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Aviation - Montreal Convention
MORE CASES
Part 2
. International Air Transport Association v. Canada (Transportation Agency)
In International Air Transport Association v. Canada (Transportation Agency) (SCC, 2024) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal, here involving "the vires of the Air Passenger Protection Regulations, SOR/2019-150 (“Regulations”) [SS: under the 'Canada Transportation Act'], and the nature and scope of the “exclusivity principle” set out in Article 29 of the 1999 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air" [SS: the 'Montreal Convention'].
Here the court interprets the Montreal Convention and it's 'exclusivity principle', here the context of interpreting new consumer provisions of the CTA:B. The Montreal Convention Under Canadian Law
[8] As this Court explained in Thibodeau (at para. 47), the Montreal Convention, like its predecessor, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (“Warsaw Convention”), was designed to achieve a number of objectives, including but not limited to the following:... achieve a uniform set of rules governing damages liability of international air carriers and to provide limitation of carrier liability. These purposes can only be achieved by the Montreal Convention if it provides the exclusive set of rules in relation to the matters that it covers. The Montreal Convention of course does not deal with all aspects of international carriage by air: it is not comprehensive. But within the scope of the matters which it does address, it is exclusive in that it bars resort to other bases for liability in those areas: M. Clarke, Contracts of Carriage by Air (2nd ed. 2010), at pp. 8 and 160-62; G. N. Tompkins, Jr., “The Continuing Development of Montreal Convention 1999 Jurisprudence” (2010), 35 Air & Space L. 433, at pp. 433-36. I return to the purpose of the Montreal Convention and the role of the exclusivity principle referenced in Thibodeau later in these reasons. For now, it suffices to note that this Court has recognized three central objectives of the Montreal Convention: first, it limits carrier liability related to claims for damages for death or bodily injury, damage to or loss of baggage and cargo, and for delay; second, it protects the interests of passengers and shippers by creating presumptive liability for carriers with respect to those claims; and third, it seeks “to create uniform rules governing claims arising from international air transportation” (paras. 41-42 and 44-46).
[9] Canada signed the Montreal Convention on October 1, 2001, and deposited its instrument of ratification on November 19, 2002. The Montreal Convention was implemented into Canadian law by amendments to the CAA (An Act to amend the Carriage by Air Act, S.C. 2001, c. 31); these incorporated the Montreal Convention in its entirety by reference (CAA, Sch. VI; Library of Parliament, Canada’s Approach to the Treaty-Making Process, Hill Studies 2008-45-E, April 1, 2021, at pp. 2-5).
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A. What Is the Scope of the Montreal Convention and the Exclusivity Principle?
[33] The Montreal Convention “applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward” (Article 1). Article 17 deals with death and bodily injury that occurs between embarkation and disembarkation and destruction, loss, and damage to baggage while the baggage was on board the aircraft or in the charge of the carrier. Carriers are presumptively liable for “damage sustained” in relation to these sorts of incidents. Similarly, Article 18 provides that a carrier is presumptively liable for “damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or damage to, cargo upon condition only that the event which caused the damage so sustained took place during the carriage by air”. Article 19 states that a carrier is liable for “damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo”. A carrier can exonerate itself from presumptive liability under Article 19 “if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures”. Article 20 additionally enables carriers to obtain whole or partial exoneration from liability if the carrier is able to prove that the damage was caused or contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the person claiming compensation.
[34] The Montreal Convention also regulates the amount of compensation owed in relation to claims for death or bodily injury, damage or loss of baggage and cargo, and for delay (Articles 21 and 22). Article 26 prevents a carrier from entering into a contract which relieves it of liability or fixes a lower limit for compensation than that set out in the Montreal Convention. Article 27 expressly permits carriers to contractually waive defences available under the Montreal Convention. Finally, Article 29 codifies the “exclusivity principle” which reads:In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable. ....
(1) Thibodeau Does Not Resolve the Question
[36] The scope of the exclusivity principle codified at Article 29 was left open in Thibodeau. In that case, passengers on an international flight operated by Air Canada brought claims for damages pursuant to the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.), on the basis that Air Canada failed to provide services in both official languages as required by the Official Languages Act. The Federal Court awarded damages to compensate the Thibodeaus for breach of their language rights, which “caused them a moral prejudice, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of their vacation” (Thibodeau v. Air Canada, 2011 FC 876, [2013] 2 F.C.R. 83, at para. 88).
