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Charter - s.2(a) Freedom of Religion
MORE CASES
Part 2
. Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General)
In Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General) (SCC, 2024) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed an appeal, that from a Quebec CA allowing an appeal, that from a Quebec Superior Court granting of a JR, that from a Ministerial "decision to deny an exemption sought by a private, Catholic school" from a mandatory "Program on Ethics and Religious Culture (ERC)" where the Minister "based her decision on the fact that the school’s whole proposed program was to be taught from a Catholic perspective".
The court considers the meaning of the term 'equivalent', here in this state-balancing religious education context:[49] With this context in mind, we turn to assessing the Minister’s decision in order to determine whether it proportionately balanced religious freedom with the statutory objectives of the ERC Program.
[50] I begin with an analysis of the statutory objectives at stake. Under s. 22 of the Regulation respecting the application of the Act respecting private education, the Minister is required to grant exemptions from the mandatory program when a school offers an “equivalent” program. The starting point for the analysis of the statutory objectives is interpreting the meaning of “equivalent”, taking into account the words of the provision in this regulatory context, the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament: Elmer A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (1974), at p. 67; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21.
[51] This regulatory context concerns the minimum educational attainments required of students in private and public schools across Quebec. Quebec seeks to ensure that students who graduate with a provincially approved secondary school diploma demonstrate the knowledge and competencies they need to be productive members of society, and that schools granting secondary school diplomas facilitate the realization of these skills. In particular, the Minister has a statutory responsibility to adopt measures that will contribute to individuals’ education and development, and to ensure that educational institutions offer services of sufficient quality: An Act respecting the Ministère de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport, CQLR, c. M-15, s. 2.
[52] To this end, under the Basic school regulation for preschool, elementary and secondary education, Quebec prescribes the compulsory subjects that must be taught each year and sets out minimum requirements for the instructional hours to be accorded to each subject: ss. 23 and 23.1. The Minister also has the power to set out core course objectives and content, establish curricula to teach these core subjects, as well as allow for optional content that can be customized according to the needs of students: Education Act, s. 461. The mandatory curricula must be taught in private as well as public schools: An Act respecting private education, ss. 25 and 32. Finally, the regulatory scheme also requires all private educational institutions to hold a permit to operate, which enables the Minister to ensure that all private schools are complying with the general regulatory framework it has set out: An Act respecting private education, s. 10.
[53] The power to grant exemptions from the mandatory curriculum in cases where a school offers an “equivalent” program is part of the Minister’s broader regulatory role of ensuring that basic educational standards are met by schools and students alike. As a result, in order to be consistent with the scheme as a whole, the Minister’s interpretation of which programs are “equivalent” should take into account the objectives each course seeks to meet and the competencies it seeks to inculcate in students.
[54] At the same time, however, there would be little point in offering an exemption if, in order to receive it, the proposed alternative program had to be identical to the mandatory program in every way. The exemption exists in a regulatory scheme that anticipates and sanctions the existence of private denominational schools. And the preamble to An Act respecting the Ministère de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport, which sets out the Minister’s powers, recognizes that parents have the right to choose establishments that, according to their own convictions, best respect the rights of their children. In order to respect values of religious freedom in this context, as well as to cohere with the larger regulatory scheme, a reasonable interpretation of the process for granting exemptions from the mandatory curriculum would leave at least some room for the religious character of those schools. The regulation providing for such exemptions would otherwise operate to prevent what the Act respecting private education itself allows — a private school being denominational.
[55] Although it prescribes some course content, the documentation describing the ERC Program does not set out detailed lesson plans that teachers are required to cover. The program is instead structured to be flexible and thematic, providing only a general framework to guide students in developing competencies in ethics, dialogue and religious culture, in service of the two key objectives of the program: the recognition of others and the pursuit of the common good.
