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Labour (Fed) - Canada Labour Code. Pacific Coast Terminals Co. v. Nenad Habus [refusal to work if danger; abuse: CLC s.147.1]
In Pacific Coast Terminals Co. v. Nenad Habus (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a labour JR, this against a CIRB order prohibiting "employer reprisals against employees for exercising their rights under Part II of the Code in relation to unsafe work" [s.147 CLC 'General prohibition re employer'].
Here the court considers the CLC s.147.1 ['Abuse of rights'] provision, which "allows for discipline where an employee has "wilfully abused" the rights conferred by sections 128 ['Refusal to work if danger'] and 129 ['Head’s investigation'] of the Code":[48] An employer in the applicants’ position is empowered by section 147.1 to discipline employees who wilfully abuse the work refusal process. So, an employee who refuses work in bad faith, deliberately obstructs the work refusal process, or otherwise misuses their rights under sections 128 and 129 cannot do so free of potential consequence.
[49] However, Parliament has mandated that the imposition of discipline on this basis can take place only once the process has concluded. This makes sense when understood in light of subsection 128(12), which allows the investigation process to proceed with or without the employee’s participation, and paragraph 129(1)(c), which permits the Head to refuse to further investigate a refusal made in bad faith. The protection provided to employees refusing unsafe work does not come at the expense of the employer’s ability to see the process through and determine after the fact whether the refusal constituted an abuse of rights warranting discipline.
[50] In the Board’s view, the applicants failed to demonstrate that there was no nexus between the discipline and the section 128 process. Nor could they tenably argue that Mr. Habus had abused his rights under sections 128 and 129 when he was disciplined before all investigations and appeals had concluded. These findings were reasonable based on the evidence before the Board and rest on a reasonable interpretation of section 147.1. . Pacific Coast Terminals Co. v. Nenad Habus [work refusal if danger]
In Pacific Coast Terminals Co. v. Nenad Habus (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a labour JR, this against a CIRB order prohibiting "employer reprisals against employees for exercising their rights under Part II of the Code in relation to unsafe work" [s.147 CLC 'General prohibition re employer'].
The court considers a CLC s.128 ['Refusal to work if danger'] issue:(1) Interpretation of section 128
[26] The applicants argue that the Board interpreted section 128 of the Code unreasonably by relying on the language of subsection 128(12) and failing to advert to section 126 in concluding that an employee does not need to participate in the investigation process.
[27] Subsection 128(1) states that an employee may refuse work when the employee has reasonable grounds to believe that performing the prescribed task, including the operation of a machine, would constitute a danger to the employee or another employee. By subsection 128(6), an employee who refuses work "“shall report the circumstances of the matter to the employer without delay.”"
[28] Subsection 128(12) states:The employer, the members of a work place committee or the health and safety representative may proceed with their investigation in the absence of the employee who reported the matter if that employee or a person designated under subsection (11) chooses not to be present. [29] The applicants do not dispute that Mr. Habus fulfilled the requirement to report the circumstances of his refusal by stating his reasons orally on the date of the refusal. However, the applicants submit that the Board erroneously relied on subsection 128(12) to conclude that Mr. Habus was not required to attend a meeting with BCMEA or complete the form at PCT’s request: Applicants’ memorandum of fact and law at para. 60.
[30] The Board reasoned that while subsection 128(7.1) imposes a duty on the employer to investigate an unsafe work refusal, the Code also contemplates, in subsection 128(12), that an employee could decline to participate in an investigation by permitting the employer (or work place committee or health and safety representative) to continue the investigation even though the employee "“chooses not to be present.”"
[31] The applicants contend that the Board’s reasoning "“reads-in an employee protection ... that does not exist”": Applicants’ memorandum at para. 61. I disagree. In my view, the Board’s interpretation is reasonable on the plain wording of subsection 128(12) and the context found in other parts of section 128. The Board’s reasons show that it was alive to these considerations.