[37] This Court’s reasons in Thibodeau focused on whether the Official Languages Act claims “fall outside the type of actions covered by the Montreal Convention” in light of “the underlying source of the claim” (paras. 73 and 75). The Court concluded that the claim was for individualized damages and came within the scope of the Montreal Convention’s exclusivity principle. However, the Court expressly declined to consider the significance of the distinction between individualized damages and standardized damages when it comes to applying the exclusivity principle (para. 81).
[38] This appeal, by contrast, requires the Court to address that which was left open by Thibodeau, namely whether the Montreal Convention precludes standardized compensation of the kind provided for by the Regulations.
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(2) The Ordinary Meaning of the Words Chosen by the State Parties When Read in Their Context
[39] The Vienna Convention is the starting point for determining the scope of the Montreal Convention (see Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 778 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at paras. 51-52; Thomson v. Thomson, 1994 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, at pp. 577-78). Article 31 of the Vienna Convention directs that the Montreal Convention, like all treaties, should be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Or, as this Court has put it, “[t]he point of departure for interpreting a provision of a treaty is the plain meaning of the text” (Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 SCC 68, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 431, at para. 16). The English text of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention refers to “ordinary meaning” and this Court in Febles referred to “plain meaning”, in the English version of its reasons. In French, both the text of the Vienna Convention and the Court’s reasons in Febles use the expression “sens ordinaire”. I take these expressions to mean the same thing, that being that the analysis begins with the words chosen by the state parties to the Montreal Convention.
[40] Article 29 [SS: of the Montreal Convention], in explaining the exclusivity principle, states that the Montreal Convention applies to “any action for damages, however founded” (Thibodeau, at para. 37 (emphasis in original)). The text of Article 29 thus discloses two criteria that guide the application of the exclusivity principle: there must be an “action” that leads to “damages”. The term “action” has a meaning well known to the law: Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “action” as “any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a determination, will result in a judgment or decree” ((11th ed. 2019), at p. 37). Similarly, Barron’s Canadian Law Dictionary defines an “action at law” as “[a] judicial proceeding whereby one party . . . prosecutes another for a wrong or injury done [or] for damage caused” or “[a] proceeding by which one party seeks in a court of justice to enforce some right” ((7th ed. 2013), at p. 9). Recalling that the term “action” must be understood in “a broad sense”, I would add that it should be read in light of the growing prominence of non-judicial tribunals and quasi-judicial adjudicators in Canada and elsewhere (see Thibodeau, at para. 60). Thus, I do not foreclose the possibility that a proceeding that occurs outside a court of law may, if it shares the characteristics of a judicial proceeding, also fall within the ambit of an “action” for the purposes of Article 29.
[41] Black’s Law Dictionary defines “damages” as “[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury” or as “the sum of money which a person wronged is entitled to receive from the wrongdoer as compensation for the wrong” (p. 488, citing F. Gahan, The Law of Damages (1936), at p. 1). Barron’s defines “damages” as “[m]onetary compensation the law awards to one who has suffered damage, loss, or injury by the wrong of another” (p. 89). In the aviation context, tort actions provide for damages so as to “compensate the plaintiff for his injury” by giving “the plaintiff ‘the equivalent in money for the actual loss caused by the wrong of another’” and in so doing attempt to “make the plaintiff whole” (P. S. Dempsey, Aviation Liability Law (2nd ed. 2013), at p. 705, quoting Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co., 83 N.E. 1091 (Mass. 1908), at p. 1092).
[42] The “ordinary meaning” of an “action for damages” thus points towards an action that shares the characteristics of a judicial proceeding and that seeks individualized compensation that is tied to an injury caused by another. Damages awards are “individualized” in that they seek to compensate the plaintiff for the loss suffered as a result of an injury caused by another. An action for damages is distinct from standardized compensation which, as I explain below, may be owed identically to all claimants irrespective of the harm (if any) they have suffered. However, Article 29 cannot be understood in isolation from the broader context of the Montreal Convention.
[43] Article 19 focuses on liability for “damage occasioned by delay”, indicating a causal relationship between the carrier’s actions and the resulting loss or injury to a passenger for which compensation is sought. It also enables carriers to avoid liability by showing that they “took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage”, suggesting that the Montreal Convention envisages defences related to due diligence akin to those that can be invoked in a court of law. Article 20 similarly enables a carrier to avoid liability by showing contributory negligence by the person claiming compensation.
