Rarotonga, 2010


Online Lawyer (Ontario)

Legal Guides
tenant / small claims / welfare (ontario works) / odsp / human rights / employment / consumer /
collection agencies / criminal injuries compensation / sppa (admin law) / animal cruelty / dogs & cats / wild animal law (all Canada)

home / about / Simon's Favorite Charity / testimonials / Conditions of Use

Get a Fee


... what's this?

Appeals - Are From Order not from Reasons

Summary Judgment - Partial Summary Judgment

Butera v. Chown, Cairns LLP (Ont CA, 2017)

Here the Court of Appeal restated case authority for the well-established rule that appeals are from Orders, not from Reasons for Decision.
[16] In my view, the motion judge erred in law in framing the issue as an analysis of whether there was an appeal from the “finding” of no misrepresentation. While issue estoppel may be based on reasons alone (see Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 4th ed (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2015) at pp. 16-18), an appeal is from an order or a judgment, not from the reasons for decision: Fram Elgin Mills 90 Inc. v. Romandale Farms Ltd., 2016 ONCA 404 (CanLII), 131 O.R. (3d) 455, at para. 33; and Glennie v. McD. & C. Holdings Ltd., 1935 CanLII 32 (SCC), [1935] S.C.R. 257, at p. 268.
Additionally the court continued to comment as follows on principles applicable to orders for partial summary judgment:
(b) Partial Summary Judgment

[22] I now turn to the second ground of appeal which relates to the granting of partial summary judgment.

[23] In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 (CanLII), [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, the Supreme Court rewrote the law on summary judgments. Justice Karakatsanis, writing for a unanimous court, commenced her analysis by stating: “Ensuring access to justice is the greatest challenge to the rule of law in Canada today.” She described accessibility as being achievable through justice that is proportionate, timely and affordable. As noted in that decision, rr. 1.04(1) and (1.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, specifically codify the proportionality principle:
1.04(1) These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits.

(1.1) In applying these rules, the court shall make orders and give directions that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding.
[24] The Superior Court of Justice has since considered a multitude of summary judgment motions using the principles established in Hryniak.

[25] Hryniak does not address partial summary judgment per se except in the context of exercising the enhanced fact-finding powers contained in r. 20.04(2.1). In that regard, Karakatsanis J. observed that it may not be in the interests of justice to use the new fact-finding powers to grant summary judgment against a single defendant if the claims against other parties will proceed to trial in any event. Such partial summary judgment runs the risk of duplicative proceedings or inconsistent facts. On the other hand, Karakatsanis J. noted that the “resolution of an important claim against a key party could significantly advance access to justice and be the most proportionate, timely and cost effective approach.”

[26] The pre-Hryniak appellate jurisprudence on partial summary judgment limited its availability. At para. 3 of Corchis v. KPMG Peat Marwick Thorne, [2002] O.J. No. 1437 (C.A.), this court applied Gold Chance International Ltd. v. Daigle & Hancock, [2001] O.J. No. 1032 (S.C.J.) to state that:
[P]artial summary judgment ought only to be granted in the clearest of cases where the issue on which judgment is sought is clearly severable from the balance of the case. If this principle is not followed, there is a very real possibility of a trial result that is inconsistent with the result of the summary judgment motion on essentially the same claim.
[27] Since Hryniak, this court has considered partial summary judgment in Baywood Homes Partnership v. Haditaghi, 2014 ONCA 450 (CanLII), 120 O.R. (3d) 438 and in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Deloitte & Touche, 2016 ONCA 922 (CanLII), 133 O.R. (3d) 561. Baywood was decided in the context of a motion for summary judgment on all claims, but where only partial summary judgment was granted. CIBC involved a motion for partial summary judgment.

[28] In both Baywood and CIBC, the court analyzed the issue from the perspective of whether (i) there was a risk of duplicative or inconsistent findings at trial and whether (ii) granting partial summary judgment was advisable in the context of the litigation as a whole. In both cases, the court held that partial summary judgment was inadvisable in the circumstances.

[29] The caution expressed pre-Hryniak in Corchis is equally applicable in the post-Hryniak world. In addition to the danger of duplicative or inconsistent findings considered in Baywood and CIBC, partial summary judgment raises further problems that are anathema to the stated objectives underlying Hryniak.

[30] First, such motions cause the resolution of the main action to be delayed. Typically, an action does not progress in the face of a motion for partial summary judgment. A delay tactic, dressed as a request for partial summary judgment, may be used, albeit improperly, to cause an opposing party to expend time and legal fees on a motion that will not finally determine the action and, at best, will only resolve one element of the action. At worst, the result is only increased fees and delay. There is also always the possibility of an appeal.

[31] Second, a motion for partial summary judgment may by very expensive. The provision for a presumptive cost award for an unsuccessful summary judgment motion that existed under the former summary judgment rule has been repealed, thereby removing a disincentive for bringing partial summary judgment motions.

[32] Third, judges, who already face a significant responsibility addressing the increase in summary judgment motions that have flowed since Hryniak, are required to spend time hearing partial summary judgment motions and writing comprehensive reasons on an issue that does not dispose of the action.

[33] Fourth, the record available at the hearing of a partial summary judgment motion will likely not be as expansive as the record at trial therefore increasing the danger of inconsistent findings.

[34] When bringing a motion for partial summary judgment, the moving party should consider these factors in assessing whether the motion is advisable in the context of the litigation as a whole. A motion for partial summary judgment should be considered to be a rare procedure that is reserved for an issue or issues that may be readily bifurcated from those in the main action and that may be dealt with expeditiously and in a cost effective manner. Such an approach is consistent with the objectives described by the Supreme Court in Hryniak and with the direction that the Rules be liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious, and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits.

[35] Lastly, I would observe the obvious, namely, that a motion for partial summary judgment differs from a motion for summary judgment. If the latter is granted, subject to appeals, it results in the disposal of the entire action. In addition, to the extent the motion judge considers it advisable, if the motion for summary judgment is not granted but is successful in part, partial summary judgment may be ordered in that context.

[36] Turning then to the substance of the second ground of appeal, the appellants submit that granting partial summary judgment on the misrepresentation issue provides minimal, if any, efficiency as the action is proceeding to trial on the negligence, breach of contract, and Arthur Wishart Act claims. The misrepresentation claims are largely intertwined with these other claims and partial summary judgment risks inconsistent results.

[37] The respondents reject these submissions, arguing that r. 20.05(1) recognizes the utility of partial summary judgment. The motion judge’s decision is entitled to deference and was appropriate for the litigation as a whole.

[38] As explained in Hryniak, the exercise of powers under the summary judgment rule generally attracts deference. Here the motion judge made an extricable error in principle in failing to consider whether partial summary judgment was appropriate in the context of the litigation as a whole. As the appellants point out, the action is proceeding to trial on the Arthur Wishart Act claims, which include allegations of a breach of the duty of fair dealing and deficient disclosure, the claims in negligence, and for breach of contract. These claims are intertwined with the misrepresentation claims. An award of partial summary judgment in these circumstances may lead to inconsistent results to the extent the misrepresentation claims were not barred due to a limitation period. On the other hand, had the litigation as a whole been considered, partial summary judgment would not have been an appropriate award as it would not serve the objectives of proportionality, efficiency, and cost effectiveness.

Law Society Number #37308N / Website © Simon Shields 2005-2020