[32] As the Board observed, section 128 sets out the complete process for the handling of unsafe work refusals. When Parliament intended to impose an obligation or prohibition on an employee within the work refusal process, it did so explicitly:(1) subsection 128(2) prohibits an employee from refusing work when doing so would risk the life, health, or safety of another person;
(2) subsection 128(6) requires the employee to promptly notify the employer of the circumstances of a work refusal;
(3) subsection 128(7) requires the employee to inform the employer as to whether they intend to exercise any recourse under a collective agreement;
(4) subsection 128(9) requires an employee who wishes to continue a work refusal to report without delay the circumstances of the refusal to both the employer and the work place committee or health and safety representative. [33] The applicants disagree that section 128 comprises the complete set of obligations on an employee participating in the work refusal process. They refer to Sousa-Dias v. Treasury Board (Canada Border Services Agency), 2017 PSLREB 62 in support of the proposition that refusing to attend a meeting as part of a section 128 investigation is insubordination that warrants discipline. In that case, Mr. Sousa-Dias refused work under section 128. The next day, he was called to a meeting by his manager. Mr. Sousa-Dias insisted that a union representative be present at the meeting with him, and when the employer refused, Mr. Sousa-Dias behaved in an intimidating and aggressive manner. He was subsequently disciplined for this conduct.
[34] The applicants liken this case to Sousa-Dias and submit that the Code must not be used as a shield against "“inappropriate or reprehensible workplace behaviour”": Applicants’ memorandum at para. 64. However, as this Court made clear on judicial review of the Sousa-Dias decision, the discipline upheld in that case was not for Mr. Sousa-Dias’s refusal to attend the meeting without his union representative but for his "“disrespectful conduct and insubordination”" at the meeting "“regardless of how he came to attend”" it: Dias v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 126 at para. 9. While this Court ultimately upheld the Board’s decision in Sousa-Dias, it declined to endorse the Board’s view that the applicant was required to attend the meeting: ibid. Sousa-Dias does not assist the applicants.
[35] The applicants also contend that the Board erred by relying on Bérubé v. Canadian National, 1991 CarswellNat 1079 in finding that Mr. Habus was not required to complete the Refusal to Work Registration form PCT placed before him. In Bérubé, the employer argued that the employee had not legitimately refused work under Part II of the Code because he had not asked for or completed the form required by the employer to do so. The Board held that "“there is no requirement in the Code that an employee who refuses work complete a form”": Bérubé at para. 26.
[36] Here the Board, after quoting paragraph 26 of Bérubé, stated that "“in order to initiate a work refusal, it is not necessary to fill out any form, even an ESDC registration form.”" Rather, "“the employee may communicate the substance of the complaint orally, as the complainant did in this case”": Decision at 13. The Board’s reference in this context to Bérubé was not an error, and its reasons in finding that Mr. Habus was not required to complete the form or attend a meeting with the employer were based on its reasonable interpretation of section 128.
[37] The Board’s reasons show that it was alive to the text, context, and purpose of the section 128 work refusal process. The reasons exhibit the requisite degree of justification, transparency, and intelligibility: Vavilov at para. 100.
[38] It is also worth noting that the form placed before Mr. Habus—the Refusal to Work Registration form—is not required under section 128 but is meant for submission under subsection 129(1) of the Code to the Head of Compliance and Enforcement, who exercises the Minister of Labour’s powers of administration and enforcement under Parts II and IV of the Code. Section 129 is triggered by a continued refusal of work under subsection 128(15). A day after Mr. Habus initially refused work, the parties had not yet reached this step in the process, which under section 128 follows the conclusion of both the employer’s investigation and that of the work place health and safety representative. The applicants do not explain why the completion of this form would have been required at the early stage of the investigation in this case.
[39] Finally on this branch of their submissions on section 128, the applicants point to section 126 of the Code, which sets out what is expected of employees "“while at work”" in relation to health and safety matters, as context for interpreting section 128. The applicants submit that the Board erroneously ignored section 126 in interpreting section 128. The result, they say, is that the Board interpreted section 128 in a manner that contradicts the general requirements in section 126 that an employee "“follow prescribed procedures,”" "“comply with all instructions from the employer,”" and "“cooperate with any person carrying out a duty”" in relation to health and safety. I would reject this submission.
