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Injunctions - RJR - 'Public Interest'. West Carleton Community Alliance v. The City of Ottawa et al
In West Carleton Community Alliance v. The City of Ottawa et al (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court partially granted a motion, here seeking a stay of a by-law amendment's "implementation pending the hearing of its application" and further, the striking of "portions of the application and portions of the Applicant’s record" - these within a JR brought "to quash both the Amendment and the MSR" ["Municipal Support Resolution"].
The court considered the 'public interest' (here of a municipality) in assessing the RJR stay pending test:iii) Does the balance of convenience favour granting the stay?
[35] The Applicant, relying on R.J.R.-MacDonald, submits that the City is not the exclusive representative of the public interest. The Applicant can reveal the public interest of an identifiable group. The Applicant submits that the status quo of no development on the land should be maintained until the application can be heard on its merits. The Applicant asks the court to infer, based on the Proponent’s refusal to answer questions about this issue, that the Proponent does not yet have its site plan approvals. Therefore, the Applicant submits that a delay in getting started will not have a significant effect on the Proponent.
[36] The Proponent states that if the operation of the bylaw is stayed, the site plan approvals cannot proceed. The site plan approvals can only be undertaken in conformity with a valid bylaw. Therefore, the stay would put the approvals and therefore the project in jeopardy.
[37] The Proponent estimates its costs of delay at five million dollars per month. It notes that June 30, 2027, is the “in-service” date for the BESS. The Proponent’s affiant attests that the project is currently on schedule to meet that date. Any delay in the site plan approvals puts that date at risk and could result in the Proponent being liable for damages to IESO.
[38] The Applicant pointed to portions of the Proponent’s affidavit to suggest that the Proponent’s contentions about both the cause and the effect of delay are incorrect. The Applicant suggested that previous delay was the cause of the potential harm to the Proponent, and that the timelines in the Proponent’s project plans are “a fiction”. I do not read the Proponent’s evidence that way. The Proponent’s affiant was quite clear that it is the current potential delay that could cost the Proponent five million dollars monthly, and that the Proponent is currently on track to meet its deadline.
[39] Like the Proponent, the City also submits that the balance of convenience favours the Respondents. The City notes that it is balancing the public interest of not only the community that includes the Applicants, but the greater region that is in need of the BESS. There is also the public interest in ensuring legislative bodies, who have passed presumptively valid legislation, are able to function effectively.
[40] The City relies on comments made by the Supreme Court of Canada, albeit not in the context of a stay motion, in Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5, at para. 19:The case law suggests that review of municipal bylaws must reflect the broad discretion provincial legislators have traditionally accorded to municipalities engaged in delegated legislation. Municipal councillors passing bylaws fulfill a task that affects their community as a whole and is legislative rather than adjudicative in nature. Bylaws are not quasi-judicial decisions. Rather, they involve an array of social, economic, political and other non-legal considerations. “Municipal governments are democratic institutions”, per LeBel J. for the majority in Pacific National Investments Ltd. v. Victoria (City), 2000 SCC 64, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 919, at para. 33. In this context, reasonableness means courts must respect the responsibility of elected representatives to serve the people who elected them and to whom they are ultimately accountable. [41] The following comments from Aware, at para. 84 are apt here:A further considerable inconvenience is argued by the County that an injunction granted in circumstances of a procedural mistake to the Applicant with no interest in the property, no evidence or special expertise in the significance of the trees, no irreparable damage to any legal interest, would compromise the County in exercising its authority under The Municipal Act ... [42] I have noted above the deferential posture the courts will take when reviewing bylaws passed by a democratically elected body, absent illegality. I have found the Applicant does not have a frivolous and vexatious case, but I have noted the high bar the Applicant will have to meet to have a chance of success. In weighing the matter, I find the balance of convenience favours the Proponent and the City. The interim inconvenience to those bodies outweighs the interim inconvenience to the Applicant. . Value Assets Inc. v. Downtown Brampton Development Corporation et al.
In Value Assets Inc. v. Downtown Brampton Development Corporation et al. (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a motion for an interim "injunction that would stop the enforcement or applicability" of a by-law - this within a JR proceeding seeking the quashing of the by-law, a restraining order and damages.
