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Family - Spousal Support
MORE CASES
Part 2
. Robson v. Pellerin
In Robson v. Pellerin (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered spousal support:[41] In recognition of the discretion involved in crafting spousal support orders and in order to promote finality, absent reviewable error, a trial judge’s decision in relation to spousal support is entitled to significant deference: Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at paras. 11-12. As the Supreme Court cautioned in Hickey, at para. 11, “appeal courts should not overturn support orders unless the reasons disclose an error in principle, a significant misapprehension of the evidence, or unless the award is clearly wrong.” Indeed, even where there is an error in the manner in which a trial judge calculated support, this court may choose not to intervene if, “when all factors are considered, it remains a fit and appropriate award in the circumstances of [the] case”: Green v. Green, 2015 ONCA 541, 387 D.L.R. (4th) 512, at para. 66. . R.L. v. M.F. [post-separation change in income]
In R.L. v. M.F. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here from an order that the appellant "pay $20,000 in monthly spousal support for a further 9.5 years".
Here the court considers the relevance of a post-separation change in income (of either spouse) determining spousal support:(iii) The trial judge did not err in ordering spousal support based on the appellant’s post-separation increase in income.
[61] The appellant argues that the trial judge erred in ordering spousal support based on his post-separation increase in income. He submits that the spousal support order did not adequately consider “the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including … (b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation”. He claims the trial judge erred by giving “insufficient weight” to the factors that he believes are more important. He claims that the trial judge’s weighing of the factors led to the respondent receiving support beyond what was experienced during the marriage.
[62] I am not persuaded that the trial judge made any reversible error.
[63] I start with the governing principles applied by the trial judge in his analysis of this issue.
[64] A recipient spouse is not automatically entitled to increased spousal support based on a payor spouse’s post-separation increase in income: Patton-Casse v. Casse, 2012 ONCA 709, 29 R.F.L. (7th) 210, at para. 26.
[65] Professor Thompson helpfully sets out the test for sharing:The basis for entitlement is critical to the sharing and the extent of sharing, of any post-separation income increase. The broad question asked in these cases is: the broad test for sharing: is there a “link” or a “connection” between the marriage/cohabitation and the increased payor income after separation? A link or connection is much more likely to be found where the claim is compensatory, while not likely in most non-compensatory cases. [66] Thompson, “It’s Complicated”, at pp. 8-9.
[67] As Professor Thompson goes on to explain, a compensatory basis for entitlement may provide a stronger claim for sharing in post-separation income. As I earlier reviewed, this is because compensatory support is based on the principle that a payee spouse is entitled to compensation for the economic advantages conferred on the payor spouse and to share in the related increase to the fruits of the marital partnership to which the payee spouse contributed and which would have occurred had the spouses continued to cohabitate. The existence of a compensatory element to a support claim is therefore an important factor in determining entitlement to share in post-separation increases in income: Rémillard v. Rémillard, 2014 MBCA 101, 379 D.L.R. (4th) 325, at paras. 132, 135; Kinsella v. Mills, 2020 ONSC 4785, [2020] O.J. No. 3668, at para. 431; Horner v. Horner (2004), 2004 CanLII 34381 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 561 (C.A.), at para. 51.
[68] The recipient must demonstrate a contribution. It can be a direct or indirect contribution: Dancy, at paras. 11-13. It is not tied to a “causal connection” test: Moge, at p. 861.
[69] The determination of whether there should be any sharing of income increases, and if so, the extent of any such sharing, must take place within the framework of the general spousal support objectives and factors set out in the relevant legislation. The Divorce Act factors and objectives in section 15.2(4) and (6) must inform the overall analysis: Kinsella, at para. 431; Linn v. Frank, 2014 SKCA 87 48 R.F.L. (7th) 34, at para. 111.