[40] As the respondents note at paragraph 46 of their memorandum, the applicants did not put section 126 to the Board in their submissions. Parties are ordinarily prohibited from raising arguments on judicial review that they did not raise before the first instance decision-maker: see Ouimet v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 200 at para. 22; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 at paras. 22-28. This prohibition extends to arguments that address context that may be relevant to the interpretation and application of a statutory provision: Canada (Attorney General) v. Ibrahim, 2023 FCA 204 at para. 53. It therefore applies to the applicants’ argument concerning section 126. In my view, it is dispositive of any section 126 issue. . Pacific Coast Terminals Co. v. Nenad Habus [reprisals]
In Pacific Coast Terminals Co. v. Nenad Habus (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a labour JR, this against a CIRB order prohibiting "employer reprisals against employees for exercising their rights under Part II of the Code in relation to unsafe work" [s.147 CLC 'General prohibition re employer'].
Here the court lists factors relevant to the JR SOR issue of 'reasonableness review':[24] The principles relevant to reasonableness review were recently summarized by this Court in GCT Canada Limited Partnership v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union Ship and Dock Foremen, Local 514, 2025 FCA 100 at paragraph 26:(1) The "“burden is on the party challenging the decision to show that it is unreasonable.”""“[A]ny shortcomings or flaws relied on by the party challenging the decision [must be] sufficiently central or significant to render the decision unreasonable.”" (Vavilov at para. 100);
(2) A decision will be unreasonable if the reasoning process is not rational or logical. In particular, "“a decision will be unreasonable if the reasons for it, read holistically, fail to reveal a rational chain of analysis or if they reveal that the decision was based on an irrational chain of analysis …”" (Vavilov at para. 103);
(3) A decision will also be unreasonable when the "“decision is in some respect untenable in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on it.”" (Vavilov at para. 101); and
(4) With respect to factual determinations, generally the court must "“refrain from ‘reweighing and reassessing the evidence considered by the decision maker’.”" However, "“[t]he decision maker must take the evidentiary record and the general factual matrix that bears on its decision into account, and its decision must be reasonable in light of them. … The reasonableness of a decision may be jeopardized where the decision maker has fundamentally misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence before it.”" (Vavilov at paras. 125, 126). [25] These principles apply to review of an administrative decision-maker’s statutory interpretation: Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21. These decision-makers need not in all cases engage in a formalistic exercise in statutory interpretation, but their reasons for decision must show that the decision-maker was alive to the essential elements of the text, context, and purpose of the statutory provision in question: Mason at para. 69. . Giffen v. TM Mobility Inc.
In Giffen v. TM Mobility Inc. (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, this from a denial of the Federal Court of a judicial review, this that "sought to set aside the ... decision of Adjudicator Michael Horan" that "determined that he had no jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s complaint that she had been unjustly dismissed following her return from maternity leave due to the limitation set out in paragraph 242(3.1)(a) of the Canada Labour Code" ... "(t)hat paragraph of the Code precluded an adjudicator from hearing an unjust dismissal complaint where a complainant was laid off because of a lack of work or discontinuance of a function.".
Here the court sets out the federal law on this HRC sex discrimination issue:[4] Division XIV of Part III of the Code creates an unjust dismissal remedy for non-unionized non-managerial employees, working in federally-regulated works, undertakings or businesses, who have one year of service with their employer. Unless one of the exceptions in Division XIV applies, such employees possess protection from unjust dismissal. At the times relevant to this appeal, complaints of unjust dismissal were decided by individual adjudicators, appointed by the federal Minister of Labour. These complaints are now heard by the Canada Industrial Relations Board (the CIRB).
[5] The transitional provisions applicable to the amendments to the Code transferring responsibility for hearing unjust dismissal complaints from individual adjudicators to the CIRB provide that the previous version of the Code applies to all complaints filed before July 29, 2019: see Budget Implementation Act, 2017, No. 1, S.C. 2017, c. 20, ss. 354, 383, 402(1); Order Fixing July 29, 2019 as the Day on which Certain Provisions of that Act Come into Force, SI-2019-76, (2019) C. Gaz. II, 5555 [SI/2019-76]. The appellant’s complaint was filed on January 24, 2019, so the previous version of the Code applies to it.
