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RTA - Definitions - "Landlord"

. Equity Builders Ltd. et al. v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al.

In Equity Builders Ltd. et al. v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al. (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court (mostly) dismissed a multiple-proceeding combination of both LL-initiated JRs and RTA s.210 appeals, here respecting multiple units in a Sarnia apartment building. After a fire "the Chief Building Official for the City of Sarnia issued an order to the Landlord directing that the premises be vacated", followed by a second order several days later restricting access to a lesser number of units. The LL subsequently refused re-entry to tenants not covered by the later less restrictive order, eventually resulting in RTA orders of illegal lock-out for numerous units - and that "the Landlords had substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment by the Tenants of their units; and found that the Landlords obstructed, coerced, threatened or interfered with the Tenants".

Here the court finds that a individual party should have received notice before they were held to be a landlord, which entailed jointly and several liability with a corporation:
Did the Board deny Mr. Singh procedural fairness by finding him to be a landlord without notice?

[68] The Landlords argue that it was procedurally unfair for the Board to find that Mr. Singh is “landlord” as defined in the RTA and therefore personally liable for the monetary awards without giving Mr. Singh notice it was considering so and receiving submission on the issue. We agree.

[69] The term “landlord” is defined in the RTA to include the owner of a rental unit as well as any person who “permits occupancy of a rental unit” or any person who is “entitled to possession of the residential complex and who attempts to enforce any of the rights of a landlord.”

[70] Mr. Singh was not named by the Board as a landlord in the first or second interim orders (dated March May 8, 2023, and March 11, 2024, respectively). He was only named as a landlord in the unit specific orders. In those orders, the Board incorrectly stated that the tenants had sought an order against Mr. Singh. In fact, none of the tenants named Mr. Singh as the landlord in their application. They each named Equity Builders or EQB as the landlord.[1]

[71] The Board did not give reasons for naming Mr. Singh as a landlord.

[72] The Tenants argue there was ample evidence to support the finding that Mr. Singh is a landlord as defined in the RTA. The Tenants argue there was nothing unfair about the Board naming Mr. Singh as a landlord because he referred to himself as the landlord throughout his testimony and he testified that he was responsible for many of the decisions about whether the tenants would be permitted back into their units, which was the central issue in the hearings. Finally, the Tenants argues that Mr. Singh was effectively on notice that he may be named as a landlord because the Board raised the issue during the hearings.

[73] Ms. Singh was entitled to a fair hearing before the Board. What is required for a fair hearing is flexible, variable and context specific. When deciding whether the proceedings below were procedurally fair, we must consider the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it, the nature of the statutory scheme, the importance of the decision to Mr. Singh, and the choice of procedure selected by the administrative tribunal: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.

[74] In terms of the nature and importance of this issue, the Board’s decision to name Mr. Singh as a “landlord” has very serious implications for him. Because of that decision, he is jointly and severally liable for all the damages awarded to the individual tenants. However, he is not personally liable for the administrative fines which total $525,000.

[75] Turning then to the procedure the Board followed in relation to this issue. The Board expressly raised the question of who ought to be named as the landlord during the hearings. At the start of the third day of the hearing, on September 29, 2023, the Board noted that the tenants had named different people and entities as the landlord(s) in their applications and the Board had named different people and entitles as the landlord(s) in the Notices of Hearing. The Board asked the parties to try to reach an agreement on that issue. The Board then said that if the parties could not reach an agreement, “we would probably have to go through on a case-by-case basis to determine who [is] to be listed or not listed.”

[76] The parties never told the Board that they had reached an agreement on who should be named as the landlord(s) and none of the tenants sought to amend their application to name Mr. Singh as a landlord.

[77] In the written closing submission filed on behalf of the 14 tenants, the tenants referred to Mr. Singh as the property manager or a director of Equity Builders. In one paragraph, when describing Mr. Singh’s evidence, the tenants referred to Mr. Singh as “the landlord.” But the tenants did not make any submissions about who should be named as the landlord(s) or why Mr. Singh should be named as a landlord.

