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Cabinet - Lobbyists Registration Act (LRA)

. Democracy Watch v. Ontario (Integrity Commissioner)

In Democracy Watch v. Ontario (Integrity Commissioner) (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here from "a motion to quash nine judicial review applications" which was grounded on lack of public interest standing.

Here the court summarizes the Lobbyists Registration Act:
The Statutory Scheme: The Lobbyists Registration Act

[7] The LRA regulates lobbyists in Ontario. It provides a set of rules that lobbyists must follow. This includes s. 3.4, which prohibits a lobbyist from knowingly placing a public office holder in a conflict of interest.

[8] The LRA also establishes a process, overseen by the Commissioner pursuant to s. 10, for investigation and discipline if a lobbyist is found to have contravened the statute: see ss. 17.1-17.12. The Commissioner has discretion pursuant to s. 17.1(1) to conduct an investigation to determine if any person has not complied with the LRA. Pursuant to s. 17.1(3), the Commissioner may cease such an investigation “for any reason” (emphasis added), including where the Commissioner believes that “the matter is minor or trivial” or where it would not be useful to continue because of delay. As the language indicates, these powers are discretionary.

[9] The Commissioner must give notice to a lobbyist if they believe the lobbyist has not complied with the LRA, along with reasons for this belief, and must give the lobbyist a reasonable opportunity to be heard regarding the alleged non-compliance and any penalty that could be imposed: s. 17.5(1). If the Commissioner ultimately finds there was non-compliance, they must give notice to the lobbyist of that finding, any penalty that will be imposed (pursuant to s. 17.9, discussed below), and the reasons for these findings: s. 17.6(1). The lobbyist then has 15 days to request that the Commissioner reconsider the finding of non-compliance or penalty: s. 17.7(1). If this request is made, then s. 17.7(3) requires the Commissioner to reconsider the decision and give notice of the outcome to the lobbyist. Section 17.8 also provides the lobbyist with a right to apply for judicial review from the finding of non-compliance or penalty within 60 days after receiving notice.

[10] Section 17.9(1) gives the Commissioner discretion to impose a penalty if the Commissioner is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, among other considerations. This penalty can be one or both of prohibiting that person from lobbying for up to two years or publicizing certain information, including the lobbyist’s name.

[11] In general, subject to certain exceptions in the LRA, the existence of an investigation and any information obtained during the investigation is confidential: s. 17.10. There is, however, certain information that must be published in the Commissioner’s Annual Report, including: the number of investigations commenced, conducted, or resumed during the year; the number of matters the Commissioner refused to investigate; a summarized description of each investigation concluded or resumed during the year; and any other information relevant to the administration of the LRA, the public disclosure of which the Commissioner believes to be in the public interest: s. 17.12.

[12] In addition to this formal investigative process, the Commissioner occasionally resolves matters through an informal process, the purpose of which is to achieve compliance without using the statutory investigative resources that are better focused on more serious breaches of the LRA.

[13] In summary, the LRA gives the Commissioner broad discretion in exercising their investigative and disciplinary powers. Given that most of the information the Commissioner relies on in exercising this discretion is confidential, the LRA provides for little public insight into why the Commissioner exercises this discretion the way they do or how the Commissioner arrives at decisions under these provisions.



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Last modified: 03-03-25
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