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Judicial Review - Limitation - Post-8 July 2020 Amendments
MORE CASES
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. Ye v Toronto District School Board
In Ye v Toronto District School Board (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court observed that the operative terms (ie. "the decision or matter") of JRPA s.5(1) are broader than only those of 'decisions':[34] The Applicant relies on s. 5(1) of the JRPA, which establishes the timeline within which an application for judicial review must be brought, to argue that judicial review is available for a “matter” and not just a decision. Under s. 2(1)2, however, the relief sought by the Applicant is only available where there is an exercise of a statutory power. As discussed above, the Application does not involve a statutory power of decision and does not otherwise satisfy the definition of the exercise of a statutory power. . Jonker v. Township of West Lincoln
In Jonker v. Township of West Lincoln (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers the s.5 JRPA limitations provisions:[33] So we need turn to the relevant statute that provides for certain obligations and requirements for judicial review. [1] The JRPA was amended in 2020 to impose a 30-day limitation period for bringing an application for judicial review, as well as the authority for a court to extend the time for making such an application. Section 5(1) and 5(2) of the JRPA now provide:5(1) Unless another Act provides otherwise, an application for judicial review shall be made no later than 30 days after the date the decision or matter for which judicial review is being sought was made or occurred, subject to subsection (2).
5(2) The court may, on such terms as it considers proper, extend the time for making an application for judicial review if it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason of the delay. [34] The JRPA provides that an application for judicial review may be commenced as of right within 30 days of the decision sought to be reviewed. If that 30-day limitation period has expired, an application for judicial review may only be commenced with leave of the Court. While the decision to grant leave is discretionary, it is clear that s. 5(2) of the JRPA provides that leave may only be granted where two mandatory conditions are met: where there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any other person affected by reason of the delay.
[35] The “apparent grounds for relief” condition requires an assessment of the substantive merits of the application for judicial review. The Court may not grant leave to commence an application for judicial review unless it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief, even where there is otherwise no substantial prejudice or hardship caused by the delay.
[36] The Divisional Court has confirmed that the two requirements in s. 5(2) are mandatory. In Unifor and its Local 303 v. Scepter Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 5683 (“Unifor”), the newly amended s. 5 of the JRPA was interpreted by Matheson J. for the court, at paras. 17 and 18:[17] Subsection 5(2) must be interpreted in context and giving meaning to all of its words. Subsection 5(1) is important context. The legislative reform introduced a 30-day time limit, which should be given force. Moving to s. 5(2), an extension of time is not mandatory where the two factors referenced in that subsection are satisfied. On the contrary, the subsection provides that an extension is in the court’s discretion. The two factors mentioned are prerequisites to the exercise of that discretion. They are necessary, but do not preclude the consideration of other circumstances. Given the time limit in s. 5(1), the length of delay and any explanation offered for it would be relevant considerations.
[18] Therefore, s. 5(2) does not foreclose a consideration of the length of delay, and any explanation offered for the delay, in the exercise of the court’s discretion. The impact of these facts may vary depending on the case and will now be considered in the context of a 30-day time limit. [37] In the same decision, the Divisional Court also confirmed that the “apparent grounds for relief” condition requires a consideration of the substantive merits of the case. While Matheson J. declined to grant leave in Unifor following a delay of more than eight months in bringing the application for judicial review, she also considered the substantive merits of the motion based on a review of the record in assessing the “apparent grounds for relief” requirement, at paras. 21 and 22:The question of whether the application raises apparent grounds for relief calls for a consideration of the merits. In this case, the applicant raises two grounds in support of its application: that the Arbitrator’s reasons for decision failed to justify the finding of a core or essential requirement, and that the Arbitrator failed to undertake a proper accommodation analysis. Yet the Award does show the line of reasoning followed by the Arbitrator, given the parameters agreed to [by] the parties. He considered the evidence, the arbitral jurisprudence, and relevant legal principles, as applied to the question put before him. With respect to the accommodation analysis, the applicant appears to be attempting to change the streamlined process and question put forward by the Arbitrator, in hindsight, rather than showing that the Award was unreasonable. It agreed to the process and that question, and the Arbitrator proceeded in turn.
