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Public International Law - Implementation of Treaties. CNL Ltd. v. Kebaowek First Nation et al.
In CNL Ltd. v. Kebaowek First Nation et al. (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed an appeal (from a JR), this over whether the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission "erred in failing to consider the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) standard as stipulated therein in relation to the approval" of "the proposed near surface disposal facility (NSDF) on the Chalk River Laboratories site (the Site) that would be used to store low-level radioactive waste (LLW)".
Here the court addresses the issue of whether relevant provisions of UNDRIP have been 'implemented' in Canadian law - which appears to have been argued in an effort to enrich the pre-existing 'duty to consult' owed to indigeous people by the federal government under the 'Honour of the Crown' in this case:[37] In my view, the central issue in this appeal is the interpretation of the UNDA and whether the various articles of UNDRIP (and, in particular, Article 29(2)) have been implemented or the Commission had the authority to implement these provisions. ....
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B. The Interpretation of the UNDA – Does it implement Article 29(2) of UNDRIP?
[53] Article 29(2) of UNDRIP specifically addresses the storage or disposal of hazardous materials and provides that:"2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent."
"2."" Les États prennent des mesures efficaces pour veiller à ce qu’aucune matière dangereuse ne soit stockée ou déchargée sur les terres ou territoires des peuples autochtones sans leur consentement préalable, donné librement et en connaissance de cause." [54] The Federal Court Judge found, in paragraph 130 of her reasons, that "“[t]he proposed NSDF is a project that clearly falls within the scope of Article 29(2), thus triggering the UNDRIP FPIC standard”". This finding is reiterated in paragraph 183 of her reasons. In paragraph 221, the Federal Court Judge finds that "“Article 29(2) highlights that FPIC is required for the disposal of hazardous materials in the lands or territories of Indigenous peoples”".
[55] These findings are predicated on interpreting the UNDA as implementing the various articles of UNDRIP and, in particular, Article 29(2).
[56] The UNDA is to be interpreted based on its text, context and purpose:[43] The modern principle requires a court to interpret statutory language “according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole” (Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at para. 10; R. v. Downes, 2023 SCC 6, at para. 24). Even so, a court need not address text, context, and purpose separately or in a formulaic way, since these elements are often closely related or interdependent (Bell ExpressVu [Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42], at para. 31; Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, at para. 28).
[Piekut v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13] [57] The issue is whether(a) the UNDA has implemented the articles as set out in UNDRIP with the result that any such articles, which are not already part of the laws of Canada, are now part of the laws of Canada; or
(b) the UNDA sets out a procedure for the implementation of the articles that are not already part of the laws of Canada. [58] As noted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Gitxaala:[66] As a General Assembly resolution, UNDRIP does not create or impose new international legal rights or obligations, nor is it formally binding as a treaty. Rather, it is a statement of internationally recognized human rights and standards. Some of its articles overlap with existing rules of treaty, custom or general principles of law of broad application, expressed in specific relation to Indigenous peoples. For example, article 3 recognizes and affirms the inherent right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination, which the International Law Commission has identified as a peremptory norm of international law and which is enshrined in binding conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46. Other UNDRIP articles elaborate and extend existing international legal rights derived from convention or custom and, to varying degrees, still others are, in whole or in part, aspirational. In other words, UNDRIP aggregates, articulates and extends a range of internationally binding rights, obligations and general principles, together with internationally recognized minimum standards of achievement, aspirations and concerns: Gib van Ert, “The impression of harmony: Bill C-262 and the implementation of the UNDRIP in Canadian law” (27 November 2018) 2018 at 2-5; Naiomi Metallic, “Breathing Life into Our Living Tree and Strengthening Our Constitutional Roots: The Promise of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act” in Alpert et. al., eds., Rewriting the Canadian Constitution (forthcoming) at 7-9; Sylvanus Ghendazhi Barnabas, “The Legal Status of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) in Contemporary International Human Rights Law” (2017) 6:2 Int’l. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 242 at 251 [“The Legal Status of the United Nations Declaration”]. [59] There would be no need to implement into Canadian law any of the articles in UNDRIP that are already part of the laws of Canada. The issue is whether the articles that are inconsistent with existing Canadian laws have been implemented.