[56] Given the highly flexible nature of the ERC Program and its heavy emphasis on these two objectives, as well as the context of the regulatory scheme as a whole, it is unreasonable to interpret equivalence as requiring a strict adherence to specific course content, rather than in terms of the ERC’s program objectives generally. Using the program’s objectives as the marker for equivalence leaves the necessary flexibility for the possibility of acceptable differences between an alternative program and the ERC Program, including differences that can accommodate religious freedom. As long as the alternative program substantially realizes the objectives of the ERC Program, it should be considered equivalent. The Minister’s task was therefore to arrive at a decision that proportionately balanced the realization of the ERC Program’s objectives of promoting respect for others and openness to diversity, with respect for Charter-protected religious freedom in this context.
[57] The information that was before the Minister when she made her decision about Loyola’s proposed alternative program consisted of two letters requesting the exemption and a three-page proposed curriculum document. Based on these documents, the Minister identified a number of key differences between the two programs. The crucial difference, however, was the religious nature of Loyola’s program. Loyola proposed an alternative program that would focus on Catholic precepts and ethics, and discuss other belief systems from a Catholic perspective. Its main goal, as the Minister’s representative noted in her letter dated November 13, 2008, was the “transmission of Catholic beliefs and convictions”. As this letter to Loyola makes clear, in the Minister’s view, a program that departs in any way from the ERC Program’s posture of strict neutrality, even partially, cannot achieve the state’s objectives of promoting respect for others and openness to diversity. This was also the position that Quebec took before this Court.
[58] The Minister’s decision necessarily engages religious freedom. The starting point, and the inspiration for most of this Court’s subsequent jurisprudence about religious freedom, is R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, where Dickson J. (as he then was), writing for the majority, articulated his visionary approach to freedom of religion:The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than that.
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint. . . . Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit alternative courses of conduct available to others. Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices. Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.
What may appear good and true to a majoritarian religious group, or to the state acting at their behest, may not, for religious reasons, be imposed upon citizens who take a contrary view. The Charter safeguards religious minorities from the threat of “the tyranny of the majority”. [Emphasis added; pp. 336-37.] [59] Justice Dickson’s formulation of religious freedom is founded on the idea that no one can be forced to adhere to or refrain from a particular set of religious beliefs. This includes both the individual and collective aspects of religious belief: Hutterian Brethren, at paras. 31, 130 and 182; R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., 1986 CanLII 12 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at p. 781. In the words of Justice LeBel: “Religion is about religious beliefs, but also about religious relationships” (Hutterian Brethren, at para. 182).
[60] Religious freedom under the Charter must therefore account for the socially embedded nature of religious belief, and the deep linkages between this belief and its manifestation through communal institutions and traditions: Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli and Lawrence David, “Whence a nexus with religion? Religious institutionalism in a Canadian context”, forthcoming, at p. 2; Dieter Grimm, “Conflicts Between General Laws and Religious Norms” (2009), 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2369, at p. 2373. To fail to recognize this dimension of religious belief would be to “effectively denigrate those religions in which more emphasis is placed on communal worship or other communal religious activities”: Dwight Newman, Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights held by Groups (2011), at p. 78. See also Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995), at p. 105.
[61] These collective aspects of religious freedom — in this case, the collective manifestation and transmission of Catholic beliefs through a private denominational school — are a crucial part of Loyola’s claim. In S.L., this Court held that the imposition of the ERC Program in public schools did not impose limits on the religious freedom of individual students and parents. This case, however, can be distinguished from S.L. because Loyola is a private religious institution created to support the collective practice of Catholicism and the transmission of the Catholic faith. The question is not only how Loyola is required to teach about other religions, but also how it is asked to teach about the very faith that animates its character and the comparative relationship between Catholicism and other faiths. The Minister’s decision therefore demonstrably interferes with the manner in which the members of an institution formed for the very purpose of transmitting Catholicism, can teach and learn about the Catholic faith. This engages religious freedom protected under s. 2(a) of the Charter.
[62] I agree with Loyola that the Minister’s decision had a serious impact on religious freedom in this context. To tell a Catholic school how to explain its faith undermines the liberty of the members of its community who have chosen to give effect to the collective dimension of their religious beliefs by participating in a denominational school.
