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Administrative - Statutory Interpretation
MORE CASES
Part 2
. Cascade Aerospace Inc. v. Unifor
In Cascade Aerospace Inc. v. Unifor (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal noted the simplified statutory interpretation analysis required of administrative decision-makers (in either an appeal or a JR, though here in a JR):[7] .... When it comes to statutory interpretation, administrative decision-makers are not expected to engage in a formalistic interpretation exercise in every case. Their task is rather to come up with an interpretation that is consistent with the text, context and purpose of the provision at issue (Vavilov at paras. 119-121). In so doing, they are not required "“to explicitly address all possible shades of meaning of a given provision”" and may find it "“unnecessary to dwell on each and every signal of statutory intent in their reasons”" (Vavilov at para. 122). . Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers
In Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal of a JR, here where the successful JR applicant argued that immigration inadmissibility [under IRPA, s.34(1)(a) and (f) - 'Inadmissibility - Security'] required that the applicant was a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in espionage "contrary to Canada’s interests", and that such espionage have a Canadian nexus.
Here the court considers the task of statutory interpretation in the administrative context:[76] Mason tells us that administrative decision makers do not have to engage in formalistic statutory interpretation exercises in every case in the way that Courts are expected to do. Administrative decision makers’ interpretation of statutory provisions must, however, be consistent with the modern principle of statutory interpretation, which focuses on the text, context, and purpose of the provision in question. That is, administrative decision makers must demonstrate in their reasons that they were alive to these elements: Mason, above at para. 69; Vavilov, above at paras. 119‑120.
[77] Even if an administrative decision maker does not explicitly address the meaning of a legislative provision, the reviewing Court may be able to discern the interpretation adopted from the record, and to evaluate whether it is reasonable: Mason, above at para. 69; Vavilov, above at para. 123.
[78] The central question is whether the missing analysis "“causes the reviewing court to lose confidence in the outcome reached by the decision maker”": Mason, above at para. 69; Vavilov, above at para. 122.
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[104] None of these interpretive tools were considered by the ID in finding that "“Canada’s interests”" should be given a broad interpretation—one that does not require a nexus to Canada’s national security or its security interests. While, as noted above, administrative decision makers need not always engage in statutory interpretation as would a Court, their interpretation of statutory provisions must be consistent with the modern principle of statutory interpretation, which focuses on the text, context, and purpose of the provision in question. That is, administrative decision makers must demonstrate in their reasons that they were alive to these elements: Mason, above at para. 69; Vavilov, above at paras. 119-120. The ID’s failure to do so here indicates that its interpretation of paragraph 34(1)(a) lacked the degree of justification required of a reasonable decision. . Canada (Attorney General) v. Ibrahim
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Ibrahim (Fed CA, 2023) the Federal Court of Appeal considered a Crown JR of a decision by the Social Security Tribunal (Appeal Division) that upheld the respondent's eligibility for a CPP-disability pension.
In this quote the court considers the duty of an administrative tribunal member when deciding issues of statutory interpretation:[15] Administrative decision-makers are not required to engage in a formalistic statutory interpretation exercise or engage the same array of legal techniques that might be expected of a lawyer or judge. Nonetheless, the interpretation of the statutory provision must be consistent with the text, context and purpose of the provision (Vavilov at paras. 119-120; Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para. 69 [Mason]).
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