[60] As noted by the Supreme Court in Reference re An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2024 SCC 5 (First Nations Families Act Reference):[4] While the Declaration is not binding as a treaty in Canada, it nonetheless provides that, for the purposes of its implementation, states have an obligation to take, “in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, ... the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends” of the Declaration (art. 38). Recognized by Parliament as “a universal international human rights instrument with application in Canadian law”, the Declaration has been incorporated into the country’s positive law by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, S.C. 2021, c. 14 (“UNDRIP Act”), s. 4(a). This statute recognizes that the Declaration “provides a framework for reconciliation” (preamble); s. 5 of the same statute requires the Government of Canada, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, to take “all measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the Declaration”. The statute’s preamble expressly provides that the implementation of the Declaration in Canada “must include concrete measures to address injustices” facing, among others, Indigenous youth and children. [61] While the Supreme Court stated that "“the Declaration has been incorporated into the country’s positive law”" by the UNDA, the Supreme Court also noted that the preamble "“recognizes that the Declaration ‘provides a framework for reconciliation’”" and that section 5 of the UNDA "“requires the Government of Canada, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, to take ‘all measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the Declaration’”". As well, the "“preamble expressly provides that the implementation of the Declaration in Canada ‘must include concrete measures to address injustices’ facing, among others, Indigenous youth and children”".
[62] The Supreme Court in First Nations Families Act Reference also noted:[15] In 2021, Parliament enacted the UNDRIP Act, s. 4(a) of which affirms the Declaration “as a universal international human rights instrument with application in Canadian law”. It is therefore through this Act of Parliament that the Declaration is incorporated into the country’s domestic positive law. In s. 4(b), the statute states that its purpose is also to “provide a framework for the Government of Canada’s implementation of the Declaration”. In s. 5, it provides that the “Government of Canada must, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, take all measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the Declaration”. Further, s. 6(2)(b) provides that the minister responsible for the statute must prepare and implement an action plan, which must include “measures related to monitoring, oversight, recourse or remedy or other accountability measures with respect to the implementation of the Declaration”. More generally, in the preamble to this statute, Parliament emphasized the Government of Canada’s commitment to “taking effective measures — including legislative, policy and administrative measures — at the national and international level, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, to achieve the objectives of the Declaration”. Parliament also referred in the preamble to the call for it to implement the UNDRIP made by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in its calls to action and by the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls in its calls for justice.
[16] The call for lawmakers to pass legislation affirming self-government for Indigenous peoples and facilitating the exercise of these rights has been echoed in other contexts. Internationally, for example, the importance of such measures has been repeatedly pointed out (see, e.g., UNDRIP, art. 38; United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, S. James Anaya, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9, August 11, 2008; United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement upon conclusion of the visit to Canada by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, October 15, 2013 (online)).
[17] Taking legislative measures of this kind has been described as being part of a process that some have termed “legislative reconciliation”, that is, the enactment of legislation “to respect, promote, protect, and accommodate inherent rights through mechanisms or frameworks elaborated upon within the statute” (see N. S. W. Metallic, “Aboriginal Rights, Legislative Reconciliation, and Constitutionalism” (2023), 27:2 Rev. Const. Stud. 1, at p. 5). In other words, legislation of this kind does not purport to be the source of the rights in question, but rather proceeds on the premise that these rights exist. Similar initiatives have also been described as “recognition legislation”, including in the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship (1996), at p. 314 (see also S. Grammond, “Recognizing Indigenous Law: A Conceptual Framework” (2022), 100 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at pp. 20-21).
[Emphasis added] [63] Stating that "“legislation of this kind does not purport to be the source of the rights in question, but rather proceeds on the premise that these rights exist”" does not support a finding that the articles as set out in UNDRIP, to the extent that there is an inconsistency between such articles and the laws of Canada, have been implemented into Canadian law and that any inconsistency between such articles and Canadian law would be resolved by finding that UNDRIP will prevail.
[64] The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Gitxaala also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in First Nations Families Act Reference and noted:[132] It seems to me the Court viewed Parliament’s enactment of the [UNDA] as a preliminary, but significant, step in the long-term process of implementing UNDRIP domestically. That step included express recognition that UNDRIP applies in Canadian law, legislative incorporation of UNDRIP into the country’s positive law, and the imposition of a statutory duty to consult, cooperate, and take measures to align domestic laws with UNDRIP, together with related planning and reporting obligations. The Court also viewed the First Nations Families Act as another, more specific, step in the same process ... [65] The provisions of the preamble and the UNDA referenced by the Supreme Court in First Nations Families Act Reference are not consistent with finding that the articles of UNDRIP have now been incorporated into the laws of Canada but rather are consistent with finding that the Government of Canada is committed to working with Indigenous peoples to take measures to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with UNDRIP. These provisions contemplate future action, not an immediate implementation of the articles as set out in UNDRIP into Canadian law.