While the applicant need not show that it has a successful application on the merits to have apparent grounds for relief, I find that these grounds for relief, I find that these grounds are weak. [38] More recently, in Yan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 1290, the Divisional Court expressly confirmed that leave to extend the time to commence an application for judicial review may be denied on the sole basis of a lack of “apparent grounds for relief,” regardless of whether the delay caused any substantial hardship or prejudice. In Yan, Schabas J. further confirmed that at the second stage of the test, prejudice is presumed to flow from delay.
[39] Courts have also held that the “apparent grounds for relief” condition in the FLA permits a review of the evidentiary record to assess the merits of the claim. In Hevey v. Hevey, 2021 ONCA 740, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently described this condition as authorizing a “limited inquiry into the merits of the proposed claim.” Similarly, in both Scherer v. Mihalcin, (2002), 2002 CanLII 44920 (ON CA), 59 O.R. (3d) 393, the Court of Appeal concluded the evidence in the record (or lack thereof) did not provide sufficient support for the underlying claim for relief. See also Donnelly v. Donnelly, (2004), 2004 CanLII 5045 (ON SC), 50 R.F.L. (5th) 344.
[40] The “apparent grounds for relief” condition is also a more demanding standard than the test for striking or amending a pleading. In Werth v. Werth, 2004 ONCJ 43, the Court likened the “apparent grounds for relief” criterion to its predecessor in the FLA, which required the party seeking relief to demonstrate a prima facie case. I agree with the Commissioner that the applicable standard is not, as the applicant appears to assume in his factum, analogous to the test on a pleadings motion, which requires only that the claim or defence be “tenable” at law to be allowed to proceed.
[41] While these decisions concern the interpretation of a different statute, they interpret the same words included in the JRPA – “apparent grounds for relief” – as a mandatory statutory precondition in a similar context: whether to grant leave to extend the time provided for in the statute to commence an application. These decisions provide helpful guidance, consistent with the Divisional Court’s decision in Unifor, that the “apparent grounds for relief” criterion should be interpreted in accordance with the following principles:The party seeking leave to commence a claim after the expiry of the 30-day limitation period bears the onus of satisfy8ing the Court that there are “apparent grounds for relief”’;
The Court must engage in at least a limited inquiry of the merits of the claim to determine whether the moving party has satisfied its onus; and
The Court may consider the evidentiary record in support of the underlying claim in conducting this inquiry. ....
[59] In any case, I am not inclined to grant leave to commence the proposed application after the clear expiry of the limitation period. This is because the applicant has neither rebutted the presumption of prejudice nor provided a satisfactory explanation for the lengthy delay. As noted in Yan, prejudice is presumed to flow from a delay in commencing an application for judicial review.
[60] Further, even where both components of the statutory test are otherwise satisfied, I may nevertheless decline to exercise my residual discretion to grant leave under s. 5(2) of the JRPA. Here, like in Unifor, the applicant has provided no explanation for the delay in moving to add the Commissioner as a party, especially after announcing its initial intention to do so more than two months earlier.[2] . Mehedi v. Mondalez Bakery
In Mehedi v. Mondalez Bakery (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court briefly considers the s.5 JRPA limitation:Delay
[12] Kelly raised the issue of delay, arguing that the application was filed two weeks after the expiry of the 30-day period under s. 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1. We decline to dismiss the application for delay. The delay is not lengthy. The Applicant, who is self-represented, consulted with a lawyer at the Human Rights Legal Support Centre in April 2022, evidencing an intention to seek judicial review during the 30-day period. Moreover, Kelly did not suggest that it was prejudiced by a delay of two weeks. . Yan v. Law Society of Ontario
In Yan v. Law Society of Ontario (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered the s.5 JRPA limitations provisions:[1] This motion to extend time to commence an application for judicial review was filed on October 18, 2022. This was about eight months after the decision of the Complaints Review Commissioner of the Law Society of Ontario dated February 7, 2022, which the moving party, Nathalie Xian Yi Yan (“Yan”), seeks to review.