[70] The analysis should therefore include consideration of the length of the relationship, the extent of the recipient’s contributions and sacrifices both during the relationship and post-separation and the duration of time during which those efforts and sacrifices were made: Kohan v. Kohan, 2016 ABCA 125, 77 R.F.L. 44, at paras. 37-38; Dancy, at paras. 11-17; Helle v. Helle, 2019 BCCA 97, 22 B.C.L.R. (6th) 133, at paras. 35-40.
[71] Important considerations in the analysis are whether the recipient’s efforts and contributions during and after the relationship contributed to the payor’s financial advancement during the relationship and post-separation. These include the expertise the respondent acquired during the parties’ relationship and the extent to which the respondent found himself in favourable circumstances as a result of the joint enterprise of the marriage: Helle, at para. 39, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38619 (September 26, 2019); Marinangeli v. Marinangeli (2003), 2003 CanLII 27673 (ON CA), 66 O.R. (3d) 40 (C.A.), at para. 75; Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 2009 BCSC 698, 70 R.F.L. (6th) 106, at paras. 113, 116-117, rev’d on other grounds, 2010 BCCA 327; Dancy, at para. 11; Patton-Casse, at paras. 26-27; see also Hersey v. Hersey, 2016 ONCA 494, at para. 20.
[72] Evidence that the recipient’s sacrifices and contributions during the relationship supported the payor’s financial progression post-separation will typically support a sharing of the post-separation income and a higher amount of such sharing. The various means by which a spouse’s contributions and sacrifices can support the other spouse’s success both in the short and long-term are broad. These include for example, assuming primary responsibility for home-management matters, taking primary childcare responsibilities during and/or after the relationship, assisting in the establishment and operation of the payor’s business or subordinating their career to that of the payor so that the payor could focus on the development of their skills and career: Hartshorne, at para. 117; Helle, at para. 40. The fact that the recipient spouse has continued to be a primary caregiver for the children post-separation is a factor that supports a sharing of post-separation income increase, since this often allows the payor to continue to focus on their career advancement: Kinsella, at para. 431.
[73] Evidence that the knowledge, skills, expertise, credentials and/or connections that enabled the payor to increase their income following the separation were acquired and developed during the relationship is a factor that will favour sharing of post-separation income increases: Hartshorne, at para. 114; Kohan, at para. 39. The closer the temporal link between the separation and the increase in income, the more likely it is that the court will find that the recipient’s efforts support the other party’s post separation financial success: Kohan, at paras. 38-39; Thompson v. Thompson, 2013 ONSC 5500, at para. 103.
[74] The court should look at whether there were any changes in the payor’s career post-separation that explain the increase in income such as a new job, position or business reorganization. However, in these circumstances, the court must still consider whether the change in position was attributable to the knowledge, skills and experience that the payor had acquired during the relationship with the support of the recipient’s efforts: Hartshorne, at paras. 115-116; Patton-Casse, at para. 26.
[75] In sum, a longer traditional marriage with children will justify full or substantial sharing of post-separation income increases. Where there is an integration of personal and financial affairs during the course of the marriage and the recipient’s sacrifices and contributions for the sake of the family and resulting benefits to the payor have been longstanding and significant, the court will be more likely to find a connection between the recipient spouse’s role in the relationship and the payor’s ability to achieve higher earnings following the separation.
[76] The trial judge followed these governing principles and concluded that the calculation of the appellant’s income for ongoing spousal support purposes should include his present income. The appellant’s contention that the trial judge did not consider all relevant factors is belied by the trial judge’s careful and detailed reasons.
[77] The appellant’s argument fails to account for the reality that sharing in post-separation increases in income is not an all or nothing proposition. As the trial judge did here, partial sharing was accomplished by the use of location in the range: Kirvan v. Kirvan, 2016 ONSC 7712, at paras. 190-191, 198-199, 219-220, 227-228; Hamilton v. St. Denis, 2019 ONSC 2766, at para. 54. The trial judge relied on the lower end of the higher post-separation SSAG range, which had the effect of reducing the respondent’s degree of sharing.