[78] The Landlord’s closing submissions only name Equity Builders Ltd. as the landlord. The Landlord’s closing submissions also contain no submissions on whether any other person or entity should be named as a landlord.

[79] The Board did not seek further submissions on the issue it raised on September 29, 2023.

[80] There is no doubt that the Board had the authority to name Mr. Singh as a landlord. The Board can add or remove a party “as it considers appropriate”: Landlord and Tenant Board Rules of Procedure, r. 1.6(b), RTA, s. 187(2). The Board is also expressly entitled to disregard "the separate corporate existence of participants” when making its findings: RTA, s. 202(1). The question, though, is not whether the Board had jurisdiction to name Mr. Singh as a landlord in addition to naming Equity Builder’s Inc. The question is also not whether there was evidence to support the Tribunal’s finding that Mr. Singh is a landlord. The question for us is whether it was procedurally fair for the Board to have done so in this case.

[81] We find that it was procedurally unfair for the Board to name Mr. Singh as a landlord in the absence of an express request by the tenants to do so without giving Mr. Singh notice of its intention to name him as a landlord and without giving him an opportunity to make submissions on that issue.

[82] The appropriate remedy for this breach of the duty of procedural fairness is to remit the matter back to the Board for a new hearing only on the narrow issue of whether Mr. Singh should be named as a landlord in the orders.
. Miller Estate v. Arguelles [LL estate standing]

In Miller Estate v. Arguelles (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a tenant's RTA appeal, here from a 'personal possession' for a family member eviction. The case was complicated by the death of the owner during the LTB proceeding, and the LTB application separate listings of 'landlord' (the property manager) and the 'owner'.

Here the court considered the effect of the LTB's amendment of the application to change the applicant from the deceased owner to their estate:
[13] The tenant has framed the issues on appeal as follows: ....
2. Did the Board err in law by amending the eviction application to The Estate of Ann Miller, without naming an executor, trustee or administrator to pursue the eviction application?
....

Amending the Applicant to “The Estate of Ann Miller”

[23] The tenant is of the view that the Board erred in law by amending the eviction application to name as a party an estate with no personal representative and that “The Estate of Ann Miller” is not an individual, as required for an eviction under s. 48 of the Act. I disagree.

[24] Section 48 does provide that a landlord giving notice to terminate so that a child may occupy the unit must be an individual. Ann Miller was a party to the N12 notice. She was an individual. She remained so when the application was issued. Her death did not make her any less an individual for the purposes of that notice.

[25] Although it may have been preferable for the Board to amend the application to reflect a trustee of Ann Miller’s estate, it was not necessary that it do so because a specific individual representative of the estate was not required to determine the issues in this case.

[26] In proceeding as it did, the Board complied with its mandate under s. 183 of the Act, to adopt the most expeditious method of determining the questions arising in a proceeding that afforded to all persons directly affected by the proceeding an adequate opportunity to know the issues and be heard upon the matter.
. Akbari et al. v. Blenkinsop et al.

In Akbari et al. v. Blenkinsop et al. (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court considered (and dismissed) a 'landlord's' appeal. I parenthesize the term 'landlord' because that's a primary issue in the case, as the appellant was not the landlord as the common law understands that, but rather another tenant (I'll refer to them here as the 'appellant') - and only a landlord by virtue of the RTA definition [s.2 "landlord", (a)], which reads:
“landlord” includes,

(a) the owner of a rental unit or any other person who permits occupancy of a rental unit, other than a tenant who occupies a rental unit in a residential complex and who permits another person to also occupy the unit or any part of the unit,

(b) the heirs, assigns, personal representatives and successors in title of a person referred to in clause (a), and

(c) a person, other than a tenant occupying a rental unit in a residential complex, who is entitled to possession of the residential complex and who attempts to enforce any of the rights of a landlord under a tenancy agreement or this Act, including the right to collect rent; (“locateur”)
During the course of the LTB proceedings, the Board found "that the Appellant had permitted the tenants to occupy the rental unit with the knowledge of the Landlords" [para 10], and thus presumably that the category that the appellant fell under was "any other person who permits occupancy of a rental unit". As well, the building owners - although they were parties - did not attend either at the LTB or the court level. The case isn't clear on this and my best guess is that this other tenant was acting as a property manager [para 5,11].