[63] As Justice Dickson observed in Big M Drug Mart, “whatever else freedom of conscience and religion may mean, it must at the very least mean this: government may not coerce individuals to affirm a specific religious belief or to manifest a specific religious practice for a sectarian purpose” (p. 347). Although the state’s purpose here is secular, requiring Loyola’s teachers to take a neutral posture even about Catholicism means that the state is telling them how to teach the very religion that animates Loyola’s identity. It amounts to requiring a Catholic institution to speak about Catholicism in terms defined by the state rather than by its own understanding of Catholicism.
[64] It also interferes with the rights of parents to transmit the Catholic faith to their children, not because it requires neutral discussion of other faiths and ethical systems, but because it prevents a Catholic discussion of Catholicism. This ignores the fact that an essential ingredient of the vitality of a religious community is the ability of its members to pass on their beliefs to their children, whether through instruction in the home or participation in communal institutions.
[65] This principle has received wide recognition in international human rights instruments. Article 18(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, for example, protects the rights of parents to guide their children’s religious upbringing:The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. [66] Though not relied on by Loyola in this case, s. 41 of the Quebec Charter also protects the rights of parents to guide their children’s religious upbringing:Parents or the persons acting in their stead have a right to give their children a religious and moral education in keeping with their convictions and with proper regard for their children’s rights and interests. [67] Ultimately, measures which undermine the character of lawful religious institutions and disrupt the vitality of religious communities represent a profound interference with religious freedom.
[68] There is, on the other hand, insufficient demonstrable benefit to the furtherance of the state’s objectives in requiring Loyola’s teachers to teach Catholicism from a neutral perspective. In her letter dated November 13, 2008 explaining her decision to deny Loyola’s exemption, the Minister sets out her reasons for rejecting Loyola’s proposed alternative curriculum:[translation]
. ... The approach to and the conception of the common good developed in the Ethics and Religious Culture program [and those] proposed by Loyola High School are very different. . . . [T]he program proposed by Loyola . . . is based on the Catholic faith and its main goal is the transmission of Catholic beliefs and convictions.
. ... the ethics aspect of the program proposed by Loyola . . . focuses on the teaching of moral reference points laid down by the Catholic Church.
. ... the program does not meet the requirements for the Ethics and Religious Culture program in terms of religious culture, as religions are studied in connection with the Catholic religion.
. ... the . . . program does not lead the student to reflect on the common good, or on ethical issues, but rather to adopt the Jesuit perspective of Christian service. These passages reflect the central problems with the Minister’s decision: it treats teaching any part of the proposed alternative program from a Catholic perspective as necessarily inimical to the state’s core objectives in imposing the ERC Program and it gives no weight to the values of religious freedom engaged by the decision. There is, in short, no balancing of freedom of religion in relation to the statutory objectives. The result is a disproportionate outcome that does not protect Charter values as fully as possible in light of those statutory objectives.
[69] In the Quebec context, where private denominational schools are authorized, forcing a religious school to teach its own religion from a non-religious perspective does not assist in realizing the ERC Program’s basic curricular goals of encouraging among students respect for others and openness to others. The Minister’s decision suggests that engagement with an individual’s own religion on his or her own terms can simply be presumed to impair respect for others. This assumption runs counter to the objectives of the regulatory scheme as a whole and it has a disproportionate impact on the values underlying religious freedom in this context. This necessarily renders the Minister’s decision unreasonable.
[70] The disproportionate nature of this decision is reinforced by the fact that the Minister’s decision effectively prohibits Loyola from teaching about Catholic ethics from a Catholic perspective. Catholic doctrine and Catholic ethics are simply too intertwined to make it possible to teach one from a religious perspective and the other neutrally. More to the point, there is no reason to distinguish between the two when it comes to religious freedom. In both cases, preventing Loyola from teaching Catholicism seriously impairs its Catholic identity.