[2] Following receipt of the CRC’s decision, Yan chose to commence an appeal of the decision to this court. Yan did so despite being informed that there was no appeal from a decision of the CRC. This court then dismissed her appeal for want of jurisdiction on April 22, 2022: Yan v. Durcan, 2022 ONSC 2426. Yan then sought to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Only after Trotter J.A. confirmed on September 29, 2022 (Endorsement, Court of Appeal File No. COA -22-OM-0029) that there was no right of appeal did Yan bring this motion, long after the 30-day requirement to commence an application for judicial review as set out in s. 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1.
[3] Section 5(2) of the JRPA places a burden on the moving party to satisfy the court that there are “apparent grounds for relief” and that “no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by the delay.” However, this does not mean that the court cannot also consider the reasons for the delay by the moving party. Ultimately, the decision remains a matter of discretion, albeit discretion that includes consideration of the factors in s. 5(2) of the JRPA: Unifor and its Local 303 v. Scepter Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 5683 at paras. 10-19; Belyavsky v. Walsh, 2022 ONSC 3135.
[4] I am not satisfied that there are “apparent grounds for relief” as required by s. 5(2) of the JRPA. The CRC found it reasonable for the LSO not to investigate its licensee, Rebecca Durcan (“Durcan”), for not attending, as a Crown witness, Yan’s Provincial Offences Act proceeding. The CRC noted, among other things, Durcan's evidence that she was never served with a summons or subpoena to attend court, the absence of any evidence of a subpoena having been served on Durcan, and that the arresting officers also did not attend, which led to the dismissal of the charges against Yan. . Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference
In Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers what is essentially a successful laches argument, here where the JR applicant delays in perfecting their application (not in commencing it):The Applicable Principles
[13] Judicial review is an equitable and discretionary remedy that can be denied on the basis of excessive delay, regardless of the merits of the case: Ransom v. Ontario, 2010 ONSC 3156at para. 4; affirmed 2011 ONSC 5594 (Div. Ct.). An applicant is under an obligation to commence and perfect their judicial review application in a timely manner.
[14] Subsection 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1. sets out a 30-day period for commencing an application for judicial review. Under s. 5(2), the court may exercise its discretion to extend the 30-day period if it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason of the delay.
[15] In exercising its discretion to dismiss an application for judicial review for delay, the court will consider the following factors:(a) The length of the delay;
(b) The reasonableness of any explanation offered for the delay; and
(c) Any prejudice suffered by the respondent as a result of that delay.
Canadian Chiropractic Association v. McLellan, 2011 ONSC 6014 (Div. Ct.), at para. 15. See also: Unifor and its Local 303 v. Scepter Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 5683, at para. 17. ....
[23] In my view, in the face of a specific case management direction and the general 30-day timeline under Rule 68.04, CP’s delay in perfecting its application for judicial review, which is at a minimum 11 months long, is excessive.
....
[26] On the issue of prejudice, TCRC points out that as a result of the failure to move the matter forward, the other outstanding grievances regarding the cancellation of annual vacation remain unresolved. In the labour relations context, delay raises concerns about the “acrimony that may result from drawn-out litigation, and the timely resolution of disputes is essential.”: Ransom v. Ontario, 2011 ONSC 5594, at para. 15. CP’s failure to pursue its application with diligence resulted in a prolonged lack of certainty regarding the underlying issue of annual vacations.
