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Labour - Weber - Exception - Third Party. R.W. Tomlinson Limited v. Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 527
In R.W. Tomlinson Limited v. Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 527 (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal partially allowed an appeal, here brought against a decision which "dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction". The context is one of labour arbitration and related non-party civil litigation.
The court considers another 'Weber' (OLRB has exclusive jurisdiction re all collective agreement disputes) exception, here where non-unionized corporate parties (that were related to a corporate unionized employer) sued the union and some of it's officers over picketing events during a strike, and a motion judge dismissed the action for "lack of jurisdiction" under R21.01(3)(a) ['Strike Pleadings - Another Proceeding Pending'] under the Weber bar of such actions:[1] This appeal requires careful attention to several structural principles that shape Ontario’s labour relations system: the rule of law, access to justice, and the proper respect owed to specialized tribunals charged with administering a legislative scheme. Taken together, these principles guide how jurisdiction and decision-making sequencing are allocated between courts and labour arbitrators, ensuring that every dispute has an appropriate adjudicative forum and that parallel proceedings do not undermine the statutory process.
[2] The motion judge’s decision illustrates the need to balance and reconcile these principles. He correctly held that the appellant, R.W. Tomlinson Limited (“R.W. Tomlinson”), as a party to the collective agreement, must arbitrate its dispute with the respondent union. But he also concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of two related, but legally distinct corporate appellants not bound by the collective agreement, 2839034 Ontario Inc. (“283 Ontario”) and Tomlinson Environmental Services Ltd. (“Tomlinson Environmental”), because their claims arose from the same dispute. While that conclusion prevented an attempt to undercut labour arbitration through parallel litigation, it also produced a jurisdictional dead end: two corporate appellants left without an available forum, since a labour arbitrator has no authority over non-parties to the collective agreement. Such outcomes invite structural scrutiny.
[3] I would adopt a nuanced answer to this challenge that reconciles all the governing principles. To safeguard structural rule of law and access to justice principles, the Superior Court must retain jurisdiction over claims involving non-parties to the collective agreement, because a labour arbitrator has no personal jurisdiction over them. At the same time, respect for the integrity of labour arbitration requires the court to consider whether to temporarily stay such parallel litigation pending arbitration between the parties to the collective agreement. This approach avoids both jurisdictional dead ends and the risk that the parties or related entities may use litigation involving non-parties to undercut the arbitral process.
[4] For these reasons, I would allow the appeal in part. I would set aside the order dismissing the claims of 283 Ontario and Tomlinson Environmental for lack of jurisdiction and replace it with a temporary stay pending the arbitration between R.W. Tomlinson and the respondent union. I would otherwise dismiss the appeal.
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(2) Addressing 283 Ontario and Tomlinson Environmental’s Claims
[28] I turn next to the claims advanced by the non-parties to the collective agreement, 283 Ontario and Tomlinson Environmental. In my respectful view, the motion judge should not have dismissed these claims for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, he should have temporarily stayed them under r. 21.01(3)(a) pending the arbitration between R.W. Tomlinson and the Union. A temporary stay would have achieved the motion judge’s central objective – preventing strategic parallel litigation from undercutting labour arbitration – while also avoiding the jurisdictional vacuums that result when litigants are left without access to either an arbitral or judicial forum for claims involving non-parties. That approach best reflects the structural principles at play – the rule of law, access to justice, and respect for the labour arbitration process – and it reconciles all the governing precedents.
[29] To explain this conclusion, I begin by addressing the principle that courts should prevent parallel litigation from undermining arbitration, and then turn to why a temporary stay – rather than jurisdictional dismissal – is typically the appropriate remedy to achieve this goal in the case of non-party claims.
(a) Courts Should Prevent Attempts to Undercut Arbitration
[30] Weber recognized that parallel court proceedings between the parties to a collective agreement undercut labour arbitration. Such proceedings introduce delay and cost, risk inconsistent outcomes, and replace specialized arbitrators with generalist courts and adversarial litigation – thus frustrating the statutory objectives of speed, accessibility, expertise, strengthening ongoing relationships, and minimizing economic disruption: Weber, at paras. 46, 49, 56-57.