[66] Subsection 2(3) of the UNDA states that:"(3) Nothing in this Act is to be construed as delaying the application of the Declaration in Canadian law."
"(3)"" La présente loi n’a pas pour effet de retarder l’application de la Déclaration en droit canadien." [67] This subsection does not use the positive language that would be required to implement UNDRIP in Canadian law. Rather, it is to be applied in interpreting the other sections of the UNDA.
[68] Section 4 of the UNDA sets out two purposes:"4 The purposes of this Act are to"
"4 ""La présente loi a pour objet :"
"(a) affirm the Declaration as a universal international human rights instrument with application in Canadian law; and"
"a)"" de confirmer que la Déclaration constitue un instrument international universel en matière de droits de la personne qui trouve application en droit canadien;"
"(b) provide a framework for the Government of Canada’s implementation of the Declaration."
"b)"" d’encadrer la mise en œuvre de la Déclaration par le gouvernement du Canada." [69] Stating in paragraph 4(a) of the UNDA that one of the purposes of the UNDA is to affirm UNDRIP as a "“universal international human rights instrument with application in Canadian law”" is not the same as implementing UNDRIP, as confirmed by paragraph (b) which provides that one of the purposes is to provide "“a framework for the Government of Canada’s implementation of the Declaration”". There is no need to provide a framework for the implementation of UNDRIP if UNDRIP is implemented by the UNDA.
[70] Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the UNDA set out obligations:(a) on the Government of Canada, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, to take measures to resolve inconsistencies between UNDRIP and the laws of Canada;
(b) on the Minister, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples and other federal ministers, to prepare and implement an action plan to achieve the objectives of UNDRIP; and
(c) on the Minister, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, to prepare an annual report to Parliament. [71] None of these obligations are consistent with the UNDA implementing UNDRIP. Rather, these obligations are consistent with the UNDA providing a framework for the future implementation of UNDRIP.
[72] In addressing subsection 1(4) of the British Columbia Declaration Act (which is the provision that corresponds to subsection 2(3) of the UNDA), the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Gitxaala stated:[139] Section 1(4) of the Declaration Act also comes under the heading “Interpretation”. It provides that nothing in the Declaration Act is to be construed as delaying the application of UNDRIP to the laws of British Columbia. The word “application” ordinarily means the way in which something is used, and “to apply” ordinarily means the act of using something by bringing it to bear or putting it upon something else with practical results: see generally, Oxford English Dictionary (online) sub verdo “application”; Cambridge Dictionary (online) sub verdo “application”; Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online) sub verdo “application”. With those definitions in mind and reading it in context, I understand s. 1(4) to recognize that UNDRIP aggregates various international rights, obligations, principles, standards and aspirations, and to clarify that nothing in the Declaration Act may be interpreted as delaying the extent to which any of them would otherwise affect British Columbia laws, either interpretively or as incorporated into statutory or common law. For example, ss. 3, 4 and 5 of the Declaration Act create three positive statutory obligations, namely, to align laws with UNDRIP, create an action plan, and produce an annual report. Fulfilling one of those obligations cannot justify delay in fulfilling another. [73] The British Columbia Court of Appeal referred to the aggregation of "“various international rights, obligations, principles, standards and aspirations”" in UNDRIP and stated that subsection 1(4) of the British Columbia Declaration Act "“clarified”" that nothing in that Act would be interpreted as delaying the extent to which any of the "“various international rights, obligations, principles, standards and aspirations”" in UNDRIP would "“otherwise affect British Columbia laws”". The reference to "“otherwise affect”" could indicate that the "“effect”" does not arise from the Declaration Act itself. The only examples cited for the application of subsection 1(4) of the Declaration Act are delays in any of three obligations arising under the British Columbia Declaration Act, which correspond to the three obligations imposed under the UNDA, and which are set out in paragraph 70 above. None of the examples cited for the application of subsection 1(4) of the Declaration Act support a finding that the various articles of UNDRIP were implemented by the Declaration Act.
