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Administrative - Summary Dismissal [SPPA s.4.6]. Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation)
In Mitanidis v. Ontario (Transportation) (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, here where the self-presenting applicant was contesting a LAT decision to dismiss an administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction, here where they earlier attempted to contest before the LAT the decision of the Minister of Transportation to suspend their driver's license [under HTA 32(5)(b)(ii)].
The court walks through part of the sometimes byzantine morass that the LAT has become ever since the province started to expand it's administrative tribunal jurisdiction (with auto insurance SABS), and illustrates the operation of SPPA s.4.6 ['Dismissal of proceeding without hearing']:The LAT Decision was Reasonable.
[6] Mr. Mitanidis seeks judicial review of the decision of the LAT dismissing his appeal for want of jurisdiction. The standard of review of that decision is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 33-34. Mr. Mitanidis takes the position that the LAT should have heard his appeal. We disagree.
[7] The Licence Appeal Tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling is reasonable. The Licence Appeal Tribunal is a statutory tribunal. It can only hear appeals if it is authorized to do so by statute or regulation. The Licence Appeal Tribunal has jurisdiction under s. 50 of the Act to hear an appeal from a decision of the Minister under s. 32 (5) of the Act if the regulations establish a right of appeal. The Minister’s decision to suspend Mr. Mitanidis’ licence, was made under s. 32 (5)(b)(ii) of the Act. Section 25.1 of the Regulations under the Highway Traffic Act, O. Reg. 340/95 says that a decision made by the Minister under section s. 32 (5)(b) to s. 32 (5)(b)(i), may be appealed under s. 50 of the Act. The regulation does not create a right to appeal a decision made under s. 32 (5)(b) (ii).
[8] It was reasonable for the LAT to conclude that the legislature intended to exclude decisions made under s. 32 (5)(b)(ii) from the scope of LAT’s jurisdiction. Because the LAT had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Mr. Mitanidis’ appeal, it also had no jurisdiction to deal with any of the Charter issues he raised. Mr. Mitanidis can only review the Minister’s decision in this case by way of an application for judicial review to this court, which he has now done.
[9] Mr. Mitanidis also argues that the procedure before the LAT was unfair. We would not give effect to this ground of appeal either. While the LAT owed a duty of procedural fairness to Mr. Mitanidis, the procedure followed by LAT was a fair one. Mr. Mitanidis was not entitled to an oral hearing before the LAT, s. 4.6(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act authorizes the LAT to dismiss a proceeding without a hearing if it is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
[10] The LAT is required to give a party notice before dismissing an appeal without a hearing and is required to give the parties an opportunity to make submissions. That is what happened in this case.
[11] After Mr. Mitanidis filed his appeal with the LAT, the LAT issued a notice of intent to dismiss. The notice set out the reason why the LAT was considering dismissing his appeal. The notice explained the potential jurisdictional issue in detail. Mr. Mitanidis was given an opportunity to make submissions on why the tribunal should not dismiss his appeal. The LAT considered Mr. Mitanidis’ submissions and issued written reasons for dismissing his appeal. . Chapman v. The Corporation of the Town of Northeastern Manitoulin
In Chapman v. The Corporation of the Town of Northeastern Manitoulin (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court considered the SPPA's grant of rule-making authority to tribunals under s.4.6 (summary dismissal for causes):[2] Section 4.6(1)(c) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 22 provides that a tribunal may (on its own motion) dismiss a proceeding without a hearing if “some aspect of the statutory requirements for bringing the proceeding has not been met”. However, s. 4.6 (2) requires that “before dismissing a proceeding under this section”, the tribunal must give notice of its intention to dismiss the proceeding and s. 4.6(3) requires that the “notice of intention to dismiss a proceeding shall set out the reasons for the dismissal”. The Tribunal never provided Mr. Chapman with notice that it was intending to dismiss his proceeding on the basis of s. 4.6(1)(c). The first time that s. 4.6(1)(c) was ever referred to in the proceedings was in the decision of the Tribunal that is under appeal. If Mr. Chapman had received notice of the Tribunal’s intention to dismiss his proceeding under s. 4.6(1)(c) he could have considered whether to withdraw or reconstitute his proceeding once construction was complete.
[3] On this basis the decision of the Tribunal must be set aside.
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