[31] Parallel litigation involving non-parties can pose similar risks. As this court recognized in Giorno v. Pappas (1999), 1999 CanLII 1161 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (3d) 626 (C.A.), at pp. 630-32, litigants sometimes use such litigation to circumvent arbitration. Sometimes, unionized employers add related non-parties as plaintiffs or sue non-parties related to the union: Cherubini Metal Works Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2007 NSCA 38, 253 N.S.R. (2d) 144, leave to appeal refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 278; Soulos v. Leitch, 2005 CanLII 13790 (Ont. S.C.), per Nordheimer J. Other times, unionized employees sue non-party employees or managers: Piko v. Hudson’s Bay Co. (1998), 1998 CanLII 6874 (ON CA), 41 O.R. (3d) 729 (C.A.), at p. 734, leave to appeal refused, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 23, citing Ruscetta v. Graham (1998), 1998 CanLII 2118 (ON CA), 36 C.C.E.L. (2d) 177 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 220, and Dwyer v. Canada Post Corp., 1997 CanLII 1110 (Ont. C.A.). Like parallel litigation between the parties, such strategies risk frustrating labour arbitration’s goals of speed, accessibility, and expertise.
[32] Giorno held that courts should prevent these risks from materializing. In that case, a unionized employee sought to sue a non-party manager despite having already grieved the same underlying workplace dispute, which fell within the arbitrator’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Because permitting this parallel lawsuit to proceed would have undermined the arbitral process, this court stopped it in its tracks. As Goudge J.A. explained, courts must prevent attempts to sidestep arbitration through strategic recasting of the parties to the dispute: at p. 632; see also K.A., at paras. 22-23.
(b) Giorno’s Assumed Remedy Merits Closer Scrutiny
[33] While Giorno’s holding that courts should prevent parallel litigation involving non-parties from undercutting labour arbitration remains good law, the remedy it employed to achieve this goal – jurisdictional dismissal – merits closer scrutiny. The case from which Giorno adopted this remedy, Weber, did not address non-party claims because both parties were bound by the collective agreement: at para. 32; see also Coté, at pp. 1967-8. However, following obiter comments in Piko, Giorno assumed that Weber required jurisdictional dismissal whenever the arbitrator had subject-matter jurisdiction, even for claims involving non-parties: Giorno, at p. 632, citing Piko, at p. 734.
[34] This assumption raises important structural concerns. Access to a forum for dispute resolution is foundational to just government. Without it, the rule of law, access to justice, and the goal of holding wrongdoers accountable are all threatened. Jurisdictional dismissal of non-party claims poses this very threat. By permanently removing the judicial forum without providing an arbitral one in its place, it denies litigants any forum to adjudicate these claims: Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 59, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 31, at para. 38; Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corporation Ltd., [1981] A.C. 909 (H.L.), at p. 977; Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Canadian Pacific System Federation v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 1996 CanLII 215 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 495, at paras. 5, 8; Nadeau, at p. 1519; Bruce v. Cohon, 2017 BCCA 186, 412 D.L.R. (4th) 191, at paras. 84-86, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 307.
(c) The Remedy of Jurisdictional Dismissal Is Unavailable
[35] The Supreme Court’s clarification of the principles governing arbitral and court jurisdiction in Bisaillon v. Concordia University, 2006 SCC 19, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666, has now overtaken the remedy prescribed by Giorno. Where a labour arbitrator lacks personal jurisdiction over non-party claims, a court must accept jurisdiction over such claims and use other tools to prevent them from undercutting arbitration. This is also consistent with the language and purport of s. 48(1) of the LRA.
(i) Bisaillon Rejects Jurisdictional Dismissal of Non-Party Claims
[36] The caselaw following Weber and Giorno establishes that dismissal of non-party claims for lack of jurisdiction is unavailable where labour arbitrators lack personal jurisdiction over the non-parties. The Supreme Court made this clear in Bisaillon, and this court reached the same conclusion in Skof v. Bordeleau, 2020 ONCA 729, 456 D.L.R. (4th) 236, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 17, and in London Life Insurance Co. v. Dubreuil Brothers Employees Assn. (2000), 2000 CanLII 5757 (ON CA), 49 O.R. (3d) 766 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 496.