[78] The appellant asks this court to re-weigh the factors properly considered by the trial judge. I would dismiss this ground of appeal. . R.L. v. M.F. [periodic review]
In R.L. v. M.F. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here from an order that the appellant "pay $20,000 in monthly spousal support for a further 9.5 years".
Here the court dismissed an argument that the trial judge erred in not designating a periodic review for a spousal support order:[60] Finally, I consider the appellant’s third argument. The appellant’s complaint of a lack of a review mechanism mirrors the argument rejected by this court in Plese. In Plese, the appellant submitted that the trial judge erred in ordering indefinite support and in making it binding on his estate so that there could be no review of the order. This court disposed of that argument by noting, at para. 64: “There is nothing in the trial judge’s order or in the underlying reasons to deprive the appellant of his right to seek a review should a material change occur in either his or the respondent’s circumstances.” The same applies in the present case. . R.L. v. M.F.
In R.L. v. M.F. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here from an order that the appellant "pay $20,000 in monthly spousal support for a further 9.5 years".
Here the court considers a determination under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG):[53] I turn next to the duration and amount of support ordered by the trial judge. Again, I see no error in the trial judge’s approach by fixing the amount and duration of the respondent’s spousal support below the lower end of the SSAG. In doing so, he followed the guidance provided by the authors of the SSAG and the governing principles in the case law interpreting them.
[54] Having first determined entitlement to spousal support, the trial judge correctly recognized that the SSAG could not be applied mechanically or automatically because the appellant’s income was above $350,000: Halliwell, at para. 117; SSAG s 11.1. He properly used the SSAG as a tool to assist in the individualized, fact-specific analysis that he was obliged to undertake. He also understood that his analysis required a consideration of the effects of the equalization payment and child support: Halliwell, at 107. He understood that, as this court noted in Halliwell, at para. 116: “Above the $350,000 ceiling, an additional formula range is created: appropriate income inputs range anywhere from $350,000 to the full income amount. Entitlement is important to determine a location within that range.” The trial judge noted that no technical formulae apply above the $350,000 ceiling and that the same factors that go to entitlement have an impact on quantum which includes both amount and duration: Bracklow, at para. 50.
[55] Above the $350,000 ceiling, discretion and case specific determinations are required. Certainly, there is no requirement to input the payor’s income at the mid-way point between the SSAG $350,000 ceiling and the payor’s actual income: Plese, at para. 57; the full amount of the payor’s income can be inputted as the appropriate amount: Dancy v. Mason, 2019 ONCA 410, 25 R.F.L. (8th) 9, at para. 18. The fact that the SSAG do not automatically apply after the payor’s gross income reaches $350,000 per year does not constitute a hard ceiling or cap: Plese, at para. 27. Rather, as the trial judge noted, it is an income level above which the court can exercise discretion to apply the exact results generated by the SSAG formula or determine the appropriate amount and duration of support within, above or below the ranges produced: Hathaway v. Hathaway, 2014 BCCA 310, 376 D.L.R. (4th) 670, at para. 66, leave to appeal refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 412; Halliwell, at para. 110.
[56] The trial judge understood that the basis of entitlement is important because it determines location within the formula ranges or justifies departure from the ranges: Halliwell, at paras. 110, 116. He determined that this was a mid-range marriage of about 14.5 years. He considered that the SSAG suggest an indefinite term of support with a duration range of 7.25 to 14.5 years. He concluded that the location within that range in this case should be below the lower end.
[57] The trial judge’s approach to fixing support below the lower end of the SSAG is in keeping with the approach followed in some other compensatory support cases involving high income-earning payor and recipient spouses with good incomes and career prospects. For example, in Gonabady-Namadon, the British Columbia Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s finding that the recipient spouse was not entitled to spousal support, but awarded support below the lower end of the range because the recipient’s substantial professional income and undiminished future prospects did not merit long-term support at the high end of the range in that case: at para. 61.