[27] Moreover, in my view, the fact that the amended notice of application differs fundamentally from the original notice of application is also relevant to the issue of prejudice. While CP maintains that the amended notice of application “narrows” and “focuses” the grounds for review, the amended notice expands the grounds for review beyond those that were initially pleaded. The original notice of application is based on, as CP described it, a “generic” challenge to the reasonableness of the original and supplementary awards. The awards were not challenged for lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdictional challenge requires different evidence than a reasonableness review, as evidenced by CP’s reliance on statements made by the arbitrator at the time. The amended notice of application also seeks relief that was not sought in the original application, specifically, that TCRC’s original motion be dismissed in its entirety, rather than an order remitting the matter to a different arbitrator. CP has provided no explanation as to why it could not raise the jurisdictional challenge in the original application. Had CP sought to file a new application for judicial review, it would have been out of time under s. 5(1) of the JRPA. In my view, it is prejudicial to TCRC to have to respond to a substantively different application for judicial review one year after the application was first commenced. . Adams v. Aamwjiwnaang First Nation
In Adams v. Aamwjiwnaang First Nation (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court considered JRPA s.5(1-2) limitations and time extension provisions Should the Applicant Be Granted an Extension of Time to File the First Application?
[9] The quotas for unmarked cigarettes for 2021-2022 were allocated at a Council meeting on March 29, 2021. The Applicant was not advised of the decision but realized that she had not been allocated any quota. After making inquiries, on May 13, 2021, the Applicant was advised of Council’s decision not to allocate her any quota. She received Council’s reasons some time after May 24, 2021. The Applicant did not commence the First Application until July 22, 2021, approximately one month after the 30-day timeline under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 (the “JRPA”).
[10] The Respondent takes the position that the time for filing the First Application should not be extended because it is moot. Because quota was allocated for 2021-2022, and that time period has passed, the Applicant could not now be allocated quota for 2021-2022. The Respondent further submits that granting an extension for the First Application would prejudice retailers who had been allocated quota for 2021-2022. At the hearing, however, the Respondent conceded that no substantial prejudice would arise.
[11] Under s. 5(1) of the JRPA, an application for judicial review must be filed within 30 days of the decision of which review is sought. Under s. 5(2), the court has discretion to extend the time to file an application for judicial review if it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by the delay.
[12] [*** SS: note next sentence ...] Because an extension under s. 5(2) is at the court’s discretion, the court may take into consideration factors beyond those specified in s. 5(2). On motions to extend the time for filing an application for judicial review, this court generally takes into consideration the length of the delay and the explanation for the delay: Unifor and its Local 303 v. Scepter Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 5683, 2022 CarswellOnt 14445, at paras. 17-18.
[13] In this case, a consideration of the relevant factors weighs in favour of extending the time to file the First Application. Although we did not ultimately agree with the Applicant’s position on these applications, given our detailed treatment of her central argument in these reasons, it will be apparent that the First Application raises reasonable grounds for review and apparent grounds for relief.
[14] An extension of time would cause little or no prejudice to the Respondent, who did not submit any evidence on the motion. The second application for judicial review, regarding the quota allocation for 2022-2023 (the “Second Application”), is related to the First Application in that it raises the same legal and factual issues. To this extent, we also find that the First Application is not moot. The allocation of quota in a given year is dependant on the retailer’s sales for the previous year. Therefore, in the event that the Applicant succeeds on the Second Application, the issue of whether she was improperly denied quota in 2021-2022 and her potential entitlement are relevant to the quota she would receive for 2022-2023. While it may not be possible to re-allocate quota for 2021-22, the Applicant’s entitlement would be relevant to the Second Application.
[15] Because the quota is allocated each year, it is also likely that whenever a judicial review application is brought, assuming it takes more than one year to reach the hearing, it would inevitably become moot by the time it is heard.
[16] Moreover, the Applicant’s delay in filing was less than one month. The Applicant took prompt steps to retain counsel and challenge the decision: See Sobczyk v. Ontario, 2022 ONSC 88, 160 O.R. (3d) 551. Specifically, on June 19, 2021, the Applicant’s counsel sought reconsideration of the decision. On June 28, 2021, Council advised the Applicant that there was no right to appeal the decision. The Applicant then retained new counsel and, on July 16, 2021, was advised that she would have to bring an application for judicial review. The First Application was served on July 22, 2021. . Unifor and its Local 303 v Scepter Canada Inc.