[37] In Bisaillon, LeBel J. explained that arbitrators require both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction in order to hear a grievance:[29] [A] grievance arbitrator’s jurisdiction depends on two factors. The first has to do with the subject or the nature of the dispute; this is the subject-matter aspect of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. The second factor relates to the persons who are parties to the dispute; this therefore is the personal aspect of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.] [38] He further clarified that the first requirement, subject-matter jurisdiction, is governed by Weber. Arbitrators have such jurisdiction only where the “essential character” of the dispute arises from the collective agreement: Bisaillon, at paras. 30-33, citing Weber, at para. 52.
[39] LeBel J. then turned to the second requirement, personal jurisdiction:[39] I will now turn to the in personam jurisdiction of grievance arbitrators. … [T]he arbitrator responsible for hearing grievances arising out of the collective agreement … has no jurisdiction to hear claims of persons to whom the agreement does not apply. … [A] grievance will be possible only to the extent that the disagreement involves parties with a connection to the agreement in question, that is, the employer and the certified union or the employees to whom the collective agreement applies.
[40] When a grievance arbitrator finds it impossible to resolve a dispute or part of a dispute because he or she does not have jurisdiction over the parties, the ordinary courts retain jurisdiction over the dispute. ... [T]he grievance arbitrator cannot claim to have authority over … third parties … [unless they] voluntarily and expressly submit[] to a grievance arbitrator’s jurisdiction[.]
[41] ... [T]hird parties will not be legally bound by the award. [Citations omitted.] [40] From these passages, three principles emerge. First, a labour arbitrator’s jurisdiction has two distinct dimensions: subject-matter jurisdiction, governed by Weber, and personal jurisdiction, which depends on whether the litigants are bound by the collective agreement or otherwise agreed to arbitrate. Second, arbitrators have no personal jurisdiction over litigants who are not parties to the collective agreement unless they voluntarily and expressly agree to arbitrate. Third, when an arbitrator lacks personal jurisdiction over some parties to a dispute, the ordinary courts retain jurisdiction, and any arbitral award cannot bind those non-parties.
[41] This third principle reflects the Superior Court’s constitutional role as a court of original general jurisdiction. It has inherent authority, even without statutory grant, to decide matters not assigned exclusively to another tribunal: Reference re Code of Civil Procedure (Que.), art. 35, 2021 SCC 27, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 291, at para. 51; Regina Police Assn., at para. 26. Accordingly, where labour arbitrators lack personal jurisdiction over non-parties, the Superior Court assumes jurisdiction: Nadeau, at p. 1519.
[42] Consistent with these principles, this court’s post-Giorno jurisprudence affirms Superior Court jurisdiction over claims involving non-parties. In Skof, the court set aside the motion judge’s jurisdictional dismissal order and held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over an employee’s claims against his employer and supervisor because the collective agreement did not apply to him: at paras. 10-16. In London Life, the court held that an employee could only sue an insurer in Superior Court because the insurer was not a party to the collective agreement: at paras. 23-24, 31, 35. While both cases also determined that arbitral subject matter jurisdiction was absent, it appears that each nonetheless treated the lack of personal jurisdiction as a sufficient basis for affirming Superior Court jurisdiction.
[43] These principles from the subsequent jurisprudence make clear that Giorno’s assumption – that jurisdictional dismissal is appropriate whenever arbitrators have subject-matter jurisdiction – can no longer stand. As Bisaillon and Skof confirm, dismissal for want of jurisdiction is justified only where the arbitrator has both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Where personal jurisdiction is absent, the Superior Court’s residual authority remains, as in London Life.
(ii) The Statute Bars Jurisdictional Dismissal
[44] Like the jurisprudence, the statute points to the same conclusion. As Goudge J.A. held in London Life, a textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation of s. 48(1) [SS: 'Arbitration'] of the LRA supports allowing courts to hear claims involving non-parties.