[58] However, choosing the lower end of the SSAG is not mandatory. The Gonabady-Namadon decision reflects the principle that in cases of high-income payor and recipient spouses above the $350,000 threshold, SSAG ranges still must be calculated and discretion must be exercised by the court to determine the appropriate amount and duration of support having regard to all the circumstances. An individualized fact-specific assessment is always required: Plese, at paras. 26, 56; Hathaway, at para. 48; Rollie Thompson, “It’s Complicated: How Entitlement Wends Its Way In and Out of the SSAG”, (Paper delivered at the 15th Biennial Family Law Conference 2025, July 3, 2015), at p. 19; Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2016), at p. 57.
[59] I therefore reject the appellant’s arguments about the duration and amount of spousal support awarded. I see no error in the trial judge’s approach or in the exercise of his discretion. . R.L. v. M.F.
In R.L. v. M.F. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here from an order that the appellant "pay $20,000 in monthly spousal support for a further 9.5 years".
Here the court considers principles of determining spousal support:(2) Spousal Support
(i) The trial judge did not err in finding an entitlement to spousal support.
[24] The core of the appellant’s complaint on this ground is reflected in the following submissions memorialized in para. 39(a) of the appellant’s factum:Entitlement: how can a support claim have a compensatory element when there is a finding that the recipient has suffered zero economic loss as a result of the roles assumed during the relationship? A finding of imputation necessarily requires the trier of fact to conclude that the recipient is both capable of earning income at the imputed level and that it is possible for that income to be earned…. [Emphasis in the factum.] [25] This submission ignores that the legislated objectives of spousal support, set out in s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3, include not only recognizing any economic disadvantage but also economic advantage:Objectives of a spousal support order
(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should
(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;
(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage. [Emphasis added.] [26] The law is clear that in considering an award of spousal support, a trial judge is obliged to consider all the factors listed in the Divorce Act. No one factor is paramount: Gonabady-Namadon v. Mohammadzadeh, 2009 BCCA 448, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 23, at para. 51; Moge v. Moge, 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at p. 852; Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, 1 S.C.R. 303, citing Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 35.
[27] Spousal support is driven by both compensatory and non-compensatory or needs-based considerations: Miglin, at para. 201. The appellant’s argument focuses only on errors in assessing need, despite the fact that the respondent’s strongest entitlement to support was compensatory to “recognize any economic advantages” arising from the marriage (Divorce Act, s. 15.2(5)(a)), to compensate her for her partnership role during a marriage of nearly 14 years, and to give her a continued share of the fruits of that partnership: Plese v. Herjavec, 2020 ONCA 810, 49 R.F.L. (8th) 28, at para. 40.
[28] The appellant’s submissions collapse the difference between the compensatory and non-compensatory bases for spousal support and show no consideration of any basis for entitlement other that the respondent’s needs. This is misguided: Cassidy v. McNeil, 2010 ONCA 218, 99 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 65. Non-compensatory support entitlement centres on the needs of the spouses and their respective means; compensatory support recognizes an entitlement to support as compensation for the economic disadvantages to the recipient spouse or the economic advantages conferred on the payor spouse as a result of the roles assumed by the parties during their marriage: Bracklow, at para. 41. An approach to spousal support grounded entirely on needs excludes the compensatory nature of support: Droit de la famille – 1221, 2012 QCCA 19, at paras. 44, 56.
