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Federal Court - Discovery. Canada (Attorney General) v. Fisher River Cree Nation [federal court can't compel third party discovery against province due to immunity]
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Fisher River Cree Nation (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed a Crown appeal, this brought against "the order of the Federal Court .... certifying as a class proceeding the action brought by the respondent First Nations".
Here the court, citing the recent Canada v. Stonechild [2025 FCA 105 (leave to the Supreme Court of Canada has been sought, File 41960)] case, refers to what it labels as 'common law immunity' whereby the Federal Court cannot compel third party discovery against provincial or territorial authorities (ie. where they are not direct parties) - which, in this case and as a matter of preferable procedure, it deemed necessary to fully hear the class proceeding indigenous child welfare issues:[17] Third, the Attorney General argued that the litigation plan proposed did not set out a workable method of advancing the proceeding and failed to distinguish the role of the proposed class representatives and the role of the Chiefs and former Chiefs, acting on behalf of the First Nations. In particular, the plan did not establish how the representative plaintiffs would discharge their duties if they ceased to hold office (AB at 626-627).
[18] Finally, the Attorney General argued that the proposed class action should be addressed in the provincial and territorial courts as the claim could not proceed in the absence of the provinces and territories and the provincial and territorial child welfare authorities who provided child and family services to Indigenous children (AB at 627-629).
[19] In this regard, the Attorney General emphasized that the child and family services provided by the provinces and territories to Indigenous children lie at the heart of the proposed class proceeding. However, Canada, as a separate Crown entity, did not have possession, power or control over documents and information relevant to the common issues. To move the matter forward, the claim requires the involvement of the provinces and territories which cannot be compelled by the Federal Court either as a party or to provide evidence pursuant to the doctrine of common law immunity. The Attorney General added that to the extent that the common issues could be determined in a class proceeding, it would be more appropriate to conduct separate actions before provincial or territorial courts as each court would have a complete set of facts to adjudicate the matter. Each proceeding would thus be more manageable as each would have fewer factual and legal issues to consider in terms of applicable legislation, regulations, policies, and child welfare authorities.
....
V. Proper Remedy
[24] While the matter could be remitted to the Federal Court for redetermination, this Court is entitled under subparagraph 52(b)(i) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, to give the judgment that the Federal Court should have given. In determining to decide the certification motion rather than send it back to the Federal Court, I have considered the factors outlined in Doan v. Clearview AI Inc. 2025 FCA 133 at para. 44. In my view, the decision of the majority of this Court in Canada v. Stonechild, 2025 FCA 105 (leave to the Supreme Court of Canada has been sought, File 41960) is determinative of the outcome. Although neither the parties nor the certification judge had the benefit of the decision, the parties did have the opportunity to make submissions on the very same issue that was before this Court in Stonechild. Stonechild’s application was also fully argued before this Court.
[25] In Stonechild, the Federal Court had certified a class proceeding brought on behalf of off-reserve children and their families. The claim was seeking to hold the government of Canada liable for its role between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 2019, in allowing Indigenous children who were in state care to be placed in non-Indigenous homes and in the care of families that were not part of their Indigenous group, community, or people, thus resulting in their loss of identity, culture and family.
[26] The majority of this Court set aside the Federal Court’s decision on the basis that "“[t]he preferable procedure for [the] claim [was] a proceeding before a court with jurisdiction to compel the production of documents from the provinces, territories and child welfare authorities who were … de facto responsible, for the delivery of child services to off-reserve Indigenous children …and that [could], if appropriate, apportion liability between the provinces, their agencies and Canada”" (Stonechild at paras. 5, 17).
[27] The majority of this Court found that the certification judge had "“erred in not recognizing, at the level of legal principle, the immunity of the provincial crown from discovery in a Federal Court proceeding where the province is not a party”" (Stonechild at paras. 16-19). It added that where there "“are well-established jurisdictional limitations on the power of a court to compel the production of documents that a party asserts are essential to its defence or are necessary for an apportionment of liability, and there is a court with jurisdiction to compel production, it is difficult to see how proceedings in the former court can be the preferable procedure”" (Stonechild at para. 22).
[28] In turning its mind to the compellability of the child welfare agencies, the majority of this Court acknowledged that non-parties who do not benefit from common law immunity could be compelled pursuant to Rules 233 and 238 of the Federal Courts Rules. However, it also noted that the enforceability of a third-party production order against provincial child welfare agencies would depend on their status as either the Crown, a Crown agent or corporation, and that the answer to this question could be different in each province, which in turn would have an impact on the evidence before the court, its manageability and fairness (Stonechild at para. 23).