In Unifor and its Local 303 v Scepter Canada Inc. (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court considered the recent s.5 JRPA (in force July 2020) 30-day judicial review limitation, with statutory extension. The case is interesting for it's consideration of the old 'laches' doctrine regarding the 'length of delay', with the new statutory provisions:Thirty day time limit
[10] Subsection 5(1) of the JRPA imposes the 30-day time limit, as follows:5(1) Unless another Act provides otherwise, an application for judicial review shall be made no later than 30 days after the date the decision or matter for which judicial review is being sought was made or occurred, subject to subsection (2). [11] The applicant submits that it should be granted an extension of time because its application fulfills the express requirements set out in s. 5(2) of the JRPA, which provides as follows:(2) The court may, on such terms as it considers proper, extend the time for making an application for judicial review if it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason of the delay. [12] More specifically, the applicant submits that there are “apparent grounds for relief” in its application and “no substantial prejudice or hardship will result”.
[13] The applicant submits that the prior approach to timeliness of applications for judicial review has no role under s. 5(2). Previously, there was no time limit. If an applicant proceeded with undue delay, the application could be dismissed. In exercising the discretion to dismiss an application for judicial review for delay, the court would consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of any explanation offered for the delay and any prejudice suffered by the respondent as a result of that delay: Kaur v. The National Dental Examining Board of Canada, 2019 ONSC 5882, at para. 4.
[14] The applicant submits that the legislative change in s. 5(2) swept away those factors, which are no longer relevant. The applicant submits that it need not explain the delay, nor should the court consider the length of the delay or any explanation for the delay. The only questions would be whether there were apparent grounds for relief and any prejudice.
[15] Counsel to the applicant frankly agreed that, taking this approach, it would be easier to proceed after a delay under the new regime (with the 30-day time limit) than the prior regime (with no time limit).
[16] Although the applicant’s counsel acknowledges that an extension under s. 5(2) is in the court’s discretion, the applicant’s position is essentially that if there are apparent grounds and no substantial prejudice, an extension must be granted. I disagree.
[17] Subsection 5(2) must be interpreted in context and giving meaning to all of its words. Subsection 5(1) is important context. The legislative reform introduced a 30-day time limit, which should be given force. Moving to s. 5(2), an extension of time is not mandatory where the two factors referenced in that subsection are satisfied. On the contrary, the subsection provides that an extension is in the court’s discretion. The two factors mentioned are prerequisites to the exercise of that discretion. They are necessary, but do not preclude the consideration of other circumstances. Given the time limit in s. 5(1), the length of delay and any explanation offered for it would be relevant considerations.
[18] Therefore s. 5(2) does not foreclose a consideration of the length of the delay, and any explanation offered for the delay, in the exercise of the court’s discretion. The impact of these facts may vary depending on the case and will now be considered in the context of a 30-day time limit. The lengthy delay in this case is therefore significant. Even before the imposition of the 30-day time limit, a delay of more than six months could justify the dismissal of an application for judicial review for delay: Kaur, at para. 4.
[19] The applicant puts forward Belyavsky v. Walsh 2022 ONSC 3135 and respectfully disagrees with its approach in this regard. In Belyavsky, the judge considered not only the two factors in s. 5(2), but also the length of the delay and explanation for the delay, in exercising her discretion to deny the requested extension of time. In my view, she was entitled to do so. . Blot Interactive Inc. v. Ontario Media Development Corporation
In Blot Interactive Inc. v. Ontario Media Development Corporation (Div Court, 2022) a single judge of the Divisional Court issued a ruling that puzzles me profoundly. Despite the 08 July 2020 amendment that brought in a JR limitation of 30 days [JRPA 5(1-3)], the court considered a motion to 'extend time' from a matter that started running over four years ago. And, instead of applying the present JR limitation law, it applied a combination of the standard 30-day appeal limitation extension [Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese (Ont CA, 2013) and the old laches six-month timeline. On top of this, the court granted the motion to extend time (over four years).