[45] Beginning with the text, the law requires clear and express statutory language to remove the Superior Court’s jurisdiction or extinguish the right to sue: Skof, at paras. 8-9; Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp., 1978 CanLII 42 (SCC), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275, at p. 280. This rule matters because litigants are presumptively entitled to seek relief in Superior Court where specialized statutory schemes — like labour arbitration — are unavailable. It also explains why courts retain inherent authority to grant remedies, such as injunctions, that lie outside an arbitrator’s powers: Brotherhood, at para. 8.
[46] The text of s. 48(1) does not remove the right to bring claims involving non-parties in court. It does not state, or even imply, that such claims must be arbitrated. Instead, it only mandates arbitration of disputes “between the parties” to a collective agreement. The Supreme Court explained that this phrase “covers both parties” and provides “redress for a breach of the agreement by either party”: O’Leary v. New Brunswick, 1995 CanLII 109 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 967, at para. 9. As London Life held, this language limits mandatory arbitration to disputes between the parties arising from the collective agreement: at paras. 22-23; see also Bohemier v. Centra Gas Manitoba Inc. (1999), 1999 CanLII 14041 (MB CA), 170 D.L.R. (4th) 310 (Man. C.A.), at paras. 18, 33, leave to appeal refused, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 185; Vale Inco Newfoundland & Labrador Ltd. v. U.S.W., 2010 NLTD 124 (CanLII), 2010 NLTD(G) 124, 299 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 73, at paras. 50-51, leave to appeal granted, 2010 NLCA 74.
[47] Because statutory interpretation begins with and focuses on the text, the clear and precise words “between the parties” are decisive: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, 498 D.L.R. (4th) 316, at paras. 24, 28; Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at para. 10.
[48] The context reinforces this conclusion. Section 56 makes a collective agreement binding on the employer, union, and bargaining unit employees.[4] As London Life recognized, this shows that arbitrators do not have jurisdiction over non-parties: at paras. 22-23. Section 48(18) confirms the same point by limiting the binding effect of an arbitral award to those same groups.[5]
[49] The legislative purpose is also consistent. As London Life explained, the legislature intended to empower employers and unions to resolve disputes arising between them – not to compel arbitration of claims involving non-parties: at paras. 24, 31. Thus, the legislature implemented its efficiency policy, recognized in Weber, by requiring party arbitration rather than non-party arbitration. This legislative choice must be respected. Instead of expanding arbitral jurisdiction beyond this statutory limit, courts must use other legally available tools to advance efficiency: CAW-Canada v. Sun Life Assurance of Canada (2000), 2000 CanLII 1338 (ON CA), 135 O.A.C. 115 (C.A.), at paras. 5, 8–9, leave to appeal refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 429; see also Quebec (Attorney General) v. 9147-0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 426, at para. 10; CISSS A, at para. 24; R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, 481 D.L.R. (4th) 195, at para. 26; TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman, 2019 SCC 19, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 144, at para. 90.
[50] Finally, this interpretation upholds the rule of law – a principle which statutory interpretation respects when possible: Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, 502 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 98. By preserving court jurisdiction over claims involving non-parties, it avoids jurisdictional vacuums that would undermine the rule of law, access to justice, and wrongdoer accountability: Brotherhood, at paras. 5, 8; Nadeau, at p. 1519; Bruce, at paras. 84-86.
(d) Temporary Stays Prevent Litigation from Undercutting Arbitration
[51] Instead of dismissing non-party claims for lack of jurisdiction, courts should consider whether to temporarily stay them pending labour arbitration pursuant to s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. This lawful remedy reconciles all the governing principles, protecting arbitration while simultaneously safeguarding the rule of law, access to justice, and judicial discretion.
