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VAVILOV - Jurisdiction - Meaning. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov
In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov (SCC, 2024) the Supreme Court of Canada revises the law of 'standard of review' ('SOR') for judicial reviews (JR). 'Standards of review' indicate the degree of deference that applies to the decisions of the lower court/tribunal/body - either on a JR or an appeal, when the reviewing court is performing their review task. This may surprise some non-lawyers. When a court performs a review (either JR or appeal), they don't ask whether the lower body was correct in all respects (broken down into: facts, law, and mixed questions of fact and law) - they don't repeat the lower body's task in it's entirety - rather they follow the applicable standard of review, or of 'deference'. The Vavilov (SCC) case revises and explains this JR 'standard of review' law as of 2019.
Here the court - IMHO in a thoroughly unconvincing argument - reverses what was a JR SOR 'reasonableness' exception for 'jurisdiction'. Apparently we do not need to preserve a standard of review of correctness to resolve the jurisdiction of a tribunal, because a "proper application" of the reasonableness SOR will do to avoid uncertainty between the options, "perhaps limiting it to one":D. A Note Regarding Jurisdictional Questions
[65] We would cease to recognize jurisdictional questions as a distinct category attracting correctness review. The majority in Dunsmuir held that it was “without question” (para. 50) that the correctness standard must be applied in reviewing jurisdictional questions (also referred to as true questions of jurisdiction or vires). True questions of jurisdiction were said to arise “where the tribunal must explicitly determine whether its statutory grant of power gives it the authority to decide a particular matter”: see Dunsmuir, at para. 59; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Guérin, 2017 SCC 42, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 32. Since Dunsmuir, however, majorities of this Court have questioned the necessity of this category, struggled to articulate its scope and “expressed serious reservations about whether such questions can be distinguished as a separate category of questions of law”: McLean, at para. 25, referring to Alberta Teachers, at para. 34; Edmonton East, at para. 26; Guérin, at paras. 32-36; CHRC, at paras. 31-41.
[66] As Gascon J. noted in CHRC, the concept of “jurisdiction” in the administrative law context is inherently “slippery”: para. 38. This is because, in theory, any challenge to an administrative decision can be characterized as “jurisdictional” in the sense that it calls into question whether the decision maker had the authority to act as it did: see CHRC, at para. 38; Alberta Teachers, at para. 34; see similarly City of Arlington, Texas v. Federal Communications Commission, 569 U.S. 290 (2013), at p. 299. Although this Court’s jurisprudence contemplates that only a much narrower class of “truly” jurisdictional questions requires correctness review, it has observed that there are no “clear markers” to distinguish such questions from other questions related to the interpretation of an administrative decision maker’s enabling statute: see CHRC, at para. 38. Despite differing views on whether it is possible to demarcate a class of “truly” jurisdictional questions, there is general agreement that “it is often difficult to distinguish between exercises of delegated power that raise truly jurisdictional questions from those entailing an unremarkable application of an enabling statute”: CHRC, at para. 111, per Brown J., concurring. This tension is perhaps clearest in cases where the legislature has delegated broad authority to an administrative decision maker that allows the latter to make regulations in pursuit of the objects of its enabling statute: see, e.g., Green v. Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 360; West Fraser Mills Ltd. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2018 SCC 22, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 635.
[67] In CHRC, the majority, while noting this inherent difficulty — and the negative impact on litigants of the resulting uncertainty in the law — nonetheless left the question of whether the category of true questions of jurisdiction remains necessary to be determined in a later case. After hearing submissions on this issue and having an adequate opportunity for reflection on this point, we are now in a position to conclude that it is not necessary to maintain this category of correctness review. The arguments that support maintaining this category — in particular the concern that a delegated decision maker should not be free to determine the scope of its own authority — can be addressed adequately by applying the framework for conducting reasonableness review that we describe below. Reasonableness review is both robust and responsive to context. A proper application of the reasonableness standard will enable courts to fulfill their constitutional duty to ensure that administrative bodies have acted within the scope of their lawful authority without having to conduct a preliminary assessment regarding whether a particular interpretation raises a “truly” or “narrowly” jurisdictional issue and without having to apply the correctness standard.
[68] Reasonableness review does not give administrative decision makers free rein in interpreting their enabling statutes, and therefore does not give them licence to enlarge their powers beyond what the legislature intended. Instead, it confirms that the governing statutory scheme will always operate as a constraint on administrative decision makers and as a limit on their authority. Even where the reasonableness standard is applied in reviewing a decision maker’s interpretation of its authority, precise or narrow statutory language will necessarily limit the number of reasonable interpretations open to the decision maker — perhaps limiting it to one. Conversely, where the legislature has afforded a decision maker broad powers in general terms — and has provided no right of appeal to a court — the legislature’s intention that the decision maker have greater leeway in interpreting its enabling statute should be given effect. Without seeking to import the U.S. jurisprudence on this issue wholesale, we find that the following comments of the Supreme Court of the United States in Arlington, at p. 307, are apt:The fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by establishing an arbitrary and undefinable category of agency decision-making that is accorded no deference, but by taking seriously, and applying rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies’ authority. Where [the legislature] has established a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where [the legislature] has established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow. But in rigorously applying the latter rule, a court need not pause to puzzle over whether the interpretive question presented is “jurisdictional”.
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