[74] In adopting other conventions, the legislation will often include a provision that addresses any inconsistency between the convention and the laws of Canada. For example, the Income Tax Conventions Implementation Act, 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 30 implemented agreements, conventions and protocols concluded between Canada and certain countries. For the conventions between Canada and Slovenia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Senegal, and the Czech Republic, and the agreement between Canada and the Slovak Republic, there is a similarly worded provision to resolve any inconsistency. For example, section 5 addresses inconsistencies between the convention for Slovenia and any other law:"5 (1) Subject to subsection (2), in the event of any inconsistency between the provisions of this Part or the Convention and the provisions of any other law, the provisions of this Part and the Convention prevail to the extent of the inconsistency."
"5 (1)"" Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), les dispositions de la présente partie et de la Convention l’emportent sur les dispositions incompatibles de toute autre loi ou règle de droit."
"(2) In the event of any inconsistency between the provisions of the Convention and the provisions of the ""Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act [(R.S.C. 1985, c. I-4)], the provisions of that Act prevail to the extent of the inconsistency."
"(2)"" Les dispositions de ""la Loi sur l’interprétation des conventions en matière d’impôts sur le revenu"" [(R.S.C., 1985, c. I-4)] l’emportent sur les dispositions incompatibles de la Convention." [75] The UNDA does not include a similar provision. Rather, the UNDA provides that the Government of Canada is to take action to resolve an inconsistency between the provisions of UNDRIP and Canadian laws:"5 The Government of Canada must, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, take all measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the Declaration."
"5 ""Le gouvernement du Canada, en consultation et en collaboration avec les peuples autochtones, prend toutes les mesures nécessaires pour veiller à ce que les lois fédérales soient compatibles avec la Déclaration." [76] In my view, this different wording for the resolution of inconsistencies is significant. The UNDA could have provided, as in other statutes adopting conventions, that in the event of any inconsistency between the laws of Canada and UNDRIP, the provisions of UNDRIP would prevail. However, since this is not the wording that was chosen for section 5 of the UNDA, it supports a finding that the provisions of UNDRIP do not prevail in the event of an inconsistency between the laws of Canada and UNDRIP, but rather an inconsistency will give rise to an obligation on the part of the Government of Canada to resolve the inconsistency in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples.
[77] The issue of an inconsistency between UNDRIP and domestic law was before the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Gitxaala. In addressing the issue, the Court was focused on section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 238, which was added to that Act in 2021:8.1(1) In this section:
“Declaration” has the same meaning as in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act;
“Indigenous peoples” has the same meaning as in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act;
“regulation” has the same meaning as in the Regulations Act.
(2) For certainty, every enactment must be construed as upholding and not abrogating or derogating from the aboriginal and treaty rights of Indigenous peoples as recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
(3) Every Act and regulation must be construed as being consistent with the Declaration. [78] There is no provision of the federal Interpretation Act that is equivalent to subsection 8.1(3) of the B.C. Interpretation Act. When the federal Interpretation Act was amended in 2024, only section 8.3, as set out in paragraph 10 above, was added. As a result, the discussion and the conclusions of the British Columbia Court of Appeal related to subsection 8.1(3) of the B.C. Interpretation Act are not relevant in this appeal.
[79] However, in my view, the conclusion of the British Columbia Court of Appeal on the effect of section 3 of the Declaration Act in relation to an inconsistency between the laws of British Columbia and UNDRIP is relevant. The Declaration Act is substantially similar to the UNDA. Section 3 of the Declaration Act addresses inconsistencies between the laws of British Columbia and UNDRIP:3 In consultation and cooperation with the Indigenous peoples in British Columbia, the government must take all measures necessary to ensure the laws of British Columbia are consistent with the Declaration. [80] In paragraph 149 of Gitxaala, the Court stated:[149] … It is the existence of inconsistency between a British Columbia law and one or more provisions of UNDRIP that triggers the Crown’s obligation to take action, namely, to develop the measures necessary to resolve the inconsistency, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, and to implement those measures (make them active or effective). .... [81] An inconsistency is not resolved by providing that the provisions of UNDRIP will prevail but rather it triggers the obligation to take action to resolve the inconsistency. This is consistent with my view that the UNDA does not implement the articles of UNDRIP immediately but rather provides for a process to eventually implement the articles.