The appellant issued a 'personal possession' termination [RTA s.48] on behalf of the owners, and in that "identified himself on the Notice as both 'a Landlord and a Representative'" [para 6], and the tenants then vacated without an LTB application. When the tenant's subsequently learned that the property was listed for sale (within one year), they applied to the LTB for a "Bad Faith Application with the LTB pursuant to s. 57", which is a recently-passed tenant-compensation provision applying to several categories of terminations, including that for personal possession termination under RTA s.48. There is an evidentiary provision [RTA 57(5)] that renders the 'listing the property for sale within one year' as creating a rebuttable presumption that the termination was in 'bad faith' .

The result of the s.57 compensation application was that the LTB held that the appellant was legitimately acting for the owners and ordered "that both the Landlords and the Appellant were jointly liable to pay compensation to the tenants in the amount of $7, 253" [para 12]. A review (reconsideration) was conducted but resulted in no change in the order. Subsequently, the appellant commenced this Divisional Court RTA s.210 appeal, to which the owners were non-participating parties. The appellant argued - unsuccessfully and solely - that the Board erred in law "by finding him jointly liable, pursuant to s. 57 of the RTA, for serving the Eviction Notice in bad faith because the LTB did not analyze the separate roles and responsibilities of the Landlords and the Appellant ..." [para 17]:
[30] For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed. There is no requirement in the RTA for the LTB to adjudicate and apportion responsibility and liability as between multiple Landlords in the event of a breach of the s. 48 of the RTA.

[31] Section 1 of the RTA states as follows:
The purposes of this act are to provide protection for residential tenants from unlawful rent increases and unlawful evictions, to establish a framework for the regulation of residential rents, to balance the rights and responsibilities of residential Landlords and tenants and to provide for the adjudication of disputes and for other processes to informally resolve disputes. 2006, c. 17, s. 1.
[32] The balancing of rights referenced in this section is between residential Landlords and Tenants. It is, specifically, not a statute designed to address the balancing of rights between multiple Landlords with respect to a specific residential unit.

[33] Nowhere in this consumer protection legislation is there language requiring the LTB to make such inquiries and determine issues as between multiple Landlords.

[34] If the legislation required the LTB to make an inquiry and determination with respect to determining and apportioning responsibilities and liability as between multiple Landlords, as part of an inquiry to determine whether there has been a breach of s. 48 of the RTA, the RTA would clearly and unequivocally state this. It does not.

[35] As well, such a statutory scheme runs contrary to the general purpose of the legislation. For example, it would require tenants who file a bad faith application pursuant to s. 57 to participate in a process that could stretch out extensively beyond a finding a violation of s. 48 in order for the Tribunal to apportion responsibility and liability among multiple Landlords.

[36] Such a process could be factually complicated and legally lengthy. It could involve extensive evidence determining contractual rights and responsibilities between any number of Landlords with respect to a specific property.

[37] There are also numerous other methods or processes to apportion liability among multiple Landlords, including, but not limited to, contractual arrangements between Landlords who are owners and their agents, such as the Appellant. In many (if not most) instances that would involve the hearing of evidence with respect to the contractual relationships between Landlords. In many instances, the Tenants would have no knowledge of any such contracted arrangements.

[38] The purpose of s. 202 of the RTA is to assist the Tribunal in determining the real nature of the relationship between Landlords and Tenants. It is not to require the Tribunal to determine the relationship between multiple Landlords in the event of a breach of the RTA.

[39] Had the legislature mandated that the LTB address and apportion responsibility for breaches of s. 48 of the RTA, it would have been an error in law for the LTB not to undertake such an inquiry. However, as this requirement is not mandated or directed by the RTA, there can be no error of law due to a failure of the LTB to make such an inquiry and determination.


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Last modified: 06-02-25
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