[44] Article 22(6) addresses the compensation limits prescribed in Article 21 in a manner that assumes the existence of an action with the characteristics of a judicial proceeding, noting that the limit “shall not prevent the court from awarding . . . the whole or part of the court costs and of the other expenses of the litigation incurred by the plaintiff”. Article 29 refers to individuals “who have the right to bring suit”. In framing the exclusivity principle, Article 29 also refers to claims in tort and contract, and the concept of punitive damages, underscoring the link between the limitation of liability and causes of action that can be pursued in courts of law. Article 33(1) states that “[a]n action for damages must be brought ... before the court of the domicile of the carrier . . . or before the court at the place of destination”. Article 35(2), which addresses limitation periods, refers to the “law of the court seised of the case”.
[45] The context in which Article 29 must be read thus supports an understanding of the words “action” and “damages” consonant with their “ordinary meaning” under Canadian law. The relevant articles are framed in a way that plainly envisages actions which share the characteristics of judicial proceedings in a court of law. These elements of the Montreal Convention take aim at individualized damages that a passenger must show were “sustained” or “occasioned” as a result of the conduct of a carrier, and the defences a carrier can invoke to exonerate itself.
(3) The Object and Purpose of the Montreal Convention
[46] The object and purpose of the Montreal Convention, including the history of its development, support the above conclusion. This Court in Thibodeau considered the history of the Montreal Convention, and how that history informs our understanding of its purpose:The Warsaw Convention (and therefore its successor the Montreal Convention) had three main purposes: to create uniform rules governing claims arising from international air transportation; to protect the international air carriage industry by limiting carrier liability; and to balance that protective goal with the interests of passengers and others seeking recovery. [para. 41] [47] Limitations on carrier liability were balanced against “a reversal of the burden of proof in [passengers’ and shippers’] favour such that, on proof of damage, fault on the part of the carrier would be presumed” (Thibodeau, at para. 42 (emphasis added)).
[48] In Thibodeau, Justice Abella, dissenting on another point, expanded in her reasons on the history and purpose of the Montreal Convention, as received from its predecessor:The predecessor Warsaw Convention came into being in 1929 to assist the fledgling airline industry take flight. At that time, aviation technology was in its initial stages. Accidents were common, and many pilots and passengers were injured or died as a result. . . .
Airlines responded by requiring passengers to sign waivers relieving carriers of any and all liability in the event of an injury. When accidents happened, those passengers were left with no remedy for their injuries or losses.
The Warsaw Convention attempted a protective reconciliation for both airlines and passengers. Airlines would benefit from the introduction of a uniform scheme of limited liability to protect against the financial risks and uncertainty posed by accidents, passengers would benefit from access to predetermined amounts of limited compensation for death or injury — about US$8,300 per passenger — and a prohibition on airlines requiring passengers to waive all liability . . . . [paras. 151-53] As Justice Abella explained, growing recognition that liability limitations set by the Warsaw Convention were too low and a broader shift in the attention of governments towards a more passenger-friendly legal regime resulted in patchwork efforts to expand carrier liability. This led to efforts to update the Warsaw Convention, culminating in the Montreal Convention of 1999. In comparison to the earlier agreement,the state parties to the Montreal Convention were more focused on the importance of “ensuring protection of the interests of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for equitable compensation based on the principle of restitution” (Montreal Convention, preamble; Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2004), at p. 371 (fn. 4)).
(Thibodeau, at para. 159) [49] From the foregoing, I draw two conclusions relevant to understanding the scope of Article 29. First, the textual focus of the Montreal Convention on actions with the characteristics of judicial proceedings that seek to vindicate individualized claims for damages related to death or bodily injury, damage or loss of baggage and cargo, and for delay is consonant with the history of the Montreal Convention and predecessor agreements. Efforts over time to find a balance between limitations on carrier liability and the interests of passengers led the state parties and airline industry stakeholders to the approach set out in the Montreal Convention. Second, the state parties to the Montreal Convention framed the exclusivity principle so as to ensure that such claims could proceed only within the framework provided for therein. This ensured that the compromise struck in the Montreal Convention could not be undercut by recourse to actions for damages under local law.
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(6) The Exclusivity Principle Precludes Actions for Individualized Damages
[63] Based on all the foregoing, Article 29 should be understood as precluding actions for damages that share the characteristics of judicial proceedings in courts of law, and that seek individualized compensation for death or bodily injury, damage or loss of baggage and cargo, and for delay in international carriage. The text, object, and purpose reflect the compromise that lies at the heart of the Montreal Convention. Passengers benefit from an evidentiary presumption under Articles 17 to 19 that allows them to pursue damages without showing fault by a carrier. Articles 21 and 22 shield carriers from unlimited liability in these matters. Foreign jurisprudence has given the Montreal Convention a meaning consistent with that which I have set out above.