[71] Loyola, as previously noted, conceded before this Court that it was prepared to teach the first competency — world religions other than Catholicism — from a neutral perspective. It sought, however, to be exempt from teaching the ethics of other religions from a neutral perspective, and proposed instead to do so from a Catholic perspective. Unlike my colleagues in their concurring opinion, however, I agree with the Court of Appeal that requiring Loyola to teach about the ethics of other religions in a neutral, historical and phenomenological way would not interfere disproportionately with the relevant Charter protections implicated by the decision. Justice Deschamps’s admonition that exposing children to a variety of religious facts does not, in itself, infringe on their parents’ religious freedom remains compelling in a denominational school: S.L., at para. 40. I agree with her that in a multicultural society, it is not a breach of anyone’s freedom of religion to be required to learn (or teach) about the doctrines and ethics of other world religions in a neutral and respectful way. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (CanLII), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at paras. 46 and 48.
[72] But what does it mean to teach about the ethics of other religions in a “neutral” and “objective” way in the context of a religious school that is permitted to teach its own religion and ethics from a religious perspective? My starting point is that in a religious high school, where students are learning about the precepts of one particular faith throughout their education, it is arguably even more important that they learn, in as objective a way as possible, about other belief systems and the reasons underlying those beliefs.
[73] I quickly acknowledge that in a religious school, teaching other ethical frameworks in a neutral way may be a delicate exercise. A school like Loyola must be allowed some flexibility as it navigates these difficult moments. Catholicism’s answer to ethical questions, for instance, will sometimes conflict with the approach taken by the ethics of other religions. It would be surprising if, in classes discussing other belief systems, students did not ask for comparative explanations, questions Loyola’s teachers are clearly free to answer. A comparative approach that explains the Catholic ethical perspective and responds to questions about it is of course legitimate.
[74] But the fact that there are difficulties in implementation does not mean the state should be required to throw up its hands and abandon its objectives. Those objectives are not only of immense public importance, they are also, as this Court confirmed in S.L., constitutional. Pursuing them in a religious school may require the Minister to accept some adjustments to the program to make it align with the school’s religious character, but these adjustments need not mean the wholesale replacement of objective explications of other religions’ ethical systems with a program that frames its discussion of ethics primarily through the moral lens of a school’s religious perspective.
[75] The alternative program that Loyola submitted to the Minister would teach other ethical frameworks primarily through the lens of Catholic ethics and morality. Even if Loyola’s teachers do so respectfully, this fundamentally transforms the ethics component of the ERC Program from a study of different ethical approaches into a class on Catholicism. The resulting risk is that other religions would necessarily be seen not as differently legitimate belief systems, but as worthy of respect only to the extent that they aligned with the tenets of Catholicism. This contradicts the ERC Program’s goal of ensuring respect for those whose religious beliefs are different, a goal no less worthy in a religious school than in a public one.
[76] The key is in how the discussion is framed. An emphasis on objective instruction insofar as possible, and on teaching other ethical positions in their own right, does not mean stifling debate or denying Loyola’s Catholic identity. On the contrary, the framework of the discussions would be wider because they are not based solely on a particular religion’s perspective. That religion’s own ethical framework would necessarily be part of the discussion, but the role will be one of significant participant rather than hegemonic tutor.
[77] There is no doubt that this will not always be easy. The question is, given the undisputed significance of the ERC Program’s objectives, can requiring Loyola’s teachers to teach and discuss other religions and their ethical positions as objectively as possible really be seen as a serious interference with freedom of religion merely because it may be difficult to execute neatly?
[78] I have difficulty seeing how this can undermine the values of religious freedom. I do not dispute that the belief systems Loyola’s teachers are required to explain to their students may not reflect their personal beliefs, or Loyola’s institutional allegiances. But teaching about the ethics of other religions is largely a factual exercise. It need not be a clash of values. Nor is asking Loyola’s teachers to teach other religions and ethical positions as objectively as possible a requirement that they shed their own beliefs. It is, instead, a pedagogical tool utilized by good teachers for centuries — let the information, not the personal views of the teacher, guide the discussion. The fact that those personal principles are not central when discussing the ethical principles of other religions does not mean that the Loyola teacher is silenced, or forced to forego his own beliefs, or even appears to be doing so. It also does not mean that Loyola’s teachers are foreclosed from explaining the Catholic perspective and its differences from other faiths.