[29] In my view, the same considerations apply to this proposed class proceeding. . Atkinson v. Commissioner of Competition
In Atkinson v. Commissioner of Competition (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, this brought against the Federal Court's decision that "the Commissioner’s right to seek a section 11 [SS: 'Order for oral examination, production or written return'] order did not end with an application before the Competition Tribunal".
Here the court contrasts the Competition Act s.11 provisions with the third party discovery provisions of FCR s.240:[55] The purpose of section 11 is distinct from the purpose of the Federal Court’s third-party discovery rules. The former is investigative; the latter is in support of an adjudicative proceeding. Section 11 enables the Commissioner to investigate and collect facts "“on any matter that is relevant to the inquiry”". In contrast, the Competition Tribunal Rules and third-party discovery are confined to matters relevant to or raised in the pleadings (Federal Courts Rules, r. 240(a)). Discovery is designed to allow a party to know the case they may have to meet at trial and to gain admissions; section 11 is designed to assist the Commissioner to determine if there is a case to bring forward, and if so, scope out its contours.
[56] The appellant’s argument reflects, again, a linear understanding of the relationship between the investigative powers in the Commissioner and the adjudicative powers of the Tribunal. Sections 10 and 11 are continuing investigative powers, not limited by the existence of an adjudicative proceeding. There is nothing in the Act that states or implies that right to discovery precludes resort to an order under section 11. To the contrary, the Tribunal Rules themselves contemplate the integration of section 11 evidence into the adjudicative process. As noted, rule 73 of the Competition Tribunal Rules requires leave of the Tribunal before section 11 evidence is admitted, which serves as a safeguard against the potential misuse of section 11 evidence (Commissioner of Competition v. Canada Pipe, 2003 CanLII 90068 (C.T.)).
[57] The argument that recourse to section 11 is constrained by the existence of the right to discovery has been considered, and rejected (see, e.g., Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Indigo Books [and] Music Inc., 2015 FC 256 at para. 40 [Indigo Books and Music]; Director of Investigation and Research v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 74 C.P.R. (3d) 55, 1997 CanLII 2729 (C.T.) [Canadian Pacific 2]). Previous cases have concluded that section 11 is an available tool for the Commissioner to use to gather information parallel to an application and "“[a]ny advantage which the [Commissioner] obtains through use of section 11 examinations is an advantage accorded to him under the Act”" (Indigo Books and Music at para. 42, citing Canadian Pacific 2).
[58] It is not inappropriate for the Commissioner to rely on its section 11 investigative power to obtain information, even when the Commissioner may have other means of obtaining that information. Rather, the presumption is that the Commissioner’s actions are bona fide and in the public interest: Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Pearson Canada Inc., 2014 FC 376 at para. 43 [Pearson]. The appellants have the onus of displacing that presumption, and they have failed to do so.
[59] But there is a third, and in my view, more compelling reason why I would reject this argument.
[60] Section 11 proceedings are ex parte for a reason. Section 11 orders are not only used against the target of the inquiry. Orders are sought against customers, suppliers, distributors and competitors of the target, many of which may be in a commercially sensitive or vulnerable relationship with the target. Commercially sensitive information lies at the core of any section 11 examination, canvassing, for example, the existence of preferred supplier arrangements or discounts, pricing, operating margins, geographic and product marketing information and the downstream price effects of a restricted practice or merger, to name but a few.
[61] Requiring the Commissioner to gather this evidence in a discovery would bring those parties, and their evidence, into direct contact with the respondent to the application. This would defeat one important purpose of section 11, which is to bolster the Commissioner’s ability to investigate and enforce competition law by incentivizing third parties who, for commercial reasons, might be otherwise reluctant to testify. Under the compulsion of a court order, they can do so without risk of compromising their business relationships or competitive position. Neither the target nor the third party has any right to participate in the application for a section 11 order, file evidence or cross-examine on the Commissioner’s affidavit; rather, their concerns are brought forward to the Court through the Commissioners duty of full disclosure. Importantly, the target is not entitled to attend the examination if it is prejudicial to the effective conduct of the examination, or if it would result in the disclosure of confidential commercial information relating to the business of the person being examined or its employer (Act, s. 12(4)). Considering the purpose of section 11 and the express statutory recognition of the sensitivities involved, attendance by the target should not be expected and requests to attend should not be routinely granted (Pearson at para. 92).
[62] To conclude, the distinctions in purpose and procedure between a section 11 examination and discovery are many and stark; discovery is not a surrogate for an investigatory power, a point made clear by the fact that failure to comply with a section 11 order can result in imprisonment up to two years or significant fines in the discretion of the court.
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