[6] Two limits on adjudicators’ jurisdiction in the Code are relevant to this appeal. The first was contained in paragraph 242(3.1)(a) of the Code, which, as noted, prohibited an adjudicator from hearing an unjust dismissal complaint if a complainant was laid off due to a lack of work or the discontinuance of a function. The second was contained in paragraph 242(3.1)(b) of the Code, which provided that an adjudicator could not consider a complaint of unjust dismissal where an alternate procedure for redress was provided elsewhere in the Code or under another Act of Parliament. ....
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[11] At the times relevant to this appeal, an employee could make a complaint under paragraph 251.01(1)(a) of the Code to an inspector if they believed their employer had contravened any provision of Part III. Subsection 251.01(4) clarified that the complaint could not be for unjust dismissal. An inspector had investigatory powers under subsection 249(2) of the Code, including the ability to examine documents and obtain statements from the implicated parties. However, in accordance with sections 251 and 251.1, the inspector function was aimed at making findings of unpaid wages and facilitating payment, including by way of an order if required.
[12] The Code has since been amended, effective January 1, 2021 to allow for, among other things, the issuance of compliance orders: Budget Implementation Act, 2017, No. 1, ss. 360, 402(3); Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 2, ss. 509, 532, 596, 625; Order Fixing January 1, 2021 as the Day on Which Certain Provisions of those Acts Come into Force, SI/2020-74, (2020) C. Gaz. II, 4086 [Compliance Order Explanatory Note]. Under the current version of subsection 251.06(1) of the Code, a compliance order can require an employer to terminate a contravention of Part III and to take certain steps to ensure the contravention does not continue or reoccur. Subsection 251.06(2) clarifies that a compliance order cannot be used as a substitute for a payment order for unpaid wages or to remedy an unjust dismissal. This tool was "“expected to provide inspectors with an effective tool for handling instances of systemic non-compliance”" (Compliance Order Explanatory Note at 4089). In general, it was part of an effort to improve workplaces, particularly for more vulnerable employees and women: see Compliance Order Explanatory Note at 4088. These provisions were not in force at the times relevant to this appeal.
[13] At the time of the appellant’s complaint, a penal prosecution was the only remedy under the Code available to address a violation of the maternity leave provisions in Part III of the Code that did not give rise to unjust dismissal or non-payment of wages. Paragraph 256(1)(a) of the Code created a statutory offence for contraventions of any provision in Part III with the exception of listed provisions that are not at play here. Pursuant to subsection 256(1.1), upon conviction, a party was subject to a fine. Subsection 258(2) also allowed a convicting court to order an employee’s reinstatement or otherwise compensate them for their loss of employment. The parties made no submissions on the ability to pursue a breach of the maternity leave provisions under the penal offence framework.
[14] The Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 [the CHRA] is also relevant to this appeal. The provisions in effect at the times relevant to this appeal have not been amended.
[15] The first set of relevant provisions in the CHRA prohibit discrimination in employment on any of the prohibited grounds listed in that Act. These include discrimination on the basis of sex, which is defined as including discrimination on the basis of child-birth or pregnancy. Subsections 3(1) and (2) and section 7 of the CHRA provide as follows:Prohibited grounds of discrimination
Motifs de distinction illicite
3 (1) For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.
3 (1) Pour l’application de la présente loi, les motifs de distinction illicite sont ceux qui sont fondés sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, l’âge, le sexe, l’orientation sexuelle, l’identité ou l’expression de genre, l’état matrimonial, la situation de famille, les caractéristiques génétiques, l’état de personne graciée ou la déficience.
Idem
Idem
(2) Where the ground of discrimination is pregnancy or child-birth, the discrimination shall be deemed to be on the ground of sex.
(2) Une distinction fondée sur la grossesse ou l’accouchement est réputée être fondée sur le sexe.
...
