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Evidence - Fact-Finding. RW Stick Holdings Inc. v. Canadian Flatbeds Ltd [IMPORTANT re nature of fact-findings]
In RW Stick Holdings Inc. v. Canadian Flatbeds Ltd (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a Small Claims Court appeal, this brought against a judgment "for $35,000 plus interest and costs, for breach of a lease agreement between the parties".
The court considers the (accepted) law that the Small Claims Court cannot grant declarations, here while attempting to explain how the appellant's argument may have misperceived the underlying issue as one of normal fact-finding:Issue No. 2: Did the Deputy Judge exceed her jurisdiction by granting declaratory relief, or in the alternative, by granting relief in a matter concerning real property rights?
Jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court
[37] The jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court is set out in s. 23(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as follows:Jurisdiction
23(1) The Small Claims Court,
(a) has jurisdiction in any action for the payment of money where the amount claimed does not exceed the prescribed amount exclusive of interest and costs; and
(b) has jurisdiction in any action for the recovery of possession of personal property where the value of the property does not exceed the prescribed amount. [38] There is no question that a deputy judge of the Small Claims Court lacks the jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. Nor does a deputy judge have the jurisdiction to grant relief regarding an interest in real property, other than monetary damages.
[39] However, RW’s Small Claims Court Claim did not seek declaratory relief or relief in regard to an interest in real property. Nor did the reasons of the Deputy Judge purport to grant such relief. Rather, RW claimed and the Deputy Judge granted relief in the form of monetary damages only. As set out below, that relief came within the jurisdictional bounds of the Small Claims Court.
The Deputy Judge Did Not Grant Declaratory Relief
[40] The reasons of the Deputy Judge do not even mention the words “declare” or “declaration”. Rather, the Deputy Judge granted judgment in favour of RW for the Small Claims Court’s $35,000 limit, plus interest and costs.
[41] Nonetheless, CFL appears to conflate the idea of a declaration with a finding of fact. In Harrison v. Antonopoulos, 2002 CanLII 28725 (ON SC), 62 O.R. (3d) 463 (S.C.J.), at paras. 25-28, Lang J. (as she then was) points out that every civil proceeding requires findings of fact, which she describes as factual declarations. Those findings are not a form a declaratory relief.
[42] Lang J. writes:25 When the court exercises its original jurisdiction between private parties, a "declaration" usually refers to declarations or findings of fact naturally arising in the course of a fact-finding exercise. It would appear that courts have been increasingly willing to incorporate factual declarations into judgments to assist parties with respect to issues of continuing liability and to give them the right to execution with respect to an ongoing right. The original jurisdiction of the court to make declarations of fact appears to have been accepted in Coombe.
26 It is important to know the purpose of the question because law and equity provide different types of declarations. Every action, by its nature, requires factual declarations. In a tort action, such as the one accompanying this claim for accident benefits, the plaintiff seeks factual findings to establish the defendant's liability. She wants the court to hold that the defendant breached the applicable standard of care by making findings that he drove his motor vehicle into the plaintiff while she was crossing the street at a marked crosswalk. While these findings might be phrased as "declarations", they are more familiarly known as findings of fact. That findings of fact are required does not, however, mean that "declaratory relief" is necessarily being requested. The distinction between declarations of fact and declaratory relief was noted by Reilly J. in Ramm v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (1999), 1999 CanLII 14784 (ON SC), 43 O.R. (3d) 652 (Gen. Div.), where he stated that declarations of fact "will form part of the judgment in any civil case: the defendant was (or was not) negligent, the statement was (or was not) libelous. What then is the difference between a declaration of fact and declaratory relief?" (p. 656 O.R.)