[79] In any event, it is the Minister’s decision as a whole that must reflect a proportionate and therefore reasonable balancing of the Charter protections and statutory objectives in issue. It does not, in my respectful view, because it rests on the assumption that a confessional program cannot achieve the objectives of the ERC Program. This assumption led the Minister to a decision that does not, overall, strike a proportionate balance between the Charter protections and statutory objectives at stake in this case. It is, with respect, unreasonable as a result.
[80] This is not to suggest, however, that in a religious school, the Minister is required to allow the ERC Program — a program that is framed as a tool to teach students about different world religions and ethical beliefs — to be replaced by a program that focuses on that religion’s doctrine and morality. To ask a religious school’s teachers to discuss other religions and their ethical beliefs as objectively as possible does not seriously harm the values underlying religious freedom. These features of the ERC Program are essential to achieving its objectives. But preventing a school like Loyola from teaching and discussing Catholicism in any part of the program from its own perspective does little to further those objectives while at the same time seriously interfering with the values underlying religious freedom. . Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General) [secularism]
In Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General) (SCC, 2024) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed an appeal, that from a Quebec CA allowing an appeal, that from a Quebec Superior Court granting of a JR, that from a Ministerial "decision to deny an exemption sought by a private, Catholic school" from a mandatory "Program on Ethics and Religious Culture (ERC)" where the Minister "based her decision on the fact that the school’s whole proposed program was to be taught from a Catholic perspective".
Here the court (interestingly) considers the religion-relevant issue of state secularism:[43] The context before us — state regulation of religious schools — poses the question of how to balance robust protection for the values underlying religious freedom with the values of a secular state. Part of secularism, however, is respect for religious differences. A secular state does not — and cannot — interfere with the beliefs or practices of a religious group unless they conflict with or harm overriding public interests. Nor can a secular state support or prefer the practices of one group over those of another: Richard Moon, “Freedom of Religion Under the Charter of Rights: The Limits of State Neutrality” (2012), 45 U.B.C. L. Rev. 497, at pp. 498-99. The pursuit of secular values means respecting the right to hold and manifest different religious beliefs. A secular state respects religious differences, it does not seek to extinguish them.
[44] Through this form of neutrality, the state affirms and recognizes the religious freedom of individuals and their communities. As Prof. Moon noted:Underlying the [state] neutrality requirement, and the insulation of religious beliefs and practices from political decision making, is a conception of religious belief or commitment as deeply rooted, as an element of the individual’s identity, rather than simply a choice or judgment she or he has made. Religious belief lies at the core of the individual’s worldview. It orients the individual in the world, shapes his or her perception of the social and natural orders, and provides a moral framework for his or her actions. Moreover, religious belief ties the individual to a community of believers and is often the central or defining association in her or his life. The individual believer participates in a shared system of practices and values that may, in some cases, be described as “a way of life”. If religion is an aspect of the individual’s identity, then when the state treats his or her religious practices or beliefs as less important or less true than the practices of others, or when it marginalizes her or his religious community in some way, it is not simply rejecting the individual’s views and values, it is denying her or his equal worth. [Footnote omitted; p. 507.] [45] Because it allows communities with different values and practices to peacefully co-exist, a secular state also supports pluralism. The European Court of Human Rights recognized the relationship between religious freedom, secularism and pluralism in Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A No. 260-A, a case about a Jehovah’s Witness who had been repeatedly arrested for violating Greece’s ban on proselytism. Concluding that the claimant’s Article 9 rights to religious freedom had been violated, the court wrote:As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. [p. 17] See also Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, No. 45701/99, ECHR 2001-XII.