[…]
Employment
Emploi
7 It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly,
7 Constitue un acte discriminatoire, s’il est fondé sur un motif de distinction illicite, le fait, par des moyens directs ou indirects :
(a) to refuse to employ or continue to employ any individual, or
a) de refuser d’employer ou de continuer d’employer un individu;
(b) in the course of employment, to differentiate adversely in relation to an employee, on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
b) de le défavoriser en cours d’emploi. [16] Secondly, the CHRA contains several provisions establishing enforcement mechanisms. More specifically, individuals who believe they have been the victim of discrimination may file a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the Commission) by virtue of subsection 40(1) of the CHRA. Subsection 41(1) of the CHRA provides the Commission, prior to the conduct of an investigation, with the discretion to decline to deal with a complaint if alternate procedures for redress are available. ....
[17] The Commission may also decline to deal with a complaint after an investigation and receipt of a report from one of its investigators if it is of the view that the complaint would be more appropriately dealt with under a different procedure. ....
[18] Where the Commission determines after an investigation, having regard to all the circumstances, that an inquiry into a complaint is warranted, subsection 44(3) of the CHRA provides that the Commission may refer the complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (the Tribunal) for an inquiry. By virtue of subsection 49(1) of the CHRA, the Commission also possesses the authority to refer a complaint to the Tribunal for inquiry at any stage after the receipt of a complaint if it is satisfied, having regard to all of the circumstances, that an inquiry is warranted.
[19] The Tribunal possesses broad remedial authority and, among other things, may require employers to reinstate employees who have been dismissed in violation of the prohibitions against discrimination set out in the CHRA. The Tribunal may also award damages, including compensation for lost wages and benefits between the date of termination and reinstatement. ....
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[44] In this regard, human rights law recognizes that discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy: Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, 1989 CanLII 96 at 1242. This recognition is now enshrined in subsection 3(2) of the CHRA.
[45] Further, it is firmly settled that the CHRA prohibits both intentional or direct discrimination as well as adverse effect discrimination, which exists when a practice or decision gives rise to discrimination on a prohibited ground in the absence of any intent to discriminate: Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 1985 CanLII 18 at 551; Canada Post Corp. v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2010 FCA 56, [2011] 2 F.C.R. 221 at para. 89; Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, [1998] 4 F.C. 205, 1998 CanLII 8112 (C.A.) at paras. 82 (Isaac C.J., dissenting but not on this point), 136–137 (Robertson J.A., majority reasons), 182 (McDonald J.A., concurring reasons). It is also well established that a decision is discriminatory if one of the factors it rested on was discriminatory even if there were many other non-discriminatory factors that also led to the decision: Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2017 SCC 30, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 591 at para. 46; Canada (Attorney General) v. Rahmani, 2016 FCA 249 at para. 4. These are foundational principles of human rights law.
[46] As concerns the interpretation of maternity leave provisions in minimum employment standards legislation, there is support in the case law for the view that proceeding in the fashion the respondent did in this case violates the statutory protections in minimum standards legislation, like the Code, afforded to women who take maternity leaves because allowing others to accumulate experience that those who take maternity leaves cannot accumulate renders the right to reinstatement a hollow one.
[47] For example, in Re Barrie (City) and C.U.P.E. Loc., 2380) (1994), 40 L.A.C. (4th) 168, 1994 CanLII 18700 (Ont. Lab. Arb.), Arbitrator Michel Picher considered a collective agreement provision that reduced an employee’s vacation credits for the period of an employee’s pregnancy leave. The arbitrator concluded that the prorating of vacation entitlements for employees on pregnancy leave did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex: at 182. He noted that the provision did not intend to isolate a particular group but rather identified a variety of circumstances where the extended absence of an employee justified the reduction of vacation credits: at 181. Nevertheless, the provision was found to have violated the statutory protection of the seniority of an employee who exercises their right to pregnancy leave as its effect was to diminish the rights and privileges enjoyed by employees by virtue of their seniority: at 186. The arbitrator held that the concept of seniority in the Ontario minimum standards legislation, similar to the Code, was "“…sufficiently broad to include ‘service’”" (at 186). The arbitrator provided as an example an employee "“who has been absent for three months on pregnancy leave returns to work and is told that she is now considered three months junior to another employee originally hired on the same day, whether for the purposes of a job competition, lay-off or any other right that relates to seniority or service”" (at 185–186). The arbitrator also held that the proration was effectively a penalty as "“what was otherwise an accrued right is taken away from the employee by reason only of the fact that she has taken pregnancy leave”" (at 189).