27 In the recently released Zamir & Woolf: The Declaratory Judgment, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), authors Lord Woolf and Jeremy Woolf provide a useful description of declaratory judgments. In accordance with the various authorities dealing with this issue, the authors note that such a judgment "is a formal statement by a court pronouncing upon the existence or non-existence of a legal state of affairs" (para. 1.01). They helpfully go on to contrast a declaratory judgment with an executory or coercive one. A declaratory judgment is restricted to a declaration of the parties' rights. It contains no provision ordering any party to do anything. In a coercive judgment, "the courts determine the respective rights of the parties and then order the defendant to act in a certain way, for example, by an order to pay damages or to refrain from interfering with the claimant's rights ...". A coercive judgment, if ignored, may be enforced through levying execution (para. 1.02). Declaratory judgments are also distinguished from "divestive" judgments, which establish new rights rather than determine existing ones, for example, divorce judgments. Finally, and also distinct from declaratory judgments, are those declarations which "declare not only the rights of the plaintiff, but also the remedy to which he [or she] is entitled" (para. 1.03). Although remedial entitlement is a component of this last type of judgment, such a declaration lacks an enforcement mechanism.
28 Declaratory relief, being only a declaration of parties' rights, is mainly sought in commercial matters to help parties define their rights, and as a means to settle matters amicably where reasonable people would otherwise disagree on their mutual obligations and wish to resolve the matter in order to avoid future disputes. In other words, a cause of action need not be extant at the time a party requests declaratory relief. Because declaratory relief is in essence a request for an advance ruling, courts have discretion to refuse such relief. This is the type of relief contemplated by s. 108(2) of the CJA - a declaration of parties' rights with no coercive effect or remedial entitlement. [43] Put simply, the Small Claims Court cannot make any determination regarding any claim before it, whether in tort or breach of contract, or otherwise, unless it makes findings of fact. There is a no difference between the findings of fact in this case and those in, for example, innumerable other Small Claims Court breach of contract decisions over the years.
The Deputy Judge Granted No Relief in a Matter Concerning Real Property Rights
[44] In addition, the Deputy Judge made no order granting relief regarding real property rights. Rather, she granted damages for CFL’s breach of contract; in this case, the Final Lease. Nothing in the reasons or order of the Deputy Judge purported to grant either party any real property rights or change any such rights. Rather, the Deputy Judge property considered the real property rights of the parties in determining that CFL owed money to RW arising out of its breach of contract.
[45] The point was made some time ago in the British Columbia Provincial Court decision, Lou Guidi Construction Ltd. V. Fedick, [1994] B.C.J. No. 2409, 1994 CarswellBC 2818 (P.C.). There, Stansfield J. faced a jurisdictional argument similar to the one propounded by CFL, in a suit regarding a breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.
[46] At para. 18, Stansfield J. found that “the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry is the nature of the relief sought, not whether the matter touches upon certain issues.” Then at para. 22, Stansfield J. determined:In my view there now is nothing precluding a judge of this court considering interests in land in determining whether a claimant should succeed in a claim for debt or damages so long as no remedy purports in any way to affect title to or other interest in land, and so long as no statute precludes the particular consideration .... [47] At para. 23, Stansfield J. concluded:In this case the property in issue has been sold to a third party, and title conveyed to that person. I cannot imagine any determination which might be undertaken in the course of deciding whether the claimant is entitled to retain the deposit, or to be awarded damages in respect of the alleged deficiency, which could affect the title to land. [48] While that decision was based on the jurisdiction granted to the British Columbia Small Claims Court by that province’s Small Claims Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 430, s. 3, that provision’s grant of jurisdiction is similar to that granted by s. 23(1) of the Courts of Justice Act. The British Columbia provision reads as follows:3(1) The Provincial Court has jurisdiction in a claim for
(a) debt or damages,
(b) recovery of personal property,
(c) specific performance of an agreement relating to personal property or services, or
(d) relief from opposing claims to personal property
if the amount claimed or the value of the personal property or services is equal to or less than an amount that is prescribed by regulation, excluding interest and costs.
(2) The Provincial Court does not have jurisdiction in a claim for libel, slander or malicious prosecution. [49] The reasoning of Stansfield J. in Lou Guidi was adopted by the Supreme Court of Yukon in two decisions involving claims for damages related to real property: Whitehorse (City) v. Cunning, 2009 YKSC 48, at paras. 76-86, and Young v. Beacon, 2010 YKSC 67, at para. 18.
Conclusion Regarding Jurisdictional Issues
[50] Nothing in the wording of s. 23 of the Courts of Justice Act, which sets out the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, prohibits that court from awarding the relief granted by the Deputy Judge below.
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