Rarotonga, 2010

Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources


ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | SPPA / Fairness (Administrative)

home / about / Democracy, Law and Duty / testimonials / Conditions of Use

Civil and Administrative
Litigation Opinions
for Self-Reppers


Landlord and Tenant (Commercial) - Insurance

. Priestly Demolition Inc. v. Universal Designs Ltd.

In Priestly Demolition Inc. v. Universal Designs Ltd. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the liability of a commercial tenant against the subrogated claim of the landlord's insurer after a fire, here as a matter of contractual interpretation:
[5] The respondent [SS: tenant] denied liability for the fire and asserted that the terms of the lease precluded any recovery for damage caused by the fire.

[6] On a Rule 22 (Special Case), Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, motion, Dineen J. stated the issue in these terms:
The issue in this case is whether a commercial lease between the parties permits the landlord’s insurer to bring a subrogated action against the tenant for damage sustained in a fire alleged to have resulted from the tenant’s negligence, or whether the tenant’s payment of a share of the landlord’s insurance pursuant to the lease precludes such an action.
[7] The motion judge considered whether the indemnification provision and other terms in the lease that provide that the tenant (the respondent) is responsible for certain damage arising from its conduct were intended to displace the assumption that would otherwise flow from the tenant contributing to the landlord’s fire insurance that the risk of loss by fire would be borne by the landlord (the appellant). He concluded that the lease must be read as a whole but ultimately the provisions on which the appellant sought to rely did not reflect an intention that the respondent should not receive the full benefit of insurance to which he contributed. He noted that the indemnity provision in the lease said nothing about operating notwithstanding the respondent’s contribution to the appellant’s insurance.

[8] In the end, the motion judge concluded:
Accepting that this lease is not free of ambiguity on this issue, I find that the interpretation advanced by the defendant is most consistent with the lease read as a whole. I would hold that the subrogated action is barred by the lease.
[9] The appellant contends that the motion judge made three errors in his interpretation of the lease.

[10] First, the appellant submits that the motion judge failed to read the lease as a whole in a manner that gave meaning to all of its terms and avoided an interpretation that would render one or more of its terms ineffective.

[11] We do not accept this submission. The motion judge explicitly identified and analyzed the terms in the lease relating to additional rent, insurance obligations, maintenance and repair, and indemnity. He was alive to the entire contract and, especially, the obligations it imposed on both parties.

[12] Second, the appellant asserts that the motion judge failed to properly consider or give weight to case law directly on point.

[13] We are not persuaded by this submission. The motion judge explicitly considered the leading decision by this court in this area of law, Royal Host GP Inc. v. 1842259 Ontario Ltd., 2018 ONCA 467, and two more recent decisions in the same domain, Paulin v. Keewatin Patricia District School Board, 2019 ONCA 286 and Capital Sewer Servicing Inc. v. Crosslinx Transit Solutions Constructors, 2022 ONCA 10. In our view, there is nothing in the motion judge’s reasoning and conclusion that falls afoul of these decisions. Indeed, the motion judge explicitly pointed out a crucial difference between the issue in this case and in Royal Host: “Unlike the lease in Royal Host, the indemnity provision in this lease says nothing to indicate that it operates notwithstanding the contribution of the tenant to the landlord’s insurance.”
. D.L.G. & Associates Ltd. v. Minto Properties Inc.

In D.L.G. & Associates Ltd. v. Minto Properties Inc. (Ont CA, 2015) the Court of Appeal considered whether a contractual duty on one party to a contract to obtain liability insurance (here a tenant) immunized the other party (the landlord) from claims that would have been covered by that insurance, where it was not obtained [paras 16-29]:
The covenant to insure

[16] D.L.G. in para. 7.1 of the lease undertook to obtain “all risks” insurance which specifically included insurance for “sewer back-up”. D.L.G. accepts that a claim in negligence against Minto for failure to properly maintain the plumbing is barred by the covenant to insure, but submits that it is not plain and obvious that the covenant also bars a claim based on Minto’s breach of its “quiet enjoyment” and “good repair” obligations under the lease.

