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Judges - Interventions. R. v. Cyrus
In R. v. Cyrus (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismisses a criminal appeal, this brought against "convictions for sexually assaulting two women and uttering a threat against one of them".
Here the court considered the propriety of the trial judge's 'interventions', an issue which is more commonly addressed under bias [see: 'Bias and Conflict of Interest - Intervention by Decision-Maker']:[10] Judicial intervention in a trial may be warranted on several grounds, including, but not limited to: clarifying evidence, avoiding irrelevant evidence, curtailing repetitive evidence, ensuring that a witness’s response to questions is appropriate and does not unduly impede the progress of the trial, and ensuring fairness and efficiency in the conduct of the trial: R. v. Walton, 2025 ONCA 368, 448 C.C.C. (3d) 83, at paras. 19-30.
[11] In R. v. Murray, 2017 ONCA 393, 347 C.C.C. (3d) 529, this court set out the types of judicial intervention in the conduct of a trial that attracts appellate disapproval. These include, but are not limited to:(i) questioning an accused or witnesses in such a way as to convey an impression that the judge aligns him or herself with the case for the Crown;
(ii) questioning witnesses in such a way as to make it impossible for counsel to present the defence case;
(iii) intervening to such an extent in the testimony of the accused that it prevents the accused from telling his or her story; and
(iv) inviting the jury to disbelieve the accused or other defence witnesses: Murray, at para. 94. ....
[20] We do not accept the appellant’s argument that the trial judge usurped the role of counsel, or that his interventions demonstrated a lack of neutrality as between the parties. Viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person present throughout the proceeding, none of the trial judge’s interventions give rise to an appearance of unfairness, either individually or cumulatively: see e.g., Walton, at para. 24.
[21] At the same time, it is worthy of a reminder that trial judges engage with a delicate balance when executing on their responsibilities as arbiters of fair and efficient trials, all the while ensuring that they do not unwittingly interfere in litigation strategy or give rise to the appearance of having taken a side.
[22] While we conclude that the trial judge’s interventions did not impact either the reality or appearance of trial fairness in this case, there were many interventions, some of which could have been left alone. In particular, the purpose of the trial judge’s extended questioning of the appellant regarding the phone number he allegedly gave to S.D. remains entirely unclear. That said, we are not persuaded by the appellant’s suggestion that this line of questioning was prejudicial to the appellant or contributed to any trial unfairness.
[23] For these reasons, we reject this ground of appeal.
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