[82] As a result, in my view, the UNDA does not immediately implement the articles as set out in UNDRIP but rather provides a framework for the implementation of the various articles as set out in UNDRIP and sets out a process for the resolution of inconsistencies between UNDRIP and the laws of Canada, which may include the federal common law. In Roberts v. Canada, 1989 CanLII 122 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, at pages 339-340, the Supreme Court found that the meaning of "“law of Canada”" for the purposes of section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, included federal common law and that the law of aboriginal title is federal common law. Whether the reference to the "“laws of Canada”" in the UNDA would also include the federal common law would need to be determined.
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[103] As noted by the Supreme Court in First Nations Families Act Reference, at paragraph 4, UNDRIP "“is not binding as a treaty in Canada”" and therefore, as a UN general assembly resolution, would not be an international obligation to which Canada has agreed. Furthermore, since the UNDA did not immediately implement the articles of UNDRIP into Canadian law and since the Commission is not the Government of Canada for the purposes of resolving any inconsistency between UNDRIP and the laws of Canada, there is no obligation on the Commission to implement UNDRIP in the course of deciding whether to approve the construction of the NSDF.
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VIII. Conclusion
[116] As a result, in my view, the Commission did not err in finding that it "“is not empowered to determine how to implement UNDRIP in Canadian law and must be guided by the current law on the duty to consult”". . Zoghibi v. Air Canada [International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination]
In Zoghibi v. Air Canada (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal considered an appeal of a JR challenging a CHRC decision, here stemming from a complaint by an airline passenger seeking 'financial relief' for alleged discrimination.
Here the court considers conflicts between an implemented international treaty, the Carriage by Air Act and the CHRC:(4) Should the Commission have taken into account article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination?
[58] The appellant submits that the Commission should have taken into account article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.
[59] This submission fails. It was reasonable for the Commission not to take into account this Convention.
[60] The appellant misunderstands how international law can be used when administrative decision-makers and courts decide domestic issues. This issue is now well-settled by a Supreme Court decision that binds administrative decision-makers and courts alike: Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30, 471 D.L.R. (4th) 391 at paras. 43-48.
[61] In the present case, Canadian domestic law has adopted into Canadian law an international convention, the Montreal Convention, with all of its limitations on damages liability in article 29. In cases such as this, we are to interpret and implement article 29: Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398.
[62] The Montreal Convention, with its limitations on damages liability in article 29, which is now a part of Canadian domestic law, is clear and unequivocal. It does not leave open exceptions for possible liability, such as international law norms and principles, human rights claims or avenues for liability under other international instruments such as the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. Nor does the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, when read and understood, reveal some sort of ambiguity in article 29 of the Montreal Convention. The Montreal Convention is neither vague nor ambiguous. Nor is there any extrinsic material behind it that helps the appellant. The Montreal Convention slams the door shut. It does not leave even a crack in the door.
[63] The appellant submits that article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination requires Canada to provide a remedy of damages for racial discrimination in international aviation despite the Montreal Convention and its incorporation into Canadian domestic law by virtue of the Carriage by Air Act. But assuming the appellant is correct, this Court has no power to issue mandamus requiring Canada to legislate to fulfil that requirement. Nor can this Court use that supposed requirement—not part of domestic law—to somehow amend the clear language of the Carriage by Air Act and the Montreal Convention.
(5) Does the Canadian Human Rights Act prevail over the Carriage by Air Act?
[64] As mentioned above, this is a new issue — one that was not raised before the Commission. But it can be dealt with in short order. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Carriage by Air Act and article 29 of the Montreal Convention are clear and unambiguous. They prohibit all damages claims however asserted. The appellant has offered nothing in terms of text, context or purpose to suggest that somehow the Carriage by Air Act and article 29 of the Montreal Convention, despite their clear language, allow for damages claims arising from domestic human rights statutes. As well, the Supreme Court’s decision in Thibodeau is dispositive. Just as the language rights legislation in that case did not prevail over the Montreal Convention, the same must be true here: see paragraphs 54-57, above. . Greenpeace Canada (2471256 Canada Inc.) v. Ontario (Minister of the Environment, Conservation and Parks)
In Greenpeace Canada (2471256 Canada Inc.) v. Ontario (Minister of the Environment, Conservation and Parks) (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court set out how international treaties become Canadian (or Ontario) law:[92] International treaties or declarations do not have automatic force in Canada. They become part of domestic law when implementing legislation is passed by the legislative entity with the authority to enact such legislation in accordance with the division of powers under the constitution. Ontario has not implemented the ICCPR with respect to its environmental laws. Accordingly, these instruments had no mandatory effect and cannot provide justification to make the declaration of a violation of international law.
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