[64] In light of this, I need not have recourse to the “supplementary means of interpretation” provided for under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, though I note that the Attorney General points to the preparatory work of the treaty (one of the supplementary means provided for under Article 32) as further reinforcing my conclusion above.[1] . Zoghibi v. Air Canada
In Zoghibi v. Air Canada (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal considered an appeal of a JR challenging a CHRC decision, here stemming from a discrimination complaint by an airline passenger that sought 'financial relief'.
Here the court considered whether the CHRC remedial provisions were overridden by those of an international treaty (the Montreal Convention) - which expressly provides that "punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable" [Art. 29] and it's implementing federal statute (the Carriage by Air Act) (it strikes me that but for the SCC precedent, this case should have been dealt with under 'paramountcy' doctrine):[14] Soon after the appellant filed his complaint, the Commission informed him that it was going to screen his complaint under ss. 40 and 41 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. Due to the Carriage by Air Act, the Commission was concerned that it would not have jurisdiction to give him financial compensation. After receiving submissions on point, the Commission found that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to award damages. It screened out the entire complaint.
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[20] However, as mentioned above, the Federal Court found (at paras. 46 and 52) that the appellant might be entitled to other human rights remedies not barred by the Montreal Convention and the Carriage by Air Act. For example, Air Canada might be subject to an order to take "“measures to redress the alleged discriminatory practice or prevent similar practices from occurring in future”" (at para. 52), for example by training its staff to handle circumstances such as this in a more rights-friendly way. It returned the matter to the Commission to decide these issues.
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(3) As a matter of interpretation, did the Montreal Convention and the Carriage by Air Act bar the appellant’s human rights claim?
[51] The Commission answered this in the affirmative. In doing so, it acted reasonably.
[52] In its reasons, the Commission adopted paragraphs 60-68 of the investigation report. The report began (at para. 60) by reviewing the Montreal Convention and the Carriage by Air Act. It noted, as mentioned above, that article 17 of the Montreal Convention allows only for monetary compensation in cases of "“death or bodily injury of a passenger”" where "“the accident ... took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking”".
[53] However, the report did not leap to the conclusion that the appellant’s claim was excluded. It asked itself whether there was any room under the Montreal Convention for claims based on "“fundamental, quasi-constitutional rights”" (at para. 62).
[54] Here, it found (at para. 62) that the Supreme Court had already decided that issue: Thibodeau v. Air Canada, 2014 SCC 67, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 340. The Supreme Court found that damages for breaches on aircraft of language rights — fundamental, quasi-constitutional rights — could not be claimed because of the Warsaw Convention, the predecessor to the Montreal Convention.
[55] The report went further (at paras. 64-65) and examined the Supreme Court’s reasoning in support of that conclusion. The Supreme Court had examined a case where a couple alleged that they were bumped from a flight because of their race: King v. American Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002). In that case, like here, the couple enjoyed statutory human rights protections against racial discrimination. Sotomayor J. (as she then was) concluded that the claim was caught by the Warsaw Convention which, like the Montreal Convention, exhaustively covers claims for injuries suffered while "“in the course of [one of] the operations of embarking”": Thibodeau at para. 68. The Supreme Court agreed with the analysis in King: Thibodeau at paras. 67-73.
[56] On the authority of Thibodeau, King (adopted by the Supreme Court) and the specific wording of the Montreal Convention and the Carriage by Air Act, the report concluded that the appellant’s human rights damages claim was barred.
[57] The Commission’s decision to adopt this part of the report and its reasoning is reasonable. The outcome is fully consistent with an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court and the meaning of the Montreal Convention and the Carriage by Air Act. As well, there is a clear, sufficiently articulated chain of reasoning leading from the facts of the case to the outcome. . Zoghibi v. Air Canada
In Zoghibi v. Air Canada (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal considered an appeal of a JR challenging a CHRC decision, here stemming from a complaint by an airline passenger who sought 'financial relief' for alleged discrimination.
Here the court considers some of the Canadian law of air travel:(3) The general legal framework concerning international travel
[11] A Canadian statute, the Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, incorporates the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 2242 UNTS 309 [Montreal Convention] into Canadian law: see s. 2(2.1).
[12] The Montreal Convention sets out exclusive rules on when and to what extent an airline is liable for incidents during international air travel. It bars monetary damages for incidents during international air travel, including, as here, embarkation. Article 17 allows only for monetary compensation in cases of "“death or bodily injury of a passenger”" where "“the accident took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking”". And article 29 of the Montreal Convention provides that "“punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable”". . Berenguer v. Sata Internacional - Azores Airlines, S.A.
