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Appeals - Combining Appeals From Different Courts (3). Ross v. Luypaert
In Ross v. Luypaert (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here from application orders for sale of one property and a writ of possession regarding another.
The court considers a Partition Act appeal route issue, here where different appeal issues lay to different courts [CJA 6(2)]:(1) Does this court have jurisdiction to hear the appeal?
[15] As a preliminary issue, the respondents raised the issue of this court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal, given that s. 7 of the Partition Act, R.S.O 1990, c. P.4 states that an appeal from any order made under the Act lies to the Divisional Court.
[16] Section 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”), gives this court jurisdiction to “hear and determine an appeal that lies to the Divisional Court or the Superior Court of Justice if an appeal in the same proceeding lies to and is taken to the Court of Appeal.”
[17] While the application judge’s order included relief under the Partition Act related to the Galt property, it also included the relief of a writ of possession related to the Bristol Property under r. 60.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The respondent concedes that the relief relating to the Bristol Property was not granted under the Partition Act.
[18] Accordingly, this case may be distinguished from the circumstances of Webster v. Groszman, 2021 ONCA 55; and 2650971 Ontario Inc. v. Shameti, 2022 ONCA 62, relied on by the respondents, where this court found it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because all the relief in the final order flowed from the sale of a property under the Partition Act. We conclude that this case is more analogous to Billimoria v. Mistry, 2022 ONCA 276, 470 D.L.R. (4th) 406, where this court found it did have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 6(2) of the CJA. In Billimoria, the final order included a declaration regarding each parties’ percentage ownership in the property at issue, which did not flow from the Partition Act. This court held that “[a]lthough appeals from orders made under the Partition Act lie to the Divisional Court, the appeal from the final judgment determining the ownership of the property lies to this court, and this court has jurisdiction to deal with all the issues on appeal pursuant to s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act”: at para. 21.
[19] Following Billimoria, as this court has jurisdiction over the appeal regarding the writ of possession concerning the Bristol property, we conclude that s. 6(2) of the CJA provides this court jurisdiction to hear the appeal against the order under the Partition Act relating to the Galt property as well. . Binance Holdings Limited v. Ontario Securities Commission
In Binance Holdings Limited v. Ontario Securities Commission (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal grants an appeal motion to consolidate to the Court of Appeal (CA) an appeal from the Divisional Court with one already in the CA [under CJA 6(2-3)]:[1] The moving party, Binance Holdings Limited, seeks an order under ss. 6(2) and (3) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, joining two appeals: (1) its appeal to the Divisional Court from an April 30, 2024 decision of the Ontario Securities Commission; and (2) its appeal to the Court of Appeal from a September 28, 2023 decision of the Divisional Court for which it was granted leave to appeal on September 13, 2024.
[2] Binance submits that the appeals are “in the same proceeding” for the purposes of s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, as they involve identical challenges to the constitutionality of a summons issued by an Ontario Securities Commission investigator pursuant to an investigation order under the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. In addition, it argues that combining the appeals comports with the administration of justice.
[3] The responding party, the Ontario Securities Commission, resists this request. It maintains that the two appeals are not “in the same proceeding” as required by s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act and, even if they could be so considered, I should not exercise my discretion to permit the requested order combining the appeals. It argues that: such an order would result in delay; the issues at the core of the two appeals are distinct; the risk of inconsistent decisions is low; and Binance ought not to be permitted to bypass the normal appellate hierarchy that is reflective of legislative intent.
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Test for Combining Appeals
[16] Sections 6(2) and (3) of the Courts of Justice Act govern combining appeals. Those provisions state:(2) The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal that lies to the Divisional Court or the Superior Court of Justice if an appeal in the same proceeding lies to and is taken to the Court of Appeal.
(3) The Court of Appeal may, on motion, transfer an appeal that has already been commenced in the Divisional Court or the Superior Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal for the purpose of subsection (2). [17] The test for combining appeals is twofold. First, given the language of subsection (2), the appeals must be in the same proceeding. Provided that threshold is met, the court must then consider whether separate appeals in different courts or combining the appeals in the Court of Appeal better comports with the administration of justice: Cavanaugh v. Grenville Christian College, 2013 ONCA 139, 360 D.L.R. (4th) 670, at para. 87, and Davis v. Amazon Canada Fulfillment Services, ULC, 2023 ONCA 634, at para. 8. Factors that may be considered in the exercise of that discretion include: the risk of inconsistent results; the extent of overlap in the two appeals; and whether combining the two appeals is contraindicated due to different issues in the two appeals: Davis, at para. 9.
[18] To these factors, I would add two others: what prejudice, if any, arises as a result of a combination of appeals; and whether a combination secures the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of the issues in the appeals on their merits. This latter phraseology derives from r. 1.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, which is stated to apply to the Rules. That provision is silent on the Courts of Justice Act. While there are some provisions of that Act to which such a provision would be inapt, I see no reason not to consider those factors in the exercise of a discretion relating to combining appeals pursuant to s. 6(2).