From all appearance everybody in this file (judge and three counsel) thinks that JR limitations still use laches, and they allowed an extension eight times the standard old laches time. Am I missing something?
. Belyavsky v. Walsh
In Belyavsky v. Walsh (Div Ct, 2022) the Divisional Court considered extending the 30-day judicial review time limitations of JRPA s.5(1):[7] Subsection 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedures Act requires that an application for judicial review be made within 30 days of the impugned decision. Subsection 5(2) allows for an extension of time to bring an application for judicial review if the Court is “satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason of the delay.”
[8] An applicant is under an obligation to commence and perfect their judicial review application in a timely manner. Judicial review is an equitable and discretionary remedy that can be denied on the basis of excessive delay, regardless of the merits of the case (Ransom v. Ontario, 2010 ONSC 3156at para. 4; affirmed 2011 ONSC 5594 (Div. Ct.).
[9] In exercising its discretion to dismiss an application for judicial review, the court will consider the following factors:(a) The length of delay;
(b) The reasonableness of any explanation offered for the delay; and
(c) Any prejudice suffered by the respondent as a result of that delay.
Canadian Chiropractic Association v. McLellan, 2011 ONSC 6014 (Div. Ct.), at para. 15. . Sobczyk v. Ontario
In Sobczyk v. Ontario (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court applied the new (2020) JR limitation period in an uncontentious case:1. Should the Application be Dismissed for Delay?
[21] Subsection 5(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act provides that an application for judicial review shall be made no later than 30 days after the date of the decision or matter for which judicial review is being sought is made or occurred. An extension of time may be granted by the court if it is satisfied that (a) there are apparent grounds for relief; and (b) that no substantial prejudice or hardship would occur as a result of the delay.
[22] The Applicant first received notice of the decision on June 17, 2021. He took prompt steps to retain counsel and the Ministry was provided with written notice of his intention to apply for review of the decision on July 6, 2021. Subsequent delay was largely attributed to his counsel being diagnosed with COVID.
[23] I am satisfied there are apparent grounds for the relief sought in the Notice of Application and there is no substantial prejudice or hardship to the Ministry as a result of the delay. The required extension of time for the filing of this Notice of Application is granted. . Walia v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario
In Walia v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario (Div Ct, 2020) the Divisional Court noted a statutory change to the JRPA on 08 July 2020 that shortens the normal common law limitation (of six months) for judicial reviews to 30 days, subject to an extension as set out in the Act:Judicial Review Procedures Act
Time for bringing application
5 (1) Unless another Act provides otherwise, an application for judicial review shall be made no later than 30 days after the date the decision or matter for which judicial review is being sought was made or occurred, subject to subsection (2).
Extension
(2) The court may, on such terms as it considers proper, extend the time for making an application for judicial review if it is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason of the delay.
Same, other Acts
(3) Subsection (2) applies with respect to any limitation of time for the bringing of an application for judicial review under any other Act, unless that Act expressly provides otherwise.
Transition
(4) Subsection (1) applies with respect to the judicial review of a decision that is made or of a matter that occurs on or after the day section 2 of Schedule 10 to the Smarter and Stronger Justice Act, 2020 comes into force. The court stated on the issue:[36] By this point, it is too late to bring an application to judicially review the Complaints Committee’s referral of the complaint to the Discipline Committee. The timelines for doing so have long passed. The Divisional Court has consistently held that judicial review "is an extraordinary equitable and discretionary remedy which can be denied in the face of excessive delay": see, for example, The Canadian Chiropractic Association v. Dr. Barry McLellan, Coroner, 2011 ONSC 6014 (Div. Ct.), at para. 14. The Court has also held that a delay of more than six months in commencing an application for judicial review is excessive: De Pelham v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2011 ONSC 7006 (Div. Ct.), at para. 14. In addition, in accordance with section 5 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, since July 2020, applications for judicial review must be brought within 30 days of the decision being challenged unless the Court is satisfied there is merit to the application and no prejudice in granting an extension. In this case, the referral occurred in May 2016, which is over four years ago.
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