[29] The determination of spousal support is highly individual and discretionary. As Professors Carol Rogerson and Rollie Thompson state in their introduction to the SSAG (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2008):Bracklow emphasized the highly discretionary, individualized nature of spousal support decisions. The Court was clear that the Divorce Act endorses no single theory of spousal support and must retain flexibility to allow judges to respond appropriately to the diverse forms that marital relationships can take. The Court presented spousal support determinations as first and foremost exercises of discretion by trial judges who were required to “balance” the multiple support objectives and factors under the Divorce Act and apply them in the context of the facts of particular cases. [30] Income imputation and the fact that a spouse has not suffered material career setbacks or prejudice do not preclude a spousal support claim. This is made clear in the provisions of s. 15.2(4) and (6) of the Divorce Act. Specifically, as stipulated in s. 15.2(6)(a) and (b), compensatory entitlement may arise where, as a result of the parties’ roles during the marriage, one spouse has conferred economic advantages on the other notwithstanding the absence of economic disadvantage. This typically includes one spouse taking on more of the family’s household or child-rearing responsibilities, freeing the other to focus on career-building and income-earning. See: Moge, at p. 860. The spouse who has shouldered household and family responsibilities may be entitled to compensatory spousal support to share in the augmented earning capacity of the other spouse: Zacharias v. Zacharias, 2015 BCCA 376, 80 B.C.L.R. (5th) 54, at para. 26.
[31] Here, the respondent’s role in the marriage reflected the parties’ joint decision that she would work part-time and shoulder the bulk of the home and childcare responsibilities, thus allowing the appellant to become highly successful in his career. As a result, the respondent’s career became secondary to the appellant’s and secondary to her role as wife and mother. The fact that the respondent continues to earn a good income post-separation does not disentitle her to spousal support: Allaire v. Allaire, (2003), 2003 CanLII 26263 (ON CA), 170 O.A.C. 72 (C.A.), at para. 21.
[32] A court is not required to decide on one basis of support to the exclusion of the others; the doctrine of equitable sharing, founded on the concept of economic merger, is the overarching principle to be focused on by the court: Chutter v. Chutter, 2008 BCCA 507, 86 B.C.L.R. (4th) 233, at para. 49; Sea v. He, 2024 BCCA 161, 89 B.C.L.R. (6th) 1, at para. 50.
[33] The SSAG explain the concept of economic merger, in s. 7.2, as follows:We use this term to capture the idea that as a marriage lengthens, spouses merge their economic and non-economic lives more deeply, with each spouse making countless decisions to mould his or her skills, behaviour and finances around those of the other spouse
...
The length of marriage then determines the extent of the claim to be protected against this loss of the marital standard of living. [34] The merger of the parties’ economic lifestyles creates a joint standard of living which must be considered in the spousal support analysis: Linton v. Linton (1990), 1990 CanLII 2597 (ON CA), 1 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), at para. 79. As the Supreme Court stated in Moge, at p. 849, this approach is consistent with the notion that “marriage is, among other things, an economic unit which generates financial benefits” and that, as the Divorce Act reflects, “partners should expect and are entitled to share those financial benefits.” Specifically, s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act recognizes that marriage is a form of partnership with economic consequences depending on the roles performed by the spouses. In particular, the assumption of childcare and household management responsibilities must not be viewed as having a reduced economic value in relation to the role of the higher earning spouse. The Supreme Court further recognized in Moge, at p. 870, that: “As marriage should be regarded as a joint endeavour, the longer the relationship endures, the closer the economic union, the greater will be the presumptive claim to equal standards of living upon its dissolution.”
[35] Applying these principles to the present case, I see no error in the trial judge’s conclusion that the respondent was entitled to compensatory spousal support. As earlier noted, the trial judge considered all the relevant factors, including s. 15.2(4) and (6) of the Divorce Act, and determined that the respondent’s “choice to work part-time did assist [the appellant] in his banking career” and “freed him to work the long hours that were the prerequisite to his success.” The trial judge concluded, correctly in my view, that the absence of coincident ongoing career or economic disadvantage to the respondent did not preclude his finding that she had “a moderate compensatory entitlement to spousal support” and an entitlement to non-compensatory support because of the length of the parties’ marriage and the financial interdependence that arose during the marriage. These findings were rooted firmly in the record and supported by ss. 15.2(4) and (6) of the Divorce Act and the governing principles of spousal support.