[17] D.L.G. argues that a trial is necessary to properly interpret the covenant to insure in the context of the entire agreement. I do not accept this argument. The covenant to insure focuses on risk and the responsibility as between D.L.G. and Minto for losses covered should the identified risks materialise during the term of the agreement. The provision is not concerned with the legal characterization of claims for losses arising out of the materialization of the risks.

[18] D.L.G.’s submission runs aground on this court’s judgment in Madison Developments Ltd. v. Plan Electric Co. (1997), 1997 CanLII 1277 (ON CA), 36 O.R. (3d) 80 at para. 9. Carthy J.A., speaking of a situation in which the landlord had covenanted to insure against all risks said:
The law is now clear that in the landlord-tenant relationship, where the landlord covenants to obtain insurance against the damage to premises by fire, the landlord cannot sue the tenant for a loss by fire caused by the tenant’s negligence. A contractual undertaking by one party to secure property insurance operates in effect as an assumption by that party of the risk of loss or damage caused by the peril to be insured against. This is so notwithstanding a covenant by the tenant to repair which, without the landlord’s covenant to insure, would obligate the tenant to indemnify for such a loss. This is a matter of contractual law not insurance law, but of course, the insurer can be in no better position than the landlord on a subrogated claim. The rationale for this conclusion is that the covenant to insure is a contractual benefit accorded to the tenant, which, on its face, covers fire with or without negligence by any person. There would be no benefit to the tenant from the covenant if it did not apply to a fire caused by the tenant’s negligence. [Emphasis added.]
[19] The language from Madison applies here. A covenant to insure is one of several provisions within a lease which allocates risk as between the parties to the lease. The allocation of risk is presumably reflected in the rent to be paid. A covenant to insure would hardly serve the purpose of risk allocation if it were read as allocating the risk to the tenant if the landlord was negligent, but to the landlord if the same act amounted to a breach of a provision in the lease, e.g. the obligation to maintain and repair. As almost any act of negligence would also be a breach of the obligation to maintain and repair, the interpretation urged by the appellant would effectively put the risk on Minto despite D.L.G.’s obligation to obtain “all risks” insurance.

The enforceability of the covenant to insure

[20] D.L.G. submits that the covenant to insure is an exclusion clause and is unenforceable under the principles set down in Tercon. In my view, the covenant to insure cannot be read as a clause excluding Minto from liability it would otherwise carry but for the clause. Instead, the covenant to insure assigns risk for certain losses by requiring that the tenant, D.L.G., obtain insurance coverage for those losses: Smith v. T. Eaton Co., 1977 CanLII 39 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 749 at 756, St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Wakeham & Sons Limited (1995), 1995 CanLII 2482 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (3d) 321 at paras. 37-39 (C.A.).

[21] As I am satisfied that the covenant to insure cannot be read as an exclusion clause, I need not address the enforceability of that clause. I would, however, observe that in the context of a negotiated lease between arms-length commercial entities I see little room for an argument that a covenant to insure, whether directed at the landlord or the tenant, could be viewed as unconscionable.

[22] Nothing in the pleadings alleges any inherent unfairness in placing the burden of obtaining “all risks” insurance on D.L.G. I reject the argument that the relationship between D.L.G. and Minto during the lease negotiations was one of unequal bargaining power because Minto had knowledge about the plumbing that D.L.G. did not have. Nothing in the pleadings suggests that D.L.G. could not have made the relevant inquiries and conducted the necessary inspections to obtain whatever information about the plumbing it deemed necessary. Although D.L.G.’s claim that it relied on fraudulent/negligent misrepresentations by Minto gives rise to tort claims against Minto, it does not provide the basis for the assertion that D.L.G. was in a position of unequal bargaining power during the lease negotiations: see also the reasons of the motion judge at paras. 85-89.


The author has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this Isthatlegal.ca webpage.

Last modified: 05-02-24
By: admin