[46] This does not mean that religious differences trump core national values. On the contrary, as this Court observed in Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54 (CanLII), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607:Not all differences are compatible with Canada’s fundamental values and, accordingly, not all barriers to their expression are arbitrary. Determining when the assertion of a right based on difference must yield to a more pressing public interest is a complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright-line application. It is, at the same time, a delicate necessity for protecting the evolutionary integrity of both multiculturalism and public confidence in its importance. [para. 2] Or, as the Bouchard-Taylor report observed:A democratic, liberal State cannot be indifferent to certain core values, especially basic human rights, the equality of all citizens before the law, and popular sovereignty. These are the constituent values of our political system and they provide its foundation. (Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation (2008), at p. 134)
[47] These shared values — equality, human rights and democracy — are values the state always has a legitimate interest in promoting and protecting. They enhance the conditions for integration and points of civic solidarity by helping connect us despite our differences: Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere” (2006), 14 Eur. J. of Philos. 1, at p. 5. This is what makes pluralism work. As McLachlin J. noted in Adler v. Ontario, 1996 CanLII 148 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (dissenting in part), “[a] multicultural multireligious society can only work . . . if people of all groups understand and tolerate each other”: para. 212. Religious freedom must therefore be understood in the context of a secular, multicultural and democratic society with a strong interest in protecting dignity and diversity, promoting equality, and ensuring the vitality of a common belief in human rights.
[48] The state, therefore, has a legitimate interest in ensuring that students in all schools are capable, as adults, of conducting themselves with openness and respect as they confront cultural and religious differences. A pluralist, multicultural democracy depends on the capacity of its citizens “to engage in thoughtful and inclusive forms of deliberation amidst, and enriched by,” different religious worldviews and practices: Benjamin L. Berger, “Religious Diversity, Education, and the ‘Crisis’ in State Neutrality” (2014), 29 C.J.L.S. 103, at p. 115. . Alexander v. Renfrew County Catholic District School Board ['faithism']
In Alexander v. Renfrew County Catholic District School Board (Div Court, 2024) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a JR, here of "a decision of the Suspension and Exclusion Appeals Committee of the Renfrew County Catholic District School Board which denied four appeals by the applicant ... from suspension and exclusion orders".
Here the court considers practical limits of Charter s.2(a) religious freedoms, and similar HRC creed rights:[63] The Committee expressly recognized both the applicant’s freedom of belief but also his ability to express those beliefs and it gave examples of how he could do that. However, it also recognized that there are limits on freedoms. While it may not have expressed itself in the way that the Supreme Court of Canada did in Amselem [SS: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47], the Committee’s reasons as a whole show that it amply applied the principles expressed in Amselem at para. 61:In this respect, it should be emphasized that not every action will become summarily unassailable and receive automatic protection under the banner of freedom of religion. No right, including freedom of religion, is absolute: see, e.g., Big M, supra; P. (D.) v. S. (C.), 1993 CanLII 35 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141, at p. 182; B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, 1995 CanLII 115 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at para. 226; Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 2001 SCC 31, at para. 29. This is so because we live in a society of individuals in which we must always take the rights of others into account. In the words of John Stuart Mill: “The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it”: On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government (1946), at p. 11. In the real world, oftentimes the fundamental rights of individuals will conflict or compete with one another. [63] This distinction was recently confirmed in a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which quoted Volpe v. Wong-Tam, 2023 ONCA 680, 487 D.L.R. (4th) 158, leave to appeal refused, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 41041, at para. 42 as follows:The problem with the appellants’ articles was not that they took a position adverse to that of LGBTQ2S+ advocates with respect to Roman Catholic doctrine and education about sexuality. The problem was that they “used derogatory and prejudicial language” to do so, using stereotypes of “predation, pedophilia, and socially destructive behaviour.” This was the aspect of the appellants’ speech that exposed them to the complaint that they expressed discriminatory statements.
Del Grande v. Toronto Catholic District School Board, 2024 ONCA 769 at para.40.
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