[36] The trial judge first addressed entitlement as the important threshold issue and pre-condition to spousal support: Cassidy, at para. 64; Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349, 138 O.R. (3d) 671, at para. 108; Plese, at para. 60. As the trial judge recognized, there is no presumptive entitlement to spousal support: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, 1 S.C.R. 269, at para. 208. Nor does income disparity alone determine entitlement to spousal support: Aquila v. Aquila, 2016 MBCA 333, 397 D.L.R. (4th) 102, at para. 51; Farrar v. Farrar (2003), 2003 CanLII 15943 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 141 (C.A.), at para. 60. The trial judge correctly plumbed the key question of why there was an income disparity between the parties and how the disparity related to the compensatory or non-compensatory basis for spousal support entitlement.
[37] The trial judge also properly recognized that, in the context of a longer marriage involving children and where the recipient spouse supported the payor’s career advancement, there can be an entitlement to spousal support even if the recipient spouse has a relatively high income. Even if not disadvantaged by the marriage in that there is no loss of competitive advantage in the workforce, the recipient spouse may nevertheless have been disadvantaged by the marriage breakdown, having lost to some degree the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, given the length of the marriage and the lifestyle the parties maintained: Gilliland v. Gilliland, 72 R.F.L. (6th) 88 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 171; Gonabady-Namadon, at para. 57; McKenzie v. McKenzie, 2014 BCCA 381, 66 B.C.L.R. (5th) 59, at para. 108; Cassidy, at para. 69.
[38] The trial judge started his analysis of this issue with reference to ss. 15.2(4) and (6) of the Divorce Act. He correctly recognized that no one of these Divorce Act factors and objectives is paramount or should be given priority, and that all of them must be considered: Moge, at p. 852; Bracklow, at para. 44.
[39] The overall goal of the Divorce Act’s support provisions strives for “a fair and equitable distribution of resources to alleviate the economic consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown”: Moge, at pp. 849-850. Marriage is an economic union that creates interdependency: Aquila, at para. 68. As also noted in Moge, at p. 848, these consequences are not limited to economic disadvantage but include economic benefits.
[40] Moge further instructs, at p. 849, that “[e]quitable distribution can be achieved in many ways: by spousal and child support, by the division of property and assets or by a combination of property and support entitlements.” However, a large property award does not necessarily preclude entitlement to spousal support: Chutter, at para. 81; and see, for example, Berta, at paras. 20-21. The trial judge’s consideration of these factors, as I earlier noted, demonstrate that he followed this approach.
[41] The trial judge found that the respondent had a non-compensatory support claim. This finding reflects the relative nature of the concept of self-sufficiency in the spousal support context and its relationship to both the marital standard of living and the other spouse’s post separation standard of living: Macdonald v. Macdonald, 2017 NSCA 34, 95 R.F.L. (7th) 76, at paras. 41, 43; Hodgkinson v. Hodgkinson, 2006 BCCA 158, 53 B.C.L.R. (4th) 52, at para. 69. The respondent was entitled to share in the fruits of the appellant’s labours enabled by her primary responsibility for the household and childcare.
[42] The fact that the recipient spouse is highly trained and capable of stepping back into the work force and earning investment income from her share of the capital assets does not automatically mean that there is no entitlement to support: Hodgkinson, at para. 68; Chutter, at para. 59. That capacity to earn income from capital assets and employment must be related to the standard of living the parties enjoyed during marriage or to the standard of living of the payor spouse after trial, or advert to the time lag that would be involved in earning income immediately after marriage. The recipient spouse is entitled to a degree of comfort well beyond “basic needs”. The arrangement between the parties during marriage required consideration of spousal support from the perspective of the standard of living that is still reasonably available to them: Hodgkinson, at para. 74. The fact that a spouse works outside the home does not make her economic choice of working part-time to assume the lion’s share of the home and child responsibilities any less traditional: Allaire, at paras. 19, 74.