[48] Turning now to the case law interpreting Division XIV of the Code, the test applied by adjudicators and the CIRB to ascertain whether an employee was laid off due to a lack of work or discontinuance of a function requires an employer to establish that there was an economic justification for the lay off and that it had a reasonable explanation for the selection of the employee to be laid off: Enoch Cree Nation Band v. Thomas, 2004 FCA 2, 247 F.T.R. 158 at para. 5; Kassab v. Bell Canada, 2008 FC 1181, 337 F.T.R. 152 at para. 24. It is arguable that reliance on discriminatory reasons for selection of the employee to be laid off or making the selection in violation of the maternity leave provisions in the Code cannot constitute a reasonable explanation. Thus, the issues the adjudicator failed to address were central to the ability of the respondent to rely on paragraph 242(3.1)(a) of the Code.
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[53] Byers Transport Ltd. v. Kosanovich, [1995] 3 F.C. 354, 1995 CanLII 3515 (C.A.) involved an unjust dismissal complaint that raised the same issues as had been settled in the context of an unfair labour practice complaint filed under Part I of the Code. The Canada Labour Relations Board (or the CLRB, the predecessor name for the CIRB) possessed exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labour practice complaints, with broad remedial authority to remedy unfair labour practices. By reason of the CLRB’s jurisdiction over the unfair labour practice complaints, this Court found that paragraph 242(3.1)(b) of the Code meant that an adjudicator has no jurisdiction to consider an unjust dismissal complaint that is in essence identical to an unfair labour practice complaint.
[54] MacFarlane v. Day & Ross Inc., 2010 FC 556, [2011] 4 F.C.R. 117 [MacFarlane] involved a situation where the complainant filed both an unjust dismissal complaint and a complaint with the Commission, following her dismissal. The adjudicator found that both complaints were essentially the same and held that paragraph 242(3.1)(b) of the Code deprived him of jurisdiction to hear the unjust dismissal complaint. The Federal Court applied the reasonableness standard to the adjudicator’s characterization of the nature of the two complaints and found that the adjudicator’s determination that the two complaints were the same was reasonable. . Duiker v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Duiker v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, this from a Federal Court JR dismissal issued, this from "a decision of the Regional Director of the Labour Program of Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC)", here regarding "a work refusal pursuant to section 128 [SS: 'Refusal to Work if Danger'] of the Canada Labour Code" at a maximum-security prison:
Here the court considers 'bad faith' as used in CLC s.129(1)(c) ['Head’s investigation']:[3] On February 10, 2022, the correctional officers in Unit F were informed that their unit would be transitioning from a "“modified”" inmate movement routine to a "“normal”" routine. This prompted the appellants and other correctional officers to refuse work claiming that a lack of access to firearms to respond to inmate violence created a danger, and that the available alternative non-lethal weaponry was inadequate. On March 3, 2022, after a recommendation by an ESDC investigator, the Regional Director decided not to investigate the work refusal on the basis that it had been made "“in bad faith”" pursuant to paragraph 129(1)(c) of the Canada Labour Code. The employees were no longer entitled to refuse work.
....
[6] The appellants submit that the Decision is unreasonable because the finding of "“bad faith”" turned on a conclusion that they did not seek to resolve the issue collaboratively, which they say is unfounded. They point to meetings on February 8 and 9, 2022 with the employer, to discuss the withdrawal of C8 Carbines from the inmate living units. In our view, these limited collaborative attempts over a brief period did not render unreasonable the Regional Director’s conclusion that the Internal Complaint Resolution Process to work in a collaborative manner had been "“bypassed”."
[7] The appellants also submit, and we agree, that employees are not required to initiate a complaint under section 127.1 of the Canada Labour Code (the Internal Complaint Resolution Process) before refusing work. Nonetheless, and whether or not such a complaint had in fact been initiated, the Regional Director was entitled to consider a failure to meaningfully pursue an internal collaborative process in reaching a conclusion of bad faith. The Regional Director’s conclusion was further supported with the observations that the C8 Carbines’ withdrawal was noted as an interim measure and that other options would be examined. Also, as noted in the Decision, the work refusal came shortly after the decision to withdraw the C8 Carbines, and it came on the heels of a second work refusal.