In Berenguer v. Sata Internacional - Azores Airlines, S.A. (Fed CA, 2023) the Federal Court of Appeal considers the Montreal Convention, here on the issue of whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction [under s.23 of the Federal Court Act] to ground a statutory cause of action:[69] The Federal Court provided another reason to strike out the amended statement of claim. It concluded that it is plain and obvious that the claim will fail because it is barred by the Montreal Convention.
[70] This issue primarily involves statutory interpretation and therefore is subject to review on the standard of correctness (TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman, 2019 SCC 19, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 144 at para. 30).
[71] Articles 19 and 29 of the Montreal Convention are central to this issue.Article 19
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures.
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage résultant d'un retard dans le transport aérien de passagers, de bagages ou de marchandises. Cependant, le transporteur n'est pas responsable du dommage causé par un retard s'il prouve que lui, ses préposés et mandataires ont pris toutes les mesures qui pouvaient raisonnablement s'imposer pour éviter le dommage, ou qu'il leur était impossible de les prendre.
Article 29
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.
Dans le transport de passagers, de bagages et de marchandises, toute action en dommages-intérêts, à quelque titre que ce soit, en vertu de la présente convention, en raison d'un contrat ou d'un acte illicite ou pour toute autre cause, ne peut être exercée que dans les conditions et limites de responsabilité prévues par la présente convention, sans préjudice de la détermination des personnes qui ont le droit d'agir et de leurs droits respectifs. Dans toute action de ce genre, on ne pourra pas obtenir de dommages-intérêts punitifs ou exemplaires ni de dommages à un titre autre que la réparation. [72] The Federal Court determined that Articles 19 and 29 limit a claim for damages for flight delay to the actual damages incurred (reasons at para. 66). The motions judge stated that since the appellant does not allege that actual damages were sustained, the claim is barred by the Convention.
[73] At the hearing, the appellant raised several arguments in support of its view that the Montreal Convention does not bar the claim. It is likely that these issues raise sufficient doubt on the issue that it is not plain and obvious that the claim is barred.
[74] However, a decision of this Court released after the appeal was heard makes it clear that the Federal Court erred in finding that the claim was doomed to fail because of the Convention: International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency, 2022 FCA 211 [IATA], leave to appeal to SCC requested, file no. 40614.
[75] IATA concerns air passenger rights regulations that deal with flight delays. They came into force in 2019. The issue before the Court was whether this law is contrary to the Montreal Convention. In a decision written by de Montigny J.A., this Court determined that the Convention does not prohibit Canada from introducing laws that provide standardized compensation for flight delays.
[76] In the course of its detailed reasons, the Court considered the impact of the Convention on a claim for breach of contract relating to obligations under the regulations. The Court concluded that the claim would not run afoul of the Convention (IATA at paras. 133, 135-141). . International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency
In International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency (Fed CA, 2022) the Federal Court of Appeal considered whether 'Ministerial Directions' under the Canada Transportation Act and related Regulations violated the Warsaw Convention, and it's successor the Montreal Convention, treaties addressing international aviation:[4] The appellants challenge numerous provisions of the new Regulations on the basis that they exceed the Agency’s authority under the CTA. They claim that the regulations contravene Canada’s international obligations under the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 12 October 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (the Warsaw Convention), its successor the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 28 May 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 (the Montreal Convention), and the Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26 (the CAA). They also allege that many of the Regulations’ provisions are ultra vires because they have impermissible extraterritorial effects, which violate fundamental notions of international law. Finally, the appellants challenge the Minister’s Direction on the basis that it exceeds the limitations imposed by its enabling statute . International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency
In International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency (Fed CA, 2022) the Federal Court of Appeal considers the relation between the "Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 28 May 1999", 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 (the Montreal Convention) and the federal Carriage By Air Act:[80] It is no doubt true that subsection 2(2.1) of the CAA which generally incorporates the provisions of the Montreal Convention insofar as they relate to "“the rights and liabilities”" of various actors involved in air transportation, is on its face less precise than the detailed obligations and compensation provided for by section 86.11 of the CTA. Subsection 2(2.1) of the CAA is only meant to be a short hand reference to the various provisions of the Montreal Convention dealing with the rights and liabilities of carriers, passengers and other persons covered by the Convention, not a full-fledged description of these rights and liabilities. For that, one must refer to the Convention itself. And the Convention can hardly be said to be less specific than the CTA. These quotes also contain an extensive review of the Montreal Convention [at para 93-111].
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