[52] There is no legal bar to a temporary stay in this context. Section 106’s broad authority to stay “any proceeding in the court” permits temporarily staying non-party claims in favour of a parallel proceeding with different parties: Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 1983 CanLII 1829 (ON SC), 41 O.R. (2d) 135 (Div. Ct.), at p. 139.[6] Such temporary stays attract a lower threshold than permanent stays. They are frequently granted if two proceedings substantially overlap and temporarily staying one pending the other’s completion would increase efficiency and reduce duplication: Ainsworth Lumber Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 BCCA 105, 85 B.C.L.R. (3d) 62, at paras. 10, 15; Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc. v. Rogers Communications Inc., 2009 CanLII 68464 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 24, per Pepall J.; Hollinger International Inc. v. Hollinger Inc. (2004), 11 C.P.C. (6th) 245 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 5.
[53] More fundamentally, temporary stays directly advance Weber’s efficiency policy and realize Giorno’s vision by respecting arbitration and preventing attempts to undercut it. They prevent a multiplicity of proceedings, avoid inconsistent results, and minimize expense and inconvenience: Penn-Co Construction Canada (2003) Ltd. v. Constance Lake First Nation, 2008 ONCA 768, 76 C.L.R. (3d) 1, at para. 4; Ghosh v. Domglas Inc. (1986), 1986 CanLII 2590 (ON SC), 57 O.R. (2d) 710 (H.C.), at pp. 714-15, per McKinlay J. As well, they respect the statutory decision-maker’s expertise and the statutory procedure’s accessibility and remedial flexibility, enabling the court to decide any outstanding issues with the benefit of the statutory decision-maker’s opinion: Pyke v. Tri Gro Enterprises Ltd. (2001), 2001 CanLII 8581 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.), at paras. 55-64, leave to appeal refused, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 493; Mahar v. Rogers Cablesystems Ltd. (1995), 1995 CanLII 7129 (ON SC), 25 O.R. (3d) 690 (Gen. Div.), at pp. 696-700, per Sharpe J.
[54] A temporary stay also safeguards the rule of law and access to justice. Unlike a jurisdictional dismissal or a permanent stay, a temporary stay preserves litigants’ access to a forum, ensuring that they are not deprived of an ultimate remedy after the statutory dispute-resolution process concludes: Delsom Estates Ltd. v. Delta (Municipality) (1994), 53 L.C.R. 241 (B.C.S.C.), at p. 247, per Saunders J.; Fareau v. Bell Canada, 2023 ONCA 303, 482 D.L.R. (4th) 462, at paras. 122-23, leave to appeal refused, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 282.
[55] Finally, temporary stays preserve judicial discretion and prevent unjust results. A stay pending administrative proceedings, while often favoured, is never automatic. Like any temporary stay, the moving party must justify it by showing that its advantages outweigh any prejudice to the responding party: Cirone v. Park Lawn Co. (2008), 2008 CanLII 4977 (ON SCDC), 233 O.A.C. 337 (Div. Ct.), at para. 11; Areva NP GmbH v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2009 CarswellOnt 1149 (S.C.), at para. 19. Thus, courts have denied stays which would unduly prejudice parties with urgent claims, especially if the party in question is vulnerable: Nadeau, at p. 1519; Lehman v. Davis (1993), 1993 CanLII 5497 (ON SC), 16 O.R. (3d) 338 (Gen. Div.), at pp. 349-50; Farris v. Staubach Ontario Inc. (2004), 2004 CanLII 11325 (ON SC), 32 C.C.E.L. (3d) 265 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 20-21.
(e) The Governing Test for Parallel Non-Party Claims
[56] For ease of application, I distill my analysis above into a two-step framework for courts deciding r. 21.01(3)(a) motions that addresses both arbitral jurisdiction and the court’s discretionary authority to manage parallel proceedings. This framework reconciles the governing principles and precedents. By preserving the court’s jurisdiction over non-party claims unless the non-party has expressly consented to arbitration, it respects Bisaillon, honours legislative limits on arbitral jurisdiction, and avoids jurisdictional vacuums that threaten the rule of law and access to justice. At the same time, it respects Giorno by allowing courts to stay proceedings involving non-parties that undercut arbitration.
(i) Step One: Jurisdiction
[57] First, the court must determine whether the labour arbitrator has both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction:1. Subject-matter jurisdiction: Apply Weber. Does the “essential character” of the dispute arise from the collective agreement?
