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RHA - Care Services. Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority v. Moore
In Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority v. Moore (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismisses an appeal "to cease operating an unlicensed retirement home", and ancillary remedies.
Here the court considerations the 'administration of a drug' care service:[5] Second, the appellants argue that the application judge erred in finding that they provided more than one care service to other residents. The appellants concede that they offered the “provision of meals” to these residents, which they acknowledge to be an enumerated care service. But they submit that the application judge misinterpreted the second enumerated care service that he found the appellants to be providing, namely, “the administration of a drug”. The appellants concede that St. Jacobs Country Living assisted residents with their drugs by engaging in such activities as “receiving medication ... storing medication, reminding or prompting (‘cuing’) some occupants to take their medication, bringing (or giving out or handing out) medication to occupants, returning unused medication to the pharmacy, having some ‘house medication’ available… and keeping a record of when occupants had ‘self-administered’ their medication.” However, the appellants argue that they were not involved in the “administration of a drug”, which they submit is confined to “applying” the medication to a resident or “putting medication into” a resident. They contend that they were merely “assisting” residents with their medication, which is not a care service.
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[11] With respect to the interpretation of the “administration of a drug”, the application judge chose not to offer a comprehensive definition, but to determine whether the activities that Mr. Moore’s business was found to have engaged in would be included in any correct definition of that term. We can see no error in his decision that the administration of a drug encompasses the services the appellants have admitted to providing. The application judge’s conclusion that the “administration of a drug” occurs if an operator assumes “control over or responsibility for a person taking a drug, giving a drug to a person and directing them to ingest or apply it, and cueing a person to take a specific drug”, respects the grammatical and contextual meaning of the phrase and is in keeping with the purpose the legislation of ensuring that residents, who are often vulnerable, can live safely. The application judge considered the appellants’ submissions and gave cogent reasons as to why they do not carry the narrow interpretation they advocate. The interpretive path he took was without error and leads inevitably to the conclusion he reached. His decision was correct.
[12] In this regard, we do not accept the appellants’ submission that the natural and ordinary meaning of the term “administration” does not include acts of assistance. In our view, the natural meaning of the phrase “administration of drugs” can encompass acts of assistance provided with respect to drug acquisition, retention, or consumption. Indeed, the appellants’ submission that “administration” does not encompass “assistance” is inconsistent with their concession during argument that “assistance” with the consumption or application of drugs would be “administration of drugs.”
[13] Nor are we persuaded that the decision by legislators to use the word “administration” relating to drugs, but “assistance” relating to other services, demonstrates their intention to distinguish “administration” from “assistance”. This submission ignores that the phrase is “administration of drugs” – the administration of a thing – whereas the references to “assistance” modify activities such as “feeding”, “bathing” “dressing”, “personal hygiene” and “ambulation”. Since the terms are used for different purposes, the contrast between them is not useful in determining their meaning.
[14] In support of its submission, the appellants also sought to rely on the phrasing used in subordinate legislation to support its theory that “administration of drugs” does not extend to assistance with drugs. We reject the appellants’ attempt to rely on the terminology found in subordinate legislation enacted by the executive branch of government as a compelling interpretive aid in determining the meaning that legislators intended.
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