause of the fatal outcome. The resulting loss of life is, therefore, a central factor in assessing the seriousness of the offence: R. v. Perry, 2025 ONCA 241, at para. 11; R. v. Romano, 2017 ONCA 837, 41 C.R. (7th) 305, at para. 19; R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 129.

[50] Sentences for driving causing death offences have evolved in response to both legislative change and a growing societal recognition of their seriousness. More than four decades ago, this court acknowledged the need for increased penalties to protect the public: R. v. McVeigh (1985), 1985 CanLII 115 (ON CA), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 145 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 149-151. Parliament has since reinforced that direction through successive amendments. In 1985, it established a 14-year maximum penalty for these offences.[1] In 2000, it increased the maximum penalty for impaired driving causing death and driving over the blood alcohol limit causing death to life imprisonment.[2] In 2018, it extended the maximum penalty of life imprisonment to dangerous driving causing death and introduced the same maximum for causing death while driving with excess blood drug concentration.[3] As these statutory maximums have increased, appellate courts have correspondingly recognized the need for higher sentences: see, for example, R. v. Larocque (1988), 5 M.V.R. (2d) 221 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 225; R. v. Mascarenhas (2002), 2002 CanLII 41625 (ON CA), 60 O.R. (3d) 465 (C.A.), at paras. 24-25; R. v. Lojovic, 2025 ONCA 319, 177 O.R. (3d) 327, at para. 64.

[51] These offences encompass a wide range of conduct and offender circumstances. Sentences must, therefore, reflect the “almost infinite variety” of ways in which these offences may be committed: R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511, 56 C.R. (7th) 83, at para. 71; see also Suter, at para. 27.

[52] Crafting a fit sentence requires a careful balancing of these factors, a task that lies at the heart of the sentencing judge’s discretion. Sentencing judges bring to this exercise their experience and their understanding of the needs and expectations of their communities. Their determinations are entitled to significant deference and should not be disturbed on appeal absent demonstrable unfitness or an error in principle that impacts the sentence: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 12, 39, 44, 48-50.

[53] Given the variability of these offences, this court has not established a rigid sentencing range. Instead, prior decisions serve as guides rather than hard constraints, assisting in assessing whether a sentence is proportionate in light of comparable cases: Altiman, at paras. 71, 102-109; Perry, at para. 21. These precedents do not displace the deferential standard of review or prevent sentencing judges from tailoring sentences to the particular circumstances of the case, including in response to legislative changes: Lacasse, at paras. 7, 57-60. Accordingly, this court has upheld sentences exceeding those imposed in earlier cases where warranted by the presence of significant aggravating factors or evolving statutory frameworks: see, for example, see, e.g., Mascarenhas, at paras. 15-29; R. v. Bush, 2012 ONCA 743, 112 O.R. (3d) 626, at paras. 8-11.

. R. v. Georgopoulos [in mitigation of sentencing]

In R. v. Georgopoulos (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal partially allowed a criminal sentencing appeal, here where the defendant was "convicted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm. He was sentenced to two and a half years in the penitentiary and received a six-year driving prohibition".

The court considers 'good character' evidence, here in a sentencing mitigation context:

[8] The sentencing judge considered the appellant’s personal circumstances. She referred to letters of support that described him as a “great guy”, devoted family man, and someone who is helpful to his friends and co-workers. The sentencing judge acknowledged that the appellant’s franchise agreement would be terminated were he incarcerated, as well as his wife’s letter which indicated that he is their family’s primary financial provider.

....

