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Insurance (Auto) - Public Transit Exception [IA s.268(1.1)]. Mohammed v. TTC Insurance Company Limited et al
In Mohammed v. TTC Insurance Company Limited et al (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a LAT SABS appeal, here brought against a ruling that "dismissed Ms. Mohammed’s application, finding she was not entitled to benefits because of s. 268(1.1)" ['Exception, public transit vehicles']:[5] Subsection 268(1) of the Insurance Act provides the general entitlement to SABS benefits under motor vehicle insurance policies. It states that “every contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability policy” shall be deemed to provide for statutory accident benefits.
[6] Subsection (1.1) then provides an exception affecting public transit vehicles. It limits the payment of benefits to an occupant of a public transit vehicle in certain situations, stating:(1.1) Despite subsection (1) and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, no statutory accident benefits are payable in respect of an occupant of a public transit vehicle, in respect of an incident that occurs on or after the date this subsection comes into force, if the public transit vehicle did not collide with another automobile or any other object in the incident. [7] Under s. 268(1.1), then, an occupant cannot obtain benefits in respect of an incident where the public transit vehicle “did not collide with another automobile or any other object in the incident.” The Tribunal found the exception applied in this case because the bus did not collide with another automobile or other object. Ms. Mohammed submitted that she was “any other object.” The Tribunal disagreed. According to the Tribunal, for the bus to collide with “any other object” the object had to be outside the bus. The Tribunal also found its interpretation was supported by the meaning of “object” in the Ontario Automobile Owner’s Policy (Owner’s Policy) (OAP-1).
[8] Ms. Mohammed submits the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the statute because the legislature chose to use the broad wording of “any other object” and did not limit or qualify the language. She says that proper application of the principles of statutory interpretation outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at paras. 72-73 required the Tribunal to give the words “any other object” their widest possible interpretation. She also claims the Tribunal gave insufficient reasons for its conclusion on statutory interpretation and erred by relying on OAP-1.
[9] We disagree. An appeal from the Tribunal is limited to questions of law. The standard of review is correctness. The Tribunal correctly interpreted the statute.
[10] The wording of the statute creates an exception that limits no-fault insurance for public transit operators in certain situations. It remains open to an applicant who cannot obtain benefits because of this subsection to seek compensation by bringing a tort claim in court, as has been done here.
[11] The plain wording of the statute requires the vehicle to have collided with another vehicle or “any other object.” The words “any other object” should not be read in isolation and as broadly as possible, as submitted by Ms. Mohammed. They instead must be read in the context of the provision as a whole, which addresses collisions by a public transit vehicle. A vehicle colliding with another vehicle or any other object by its plain wording does not include a person inside the vehicle. The relevant context is also that the provision limits the payment of benefits for occupants of public transit vehicles. It is not intended to capture all injuries suffered by a public transit rider.
[12] In context, there is no ambiguity. Because Ms. Mohammed was inside the bus, the bus did not collide with her. Although Ms. Mohammed put forward various hypotheticals that may apply to other situations that come before the court, they do not assist her on the facts in this case. The interpretation adopted by the Tribunal was correct.
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