2. Personal jurisdiction: Apply Bisaillon. Are the parties before the arbitrator bound by the collective agreement, or have they expressly and voluntarily submitted to arbitral authority? [58] This inquiry determines whether the litigation remains in court. If the arbitrator has both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the proceeding for want of jurisdiction. If the arbitrator lacks either or both forms of jurisdiction, the Superior Court retains jurisdiction and must proceed to step two.
(ii) Step Two: Temporary Stay
[59] Second, the court must determine whether to temporarily stay the litigation pending labour arbitration between the parties to the collective agreement. While the moving party bears the onus and the court retains discretion, stays are favoured to achieve Giorno’s goal – preventing litigation from undermining arbitration and promoting coherent, efficient decision-making. The following two-stage framework guides judicial discretion:1. Evaluate the strength of the factors favouring a stay, including:
a) Efficiency: avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings, minimizing expense and inconvenience, and approaching overlapping facts and issues consistently; and,
b) Respect for labour arbitration: including its expert decision-makers, accessible procedures, and flexible remedial powers.
2. Weigh these benefits against any prejudice to the responding party, recognizing that significant delay, evidentiary prejudice, or vulnerability may sometimes justify allowing litigation to proceed despite overlap. (f) Application: The Non-Party Claims Should Be Stayed
[60] Because the motion judge did not have the benefit of this framework, I would analyze the issue afresh. Applying these principles, the motion judge’s central conclusion was sound – the claims of 283 Ontario and Tomlinson Environmental should not proceed at this time because they would undercut the labour arbitration between R.W. Tomlinson and the respondents. However, I reach this result by temporarily staying those claims pending the arbitration rather than by jurisdictional dismissal.
[61] At step one, the Superior Court has jurisdiction over the claims of 283 Ontario and Tomlinson Environmental. The arbitrator lacks personal jurisdiction over them because they are non-parties to the collective agreement who have not expressly agreed to arbitrate. This engages the court’s residual jurisdiction and precludes jurisdictional dismissal.
[62] Turning to step two, the appropriateness of a temporary stay is properly before the court. It reasonably arises from the jurisdictional dispute the parties litigated because a stay is sometimes granted as an alternative to jurisdictional dismissal, and is contemplated in a motion under r. 21.01(3)(a): 1196303 Ontario Inc. v. Glen Grove Suites Inc., 2015 ONCA 580, 337 O.A.C. 85, at para. 87; Donovan v. Waterloo (Police Services Board), 2022 ONCA 199, at paras. 41-42.
[63] I would temporarily stay the non-party claims because they substantially overlap with the labour arbitration. All relate to the same strike, the same picketing activity, and the same alleged interference with business operations across a closely integrated corporate group. Allowing 283 Ontario and Tomlinson Environmental to litigate these issues in parallel would create a multiplicity of proceedings, generate unnecessary cost and delay, and risk inconsistent factual findings on shared questions – precisely the systemic harms Weber and Giorno caution against. Most importantly, permitting parallel litigation here would send the wrong message: that the managers of a unionized employer can undercut the very arbitral process to which they agreed by allowing related non-unionized entities under common control to bring collateral lawsuits found by the motion judge to be a strategic attempt to leverage upcoming collective agreement negotiations.
[64] In contrast, the labour arbitrator is best placed to address the overlapping issues. Through context-sensitive expertise and accessible procedures, the arbitrator can resolve those issues promptly and efficiently, thus streamlining the litigation and enabling the court to approach any residual matters with the benefit of arbitral findings and remedial perspective.
[65] No prejudice to 283 Ontario or Tomlinson Environmental outweighs the factors favouring a stay. Instead, arbitration’s comparatively accessible and expedient procedure mitigates any delay concerns: Ghosh, at p. 715. 283 Ontario and Tomlinson Environmental did not actively pursue the litigation for a year and a half and only changed course to gain negotiating leverage. Such strategic litigation to undercut arbitration is the very problem Giorno sought to prevent. There is no evident prejudice to the appellants.
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