In Melville v. McLaren (Div Court, 2024) the Ontario Divisional Court cites a statutory interpretation "presumption against interference with vested rights":
[24] Fourth, the interpretation advanced by Ms. Melville is inconsistent with the presumption against interference with vested rights. Legislation should not be interpreted in a way that impairs existing substantive rights unless there is express language to that effect in the legislation or that result is a necessary implication of the legislation: Proctor & Gamble Inc. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), 2010 ONCA 149, 99 O.R. (3d) 321, at para. 54, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2010] S.C.C.A. 149; Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 1975 CanLII 4 (SCC), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 271, at pp. 282‑83, Hoggarth v. MGM Farms and Fingers Limited, 2015 ONSC 2494 at para. 91. In other words, we should not interpret s. 119(9) of the Land Titles Act in a way that impairs existing rights unless there is express language in the Act or unless impairing existing rights cannot be avoided without doing violence to the meaning and purpose of s. 119(9).
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