The court considers the 'irreparable harm' element of the RJR interlocutory injunction test, here for municipalities defending a bylaw:Balancing of Harms Test Favours the City
[54] When an injunction is sought to restrain the enforcement of a by-law, there are special considerations because the law presumes that staying enforcement of a law will harm the public interest. Courts are reluctant to enjoin a government from enforcing the law: Temagami, at paras. 28-29.
[55] The Supreme Court has held that the onus for a public authority to prove “irreparable harm to the public interest is less than that of a private applicant” and that the “... test will nearly always be satisfied simply upon proof that the authority is charged with the duty of promoting or protecting the public interest and upon some indication that the impugned legislation, regulation, or activity was undertaken pursuant to that responsibility: RJR-MacDonald, at pp. 346.
[56] There is thus a presumption of harm if the City’s new by-law is stayed.
[57] City Council is a democratically elected body that has exercised its discretion to enact new policies for the regulation of mobile businesses. Staying the revised by-law would do much more than simply permit Value Assets to continue to lease its property to Class C Refreshment Vehicles. It would also remove the new fire safety regulations, eliminate the requirement that Refreshment Vehicles obtain approval for the area in which they will operate, remove the prohibition on selling cannabis and remove peddlers of goods from the regulatory scheme entirely. In addition, there is harm to nearby restaurants that can lose business as a result of the operations of Class C Refreshment Vehicles within 50 metres.
[58] I find that those harms significantly outweigh the potential, unquantified loss of rental income to the applicant that might be incurred prior to the determination of this application. Moreover, a party seeking an interlocutory injunction is required to give an undertaking as to damages in the event the injunction is later found to have been unwarranted. Value Assets offers no undertaking to the City or the BIA for damages. . Canada (Attorney General) v. Responsible Plastic Use Coalition
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Responsible Plastic Use Coalition (Fed CA, 2023) the Federal Court of Appeal considered a motion for stay pending appeal, here seeking an extension to 60 days after the appeal was resolved.
In these quotes the court considers the weighing of the RJR-MacDonald test factors where the effect of the decision is to "suspend legislation, regulations or other promulgations" (ie. the 'public interest'):[18] The case law recognizes that, where the grant or refusal of a stay would suspend legislation, regulations or other promulgations, the public interest is engaged and is considered as part of both the second and third criteria for the issuance of a stay: RJR MacDonald at 348; Canadian Council for Refugees at para. 24.
[19] The public interest, moreover, is to be widely-construed. As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada at page 346 of RJR MacDonald, in the context of a request to stay the effect of legislation that was alleged to violate the Charter:... the concept of inconvenience should be widely construed in Charter cases. In the case of a public authority, the onus of demonstrating irreparable harm to the public interest is less than that of a private applicant. This is partly a function of the nature of the public authority and partly a function of the action sought to be enjoined. The test will nearly always be satisfied simply upon proof that the authority is charged with the duty of promoting or protecting the public interest and upon some indication that the impugned legislation, regulation, or activity was undertaken pursuant to that responsibility. Once these minimal requirements have been met, the court should in most cases assume that irreparable harm to the public interest would result from the restraint of that action.
A court should not, as a general rule, attempt to ascertain whether actual harm would result from the restraint sought. To do so would in effect require judicial inquiry into whether the government is governing well, since it implies the possibility that the government action does not have the effect of promoting the public interest and that the restraint of the action would therefore not harm the public interest.
[Emphasis added.] [20] Contrary to what the respondents assert, these principles have been applied to stay cases outside the Charter context. For example, the Quebec Court of Appeal, in a division of powers case, refused a stay where the effect of granting it would have been to suspend legislation in Québec (Procureur général) c. Canada (Procureur général), 2013 QCCA 1263 at para. 50.
....
[28] Given the number of parties impacted by the Single-use Regulations, the recent coming into force of many of the prohibitions in them, and the case law that favours the grant of a stay pending appeal in circumstances where legislation, regulations, or other promulgation would be rendered inoperative, I find that the second and third steps of the test for the grant of a stay are met in this case. In short, if the stay were refused, irreparable harm would be done to the orderly roll-out of the Single-use Regulations and considerable confusion would arise for the many businesses that have moved to comply with their provisions. This would not be in the public interest, which has been found by binding case law to exist when there is some indication that the impugned legislation, regulation, or activity was undertaken by a body charged with acting in the public interest. The Governor in Council, who promulgated the Order, is the highest federal executive authority and is charged with so acting.
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