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Statutory Interpretation - Interpretation
COMMENT
This is a new sub-topic at 2025 which may be aptly characterized as the 'interpretation' of statutory interpretation (SI). To date, statutory interpretation has consisted of identifying which interpretive factors (which I have identified as 'presumptions' in other writing) dominate in the case area that you are dealing with, a largely discretionary task which has led to the development of the wide range of SI 'doctrine' you see listed in the SI homepage.
These cases here however attempt to take the task a step further - to consider how to decide within the candidate doctrine. I will treat this as 'law in progress' and thus you can expect it to be correspondingly uncertain.
. Canadian National Railway Company v. Canada (Transportation Agency)
In Canadian National Railway Company v. Canada (Transportation Agency) (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal (Stratas JA) allowed an appeal, this against a "Canadian Transportation Agency’s rates-setting decision" regarding 'interswitching'.
Here the court considers what I think can be called 'interpretating statutory interpretation' - that is, deciding within the many statutory interpretation ('SI') doctrines the ultimate SI resolution:[33] We can test which interpretation "“accords most harmoniously with text, context and purpose”" and best expresses the authentic meaning of the legislation by examining real-world circumstances and the real-world effects of rival statutory interpretations: Williams v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FCA 252, [2018] 4 F.C.R. 174 at para. 52; see also, to similar effect, Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2025 SCC 15 at para. 76. However, care must be taken not to allow real-world circumstances and real-world effects to place into Parliament’s statute what is not authentically there. .... . Botbyl v. Heartland Farm Mutual Inc.
In Botbyl v. Heartland Farm Mutual Inc. (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a LAT SABS appeal, here from a LAT reconsideration decision which overturned an initial decision "that granted the Insureds relief from forfeiture of their insurance policy under s. 129 of the Insurance Act". The central issue here was whether the LAT [under s.280 'Resolution of disputes'] had jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture [under IA s.129], even though that provision grants such jurisdiction to the "court".
Here the court considers the limits of statutory interpretation:[80] Laskin J.A. went on to cite the following excerpt from Maunsell v. Olins [1975] A.C. 373, at p. 382, [1975] 1 All E.R. 16 (H.L.):They [the rules of statutory interpretation] are not rules in the ordinary sense of having some binding force. They are our servants, not our masters. They are aids to construction, presumptions or pointers. Not infrequently one "rule" points in one direction, another in a different direction. In each case we must look at all relevant circumstances and decide as a matter of judgment what weight to attach to any particular "rule". [81] In this case, to echo the words of Chief Justice Dickson in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, supra, we prefer to give weight to the presumption in favour of fostering a primary goal of the SABS [relieving hardship to the victims of motor vehicle accidents] than to the presumption of consistent expression. In dong so we take note of the fact that, as Sullivan remarks, the Insurance Act is a statute that has undergone a number of amendments over the years. Therefore, it is not surprising that the there are variations of meaning within its text. . R. v. Arapakota
In R. v. Arapakota (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a Crown criminal appeal, here from an acquittal from a prosecution under "s. 3(1)(a) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34 (CFPOA), which criminalizes the offering or making of loan, reward, advantage or benefit to a foreign public official or for the benefit of an official, “in order to obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business”, and “as consideration for” an act or omission by that official in connection with the performance of the official’s duties or functions".
Here the court states limits to the endeavour of statutory interpretation:[75] This brings us back to where we started. Legislative intent as disclosed by the text, context and purpose of the law is at the centre of the modern approach to statutory interpretation. The principles I have reviewed are relevant to assist in discerning that intent where the words of a statute are ambiguous or capable of bearing competing interpretations. All of this is in service to the interpretation of the words used in a statute. Interpretive principles cannot be used to rewrite statutory language. As Lebel J. observed in Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), 2006 SCC 20, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 715, at para. 23:Reference to the purpose of the provision “cannot be used to create an unexpressed exception to clear language”. Where, as in this case, the provision admits of more than one reasonable interpretation, greater emphasis must be placed on the context, scheme and purpose of the Act. Thus, legislative purpose may not be used to supplant clear statutory language, but to arrive at the most plausible interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. [Citations omitted.] [76] As pithily stated in MediaQMI inc. v. Kamel, 2021 SCC 23, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 899, at para. 39, “the goal of the interpretative exercise is to find harmony between the words of the statute and the intended objective, not to achieve the objective ‘at all costs’”.
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