[43] The trial judge made no error in determining that the respondent had a moderate compensatory and a non-compensatory entitlement to spousal support. He reached this conclusion after a thorough and careful review of the evidence, the relevant provisions in the Divorce Act and the applicable principles from the governing jurisprudence. There is no basis for appellate intervention. . R.L. v. M.F.
In R.L. v. M.F. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here from an order that the appellant "pay $20,000 in monthly spousal support for a further 9.5 years".
Here the court considers appellate deference accorded to spousal support decisions:[20] The determination of support obligations, including the amount and duration of any order and any entitlement to share in a payor spouse’s post-separation income increases, involves the exercise of considerable discretion by trial judges, giving rise to significant deference on appeal: Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at paras. 10 to 12; Hendriks v. Hendriks, 2022 ONCA 165, 71 R.F.L. (8th) 266, at paras. 17, 40; Scheibler v. Scheibler, 2024 ONCA 191, 100 R.F.L. (8th) 51, at para. 10. As this court noted in Berta v. Berta, 2017 ONCA 874, 138 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 49: “This deference is augmented for payor incomes over $350,000 where the SSAG themselves suggest ‘pure discretion’ as one of two possible approaches”.
[21] Absent material error, such as a serious misapprehension of the evidence or an error of law, an appellate court is not entitled to overturn a support order simply because it would have made a different decision or balanced the factors differently: Ballanger v. Ballanger, 2020 ONCA 626, 2 C.C.L.I. (6th) 15, at para. 23. In Johanson v. Hinde, 2016 ONCA 430, W.D.F.L. 4103, at para. 1, this court explained the rationale behind the particular deference owed to factual findings of trial judges in family law litigation: “The deferential standard of review of decisions of trial judges on questions of fact, and questions of mixed fact and law, is designed to promote finality and to recognize the importance of trial judges' appreciation of the facts. If anything, this is more accentuated in family litigation.” See also: Hickey, at paras. 11 to 12.
[22] The same high standard of review applies to a trial judge’s discretionary prejudgment interest award. Absent reversible error, there is no basis to interfere with a trial judge’s discretionary decision to order prejudgment interest: Debora v. Debora (2006), 2006 CanLII 40663 (ON CA), 83 O.R. (3d) 81 (C.A.), at para. 93.
[23] As I shall explain, the appellant has not reached this high appellate review threshold. He has unearthed no legal error in the trial judge’s careful and thorough analysis. Rather, his argument effectively focusses on the trial judge’s factual findings without demonstrating any error in principle or palpable or overriding error. . Rathee v. Rathee [SSAGs]
In Rathee v. Rathee (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a family law appeal, this from a JR, this against a family arbitration regarding spousal support.
Here the court considers the federal SSAGs ('Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines'):[18] The core reason advanced by the appeal judge for overturning the arbitral award was that the arbitrator did not pay proper attention to, and apply, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAGs”)[1] developed by the federal Department of Justice and widely used throughout the family law community, including by lawyers and judges. ....
....
[24] The overarching problem with the appeal judge’s reasons is that he ignored the clear direction of the SSAGs, as highlighted by this court in Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349, at para. 115, that support entitlement considerations inform the proper application of the SSAGs formula. In assessing the wife’s spousal support entitlement, he ignored that the wife entered the marriage with a net worth of approximately $95,000 and left it with a net worth of over $3.5 million. He also gave no credit for the eight and a half years of rent-free occupation of the jointly-owned matrimonial home that the husband provided the wife post-separation but before the parties resorted to arbitration and, ultimately, the courts.
....
[32] In McKinnon v. McKinnon, 2018 ONCA 596, van Rensburg J.A. stated at para. 24:The SSAGs are the presumptive starting point for awarding support. Any departure from them requires adequate explanation: Slongo v. Slongo, 2017 ONCA 272 at paras. 105 and 106. [33] In Slongo v. Slongo, 2017 ONCA 272, Simmons J.A. explained the rationale for this requirement, at para. 105: “without [the SSAGs], it is very difficult to establish a principled basis for arriving at a figure for spousal support.”
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