[13] The sentencing judge explained further that good character carries less significance when sentencing someone for a driving related offence because “it is often people of otherwise good character who inexplicably choose to drive recklessly”. Referring to R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 73, she explained that denunciation and general deterrence are the paramount sentencing objectives in cases involving “ordinary law-abiding people”. She reasoned that “[r]ehabilitation is a relevant factor, but does not have a significant role here”. She returned to the firearm analogy to explain why denunciation and deterrence take precedence over restraint and rehabilitation:

Drivers of motor vehicles need to understand that their right to drive is a privilege that carries with it the responsibility to behave in a manner that respects the safety of the public. Many people have gotten that message about drunk driving, but do not recognize that excessive and dangerous speeds and other dangerous conduct that is a threat to public safety will receive the same kind of criminal sanctions. The public understands that young men who shoot guns in public and endanger bystanders can expect to go to jail. The public simply does not have the same attitude about middle-aged, privileged individuals who engage in equally dangerous conduct when driving a motor vehicle. Those perpetrators should also expect to go to jail. There is no reason why one should be treated differently from the other. Indeed, it is easier to understand and show some leniency towards a young person, particularly from an underprivileged community.

....

[20] Further, how much weight, if any, to be given to the appellant’s good character was within the sentencing judge’s discretion. Her comment about who commits like offences simply reflects judicial consensus that sentences for driving offences and other offences, which are often committed by individuals of otherwise good character, need to reflect their true seriousness: R. v. Lacasse, at para. 73; R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724, 169 O.R. (3d) 321, at para. 69; R. v. Currie, 2018 ONCA 218, at para. 12. The sentencing judge was entitled to weigh evidence of the appellant’s good character as she saw fit and there is no basis for appellate intervention: R. v. Lacasse, at paras. 48-50; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 46.

. R. v. Georgopoulos

In R. v. Georgopoulos (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal partially allowed a criminal sentencing appeal, here where the defendant was "convicted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm. He was sentenced to two and a half years in the penitentiary and received a six-year driving prohibition".

Here the court reviews 2018 amendments to the criminal driving offences:

[9] The sentencing judge emphasized the gravity of the offence. She reviewed the legislative history of Criminal Code driving offences, including Bill C-46, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2018, c. 21. Bill C-46 came into effect on June 21, 2018, and comprehensively revised the provisions related to these offences under Part VIII.1 (“Offences Relating to Conveyances”). It raised the maximum sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm from 10 to 14 years (s. 320.13(2)), and the maximum sentence for dangerous driving causing death from 14 years to life imprisonment (s. 320.13(3)). These increases brought the penalties for dangerous driving in line with the equivalent impaired driving offences. The amendments also added s. 320.12(a), a “Recognition and declaration” which states that “operating a conveyance is a privilege that is subject to certain limits in the interests of public safety that include licensing, the observance of rules and sobriety”. In the sentencing judge’s view, Parliament “considered dangerous driving to be an offence that should be treated as equivalent in severity to impaired driving.”

....

Relevance of Criminal Code Amendments

[25] The appellant contends that the sentencing judge erred by relying on the 2018 amendments to the Criminal Code which increased the maximum sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, aligning it with the maximum penalty for impaired driving causing bodily harm, as a “stand-alone basis to depart from previous jurisprudence.” He argues further that the sentencing judge failed to consider the impact of Bill C-5, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 2022, c. 15, which came into effect on November 17, 2022, and made conditional sentences available for dangerous driving and impaired driving. In the appellant’s view this legislative change should have tempered any inclination to increase the range of sentences for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

[26] I reject this argument. The sentencing judge did not place undue emphasis on the 2018 amendments that raised the maximum sentence for a s. 320.13(2) offence. Rather, she sought to reflect Parliament’s clear intention “to create a stronger approach to punishing driving offences”: R. v. Boily, 2022 ONCA 611, 163 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 51. As the Crown points out, appellate courts in other provinces have reached similar conclusions: Vaillancourt c. R., 2023 QCCA 690, at paras. 27, 47; R. v. Amyotte, 2020 MBCA 116, at para. 6. It is difficult to find fault with a sentencing judge for emphasizing a legislative change that Parliament clearly intended to deter dangerous driving by imposing harsher sentences. This is the evident purpose of Bill C-46. And, as the Supreme Court has directed, “[t]o respect Parliament’s decision to increase maximum sentences, courts should generally impose higher sentences than the sentences imposed in cases that preceded the increases in maximum sentences”: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 100.