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Evidence - Credibility (5). Okafor v. Ontario College of Teachers [tribunal]
In Okafor v. Ontario College of Teachers (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a teacher's appeal [under s.35(1) of the Ontario College of Teachers Act], here brought against "the decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers .... which found her guilty of professional misconduct ..." and from "the Discipline Committee’s penalty decision ... that ordered ... a five-month suspension, and costs in the amount of $60,000.00".
Here the court considers the potential role of self-interest in the assessment of credibility:[59] The Appellant submits that the Discipline Committee erred in law in placing undue weight on her interest in the outcome when assessing her credibility.
[60] In R. v. Laboucan, 2010 SCC 12, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 397, Charron J. stated at paras. 11-18:[11] The fact that a witness has an interest in the outcome of the proceedings is, as a matter of common sense, a relevant factor, among others, to take into account when assessing the credibility of the witness’s testimony. A trier of fact, however, should not place undue weight on the status of a person in the proceedings as a factor going to credibility. For example, it would be improper to base a finding of credibility regarding a parent’s or a spouse’s testimony solely on the basis of the witness’s relationship to the complainant or to the accused. Regard should be given to all relevant factors in assessing credibility.
[12] The common sense proposition that a witness’s interest in the proceedings may have an impact on credibility also applies to an accused person who testifies in his or her defence. The fact that the witness is the accused, however, raises a specific concern. The concern arises from the fact that both innocent and guilty accused have an interest in not being convicted. Indeed, the innocent accused has a greater interest in securing an acquittal. Therefore, any assumption that an accused will lie to secure his or her acquittal flies in the face of the presumption of innocence, as an innocent person, presumably, need only tell the truth to achieve this outcome.
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[14] In most cases, I would agree with counsel that this factor is simply unhelpful and, as a general rule, triers of fact would be well advised to avoid that path altogether, lest they unwittingly err by making the impermissible assumption that the accused will lie to secure an acquittal. However, I would not adopt an absolute rule as proposed, for the following reasons.
[15] An absolute rule prohibiting the trier of fact from considering that an accused may have a motive to lie in order to secure an acquittal, regardless of the circumstances, would artificially immunize the accused in a manner inconsistent with other rules of evidence that provide special protection to the accused. ...
[16] An absolute rule as proposed would also be contrary to established principles of appellate review. It should now be regarded as trite law that a trial judge’s reasons should be read as a whole, in the context of the evidence, the issues and the arguments at trial, together with “an appreciation of the purposes or functions for which they are delivered”
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[18] … At the end of the day, the determining question is whether the trial judge’s comments undermined the presumption of innocence. [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis in original.] [61] Although Laboucan is a criminal case, the same logic applies to someone accused of professional misconduct. Accordingly, whether the Discipline Committee erred in law by noting that the Appellant had an interest in the outcome of the hearing in the context of assessing her credibility requires that this comment be considered in light of the entire decision.
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