[8] It was not unreasonable for the Regional Director to conclude that these facts supported a failure to pursue a collaborative resolution and a finding of "“bad faith”", consistent with the ESDC Occupational Health and Safety Interpretations, Policies and Guidelines (Complaint is Trivial, Frivolous, Vexatious, or Made in Bad Faith – 905-1-IPG-083) and the law. As the Federal Court observed, a work refusal is not limitless. It is a "“back up mechanism”", to be exercised in emergency situations, when the main elements of an internal review process have not been effective: Correctional Service of Canada v. Ketcheson, 2016 OHSTC 19 at para. 140.
[9] The appellants also submit that the Decision is unreasonable because the conclusion on no imminent threat of serious harm rested on the premise of a modified inmate movement routine at the time of the work refusal, and that was about to change. Accepting the appellants’ distinction that Unit F was returning to a normal routine, this does not render the Decision unreasonable. The work refusal was initiated in other living units and the statement in the Decision holds true concerning those.
[10] We accept the appellants’ concern that the Federal Court provided supplementary reasons for the Decision when it identified contradictory positions taken by correctional officer Cotton on the danger associated with C8 Carbines. While this information was before the Regional Director, it is not obviously part of the Decision, and it was not for the Federal Court to add further justification for the Decision: Vavilov at para. 96.
[11] In the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Regional Director to conclude that the work refusal was made in bad faith and, thus, an investigation was not required. . Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal comments on the role of the Canada Labour Code:[1] The Canadian Pacific Railway Company is a federally regulated employer. As such, it is required to comply with the provisions of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, including the provisions of Part II of the Code that govern occupational health and safety in federally regulated workplaces. Of particular relevance to this application is subsection 134.1(1) of the Code, found in Part II, that requires CP to establish a Policy Health and Safety Committee (Committee) "“[f]or the purposes of addressing health and safety matters that apply to [CP’s] work, undertaking or business”". . Canada (Attorney General) v. Monette
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Monette (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed a Crown JR, here from a CIRB decision involving the unpaid wage provisions of the Canada Labour Code which the court found 'unreasonableness' for it's lack of thoroughness:[17] Section 251.18 of the Code reads as follows:251.18 Directors of a corporation are jointly and severally liable for wages and other amounts to which an employee is entitled under this Part, to a maximum amount equivalent to six months’ wages, to the extent that
(a) the entitlement arose during the particular director’s incumbency; and
(b) recovery of the amount from the corporation is impossible or unlikely." "
251.18 Les administrateurs d’une personne morale sont, jusqu’à concurrence d’une somme équivalant à six mois de salaire, solidairement responsables du salaire et des autres indemnités auxquels l’employé a droit sous le régime de la présente partie, dans la mesure où la créance de l’employé a pris naissance au cours de leur mandat et à la condition que le recouvrement de la créance auprès de la personne morale soit impossible ou peu probable. [18] Section 154 of the BCA provides as follows:154. Directors of a corporation are solidarily liable to the employees of a corporation for all debts not exceeding six months’ wages payable to each such employee for services performed for the corporation while they are directors of the corporation respectively.
154. Les administrateurs de la société sont solidairement responsables envers ses employés, jusqu’à concurrence de six mois de salaire, pour les services rendus à la société pendant leur administration respective.
However, a director is not liable unless the corporation is sued for the debt within one year after it becomes due and the notice of execution is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part or unless, during that period, a liquidation order is made against the corporation or it becomes bankrupt within the meaning of that expression in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3) and a claim for the debt is filed with the liquidator or the syndic.
Toutefois, leur responsabilité n’est engagée que si la société est poursuivie dans l’année du jour où la dette est devenue exigible et que l’avis d’exécution du jugement obtenu contre elle est rapporté insatisfait en totalité ou en partie ou si la société, pendant cette période, fait l’objet d’une ordonnance de mise en liquidation ou devient faillie au sens de la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité (L.R.C. 1985, c. B-3) et qu’une réclamation de cette dette est déposée auprès du liquidateur ou du syndic. ....
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