[19] The first issue to consider is whether the two appeals in issue on this motion are in the same proceeding.
[20] This issue is not one of first impression for this court. In Confederation Trust Co. v. Donofrio (1994), 1994 CanLII 999 (ON CA), 73 O.A.C. 132 (C.A.), 33 appeals arose from separate actions and some appeals lay to Divisional Court. Nonetheless, Laskin J.A. determined that he had jurisdiction under s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to allow all of the appeals to be heard by the Court of Appeal. Similarly, in McLeod v. Castlepoint Development Corp. (1997), 1997 CanLII 12080 (ON CA), 31 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), Moldaver J.A. (as he then was), writing for the panel, considered whether this Court had jurisdiction under s. 6(2) to hear an appeal from an order overruling a Land Titles Deputy Director’s decision under the Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.L.5 and an order arising from a separate application to court. The former provided for an appeal to the Divisional Court and the latter to the Court of Appeal. He wrote at para. 35:While the matter is not entirely free from doubt, I am satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction under s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act. In this regard, I note that both appeals relate to the same subject matter; that the grounds of appeal and legal issues raised are identical in each; that MacKinnon J. heard and disposed of the application and the appeal from the Deputy Director together and that the order under appeal incorporates both matters. I note as well that the respondents did not raise the jurisdictional issue in their written material, nor did they pursue it when it was brought to their attention by the court in oral argument. Indeed, they submitted that it would be appropriate for the court to determine all aspects of the appeal. Accordingly, in the particular circumstances of this case, I am of the view that jurisdiction lies with this Court. [21] The moving party relies on McLeod v. Castlepoint Development Corp. and Confederation Trust Co. v. Donofrio and urges me to adopt a purposive approach that focuses on the substance of the dispute and that interprets the language in s. 6(2) as meaning appeals that relate to the same lis or dispute. It argues that by enacting ss. 6(2) and (3), the Legislature provided a mechanism to avoid inefficiencies, reduce costs, and avoid inconsistent results and these provisions should be interpreted in that light. It argues that both of its appeals relate to the same dispute or lis, and involve identical factual and legal issues relating to the constitutionality of the summons and the jurisdiction of the Ontario Securities Commission to hear the challenges.
[22] The Ontario Securities Commission acknowledges that the parties and issues overlap but submits that the decisions are legally distinct proceedings, as they were decided by two different adjudicators following two different hearings arising from two different originating processes. It argues that the cases relied upon by the moving party were unique decisions that turned on their particular facts. It particularly relies on Wright v. Strauss, 2019 ONCA 844.
[23] That case involved an appeal from an order striking a notice of application challenging the transfer of a mortgage from a family company to a trust and an appeal of a second order striking a statement of claim challenging the validity of the trust. One appeal lay to the Divisional Court and the other to the Court of Appeal. This court determined that it did not have jurisdiction under s. 6(2) as the appeals involved legally distinct proceedings each with its own originating process.
[24] I find in favour of Binance on the first component of the test.
[25] Although I accept that the two cases relied upon by Binance are factually different, this court determined in both that the words “in the same proceeding” could encompass proceedings commenced by different originating processes. Thus, the fact that two procedural routes were taken does not preclude the application of s. 6(2).
[26] In this case, both appeals involve the same parties, the same facts and the same legal issues, and they have the same legal origin, namely the investigation order and the summons. In contrast, Wright involves two appeals concerning distinct legal issues.
[27] In my view, Binance has met the first hurdle associated with its request for a combination order.
[28] I turn now to the second component of the test. Again, I conclude that it favours Binance’s position.
[29] I agree with Binance that combining the appeals will permit this court to fully and finally resolve which body has original jurisdiction to review and quash a summons issued by an investigator under s. 13(1) of the Securities Act, the issue raised in both appeals. Neither the Capital Markets Tribunal nor the Ontario Securities Commission would take jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the Divisional Court said that an unpursued avenue was an application to quash the summons before the Ontario Securities Commission under s. 144(1).
[30] Moreover, there is a risk of inconsistent findings on whether the Ontario Securities Commission has jurisdiction to quash a summons under s. 144(1).
[31] Further, there are no issues that contraindicate combining appeals and no real or compelling prejudice has been identified by the Ontario Securities Commission. The request to stay the summons was refused, and combining the appeals will permit the matters to be heard by just one court rather than two, since leave to appeal the Divisional Court’s order was granted by this court.
[32] Lastly, combining appeals secures the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of the issues in the appeals on their merits. In that regard, to ensure that there is no further delay, I am ordering that the hearing of the appeals be expedited.
[33] For these reasons, the motion is granted. I order that: (1) Binance’s appeal to the Divisional Court be transferred from the Divisional Court to this court; (2) the transferred appeal be heard in combination with Binance’s appeal to this court; (3) both appeals be expedited; and, as agreed by the parties, the respondent shall pay costs of $2,500 to Binance.
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