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Reasons - Degree Canvassing (2). Singh v. Persaud
In Singh v. Persaud (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here brought against an order vesting title to real estate in the respondent.
Here the court excuses weaknesses in reasons for decision where the record shows a command of the relevant facts:[45] As this court observed in Waxman v. Waxman (2004), 2004 CanLII 39040 (ON CA), 186 O.A.C. 201 (C.A.), at paras. 343-44, leave to appeal refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 291, the mere absence of any reference to evidence in reasons for judgment does not establish that the trial judge failed to consider the evidence, and where the reasons as a whole show “a strong command of the trial record and a careful analysis of the evidence, leading to detailed findings of fact”, the absence of a reference to a specific piece of evidence “suggests, not that the trial judge ignored that evidence, but rather that she did not regard that evidence as significant”. . Blair v. University of Waterloo et al
In Blair v. University of Waterloo et al (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an HRTO JR, this brought against the dismissal of their claim that "the university discriminated against them on the basis of disability for failing to administer a disability-related bursary to provide funding for a motorized mobility device, which they described as a powerchair".
In accordance with Vavilov, the court holds that tribunals needs not "refer to all their documents in its reasons", here in the course of a JR 'reasonableness review'. I am uneasy with this conclusion - how can the HRTO conclude that the evidence documents "were of minimal assistance" when they were "not required to review each document relied on by the applicant" (and apparently didn't)? And if they did review them, how much work would it be to dismiss this evidence as irrelevant?:Was the Tribunal’s decision unreasonable because it failed to refer to the applicant’s exhibits?
[9] Contrary to the applicant’s submission, the Tribunal was not required to refer to all their documents in its reasons. A tribunal’s reasons must be sufficient to justify its decision and explain the decision’s rationale. They must demonstrate justification, transparency, and intelligibility and meaningfully grapple with the key issues or central arguments raised by the parties. However, decisions are not assessed against a standard of perfection. A reasonable decision is not required to deal with every argument or piece of evidence raised by the parties: Vavilov, at paras. 81, 91, 97, 128.
[10] The Tribunal was not required to refer to the documents the applicant drew to the court’s attention. Those documents included an OSAP disability verification form that the applicant completed to apply for disabled status. This form did not reasonably provide evidence that the applicant was guaranteed funding through the BSWD. The form expressly stated that, if verified, the applicant “may…qualify for other funding through the ‘Bursary for Students with Disabilities and the Canada Student Grant for Services and Equipment for Students with Disabilities’.” (emphasis added) The form also stated that the BSWD would require a separate application. It is clear on its face that the form represented an initial step before applying for funding under the BSWD. It was not sufficiently connected to the central issues to require the adjudicator to specifically address it.
[11] Similarly, the Tribunal was not required to address the Ontario government document advising the applicant that their documents were “approved.” The “approving document” showed the documents of the applicant that had been “accepted” by OSAP. The listed documents included the applicant’s “disability status change documents.” The “approving document” stated that the applicant’s documents had been “provided and approved” but did not say that funding for a particular disability support was approved. As set out above, a verified disability only meant the applicant might qualify for funding through the BSWD, which would require a separate application. Again, the Tribunal was not required to expressly address the “approving document”.
[12] Overall, the Tribunal was not required to review each document relied on by the applicant, particularly when those documents were of minimal assistance. This ground of review is dismissed. . Musani v. Canada (Attorney General) [presumption that all evid is considered]
In Musani v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a JR, this brought against "a decision of the Appeal Division of the Social Security Tribunal of Canada, which dismissed her appeal from a decision of the Tribunal’s General Division", this respecting the denial of the applicant's "request to antedate her claim for EI benefits; that is, to treat the claim as having been made earlier than it was".
Here the court states a presumption that a tribunal consider all evidence before it:[31] With respect to the first two issues, it is established law that a "“tribunal need not refer in its reasons to each and every piece of evidence before it, but is presumed to have considered all of the evidence,”" and that "“assigning weight to evidence […] is the province of the trier of fact”": Simpson v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FCA 82 at para. 10. .... . Bank of Montreal v. Ieradi
In Bank of Montreal v. Ieradi (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal - here brought against an order "in the amount of $632,564.31, the amount owing on an unsecured loan, plus $105,000.00 in costs".
Here the court considers the degree of evidence review required in adequate reasons for decision:[10] The trial judge is not required to refer to all the evidence or address every submission made. The reasons must disclose the evidentiary basis for the decision. The court is required to identify the path taken to reach its decision: Clifford v. Ontario Municipal Employee Retirement System, 2009 ONCA 670, 98 O.R. (3d) 210, at para. 29 leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 461; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 18-21. . Chown v. Frontenac Condominium Corporation No. 19 [conclusory reasons]
In Chown v. Frontenac Condominium Corporation No. 19 (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, here brought against the decision of "the Chair of the Condominium Authority Tribunal (the “CAT”) ... finding that impugned Minutes of Board Meetings of the Respondent Condominium satisfy the requirements of the Condominium Act".
This is an unusual court note, apparently instructing the lower tribunal how it might deal with excessively 'picayune' (the court's term, at para 14) complaints - this in a board minutes-complaint context:A Note on Sufficiency of Reasons
[24] It is not generally the role of this court to undertake the analysis set out above at paragraphs 16-23. That is the task of the tribunal at first instance. Where a tribunal gives conclusory reasons, this court may well send the case back to the tribunal for a “do over”: the tribunal’s analysis, and not just its conclusion, should be available for this court for the purposes of appeal.
[25] I would not, however, send this case back for a “re-do” because the basis of the decision below seems clear and largely justified by the way this case was argued before the CAT. When a claimant raises 67 complaints, and it is perfectly plain that most of them are without merit, the tribunal should not spend its time providing a detailed analysis of each impugned minute. Using the technique used in this decision, of addressing a claimant’s most compelling complaints and then declining to give detailed analysis of the remaining complaints (where the most compelling complaints do not establish the claim) would provide sufficient analysis for this court to do its work on appeal without having to undertake the work that should be done at first instance.
[26] I was satisfied, after considering the four examples above, that the “most compelling” examples urged by the Appellant were not, in fact, meritorious. This is a small condominium corporation, and the unitholders (including the Appellant) should not be put to more legal expense to get to the bottom of the “minutes” issue.
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