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Statutory Interpretation - Modern Principle - "Text". Reference re iGaming Ontario
In Reference re iGaming Ontario (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a 'reference' [under CJA 8 'References to Court of Appeal'] regarding whether "legal online gaming and sports betting [would] remain lawful under the Criminal Code if its users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada".
Here the court considers the 'text' element of the statutory interpretation test:1. Text and ordinary meaning
[137] Statutory interpretation must always begin by paying close attention “to the text of the statute, which remains the anchor of the interpretive exercise”: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, 498 D.L.R. (4th) 316, at para. 24. That is because it is through the text that the legislature seeks to achieve its purpose: Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse, at para. 24; MediaQMI inc. v. Kamel, 2021 SCC 23, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 899, at para. 39.
[138] Accordingly, the text’s ordinary meaning is the starting point of statutory interpretation. Ordinary meaning “[m]ost often … refers ‘to the reader’s first impression meaning, the understanding that spontaneously emerges when words are read in their immediate context’”: Pharmascience Inc. v. Binet, 2006 SCC 48, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 513, at para. 30. The ordinary meaning is generally presumed to reflect the intention of the legislature, and it plays a dominant role where it is precise and unequivocal: Belwood Lake Cottagers Association Inc. v. Ontario (Environment and Climate Change), 2019 ONCA 70, 431 D.L.R. (4th) 318, at paras. 40-42; Canada v. Loblaw Financial Holdings Inc., 2021 SCC 51, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 687, at para. 41. . Grenon v. Canada
In Grenon v. Canada (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal considered the 'text' element of the modern statutory interpretation test of 'text, context, purpose':(a) Text
[138] The Supreme Court of Canada recently reminded us that "“[t]he starting point in any interpretive exercise is the text of the provision”" and that "“[i]n the absence of statutory definitions, what should be focused on is the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the text, that is, ‘the natural meaning’ that appears when the provision is simply read through as a whole”": Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, 498 D.L.R. (4th) 316 at paras. 23, 28 [CISSS A].
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